Spanair accident at Madrid

[ibelieveicanfly]

wait for blackboxes

It is still unclear what really happened,wait for the balck box what they will unveil!
What is sure is that MD80 series aircrafts are reliable planes(I have 6000hrs on these series) if they are correctly maintained and flown basically like any other commercial airliner.
What is sure also is that an MD82 cabin version charter with around 160 seats is the absolute maximum capacity.add to this:
-holiday luggage (which maybe different from what say the loadsheet if std figures are taken),that said makes a DOW of around 40t+ at least 13500kgs of payload+ min block of around 10t= min weight 63,5t
-not new engines so that T/O calculations perfo are certified for relatively new engines in tables.
-very high density altitude
-pilot technique at VR with engine loss(this plane is not easy to handle at the critical time for eng fail especially at high gross weight),seen that many times in the sim with new pilots
-eventually fatigue for pilots(duties times,strike about to come,motivation,one RTO before the second attempt,etc...)

[bardos]

from the newspaper El Mundo

MARÍA J. GARCÍA
PALMA.- "Estimado Lars", así arrancaba una carta que la sección sindical del Sepla en Spanair envió por e-mail en abril de 2007 al entonces director general de la aerolínea, Lars Nygaard. La primera misiva trasmitía "la inquietud" de los aviadores por un "caos operativo que hace poner en riesgo el pasaje, razón de ser de Spanair".
Diferentes e-mails del Sepla a la dirección y a la presidencia de la aerolínea durante más de un año, a una cadencia casi mensual, han repetido el mismo mensaje: el caos y la mala gestión pueden influir en la operativa de la compañía.
La primera misiva, perteneciente a una serie de comunicaciones a la que ha tenido acceso EL MUNDO mostraba la preocupación de los pilotos por la situación de la aerolínea: "Los sábados días 19 y 20 [abril de 2007] hemos tenido asambleas con los afiliados a Sepla, y es nuestra obligación informarte de la elevada inquietud que reina entre los mismos por el modo en que se realiza la operación diaria desde hace un mes".
"El elevado número de vuelos retrasados, las escalas programadas en tiempos que se escapan a la realidad, la falta de recursos, calidad de medios en tierra, los reiterados AOG's en las flotas, la escasez de tripulaciones y el sistema de movimientos de los tripulantes, para lograr una tripulación concreta, hacen que el sentimiento general sea de caos operativo que hace poner en riesgo el pasaje, razón de ser de Spanair", continúa la carta.
Al referirse a AOG's, los pilotos aluden a un acrónimo que se desglosa como Aircraft on Ground, avión en tierra, y supone que una nave tiene un problema tal que no está autorizada a despegar. "No cumple los requisitos para volar", explica Javier Navas, jefe de la sección sindical del Sepla en Spanair. "Por ejemplo, si al avión del miércoles no le hubiesen autorizado despegar al volver al finger, hubiera sido un AOG".


“Dear Lars” is the way in which an e-mail began from the Spanair Group within the Spanish Pilots Union (SEPLA) to the then director of Spanair, Lars Nygaard, in April, 2007. This first communication communicated the “concerns” of the pilots in relation to “the operational chaos which puts at risk the passengers, the main reason for the existence of Spanair.”
Monthly e-mails from SEPLA to management and to the President of the airline over the course of a year, repeated the same basic message: chaos and mis-management could influence company operations.

The first letter, which forms part of a series of communications to which El Mundo has obtained access, shows the pilots’ concerns for the situation of the airline: “On the 19th and 20th of April, 2007, we have held meetings of SEPLA members and it is our duty to inform you of the high degree of unease felt by its members with respect to the way daily operations are being carried out over the past month.”
“The high number of delayed flights, the totally unreal flight transfer times, the lack of resources, the quality of resources on the ground, the countless AOG’s in the fleet, the shortage of crew members and the system of crew transfers in order to achieve a full crew gives the overall feeling of operational chaos which puts at risk the passengers, the main reason for the existence of Spanair,” the e-mail continued.
Mentioning AOG’s, the pilots are referring to the acronym for “Aircraft on Ground”, and it means that an aircraft has a considerable problem and is not authorized to take off. “It does not meet the requirements for flight,” explained Javier Navas, chief of the Spanair section of the pilots’ union SEPLA. “For example, if Wednesday’s airplane hadn’t been authorized to take off after returning to the hangar, it would have been an AOG.”

[Volume]

Would like to know the seat row of the quoted survivor.

All Survivors are row 14-19

[spinnaker]

Originally Posted by the dude2

Once the aircraft leaves the gate, more importantly, the ground crew via headset, the failure of any system is considered to be taken as in the air. We apply MEL to it and carry on, if it is a no go we return to the gate. Otherwise it it is written up on next arrival station, providing there is maintenance or we wait till we get home. Safety always prevails, no shortcuts.

