Spanair accident at Madrid
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I have laboured through the last 500 odd posts but may still have missed it.
An engine FIRE does not necessarily mean a loss of thrust, usual drill - cancel the bell, continue climb to 400', carry out fire drills and assess the situation, usually an immediate return. An explosive failure accompanied by a fire would be different and not only cause an immediate loss of thrust but if the rotating parts also seize then the torque and yaw effect of the sudden power failure on one side will be considerably increased. The mis identification of a fire, (no loss of thrust), with a failure and a subsequent rudder input, especially at low speed/height, could well prove disastrous, but we don't know, do we?
Once again, sorry if this aspect has already been covered but I missed it.
An engine FIRE does not necessarily mean a loss of thrust, usual drill - cancel the bell, continue climb to 400', carry out fire drills and assess the situation, usually an immediate return. An explosive failure accompanied by a fire would be different and not only cause an immediate loss of thrust but if the rotating parts also seize then the torque and yaw effect of the sudden power failure on one side will be considerably increased. The mis identification of a fire, (no loss of thrust), with a failure and a subsequent rudder input, especially at low speed/height, could well prove disastrous, but we don't know, do we?
Once again, sorry if this aspect has already been covered but I missed it.
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Fire Vs explosive failure
I agree that a fire alone would not create any loss of thrust and there would therefore be no immediate reason to abort take off. However, we do not yet know, if there was afire, what was the cause.
The report of wheel tracks off the runway add weight to my theory that the aircraft landed back on the tarmac and then suffered loss of control authority - for whatever reason. Did the stb clamshell activate alone with no thrust on the port side or did the port clamshell fail to operate as both engines were being used with reversers in an attempt to arrest the aircraft?
The topography at Madrid seems to have contributed to the break up of the aircraft in the 'ravine'. Had it skidded acorss flat fields and even wiped off the undercarriage I would be suprised if the force involved would have resulted in complete break up- there is plenty of evidence to suggest not.
So the crew perhaps took the correct action but then went off a cliff, whilst still within the airport perimeter - tragic!
The report of wheel tracks off the runway add weight to my theory that the aircraft landed back on the tarmac and then suffered loss of control authority - for whatever reason. Did the stb clamshell activate alone with no thrust on the port side or did the port clamshell fail to operate as both engines were being used with reversers in an attempt to arrest the aircraft?
The topography at Madrid seems to have contributed to the break up of the aircraft in the 'ravine'. Had it skidded acorss flat fields and even wiped off the undercarriage I would be suprised if the force involved would have resulted in complete break up- there is plenty of evidence to suggest not.
So the crew perhaps took the correct action but then went off a cliff, whilst still within the airport perimeter - tragic!
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Choumeur,
Mange le fromage and enjoy the posts without insulting others. IT IS an opinion and not a conclusion.These two words have different meanings...
Not an Einstein
Mange le fromage and enjoy the posts without insulting others. IT IS an opinion and not a conclusion.These two words have different meanings...
Not an Einstein
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Reference Iberian crew's comments above - have I got this right? 
I'd somehow assumed that the aircraft had left the airfield. Not so - it seems. From Iberia, it came to rest between the runways. Northern end of 36L is at 1,995 feet AMSL. The gulley between the runways is, at its lowest, 1,925 feet. Leave the runway and you're straight into a 70 foot gully! To my simple mind that is in no way an airfield.
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I'd somehow assumed that the aircraft had left the airfield. Not so - it seems. From Iberia, it came to rest between the runways. Northern end of 36L is at 1,995 feet AMSL. The gulley between the runways is, at its lowest, 1,925 feet. Leave the runway and you're straight into a 70 foot gully! To my simple mind that is in no way an airfield.
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Airline engineer, not aircrew, a bit puzzled.
Given that aircraft will, on occasion, leave the runway for a variety of possible reasons, and sometimes at high speed, why is anyone surprised that an incident turns into a disaster when a "small ravine" gets in the way? What is that "small ravine" doing there?
