Five people to face Concorde crash trial

[wideman]

how do the prosecutors intend to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt...

"Reasonable doubt" is the standard for U.S. (and U.K.?) criminal convictions, but I do not know the standard for convictions in the French/Napoleonic code of laws. Could someone who is knowledgeable kindly provide some information?

[wings folded]

Quote:
Can somebody clarify why a charge of involuntary manslaughter has been applied in this case.
Thanks to Wings Folded, Dicky Pearse and tkazaz for their answers.

I don't think the question has ben answered though.

The UK act only applies to the corporation and comes with a fine. This trial is against individuals and the penalties could involve a fine and prison time for those folks.

I will attempt a better explanation for those trying to understand the legal process.

Applicable law is French law. UK Acts and US law have no relevance.

The case is being heard in the Tribunal Correctionnel at Pontoise, the administrative capital of the Departement in which the accident took place. (A "Departement" is an administrative sub division of France. Think of a "County" or a "State" if you are in doubt)

A Tribunal Correctionnel is the second in ascending sequence of Courts according to the severity of the accusations. French law classifies three types of process. The lowest are to deal with "contraventions" (e.g. traffic offenses), the second are to deal with "delits" and this is the one we are dealing with here. The most severe deals with "Crimes" (e.g. murder)

There is no jury.

The court is composed of three career judges. Not elected. Not appointed by some mysterious inner circle. Selected on merit into a very demanding specialised school, and trained intensively.

A prosecutor (called Procureur) pleads the case against the accused on behalf of the Nation (for Americans, think of "The People versus...."; for Brits, think of "Regina versus.."

Defendants are legally represented.

Affected third parties may be present and plead. They are termed "Parties Civiles". Relatives of victims on the ground fall in this category.

What are the sanctions for manslaughter in France?

That's not how it works. It is not laid down. Towards the end of the trial, the Procureur requests the Court to impose the sanctions which he or she has determined to be appropriate, but the Court makes its own mind up.

Fines and / or up to 10 years prison are possible, but may be doubled in the event of a case of a recurrence by the accused. This is not likely to be the case here.

A prison sentence may (and often is) be suspended, whereby the accused does not actually serve time, but does however have a criminal record.

The judges take expert evidence and legal argument, and determine accordingly.

The process may not be perfect; the judges are not aviation accident experts.

They are trained however to weigh the evidence and to make a determination within the application of the law.

In so doing, they put an end to the sorts of controversies expressed already on this thread in the vein of "theory / counter theory",

Such as "I have a mate who knows exactly what happened", "it must have been the titanium strip", it must have been shoddy tyre design", "it must have been overloading" or whatever.

Given the exchanges of views expressed on this thread by people who appear to know quite a bit about the topic, at times with, at best bad temper, and sometimes quite frankly puerile, the explanation of this tragedy is clearly not straightforward.

It is not just in aviation that sometimes a chain of events or circumstances leads to an outcome, but any one link in that chain may not be the sole root cause.

The judges will hear evidence amounting to 90 volumes of documents, some from the BEA, some from Sud Aviation, some from Continental, and so forth. Inconsistencies in the evidence will be spotted. The decision will be made according to the most convincing explanation.

All civilised societies have in place a judicial system to resolve this kind of dilemma.

[M2dude]

Hi, BOAC; nice name too. (Yes, lots of ties). I'll see if I can find it, but I saw a photo of the fuel panel a couple of weeks after the crash which showed the stub of the O/R switch at O/R. I'm certainly not trying to suggest that this is THE major issue here, just another piece in a very large and complex jig-saw; a tragic one at that.

[Chronus]

Concorde Trial

WINGS FOLDED may find it helpful to read the Time report where he may note that a defendant party is Continental, a corporation. So my understanding is that not only do individuals stand charged with criminal offences but so does a corporate body. The link to the Time article is at
Paris Concorde Trial Seeks Answers on Air France Crash - TIME

[S.F.L.Y]

I saw a photo of the fuel panel a couple of weeks after the crash which showed the stub of the O/R switch at O/R.

So you saw a picture 10 years ago and you consider it enough to accuse the crew for over pressurizing the tank.

Your words:

Yes it was proven; Tank 5 O/R switch found at O/R in wreckage.

I wonder if captplaystation did even see such a picture but he seems very prompt in "revealing" this new crew contribution to the accident.

[lomapaseo]

wings folded
Thanks for a thread-subject worthy explanation.