How does that work then? Did you mean refer to the QRH? I always took the MEL applies prior to dispatch, not after. How do you accomplish maintenance actions?

[yakmadrid]

Waist of time reading these comments

"This is very sad.
What gets me it looks like over running has lead the airplane to crash off an elevated runway end which I'm sure is responsible for the seriousness of this accident.
When are ICAO EASA etc going to mandate Engineered Material Arresting Systems at the end of all runways. If this was in place in Madrid then this would be a serious incident not a fatal accident.
Airports are making record profits but refuse to spend money on these safety features and should be held accountable".

1. Do you know how long is rwy 36L in Madrid? Obviously not.
2. 2000ft. an elevated rwy? I guess you have never flown into Quito.
3. Actually Barajas is one of the few airports in the world that have an arresting system at the end of the rwy. Do your homework and find where they are.

Please wait until you finish high school before making any more comments.

[Poof in Boots]

A person who claims to be a pilot with nearly 40 years experience of flying the DC9/MD80 said that the plane could be difficult to fly because it had a "super critical wing".

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

[triton140]

What gets me it looks like over running has lead the airplane to crash off an elevated runway end

I've so far restrained myself from commenting on this accident, because I really don't have any facts to venture a credible opinion (and I'm not a commercial pilot to boot, just lowly PPL) - but the above comment just beggars the imagination - please read the thread - there's lots of evidence it ran off the runway before the end. Not saying of course that things might not have been different if the ground had been graded between the runways because there's no doubt things might have been less severe - but speculation aside I think we can all agree running off the end of the runway is not a cause.

[forget]

2. 2000ft. an elevated rwy? I guess you have never flown into Quito.

Please wait until you finish high school before making any more comments.

By 'elevated runway' the poster was, I believe, () referring to the terrain drop-off adjacent to the runway.

[bsieker]

xkoote,

thank you. I intended no offence, and I don't doubt the MD80 is a well thought-out and thoroughly engineered aircraft, not inherently more or less safe than other types.

I felt compelled to address some of your points since you made it sound like you thought the MD80 was a lot more safe than comparable types. As to mentioning the A320 specifically: two reasons. (a) it is the type I am most familiar with, and (b) you specifically mentioned its flight control software, which has not, as such, caused a single accident, although cockpit ergonomics could be argued to have been a causal factor in some. But the same is probably true for many types.

About my person: I am Senior Reverse Engineer of a small company specialising in the causal analysis of incidents and accidents. Often we are hired to perform analyses for legal proceedings, using rigorous causal analysis methods; we have been working on microlight, as well as transport aircraft. We are associated with the research group RVS of the university of Bielefeld, headed by Prof. Peter B. Ladkin PhD, that has developed the Why-Because-Analysis.

Bernd

[Fangio]

EFATO after Vr

DUDE 2
I suggest that you read AAIB report 3/2001, re G-OJEM 30 March 1998 Stansted airport. Uncontained engine failure after V1/Vr

Fangio

[Chomeur]

Skydrol leak, I would totally agree that you are not an Einstein. I cannot agree with your "pointing the finger" at the crew in the almost total absence of definitive information at this time. ANYBODY who has been in the flying game with ANY common sense will wait for proper investigation and analysis to take its course before making such pronouncements.

[Capot]

From the same post.....

ust an hour or so before the flight they were supposed to go on strike and here they were, after a, no doubt, stressful RTO, late, rushed. Go figure.

Please only professional responses. And that, of course, includes engineers and other aviation professionals.

Yeah, right.

[Colocolo]

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

Unfortunately, when crewmembers only (Kalitta is a cargo hauler; mostly?)are involved, the press usually does not follow up because the public is not interested.

Colocolo

BTW: is Tortilla Flat east of Phoenix towards Roosevelt lake?

[Michael SWS]

Originally Posted by Volume

All Survivors are row 14-19

Press reports suggest that a six-year-old boy sitting in 6A survived. His sister, in 6B, did not.

[D-OCHO]

Strange how KALITTA loses two 747's in 6 weeks with barely a mention in the international press.......

Not strange.
In those crashes not 150+ people died due to the fact that Kallita is an mostly if not all cargo airline.

[GSMini]

Apparently there is a short video of the accident from cameras next to the t4 or the satellite pointing to the RWY. It´s been viewed by the authorities and some media.

It seems that the MD took off "short of power", stalled, right wing made contact with the rwy en then..well we know what happened.

Doubts are arising about any engine failure because here seem to be no explosion in any engine. The aircraft apparently exploded when it crashed agains the rwy and the adjacent field.

A pilot landing (returning from Guayaquil..IB pilot? )saw that the MD was taking a lot of the rwy to depart, and he thought that they were not gonna make it.