Would I be wrong in stating that this is not the only recent accident that ended much more badly than it might otherwise have done because of what it encountered after leaving the runway? That A340 at Toronto went into a ditch, burned and everyone involved was very lucky. I believe that was the second time that, that scenario unfolded at Toronto.
What are the airport regulations on quality of terrain, covering of drainage ditches, gulleys, hummocks, trees, roads, fences etc. What I would like to see is a large expanse of soft sand, covered drainage culverts and short grass (long grass burns too much). Why is this sort of thing not as obvious as having fire engines?
Given that aircraft will, on occasion, leave the runway for a variety of possible reasons, and sometimes at high speed, why is anyone surprised that an incident turns into a disaster when a "small ravine" gets in the way? What is that "small ravine" doing there?
Would I be wrong in stating that this is not the only recent accident that ended much more badly than it might otherwise have done because of what it encountered after leaving the runway? That A340 at Toronto went into a ditch, burned and everyone involved was very lucky. I believe that was the second time that, that scenario unfolded at Toronto.
What are the airport regulations on quality of terrain, covering of drainage ditches, gulleys, hummocks, trees, roads, fences etc. What I would like to see is a large expanse of soft sand, covered drainage culverts and short grass (long grass burns too much). Why is this sort of thing not as obvious as having fire engines?
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Spanish media says that the airport tapes shows that apparently they used more runway than usual, climbed about 50m, with no visible sign of engine fire but with an attitude that indicates less available power than required. It banks to the right, the right wing touches the ground and they lost control.
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forget... Yes - known since shortly after accident it's in the gully between the runways...
You say "it should not be allowed" but why? Runoff areas are specified - but in general in line with the runway. At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...
NoD
You say "it should not be allowed" but why? Runoff areas are specified - but in general in line with the runway. At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...
NoD
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Does anyone have any idea where this extended and locked (?) reverser ended up? I don't see any blacktop within 2,000 feet of the ravine.
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I'm becoming even more baffled. The fire trucks couldn't reach part of the airfield between the runways because of terrain and scrub.
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Why is this sort of thing not as obvious as having fire engines?
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Airfield topo
I agree a ravine between two runways is a bit extreme but how far out do you make everything flat? If this happened at LHR on 27L then you would end up in T5!
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[QUOTE]At many airports, where at ran off, it would be in a terminal - indeed, would be so at the other end of 36...[/QUOTE]
Not so. 18 is never used for take offs - we're told.
And terminals are a necessity. Ravines - not welcome.
Not so. 18 is never used for take offs - we're told.
And terminals are a necessity. Ravines - not welcome.
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in light of the new video:
a couple of ideas in light of the new video:
is it possible that the mx staff pulled the wrong circuit breaker while placing whatever system on "mel", somehow disabling the flap/slat/takeoff configuration warning system, and that the pilots somehow didn't set the flaps/slats properly? (think detroit)
is it possible that the engine power was not properly set to desired thrust?
did the pilots, when faced with problem, firewall the throttles?
a takeoff stall recovery is firewall power/slats/flaps 15 (or in the md 80, to the dial a flap detent I think)
is it possible that the mx staff pulled the wrong circuit breaker while placing whatever system on "mel", somehow disabling the flap/slat/takeoff configuration warning system, and that the pilots somehow didn't set the flaps/slats properly? (think detroit)
is it possible that the engine power was not properly set to desired thrust?
did the pilots, when faced with problem, firewall the throttles?
a takeoff stall recovery is firewall power/slats/flaps 15 (or in the md 80, to the dial a flap detent I think)
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I'm sure we'd all love to see runways which are 10km long and wide (which have the advantage of being used in any wind direction), but it simply won't fit in most locations (with the exception of maybe DEN) and would be way to expensive. Indeed most airports will have buildings, roads or even other active runways there instead of trees and ravines.
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Air Traffic Controller - retired.
Airfield Safeguarding Criteria cover a range of issues, including vertical obstacles and frangible items within designated distances of the RW centre-line and end zones. I can't remember any of the numbers now, but essentially the criteria provide a degree of protection for any ac departing the RW pavement, and include an element of "reinforced grass" adjacent to the RW. They are not, however, intended to cover situations where an aircraft substantially departs the operating surfaces.