At least posts like yours brings a sense of knowledge rather than conviction of opinions to the Thread subject

Of course I, like others, have an opinion of guilt and blame, but it is of little value even if I were to testify as an "expert witness". The law of the land decides the issues in the eyes of the public

[wings folded]

tkazaz,

WINGS FOLDED may find it helpful to read the Time report

No, I do not find it helpful.

I never have found reports of journalists with little or no knowledge of the topic to be helpful.

I know that Continental are defendants in this case. Iknow also that other corporations are defendants also.

I wished to add that, and it is obvious, acquittal is also a possible outcome.

It has been almost ten years since the event.

French legal procedure requires an examining magistrate (Juge d' Instruction ) to identify parties potentially implicated.

Much of these ten years have been spent with all the evidence with which the Court has been bombarded being sorted, examined, verified.

We are now at trial stage.

Extravagent/ridiculous hypotheses have been set aside.

The judicial system will make a determination.

It may well exhonerate a welder working for Continental. Or Continental full stop.

Or it may not.

That is the job of these judges.

It is not the job of journalists from "Time".

It is not the job of contributors to this forum.

[SLFinAZ]

I've been fascinated by this entire thread and have a couple of thoughts. The more of these threads you read the more and more you become aware of the tremendously fickle winds of fate that bring all the holes into alignment. My questions flow along the following lines...

1) This is all based on a prosecutors findings less then a year ago. Given that it's an AF plane i'm amazed not a single person from AF is accountable with regard to the weight/balance and maintenance issues the plane clearly had.

2) Given the delicate issues clearly documented by numerous other tire issues I can't believe that a runway check wasn't done immediately preceding the takeoff roll. After all stuff does fall of planes from time to time.

3) Given the documented irregularities in the judicial proceedings specific to the Airbus crash I would have serious misgivings specific to both the custody and chain of evidence here. From my admittedly non ring side seat this comes across as an entirely politically affair. Accordingly I wouldn't trust or accept a "verdict" given my 3 administrative judges in a non jury proceeding.

From an SLF's perspective the tires had a history of "issues". The plane was overweight, improperly maintained, out of balance and on a runway with such significant degradation as to be out of service for a portion of it's length. To overlook all of this and attempt to magically pin the blame on an other "hole in the cheese" that may or may not even exist (even if the titanium strip contributed it should have been found prior to the takeoff roll IMO) is farcical.

Sadly (given its historical and aesthetic appeal) it's a plane that should have been out of service well before this tragedy occurred.

[M2dude]

It may be possible to put all of the points that have been made by myself and others here in context if you consider the following list of AF incidents during their operation of the aircraft. Gonez was, as was said by others, the final lining up of the holes in the Swiss Cheese. These events really happened, are not rumours, and are not the figment of anyones imagination.

1. The permanent structural damage caused to A/C F-BVFD, in 1977. The aircraft made TWO extremely heavy landings in succession at Dakar, This resulted in a crushing of the tailwheel assembly and heavily scraping the rear of the engines over several hundred feet. The end result was a serious distortion of the airframe, dramatically reducing the A/C’s supersonic performance. Because of very high fuel burn, this A/C was limited to only a few routes, and was permanently grounded in 1982. (A/C was broken up).
2. Massive engine damage caused by omitting a critical component (two actually) during maintenance (sound familiar?), this time on an air intake ramp actuator.. This act of forgetfulness was coupled with an illegal set of mode switch operations by the F/E that resulted in a double engine surge. The dramatic structural weakness caused by the 2 ommited components causedthe intake ramp torque tubes being separated from the actuator, the ramps were driven downwards, the fwd ramp hitting the floor of the intake and disintegrated. The large amount of debris flew into the engine. Fortunately the A/C was close enough to JFK to make an emergency landing. The intake assembly itself was also seriously damaged, and had to be returned to Filton for repair. (Oh, and the two missing components were found on a bench in the hangar in CDG).
3. Major overfueling surge of an engine at Mach 2, due to a flight engineer experimentally tripping a C/B. This bit of craziness speaks for itself.
4. Incorrect hydraulic fluid (Skydrol) added to aircraft. The mixing of the Ester based Skydrol with the mineral based Chevron M2V fluid resulted in a polymer being formed in solution. When cold this polymer was found to be fairly fluid, but became solid as the fluid heated up. As the aircraft became supersonic systems began to fail one by one as hydraulic ports and valves were clogged by the polymer. Fortunately, as the A/C decelerated, the fluid cooled and the blockages again became fluid. The A/C just managed to return to Paris, and did not fly again for nearly a year. (EVERY single hydraulic component had to be replaced).
5. Flying for over one hour with NO electronic control on one engine. (System was totally electronic control). Due to the overspeed protection system also being disabled, there was a major overspeed of the engine. RR insisted that every rotating component on this engine was quarantined.
6. Ignorance of a very basic power generation defect, defect occuring every flight for several months without rectification. This finally resulted in a fire in one of the elrctronics racks. The cabin crew fought the fire through a hole burnt in a rack panel.
7. And finally, in late 2002, another disaster narrowly avoided when the crew failed to correctly follow drills following the loss of fuel from a failed engine fuel pipe. The offending engine was shut down, but the fuel LP valve was not closed, even when the fuel continued to escape. (A/C just made Halifax after crew FORTUNATELY decided to finally follow the correct drill).