He has been called by the police to tell them what he saw.

All this info is from www.abc.es Sorry, no translation.

Regards.

[DWG46]

I just recieved the following email

Madrid crash: sparks caused explosion

Friday, August 22, 2008

Martin Ferguson


The explosion which killed 153 passengers in Wednesday’s Madrid air catastrophe was caused when the plane’s fuselage hit the runway, according to reports in Spain.

The latest information from the Spanish capital suggests that sparks created by the aircraft skidding on the concrete caused the blast by igniting kerosene in the fuel tank, rather than an overheated engine as initially reported.

The Spanair flight 5022 – a code-shared flight with Lufthansa 255 – was en route to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. The McDonald Douglas MD-80 aircraft had 172 passengers and crew onboard.

DNA tests are being carried out to identity most of the casualties, according to government officials. Deputy prime minister Maria Fernandez de la Vega last night said 59 bodies had already been identified.

Foreign forensic experts have flown to the Spanish capital to assist with autopsies.

Families of the dead are demanding an investigation be launched to establish why the aircraft was allowed to take off only two hours after being grounded with technical problems.

Pilots had reported a problem with a temperature gauge, but it was thought to have been fixed. An independent commission has been established to lead the inquiry.

Politicians yesterday declared a day of national mourning, and vigils were held across Spain to remember those who died.

Some of the survivors remain in “critical” conditions in Madrid hospitals, while others, according to Spanish reports, have showed signs of improvement.

The casualties, who were mostly Spanish, came from 19 countries, including Germany, France and Italy.

It is the worst air disaster to hit mainland Spain since 1983, when a Boeing 747 operated by Colombian airline Avianca crashed near Madrid on landing, killing 181 people.

In 1977, 583 people died when two aircraft collided at Tenerife airport.

Link

Taken from TTG (Travel Trade Gazette)

[sussex2]

See my post #527..

[Big Burd]

EFATO at Vr

The Emerald Airways accident at STN is interesting comparison. The crew actions were praised by AAIB although they contravened OPS procedures. Similarly, AAIB report 1/2001 ( I think) Cessna 404 Titan at Glasgow which resulted in fatalities was potentially as a result of crew following standard operating procedure - to complete a circuit and land after single engine failure.
( In fact it was finally concluded that the wrong engine was shut down - leaving the aircraft without power after failure at or just after Vr.)

Indeed, that aircraft would also have been capable of flight subject to reduced climb performance. It was close to MTOW and perhaps had the crew elected to land ahead initially, they may have managed a landing outwith the airport boundary.

It seems at Madrid there was catastrophic engine failure at a critical point. If the crew decided to try and land ahead I expect they had a very good reason for making that decision. Engine failure at close to MTOW when hot and relatively high is never easy. Add potential hydraulic leakage/pressure failure due to a breached pipe and resulting in control authority issues and then there may be even less hope of continuing a climb and return.

The evidence suggests the aircraft was airborne- but only just. Without a positive rate of climb and with perhaps some runway and overshoot ahead it might be seen as a reaosnable option to try and set down rather than continuing. TORA at Madrid relative to Aircraft MTOW and TODR would perhaps leave a margin of which the crew would have perhaps subconsciuosly been aware or could see. Not being proficient on MD80 I can only speculate as to the view ahead after Vr and initial climb.

I think the crew may well have made the right call.

If the port engine had an explosive failure then it would seem strange that the aircraft would then veer off to starboard. The loss of an engine alone should not result in a huge turning force given the engines on MD80 are relatively close to the centreline. However, reverse thrust on the starboard side only would establish a positive turning moment which would be difficult to balance with rudder ( assuming that the hydraulics had not been fatally damaged). If the port clamshell was inop ( liklely) or if there was no thrust available anyway on the port side. Then would this be enough to slew the aircraft off the airfield?

All the above is pure speculation for which I should offer some apology. However, in circumstances it is inevitable that the crew's actions will be criticised by some. My point is that they will have done everything that they were trained to do to save the passengers. They made the best decisions at the time based on the information at their disposal. Sometimes that makes no difference to the outcome.

[agusaleale]

extracted from the site Pilotos de Iberia

pilotosdeiberia.com :: Ver tema - Accidente Barajas. Comentarios sobre posibles causas. THIS QUOTE HAS BEEN WRITTEN BY AND OLD IBERIA CAPTAIN ALREADY FLYING.