In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?
Airfield Safeguarding Criteria cover a range of issues, including vertical obstacles and frangible items within designated distances of the RW centre-line and end zones. I can't remember any of the numbers now, but essentially the criteria provide a degree of protection for any ac departing the RW pavement, and include an element of "reinforced grass" adjacent to the RW. They are not, however, intended to cover situations where an aircraft substantially departs the operating surfaces.
In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?
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Forget's (and others) comments
On the ref'd comments on airport design, I would just like to let you know that LEMD follows the recomendations of ICAO Annex 14.
As forget's picture shows, there is a large FLAT area (actually 4350x300m) surrounding both runways, which is over the recomendation.
Te actual location of the crash can be seen here.
Gráficos en ELPAÍS.com
I am no airport design expert, but I now a flat area 4350x300m is a lot bigger AND wider than a lot of other airfields. It would have been better to have it 2000m wide as suggested, but in no way can it be said that LEMD is unsafe because of this: safety criteria is based on international recomendations, (which may or may not have to be amended a s aresult of this accident)
Do I need to remind you of the hundreds of international airports wtih a lot of bigger hazards surrounding the runway?
By the way: no, I am not connected in any way to that airport, other than as a user.
As forget's picture shows, there is a large FLAT area (actually 4350x300m) surrounding both runways, which is over the recomendation.
Te actual location of the crash can be seen here.
Gráficos en ELPAÍS.com
I am no airport design expert, but I now a flat area 4350x300m is a lot bigger AND wider than a lot of other airfields. It would have been better to have it 2000m wide as suggested, but in no way can it be said that LEMD is unsafe because of this: safety criteria is based on international recomendations, (which may or may not have to be amended a s aresult of this accident)
Do I need to remind you of the hundreds of international airports wtih a lot of bigger hazards surrounding the runway?
By the way: no, I am not connected in any way to that airport, other than as a user.
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Very little of Madrid is built between these runways.
If you have been to Spain recently and seen the hundreds of kilometres of perfectly smooth grading they have made to their autopista network in the last five years to link cities with key airports like this then it begs the question why was this terrain left with textural consequences?
If you have been to Spain recently and seen the hundreds of kilometres of perfectly smooth grading they have made to their autopista network in the last five years to link cities with key airports like this then it begs the question why was this terrain left with textural consequences?
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In a perfect world, given unlimited funds, the area within [pick your own distance] of the RW would be level and unobstructed. How far would you extend? How much of Madrid would you level in the process [or indeed the Bath Road adjacent to Heathrow]?
(Unless, of course, they're filling it in.
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I will admit I was looking more towards to the south-east of the airport ... where there appears [on Google Earth] to be a rather tiresome river and a lot of industrial buildings.
However, my point is more general: I say again ... how far does one go? and at what cost?
@ Forget ... I take your point. An "interesting" activity. However, well outside the safeguarding areas. Change [extend] the parameters and, world-wide, you would be bulldozing whole swathes of cities, motorways and other infrastructure [and filling in those lovely useful reservoirs west of LHR].
However, my point is more general: I say again ... how far does one go? and at what cost?
@ Forget ... I take your point. An "interesting" activity. However, well outside the safeguarding areas. Change [extend] the parameters and, world-wide, you would be bulldozing whole swathes of cities, motorways and other infrastructure [and filling in those lovely useful reservoirs west of LHR].
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EFATO
BIG BURD
The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures.
The above statement is not correct.
The crew did not contravene OPS procedures. The Emerald OPS manual clearly stated that it was at the captain's discretion to land back on if this was the safest option.
Whilst the HS748 is a Perf. A aircraft, the length of RW23 at STN was more than twice the accelerate/stop distance required at the WAT, and the take off was from the start of the runway, not an intersection.
The uncontained failure was a catastrophic event, depositing the turbine compressor wheel on the runway, the wheel had exited the cowling vertically severing fuel lines, hydraulics and fire protection system, spilling burning fuel over the wing an undercarriage. While the severe fire that followed was rapidly burning through the main spar. On the flightdeck, there was no fire warning, audible or visual, until the arcraft had safely landed back on the runway and just before the overrun onto the grass. All 46 pax and 4 crew walked away uninjured, hence the praise you refer to.