This is a series of events, not just one in isolation, perhaps now some people will see our frustration with this whole thing, concerning the errors made AGAIN leading up to this terrible tragedy.

[PJ2]

M2dude;

The list speaks for itself and is disconcerting. Much could be said but I think would be redundant as most will understand the broader issues here.

I would like to ask you what the nature of the AF flight data monitoring program for the Concorde was. BTSC had a QAR so I am assuming there was an active data-monitoring program. I wonder first, if the aggregate data was ever kept or was it routinely destroyed after a period of time. More importantly, was the quality and capability of the program such that other "events" were captured and if so, what they may have told those examining the data and where indicated, what may have changed in operations as a result of the data.

I realize that the time the aircraft was in operation was long before sophisticated computer analysis capability but I also know that BA has run a data analysis program since the late-50's and so was doing rudimentary analysis even then.

Concurrent with the list you have posted which is serious enough, some knowledge of the long-term operational issues as captured and naturally reported to the operations people in routine data analysis might be of relevance. In any case, I'm just asking, nothing more intended.

In any case, thanks for your welcome contributions.

PJ2

[M2dude]

Hi PJ2. I seem to remember that the AF data monitoring was not that sophisticated, and parameters monitored were a fraction of the British content. I think that it is pure conjecture as to whether the data was retained; your guess is as good as mine.
These events were always greey
ted by a 'Oh no, they've done it again' this side of the English channel, and as the details of the Paris tragedy emerged there was a very somber 'they ran out of luck this time'. The holes in the Swiss cheese.

[captplaystation]

From a purely non-technical view, I spent 4 yrs of my working life doing CDG-LHR and back twice each working day during the Concorde era.
I always felt judgemental in comparing the absolutely pristine BA Concordes I saw, with the frankly grubby unkempt looking examples that I studied at close quarters on the other side of the channel.
I always wondered if one could equate the external appearance with the level of care and attention lavished on them internally.

It appears maybe my suspicions were not so ill founded.

No doubt S.F.L.Y will be along in a minute asking for proof, strange, as one who had acess to the report before it was even published he would know all this surely

Most of us have heard of one or two of the occurences you speak of (as some were rather difficult to keep quiet ) so I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of your claims.

[Frangible]

This forum is usually full of praise for the AAIB's analysis but not when it stands in the way of having a pop at the French. Please follow the critical path. All that stuff about grubby French a/c and other misdeeds may be true but they have nothing to do with the crash.

AAIB dissented from the BEA conclusions about what started the fire on BTSC and even the tank-rupture, declaring that there was no physical evidence to say that this exotic and unprecedented pressure wave in the tank should have been responsible, as opposed to the idea that a lump of rubber had gone through the wing, as it had at Dulles in June 1979. And yet, BEA chose the exotic over the thing that had already happened.

Equally improbable was the idea of ignition being caused by a flame front from the reheat moving forward against an airflow of 90m/s (in the rest of the physical universe it can't move forward against more than 6 m/s), which was the official BEA view. Much more probable, said AAIB, was the idea that the electrical cables in the wheel bay had been shorted by wheel debris and those sparks lit the escaping fuel. These wires also shorted at Dulles but, fortunately, did not ignite the streaming fuel.

The NTSB called the 79 incident "potentially catastrophic" at the time, but the Anglo-French (it always took two, remember, where Conc was concerned) post-incident analysis concluded that a recurrence was so improbable as to be not worth guarding against, although tyres were strengthened because of continual blow-outs. In the opinion of the AAIB investigators of BTSC what happened was a recurrence of 79 with the sparks igniting the fuel -- a simple, common sense and much more plausible explanation. IMO, if the BEA and the French establishment were trying to protect anyone from criticism in its investigation of Gonesse it was the aeronautical establishment, not AF.

