EZY Captain gets the boot
With respect, I suspect that what might solve all of your problems is some good old fashioned statistical quality control since it appears your companies have exactly the sort of digital data to do it easily. Statistical QC will distinguish between what is a natural deviation from the mean and an actual departure that indicates something is wrong with the piloting. In fact I'd be surprised if most airlines aren't doing this already if they have the digital data.
What gave me the clue is in the "stabilised by 390 ft RA" comment.
Are you safe if your data indicates that you were stabilised per whatever your company's manual say at 501 ft, but not safe at 499 ft?
Are you safe if your manual says 180 knots and you fly 178 or 182 knots?
Safety is not a Yes/No thing unless you can prove that what has happened is unsafe.
You cannot make any determination about whether a pilot is doing the right thing unless you can determine that he is doing something statistically different from his peers.
For that, you need to determine the mean and standard deviation of speeds and heights for each of your aircraft types at each "gate" and across your entire pilot workforce. I imagine your digital data can do that easily.
Once you have that information it is a simple matter to determine if non-conformance to the "book" figure is a matter of normal random variation or a statistically significant deviation from the rest of the Pilot population.
You can also look at the personal mean and standard (statistical) deviation for each pilot, and analyse it any number of ways to work out trends and spot problems before they cause anyone grief. Might also show a few surprises too.
Furthermore, if you really have all that data and can do the above analysis, then you ought to make sure your airlines share it between themselves and benchmark their performance.
It would also end the eternal arguments about who are "Cowboys" and who aren't.
What gave me the clue is in the "stabilised by 390 ft RA" comment.
Are you safe if your data indicates that you were stabilised per whatever your company's manual say at 501 ft, but not safe at 499 ft?
Are you safe if your manual says 180 knots and you fly 178 or 182 knots?
Safety is not a Yes/No thing unless you can prove that what has happened is unsafe.
You cannot make any determination about whether a pilot is doing the right thing unless you can determine that he is doing something statistically different from his peers.
For that, you need to determine the mean and standard deviation of speeds and heights for each of your aircraft types at each "gate" and across your entire pilot workforce. I imagine your digital data can do that easily.
Once you have that information it is a simple matter to determine if non-conformance to the "book" figure is a matter of normal random variation or a statistically significant deviation from the rest of the Pilot population.
You can also look at the personal mean and standard (statistical) deviation for each pilot, and analyse it any number of ways to work out trends and spot problems before they cause anyone grief. Might also show a few surprises too.
Furthermore, if you really have all that data and can do the above analysis, then you ought to make sure your airlines share it between themselves and benchmark their performance.
It would also end the eternal arguments about who are "Cowboys" and who aren't.
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Agaricus bisporus
Just to clarify things. This guys SOP's say he needs to be in the landing config by 1000'. Not on speed as well (otherwise there would be a few more headed into muddy waters).
I feel for the poor sole but there by the grace of god go us. I hazard a guess, from what others say, that he did not intend to go out that day and become a rodeo rider. But at the end of the day burning a further 500kg of more and more expensive comodity is now the ONLY option. Not the time for deviation from the norm if ever there was one.
Just to clarify things. This guys SOP's say he needs to be in the landing config by 1000'. Not on speed as well (otherwise there would be a few more headed into muddy waters).
I feel for the poor sole but there by the grace of god go us. I hazard a guess, from what others say, that he did not intend to go out that day and become a rodeo rider. But at the end of the day burning a further 500kg of more and more expensive comodity is now the ONLY option. Not the time for deviation from the norm if ever there was one.
Sunfish - I think you make some very valid and important points that are worth thinking about over and over again. There is a lot there to unpack.
Indeed, the kind of data collection done in such programs lends itself very nicely to such statistical analysis. I understand and know exactly what you are saying.
That acknowledged, some considerations are in order. First, one would expect that a statistical approach is one part, perhaps a large part, but not the only part of a thorough approach to flight data analysis. We know this untuitively even though most outside the cockpit of an airliner do not.
I say this, because a statistical approach can have unintended responses and can mask "once-of's" which may highlight a latent problem but which occur rarely.
For example, in trying to advance our flight data program, some non-flying, non-safety managers and executives have suggested (and so far, their views have prevailed, much to our great frustration and concern), that only a "representative sample" of airplanes need be equipped with QAR recording equipment.
Further, they have suggested that one fleet type is a sufficient sample of the operation and further installations are all but unnecessary or at least should wait. It has also been suggested that further installations weren't needed until they could be shown to be "commercially viable". You could have heard a pin drop...