This is an identical incident with the same type of engine the Rolls Royce Dart
]The Transportation Safety Board of Canada report number H90001, Quebecair F27B CF-QBL Flight No 255[/B]Fatal accident at Quebec City Airport, 29 March 1979
The flight lasted 1min 12secs fourteen passengers and three crew died in the crash.
"At time 36 seconds(after brake release) there was a loud bang from the right engine as it disintegrated and a severe fire developed. The aircraft was at approximately 103 kts and 40 feet above the runway.
time 42 The captain started the engine failure/fire emergency drill.
At time 45 the tower controller who had noticed flames from the right engine advised flight 255 that the right engine was on fire and authorised them to land on any runway.
From time 50 to 1:05 the crew attempted to raise the landing gear which never came up.
The aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above the runway elevation and started a right turn, apparently in an attempt to complete a short circuit, remain visual and execute an emergency on the airport.
At time 1:14 the captain called for the propeller to be feathered. Up to this point the crew did not know that the right engine had separated at the first stage impeller and the forward section of the engine along with the forward section of the engine along with the propeller and some cowling had fallen onto the runway
At time 1:24 the No 1 fire bottle was fired and the aircraft continued in a right turn at about 100 feet above the terrain at a very low airspeed. The engine fire continued.
As the aircraft approached the College de Sacre Coeur, the angle of bank increased and the aircraft started to descend until impact.
Impact occured in a nose down, right wing low attitude at approximately 80 kts.
A fierce fire broke out and most of the fuselage forward of the wing was consumed by fire."
There but for the grace of God.
The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures.
The above statement is not correct.
The crew did not contravene OPS procedures. The Emerald OPS manual clearly stated that it was at the captain's discretion to land back on if this was the safest option.
Whilst the HS748 is a Perf. A aircraft, the length of RW23 at STN was more than twice the accelerate/stop distance required at the WAT, and the take off was from the start of the runway, not an intersection.
The uncontained failure was a catastrophic event, depositing the turbine compressor wheel on the runway, the wheel had exited the cowling vertically severing fuel lines, hydraulics and fire protection system, spilling burning fuel over the wing an undercarriage. While the severe fire that followed was rapidly burning through the main spar. On the flightdeck, there was no fire warning, audible or visual, until the arcraft had safely landed back on the runway and just before the overrun onto the grass. All 46 pax and 4 crew walked away uninjured, hence the praise you refer to.
This is an identical incident with the same type of engine the Rolls Royce Dart
]The Transportation Safety Board of Canada report number H90001, Quebecair F27B CF-QBL Flight No 255[/B]Fatal accident at Quebec City Airport, 29 March 1979
The flight lasted 1min 12secs fourteen passengers and three crew died in the crash.
"At time 36 seconds(after brake release) there was a loud bang from the right engine as it disintegrated and a severe fire developed. The aircraft was at approximately 103 kts and 40 feet above the runway.
time 42 The captain started the engine failure/fire emergency drill.
At time 45 the tower controller who had noticed flames from the right engine advised flight 255 that the right engine was on fire and authorised them to land on any runway.
From time 50 to 1:05 the crew attempted to raise the landing gear which never came up.
The aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above the runway elevation and started a right turn, apparently in an attempt to complete a short circuit, remain visual and execute an emergency on the airport.
At time 1:14 the captain called for the propeller to be feathered. Up to this point the crew did not know that the right engine had separated at the first stage impeller and the forward section of the engine along with the forward section of the engine along with the propeller and some cowling had fallen onto the runway
At time 1:24 the No 1 fire bottle was fired and the aircraft continued in a right turn at about 100 feet above the terrain at a very low airspeed. The engine fire continued.
As the aircraft approached the College de Sacre Coeur, the angle of bank increased and the aircraft started to descend until impact.
Impact occured in a nose down, right wing low attitude at approximately 80 kts.
A fierce fire broke out and most of the fuselage forward of the wing was consumed by fire."