The issue of an alleged failure by the authorities to act correctly after the 79 incident has not escaped the attentive French prosecutors, however, and the responsible officials from 30 years ago have also been indicted.

Enough French-bashing. IMO the fact that the exploding tyre caught a French Conc instead of a British one is just bad luck and AF, whatever its sins, is not in the frame, any more than all the other bits of supposed evidence which prove the Englishman's innate superiority over the Frenchman.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by M2

showed the stub of the O/R switch at O/R.

- fully in agreement of the 'jigsaw' aspects, but

a) Which switch?
b) hopefully not instigating a 'conspiracy theory', but why was it not mentioned by the BEA report since I gather from your posts you consider it to be highly relevant?

[shortfinals]

Frang,

With due respect for an otherwise impeccable post, the stuff that went through the wing at Dulles in 79 was metal. The wheel broke up following a tyreburst. It was after that that the regulators required Concorde's wheels to be built so they could run safely with no tyre all the way to rotate.

When the CAA eventually grounded the BA fleet after Gonesse, it was because they had, by then, established the size and weight of the piece of rubber that caused the Gonesse accident. All tyreburst tests done before this had shown that pieces of rubber/carcass would be 1kg or less (I think that was the weight), and ballistic tests had demonstrated that the aircraft could survive the damage that chunks of that size would cause. When they found that the chunk of tyre at CdG was much larger and heavier, theoretically because the tyre had been cut in the way the BEA said it was, they had to admit that, without further protection, the argument that Concorde's design was still safe had just been destroyed by an unexpected set of circumstances.

[BEagle]

One thing I find totally baffling is the pre-flight performance by the crew.

They knew that the aircraft would be 'right on the limit' (MTOW), then 'adjusted' the taxy fuel burn by more than 100% to make it appear that the aircraft would be at MTOW at the start of its take-off roll. Just before take-off, it was clear that it hadn't used anything like the 'amended' taxy fuel burn. So they all knew it was over MTOW. But when the departure wind was passed to them, not one single comment was raised by any of the crew about the effect on Regulated TOW.....

They knowingly started the take-off outside the limits required by regulators in terms of scheduled performance. What sort of a company allows such lax attitudes to be prevalent amongst its crews?

[lomapaseo]

Shortfinals

With due respect for an otherwise impeccable post (Frangible above), the stuff that went through the wing at Dulles in 79 was metal. The wheel broke up following a tyreburst. It was after that that the regulators required Concorde's wheels to be built so they could run safely with no tyre all the way to rotate.

When the CAA eventually grounded the BA fleet after Gonesse, it was because they had, by then, established the size and weight of the piece of rubber that caused the Gonesse accident. All tyreburst tests done before this had shown that pieces of rubber/carcass would be 1kg or less (I think that was the weight), and ballistic tests had demonstrated that the aircraft could survive the damage that chunks of that size would cause. When they found that the chunk of tyre at CdG was much larger and heavier, theoretically because the tyre had been cut in the way the BEA said it was, they had to admit that, without further protection, the argument that Concorde's design was still safe had just been destroyed by an unexpected set of circumstances.

Yes I agree that taken together these two posts are well balanced interpretations of what happened.

I will add just a slight but critical interpretation myself.

The piece of tank found on the runway at CDG did not exhibit evidence that it had been substantially penetrated through by anything. It had in all proability been impacted by the rubber from the tyre and damaged. Many alloys of aluminum at these thicknesses do have a tendancy to fracture easily once damaged by blunt ballistic impact. The subsequent fixes addressed this archilies heel. The earlier events did not exhibit the same failure mechanism nor result.

Thus lessons learned every day

[S.F.L.Y]

@ captplaystation and M2dude:

You're more than welcome to share your points of view in regard to your suspicions about the over-pressurized fuel tank, but you can't seriously act like if this was a proven fact should you wish to be considered as professionals. I've been politely asking for your sources and only found insults. Ultimately you've demonstrated you're lack of objectivity and clearly tried to manipulate readers with fantasies.

If I had access to the report before its release its simply because I was somehow connected to the person in charge of the investigation.

M@dude, you can criticize AF as much as you want by demonstrating how unprofessionally this company was operating its concordes, you won't prove that the aircraft weren't in danger when operated by BA. First of all BA had its own list of "BA specific" incidents (many in-flight rudder separations, in-flight part of elevon separation, fuel tank perforation caused by the loss of ten wheel nuts (!) etc.). Above all, BA experienced 5 fuel tank perforations before the accident (1 for AF) and you can't seriously pretend that BA didn't face any related risk.