Such a response is financially driven of course and has nothing to do with thinking about flight safety. "Not knowing" for a company's leadership in today's environment is a demonstrably high-risk approach to both financial and flight-safety due diligence but it flourishes as seen, nonetheless.
Also, (and I suspect you know this intuitively), statistics such as averages, means and deviance are right out the window if "you're it" and you've had a crash, (or worse, are in one). There is no such concept as an "average" or "risk", after an accident. It is antecedents, pathways, "why-because" analysis and "was it in our data?" from that point on. Much more could be said...
The other mask which statistics may apply in an unintended fashion is, what if your pilots are simply very good at "rescuing" non-stabilized approaches and achieving successful, touchdown-zone landings 100% of the time? Indeed, some non-flying (and some flying!) managers ask, "If you're saying these approaches are 'high risk', where are the over-run accidents?"
The notion of "stochastic" may be useful in thinking about both the great value of flight data analysis as well as it's "problems". The term means, very roughly (because I am neither a mathematician or a statistician), "(Greek stochazein, to shoot with a bow at a target; that is, to scatter events in a partially random manner, some of which achieve a preferred outcorne). If a sequence of events combines a random component with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure, that sequence is said to be stochastic." - Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature, ca 1960
An example would be, (keeping in mind how accidents happen in our industry), a person running across a fairly busy road or non-rushhour freeway will likely make it first time, second and perhaps a dozen times. But ultimately, done enough times, that person is going to be hit. There is both randomness and a "preferred" (by the process, NOT by the person!), outcome. THAT it is going to happen, of that we are certain. WHEN, cannot be said, nor can flight data tell us which approach will end up as an accident.
In doing their "best" for the organization so that it and it's owners "prosper", the ubiquitous bean-counter, senior airline executives, non-flying managers and those managers who fly but who have lost their way on the way to management, use this sleight-of-thought all the time to justify cost-cutting in flight safety areas and programs. We produce nothing measurable so can it be so bad to cut, or with-hold supporting resources?
Will flying 182kts or 178kts get you a "pull-up and go-around" from ATC? Will 160/4 make you safer? Obviously it depends on a lot of things, very few of which are secure predictors of an accident.
The key in any risk-intensive enterprise is finding the balance and using what data is available intelligently. While this is a black-and-white view which demands a far more subtle approach, at precisely the time when their services and their work are needed most, these days flight safety departments and their programs are seen as expensive impediments whose conservatism is counter to "efficient" use of resources such as fuel, people and airplanes. The natural tension between these two forces is in danger of being overtaken by commercial side.
The call for SOP adherence throughout this thread is both freshening and heartening, for again, if ever there was a time....
This is one of the most important threads on PPRuNe at the moment. It goes to the heart of what makes this business, in all its aspects, so fascinating.
Indeed, the kind of data collection done in such programs lends itself very nicely to such statistical analysis. I understand and know exactly what you are saying.
That acknowledged, some considerations are in order. First, one would expect that a statistical approach is one part, perhaps a large part, but not the only part of a thorough approach to flight data analysis. We know this untuitively even though most outside the cockpit of an airliner do not.
I say this, because a statistical approach can have unintended responses and can mask "once-of's" which may highlight a latent problem but which occur rarely.
For example, in trying to advance our flight data program, some non-flying, non-safety managers and executives have suggested (and so far, their views have prevailed, much to our great frustration and concern), that only a "representative sample" of airplanes need be equipped with QAR recording equipment.
Further, they have suggested that one fleet type is a sufficient sample of the operation and further installations are all but unnecessary or at least should wait. It has also been suggested that further installations weren't needed until they could be shown to be "commercially viable". You could have heard a pin drop...
Such a response is financially driven of course and has nothing to do with thinking about flight safety. "Not knowing" for a company's leadership in today's environment is a demonstrably high-risk approach to both financial and flight-safety due diligence but it flourishes as seen, nonetheless.
Also, (and I suspect you know this intuitively), statistics such as averages, means and deviance are right out the window if "you're it" and you've had a crash, (or worse, are in one). There is no such concept as an "average" or "risk", after an accident. It is antecedents, pathways, "why-because" analysis and "was it in our data?" from that point on. Much more could be said...
The other mask which statistics may apply in an unintended fashion is, what if your pilots are simply very good at "rescuing" non-stabilized approaches and achieving successful, touchdown-zone landings 100% of the time? Indeed, some non-flying (and some flying!) managers ask, "If you're saying these approaches are 'high risk', where are the over-run accidents?"