There but for the grace of God.
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The MD-82
Just once more to clarify two important issues with an MD-82 takeoff in this particular scenario. I have already mentioned this in a previous post.
1. Madrid's runway 36L is 14271' long !
2. Given that length and given a collegues experience taking off from that runway, even at a gross TO weight of about 66 tons (given my personal guesstimate) the MD-82 would have taken of with between 2° and 3° of flaps and a rotation speed of close to 160 knots.
3. It is clear that even so the MD-82 did not even leave the airport perimeter. And that the MD-82 "appeared" to have encountered problems with still a lot of runway remaining.
4. If the crew made a derated TO, they would not have automatic emergency thrust applied as that (ART) system must be OFF when using TO FLEX.
5. Even though they did not have automatic emergency thrust, the ATR system should have set EPR G/A on the remaing engine if it was set below that EPR setting.
6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed as the MD-82 has conventional (auto)throttles.
7. Given the amount of energy they had at liftoff, the MD-82 would have no problem whatsoever in continuing it's takeoff engine failure profile.
8. For an MD-82 travelling at close 170 knots probably, it seems odd that it could not have gotten off to more than 20-50 m height.
9. The crew "appeared" to either have aborted after becoming airborne, or they encountered a deployed reverser at liftoff. Either one a far fetch. Let's hope all becomes clear in this matter.
Xander
1. Madrid's runway 36L is 14271' long !
2. Given that length and given a collegues experience taking off from that runway, even at a gross TO weight of about 66 tons (given my personal guesstimate) the MD-82 would have taken of with between 2° and 3° of flaps and a rotation speed of close to 160 knots.
3. It is clear that even so the MD-82 did not even leave the airport perimeter. And that the MD-82 "appeared" to have encountered problems with still a lot of runway remaining.
4. If the crew made a derated TO, they would not have automatic emergency thrust applied as that (ART) system must be OFF when using TO FLEX.
5. Even though they did not have automatic emergency thrust, the ATR system should have set EPR G/A on the remaing engine if it was set below that EPR setting.
6. A quick shove of the autothrottles would have given them emergency power (or even more) if needed as the MD-82 has conventional (auto)throttles.
7. Given the amount of energy they had at liftoff, the MD-82 would have no problem whatsoever in continuing it's takeoff engine failure profile.
8. For an MD-82 travelling at close 170 knots probably, it seems odd that it could not have gotten off to more than 20-50 m height.
9. The crew "appeared" to either have aborted after becoming airborne, or they encountered a deployed reverser at liftoff. Either one a far fetch. Let's hope all becomes clear in this matter.
Xander
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forget, the 'quarry' you refer to is, by the looks of it anyway, a remnant of the construction of the two runways, i.e. a depot, a yard where concrete was being made.
If you use Google Maps (not Google Earth), and you zoom out to 1000ft/200m, it appears to be part of a now-rerouted motorway/dual carriageway between the north-west and the south-east end of the airport (zoom out to 1km/1mi ratio, and you can see how that cleared bit merges with the southern end of 36R, and naturally appears to continue to the northern end of 33R).
Perhaps our Spanish/Madrid residents can help out on what changed when MAD T4 was built; there are two crossing points on the southern creek and the northern creek (where the fuselage ended up). But there IS elevation, that much is clear.
I found this link that explains some (but not all) of the changes: Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD/LEMD) Airport Technology
S.
If you use Google Maps (not Google Earth), and you zoom out to 1000ft/200m, it appears to be part of a now-rerouted motorway/dual carriageway between the north-west and the south-east end of the airport (zoom out to 1km/1mi ratio, and you can see how that cleared bit merges with the southern end of 36R, and naturally appears to continue to the northern end of 33R).
Perhaps our Spanish/Madrid residents can help out on what changed when MAD T4 was built; there are two crossing points on the southern creek and the northern creek (where the fuselage ended up). But there IS elevation, that much is clear.
I found this link that explains some (but not all) of the changes: Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD/LEMD) Airport Technology
S.
Last edited by VAFFPAX; 22nd Aug 2008 at 13:26.