Os diré lo que he visto hoy y me ha dejado absolutamente perplejo.
Hago un vuelo Madrid-Las Palmas-Madrid. Lo echamos a suertes y el salto Madrid-Las Palmas lo hace el copiloto, yo me hago la vuelta.
Despegue por la 36L de Barajas, la pista por la que despegó el MD de Spanair.
Llegamos a V1, rotamos y ya en el aire digo “Positive climb” y el copiloto me dice “Gear Up” Cuando estoy subiendo la palanca del tren veo a la derecha la superficie quemada por al accidente. ¡No está al final de la pista sino entre medias de las dos pistas! Pero lo más sorprendente, es que se ve perfectamente en el suelo, en la tierra las huellas del tren de aterrizaje del MD, totalmente nítidas en la hierba, como se sale el avión por la derecha de la pista, ¡Cuando todavía quedaban más de 1000 metros de pista, y acaban, desviándose cada vez más en la zona negra quemada.!
A la vista de esto pienso:
Si el avión llegó a volar, no creo que se elevase más de 20 o 30 pies del suelo. Cayó sobre la pista de nuevo, pero no estrellándose, pues de lo contrario habría partido o dañado el tren de aterrizaje y las huellas de las ruedas están totalmente nítidas a la derecha de la pista sobre la hierba.
Si ni llegó a volar, cosa que parece verosimil, el avión, aborta el despegue y se va a la derecha de la pista, abandona ésta y corriendo por la hierba, se desvía cada vez más hasta que acaba en medio de ambas pistas, en donde hay un pequeño barranco y ahí se debió destrozar.
Es decir el MD no se ha estrellado en el verdadero sentido de la palabra. Si voló algo, aterrizó de nuevo sobre la pista o en su borde derecho, pero no de una manera tan violenta que partiera el tren, ya que las huellas de las ruedas están muy nítidas en la hierba y sin otras señales de que haya arrastrado el fuselaje o las alas. Se desvía cada vez más y acaba en el barranco entre las pistas.
Donde se salió, o desde donde se ven las huellas de las ruedas que abandonan la pista hacia la derecha es un poco pasado la antena de la senda de planeo del ILS de la pista 18R, es decir en ese punto queda todavía más de 1000 metros de pista asfaltada por delante, ya que el umbral de la pista 18R está desplazado 950 metros de la cabecera.
¿Cómo se pudo desviar así? Lo ignoro, ¿Quizás metió la reversa derecha a tope y la izquierda no y eso le sacó “al verde”? Pues es posible. Lo que yo he visto claro es que el avión no se “estrelló” en el verdadero sentido de la palabra, simplemente se desvió hacia al derecha, se salió de la pista, no sé si antes llegó a volar algo o no, pero lo que está claro es que el tren de aterrizaje estaba intacto al salirse de la pista, corrió por el campo desviándose cada vez más y acabó esa carrera en el barranco que existe entre las 36L y 36R.
Ahora que cada cual saque sus conclusiones. Yo estoy bastante perplejo

What I have seen today has left me absolutely perplexed.
I was in a flight Madrid-Las Palmas-Madrid. The flight Madrid-Las Palmas was made by the co-pilot, I did the return.
Liftoff for the 36L, the same runway that took the MD of Spanair.
We arrived at V1, rotate and in the air I say "Positive climb" and the co-pilot tells me "Gear Up" . When I am pulling the climbing lever I see to the right the area burned in the accident. It is not the end of the runway but between the two tracks! But the most surprising is that it is seen perfectly on the ground the tracks of the landing gear of the MD completely clear on the grass, the plane exiting by the right side of the runway, when there were still more than 1000 meter of the runway, and ultimately, diverting in the area burnt black.!
In view of this I think:
If the plane was flying, I do not think that it rose more than 20 or 30 feet above the ground. It fell on the track again, but not crashing, otherwise they would have damaged part or the landing gear and the footprints of the wheels are absolutely clear on the right side of the runway on the grass.
If it didn´t got airborne (that seems plausible) the plane aborts the take-off and goes to the right of the runway, leaves it and runs in the grass, finishing just in the middle of both runways, where there is a small ravine and finishes destroyed.
That is to say that the MD did not crashed in the true sense of the word. If it flew, landed back on the track or at its right edge, but not so violent (it did not destroyed the langing gear) as the tracks of the wheels are very sharp on the grass, without any other evidence that the fuselage or the wings had dragged the soil. It diverted more and ended in the ravine between the tracks.
The place where it left the runway, or from where you can see traces of the wheels leaving the runway to the right is a little bit passing the antenna of the gliding path of the ILS runway 18R; at this point there are still more than 1000 meters of runway ahead, as the threshold of the runway 18R is moved 950 metres from the header.
How could it diverted like that? I dont know, Maybe put the right thrust reverser on top and not the left and that made the plane exit "to the green"? It is possible. What I've seen clear is that the plane did not "crashed" in the true sense of the word, simply was diverted towards the right, left the track, I do not know whether it flew before or not, but what is clear is that the landing gear left intact the track, ran throughout the ground, deviating and finishing in the ravine between 36R and 36L.
Everyone has to get it own conclusions. I am quite puzzled