The notion of "stochastic" may be useful in thinking about both the great value of flight data analysis as well as it's "problems". The term means, very roughly (because I am neither a mathematician or a statistician), "(Greek stochazein, to shoot with a bow at a target; that is, to scatter events in a partially random manner, some of which achieve a preferred outcorne). If a sequence of events combines a random component with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure, that sequence is said to be stochastic." - Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature, ca 1960
An example would be, (keeping in mind how accidents happen in our industry), a person running across a fairly busy road or non-rushhour freeway will likely make it first time, second and perhaps a dozen times. But ultimately, done enough times, that person is going to be hit. There is both randomness and a "preferred" (by the process, NOT by the person!), outcome. THAT it is going to happen, of that we are certain. WHEN, cannot be said, nor can flight data tell us which approach will end up as an accident.
In doing their "best" for the organization so that it and it's owners "prosper", the ubiquitous bean-counter, senior airline executives, non-flying managers and those managers who fly but who have lost their way on the way to management, use this sleight-of-thought all the time to justify cost-cutting in flight safety areas and programs. We produce nothing measurable so can it be so bad to cut, or with-hold supporting resources?
Will flying 182kts or 178kts get you a "pull-up and go-around" from ATC? Will 160/4 make you safer? Obviously it depends on a lot of things, very few of which are secure predictors of an accident.
The key in any risk-intensive enterprise is finding the balance and using what data is available intelligently. While this is a black-and-white view which demands a far more subtle approach, at precisely the time when their services and their work are needed most, these days flight safety departments and their programs are seen as expensive impediments whose conservatism is counter to "efficient" use of resources such as fuel, people and airplanes. The natural tension between these two forces is in danger of being overtaken by commercial side.
The call for SOP adherence throughout this thread is both freshening and heartening, for again, if ever there was a time....
This is one of the most important threads on PPRuNe at the moment. It goes to the heart of what makes this business, in all its aspects, so fascinating.
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Doug the Head please, please, do not associate anything as crass as airline management with something as wonderful as Comfortably Numb, I'll forgive you this time.
160 to 4 is not a problem, the problem is when certain people high up the chain decide to publish in detail a procedure for just about everything. Frankly, if we cannot find a way to fly 160 to 4 and get it configured by 1000' then we should not be doing this job.
As for arguing with our ATC colleagues about who is God today this has got to stop. We all have to work together to make this system work, ATC tell me to do something, I then as aircraft commander decide if that is a safe and viable course of action. If it is then it gets done, if not we try to find another way. We do this all the time and don't have protracted discussions about it so why get all upset about 160 to 4?
Of course safety has to be number one but the FDM or whatever we call it today has shifted people's focus away from the runway to 500' above it and we have an almost manic focus on the 500' gate and the parameters that have to be satisfied. Just the thought of getting that phone call is pre-occupying guys attention way out on the approach. Not a good thing in my book. Sure, monitor what is going on but try not to be as draconian with the data usage. A phone call for bug +12 knots passing the gate and then landing safely on speed is getting a bit too anal. Especially when we know the autothrust can be a bit wide of the mark, especially with flap 3 landings and tailwind on the approach (A319 that is).
160 to 4 is not a problem, the problem is when certain people high up the chain decide to publish in detail a procedure for just about everything. Frankly, if we cannot find a way to fly 160 to 4 and get it configured by 1000' then we should not be doing this job.
As for arguing with our ATC colleagues about who is God today this has got to stop. We all have to work together to make this system work, ATC tell me to do something, I then as aircraft commander decide if that is a safe and viable course of action. If it is then it gets done, if not we try to find another way. We do this all the time and don't have protracted discussions about it so why get all upset about 160 to 4?
Of course safety has to be number one but the FDM or whatever we call it today has shifted people's focus away from the runway to 500' above it and we have an almost manic focus on the 500' gate and the parameters that have to be satisfied. Just the thought of getting that phone call is pre-occupying guys attention way out on the approach. Not a good thing in my book. Sure, monitor what is going on but try not to be as draconian with the data usage. A phone call for bug +12 knots passing the gate and then landing safely on speed is getting a bit too anal. Especially when we know the autothrust can be a bit wide of the mark, especially with flap 3 landings and tailwind on the approach (A319 that is).
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Ag Bis
I wasn't remarking on the breach or otherwise of SOPs, the company in question has a 500ft stabilised requirement, but no SOP 500ft Go Arround / continue call.