While the professionalism of the operators can be discussed for long, the specific risks directly related to the accidents where clearly known on both sides of the channel by the airlines, CAA/DGAC, BEA/AAIB, crews and engineers. Pretending this accident isn't related to a long lasting aircraft weakness and only caused by an unprofessional company is absolutely pathetic.

[captplaystation]

If you reread my post #168 you will see I said if a fiddle had been found (which ameliorated the aircrafts well known range/payload deficiency) "well, you tell me".

Given this particular crews willingness to use other "fiddles" on the accident flight

1 - overestimating taxi fuel & not correcting afterwards
2 - Ignoring the tailwind which meant they were now overweight
3 - possibly missing a few last minute bags in the weight & balance calculation

it strikes me that they needed all the fuel they could get onboard, so would you be greatly surprised that another "fiddle" which seems to have been known about (and not needed I would propose on the slightly shorter flights of BA from LHR) could indeed have been used on this occasion.
I don't have any evidence it was, but given the crews slightly lax attitude to accuracy in other aspects of planning & execution, why not ?
Courtesy of the fact BA had lighter cabin fittings and a few less track miles to go to JFK I believe they didn't have this problem, but I know the AF operation Westbound didn't have a lot in hand with a good load.

I agree, the foundation for this tragedy should have been recognised and corrected in 1979, it wasn't, and it lurked in the background waiting for this unfortunate combination of circumstances to line up the final hole.
If the court find that the principal cause of this accident had anything to do with Continental, it will stink of whitewash.
What about the witnesses (pompiers @ CDG) who claimed to have seen sparks or flames well before the supposed position of the titanium strip, where was their evidence in your pet report ?
Furthermore if the gear bogey problem was judged by the BEA to be fairly inconsequencial why did they manage to lose directional control.
The report may be factual, up to a point, but it sure fails to emphasise the importance of things that would have been embarassing to AF ( the performance irregularities, the maintenance irregularities, the poor crm demonstrated by the crew in prematurely shutting down a live engine during the take-off)
Whether the court will look at these aspects, or just try to blame , 30 yrs later, the "soft targets", and a corporation on the wrong side of the Atlantic we will see.
If they do it will be as laughable as trying to blame an accident caused primarily by lack of situational awareness, on a little A/T defect, coincidentally also the fault of a corporation on the other side of the pond.
No wonder the Yanks must wonder how we can fit our heads so far up our own @rses.

[M2dude]

It is so pleasant to see that the majority of postings in this most serious of subjects, from both points of view, are being conducted sensibly and honestly.
I would respectfully disagree with Frangible, regarding French bashing, generally it is about the highly questionable engineering and operational standars of a certain Europian airline, at least as far as the Concorde operation goes, not French bashing sir. There is 27 years of 'previous convictions' here, and this is FACT. As far as the state of the AF A/C goes, I would suggest that the way you look after your aircraft speaks volumes about your engineering standards. On visits to AF in CDG, I and others were truly HORIFIED at the state of their A/C, not just about the agreed terrible state of the paintwork etc, but externally filthy and repair patches everywhere. (I remember in one case a HUGE patch over the main passenger entry door; lovely first impression for the passengers). But tattyness was not just confined to the exterior of the A/C; one of the DC power switches was twisted and bent, and the F/D had a distinct air of looking 'knocked about'. As far as the mechanics of what happened, I re-iterate that in the history of Concorde, this was the ONLY skin rupture (Approx the same size as an A4 sheet!!) caused by soft material only, blown OUTWARD; every other case was one of metalic debris causing relatively small fissures. (Nonetheless these of course must be and always were treated as serious). So what was so different here? Arguably the size (mass) and velocity of the tyre segment released when the tyre was destroyed, due to the previously posted conditions, and of course the condition within the tank.
We should all maybe consider what the motive is of a certain individual here, who seems personally obsessed with casting as much negative energy towards the aircraft as he possibly can. As soon as someone says something remotely positive about the A/C he seems to pounce, with the enthusiasm of a wild cat, coming out with the same 'recording' every time. He seems to know more about everything than those with 27 or more years experience. I will not engage here any more with responses to his jibes. (But as a matter of interest to all, the reported rudder and elevon panel failures (Eventually remedied by modifications and brand new units) caused no aerodynamic or control problems whatsoever. If something like this happens to a Boeing, it never even makes the back pages, but that's life I guess).