My observation was based on the dynamics of that particular situation: a positioning flight, no pax or CC. Landing on a very long runway at a very light weight with a planned ( my emphasis ) exit at the end. Instructed by ATC 180 to 4 and the instruction not cancelled and then having to decel and configure a very slippy jet in 2 and bit miles.
Firstly the use of FDM data in that situation to achieve a dsiciplinary kill is, in my opinion, over the top: no one was hurt, the jet landed safely and my chum isn't given to random acts of cowboy behaviour.
Having decided to use the FDM as a big stick it would, in my opinion have been more sensible to simply have him in for tea and biscuits, ask for an explanation, and tell him not to try that on a revenue flight or he will have his legs slapped.
Proportionate response to FDM data is what is needed: if it is used as a preventative tool, i.e. any minor trangression results in a slapped wrist rather than sacking it serves it's purpose. If the transgressor repeats the "offence" a closer examination of their operating technique may well be required. However, using it as a Sword of Damocles is hardly what it was designed for!
I wasn't remarking on the breach or otherwise of SOPs, the company in question has a 500ft stabilised requirement, but no SOP 500ft Go Arround / continue call.
My observation was based on the dynamics of that particular situation: a positioning flight, no pax or CC. Landing on a very long runway at a very light weight with a planned ( my emphasis ) exit at the end. Instructed by ATC 180 to 4 and the instruction not cancelled and then having to decel and configure a very slippy jet in 2 and bit miles.
Firstly the use of FDM data in that situation to achieve a dsiciplinary kill is, in my opinion, over the top: no one was hurt, the jet landed safely and my chum isn't given to random acts of cowboy behaviour.
Having decided to use the FDM as a big stick it would, in my opinion have been more sensible to simply have him in for tea and biscuits, ask for an explanation, and tell him not to try that on a revenue flight or he will have his legs slapped.
Proportionate response to FDM data is what is needed: if it is used as a preventative tool, i.e. any minor trangression results in a slapped wrist rather than sacking it serves it's purpose. If the transgressor repeats the "offence" a closer examination of their operating technique may well be required. However, using it as a Sword of Damocles is hardly what it was designed for!
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160 to 4.
Oh my goodness, everyone quite upset, it seems.
Some can, some can't, and if you do it wrong, tea and biscuits in the head shed.
Lets see, in January, the approach controller wants to know if we can do 200 to a five mile final.
I tell him...absolutely, not a problem.
Of course we are an adaptable type (TriStar -500) and heavy.
What's more important is...the head shed is manned by folks who put their trust in the pilots, not in some tattle-tale box.
What a shame others aren't the same.
Oh my goodness, everyone quite upset, it seems.
Some can, some can't, and if you do it wrong, tea and biscuits in the head shed.
Lets see, in January, the approach controller wants to know if we can do 200 to a five mile final.
I tell him...absolutely, not a problem.
Of course we are an adaptable type (TriStar -500) and heavy.
What's more important is...the head shed is manned by folks who put their trust in the pilots, not in some tattle-tale box.
What a shame others aren't the same.
Excellent post 411A, as ever you manage to capture perfectly the essence behind the debate. By the way interesting report in D&G on an unstabilised approach in Darwin for those interested in what alse can happen when you get it wrong.
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This chap has apparently made an error of judgment. Now there are not many who I would think would go to work intent in deviating from SOP's to a point that puts you out of a job. For that reason I sympathise with this guy/girl. But I am not aware of the case or details so perhaps my sympathies are unfounded. At the end of the day it appears they (the captain) did not follow SOP and paid the ultimate price.
Now for your purposes.
I would suggest you keep up to date on your SOP's. The March 08 Boeing ops manual did indeed have the command "Captain You Must Go-Around". Now in your defence this would probably have been the governing authority in use at the time of the event (only a guess, please forgive me if this is in fact incorrect). But the update effective 10th July does not differentiate between who is PNF and merely states "Not stable go-around". I must say I prefer this later one as I think the previous SOP was rather vague. This is now quite clear and succinct. But to conclude, "ambiguity" is sometimes not as straightforward as it seems when dealing with complex manuals.
Now for your purposes.
Let's go on, shell (sic) we? SOPs continue by saying that if the a/c is not configured by 500' then the (PNF) "Must" say, "Captain You Must Go-Around!" What is ambiguous about that?
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Unfortunately the companies that rely on FDM and a big stick approach are not helping to create a culture where general airmanship is of high priority. It will breed pilots who get all the monitored parameters right but who neglect the unmonitored parameters (like what is said on the radio, interaction with other crew members etc) because their jobs depend on it.
In this respect I would say the BA way is far superior to the EZY way.
In this respect I would say the BA way is far superior to the EZY way.
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Once again we are losing sight here of reality, with spelling police, Tristar sales and sniping in flow.
Main points, I feel:
As said on the many threads here before on the 'speed on finals' topic, IF you cannot accept it, tell ATC EARLY. Likewise they need to tell you EARLY, either by Notam/chart or R/T pre-notification before finals. It is no good suddenly asking at 7 miles, (or requesting a 'new' specific exit as we bravely wrestle with the controls at 100kts on the runway, avoiding the orphans' school and housing estate).
To me, there has to be more to this 'sacking' than we see here. While '180 to 4' is just NOT practical in anything but a Harrier or prop, ONE whoopsie should NOT result in a sacking.
Nearly ALL of us have to adjust our planning to 1000' stable now-a-days whether we like it or not - fact. I came from an environment where it was 'throttles closed, on speed on the numbers or you are a pansy' to airlines and made that adjustment (well, most of the time
).
If EJ are making life impossible, as BA tried to do at Brussels for example way back (another thread), tell them! ASR/Flight report. Make a FUSS. If the management wet dreams are making life difficult/impossible for ATC, take action, be it reports/filings or even send arounds if you have to (the latter rapidly focussing bean-counters' attention).
160 to 4 is not impossible, but it needs a bit of work. On a previous thread we established that a pre-requested 170 to 5 was 'manageable' for ATC but would reduce the rates.
My experience of FDR monitoring has been positive. The 'cowboy' element can easily be identified. If this guy was not such, and had just this one 'event', the decision is bizarre and in my opinion could easily have been handled differently.
Main points, I feel:
As said on the many threads here before on the 'speed on finals' topic, IF you cannot accept it, tell ATC EARLY. Likewise they need to tell you EARLY, either by Notam/chart or R/T pre-notification before finals. It is no good suddenly asking at 7 miles, (or requesting a 'new' specific exit as we bravely wrestle with the controls at 100kts on the runway, avoiding the orphans' school and housing estate).
To me, there has to be more to this 'sacking' than we see here. While '180 to 4' is just NOT practical in anything but a Harrier or prop, ONE whoopsie should NOT result in a sacking.
Nearly ALL of us have to adjust our planning to 1000' stable now-a-days whether we like it or not - fact. I came from an environment where it was 'throttles closed, on speed on the numbers or you are a pansy' to airlines and made that adjustment (well, most of the time
).If EJ are making life impossible, as BA tried to do at Brussels for example way back (another thread), tell them! ASR/Flight report. Make a FUSS. If the management wet dreams are making life difficult/impossible for ATC, take action, be it reports/filings or even send arounds if you have to (the latter rapidly focussing bean-counters' attention).
160 to 4 is not impossible, but it needs a bit of work. On a previous thread we established that a pre-requested 170 to 5 was 'manageable' for ATC but would reduce the rates.
My experience of FDR monitoring has been positive. The 'cowboy' element can easily be identified. If this guy was not such, and had just this one 'event', the decision is bizarre and in my opinion could easily have been handled differently.
Ut Sementem Feeceris
170 to 5 is now "standard" at ESGG (STN) and I think it works very well compared to the "old" 160 to 4. Conf 2 selected 170. If a tail wind, manage the speed at approx 5.1-3 and configure with gear flap. If a headwind , managed at approx 4.6-8 and configure. Usually you are decelerating nicely through 160 as you pass 4 D and are stable at 1000'.
I did hear that BA have stopped doing F3 landings on their A319's as it is difficult to get stable (if no real headwind component). Anyone care to clarifiy if that's the case?
A4
I did hear that BA have stopped doing F3 landings on their A319's as it is difficult to get stable (if no real headwind component). Anyone care to clarifiy if that's the case?
A4
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It seems to me that it is ATC that must give way on this one - and that is what it amounts to. The focus by airline management on stabilised approaches is relatively recent and pilots must comply, understandably allowing themselves some margin. Rather than glibly state that pilots should inform ATC if they are unable to comply, would it not be better for all concerned if ATC were to recognise that their 160/4 ( or variants on) procedure is no longer practical and change it.
Nonemmet, I don't have a problem with that but we should sit down and talk about it rather than an airline publish an SOP which flies in the face of current ATC practise and let the pilots and controllers try and sort it out.
And there will have to be a change in spacing and therefore a reduction in capacity because the Easy 319s cannot conform. Are the airlines happy with increased delays and is the airport authority happy with a reduction in runway movements?
And there will have to be a change in spacing and therefore a reduction in capacity because the Easy 319s cannot conform. Are the airlines happy with increased delays and is the airport authority happy with a reduction in runway movements?
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Well defruiter - I've never been broken off when i've told ATC I can't comply!! As I said, I'll do what I can to help out, fly the speed I'm asked to - but if I can't then I won't... If YOU can't sort out the traffic behind then that simply is not my problem
Besides - if you did break me off to fit in someone behind and above then I'd be on the blower to your boss fairly pronto
Besides - if you did break me off to fit in someone behind and above then I'd be on the blower to your boss fairly pronto
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To me, there has to be more to this 'sacking' than we see here. While '180 to 4' is just NOT practical in anything but a Harrier or prop, ONE whoopsie should NOT result in a sacking.
If you are on double secret probation you tow the line and are conservative.
You certainly DONT give the management any cause to issue a P45.
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The joke of this all is if the poor chap who was busted for being stable at 390ft had made his approach into BRS (with a much shorter runway), 500ft rad alt just so happens to be around 270ft AAL.
If it really was a "saftey" issue it would be based on AAL not rad alt
If it really was a "saftey" issue it would be based on AAL not rad alt
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White Knight
Your attitude is really quite disappointing. If I can't "sort out the traffic" behind you because you tell me at the last minute that you can't fly an ATC assigned speed , then believe me if it results in a loss of separation it'll soon become your problem when the CAA are on the blower to you.
Furthermore, if you are broken off because your actions endanger other a/c, then please feel free to phone in because you'll get pretty short shrift form the controller involved, the Airports Supervisor and most probably the Watch Manager. You getting put at the back of a queue of traffic will really be the last thing we care about if we have just prevented an incident. Maybe you're one of these guys who thinks they're the only a/c in the sky. Funny how nearly all of them all like that until they plug in with us and see the consequennces of their actions.
Comments such as yours really don't offer anything to this discussion. As has been said on here several times by myself, Defruiter, Del Prado and others....if we can help, we will help...but we need to know in advance! What part of this has been lost in translation?
Your attitude is really quite disappointing. If I can't "sort out the traffic" behind you because you tell me at the last minute that you can't fly an ATC assigned speed , then believe me if it results in a loss of separation it'll soon become your problem when the CAA are on the blower to you.
Furthermore, if you are broken off because your actions endanger other a/c, then please feel free to phone in because you'll get pretty short shrift form the controller involved, the Airports Supervisor and most probably the Watch Manager. You getting put at the back of a queue of traffic will really be the last thing we care about if we have just prevented an incident. Maybe you're one of these guys who thinks they're the only a/c in the sky. Funny how nearly all of them all like that until they plug in with us and see the consequennces of their actions.
Comments such as yours really don't offer anything to this discussion. As has been said on here several times by myself, Defruiter, Del Prado and others....if we can help, we will help...but we need to know in advance! What part of this has been lost in translation?
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All this intense discussion is pointless, anyway.
Airlines are reducing schedules/flights due to the high(er) price of avtur.
Less capacity requires fewer runway requirements.
Which means... fewer arrivals.
IE, more distance to work with for the ATC folks (who are already worked to the max, I'm sure).
Problem solved...in the short term.
Longer term.... airline managements need to wake up and smell the coffee, for it is THE FOLKS UP AT THE POINTY END WHO MAKE THE DECISIONS.
In other words, stop this nonsense of secong guessing.
Full stop.
NB.
In the small carrier I work for, it is the FD crew who call the shots, and the head shed backs us up...totally.
Without reservation.
Airlines are reducing schedules/flights due to the high(er) price of avtur.
Less capacity requires fewer runway requirements.
Which means... fewer arrivals.
IE, more distance to work with for the ATC folks (who are already worked to the max, I'm sure).
Problem solved...in the short term.
Longer term.... airline managements need to wake up and smell the coffee, for it is THE FOLKS UP AT THE POINTY END WHO MAKE THE DECISIONS.
In other words, stop this nonsense of secong guessing.
Full stop.
NB.
In the small carrier I work for, it is the FD crew who call the shots, and the head shed backs us up...totally.
Without reservation.
