Five people to face Concorde crash trial
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I do not won't to get involved with you boy's arguements but thought I would add the following points :-
1]There were no routine runway inspections for the departure of British Airways Concorde. However from the early 1980's a rigorous inspection of the parking bay and push back area was imposed, as it was found out that this was where FOD could be most likely found. It was found to include catering objects such as spoons, and baggage pieces such as buckles along with nuts/bolts from engineering.
2] Concorde had high speed tyres fitted to it, which if I remember correctly had a top speed of 225kts so tyre speed in this incident was not the problem, but it was always in the back of your mind
3] Concorde did have a tyre deflation warning system, but only up to 132 kts after which it was inhibited. The reason for this was that most of the tyre problems experienced in the early days was from slow tyre deflation due to FOD on the ramp or in some case on the taxi way without the crew being aware of it. This led to the other tyre on that axle being overloaded and giving way / shredding during the take off run. From many test done it was found that a tyre could easily withstand an overload for a certain period and it was determined that if a tyre deflated after 132 kts it's partner could stand the overload for longer than it took the aircraft to get airbourne, so to prevent high speed rejects the tyre warning was inhibited above this speed. Therefore in this case as the tyre rupture happened above 151 kts there would have been no warning.
4] Taxing fast was accepted if not the norm on Concorde, but not for 100% of the time. The recommended proceedure so as to save brake wear and high temps was to allow the speed to build quite high and then brake almost to a stop, before allowing the speed to rise again. You might have seen the high speed bit!! In fact getting to the runway too quick was not always benificial as often it just meant sitting waiting for space in the tanks to transfer fuel for C of G reasons
5]From the wreckage a C of G gauge was found showing 54.2 % which is within the Take off allowable range. In this case they were taking off at 54% so the aft limit was 54.3% for take off. However this indication was a gauge to check the C of G was withing range after you had transferred the correct amount of fuel from tank 11. If the C of G was not then within the correct range it meant there was something wrong with the load sheet. Now all this is in the ideal world and of coarse there was a certain amount of flexibilty used, but not much.
6] What has been called here the fidlle of putting on extra fuel was no such thing, but rather an approved manufacture's proceedure, and in BA was used rarely, mainly when trying to get the official paperwork figure on for say LHR to BGI. However as you topped up the tanks slighty over normal max full level, but still leaving airspace in the tank, it did mean the the F/E had to wait during taxi out for some of this extra fuel to be burnt off for him to transfer fuel for C of G reasons as his transfer fuel valves would not open until the fuel level had dropped below the normal high level switches. So this was a good proceedure, but it did rely on the Dispatcher loading the aircraft in such a manner that very little fuel transfer [burn off] was needed to achieve the C of G for take off, otherwise you just held waiting for the burn off to take place to allow transfer
Opps sorry gone on for longer than I realised, hope it helps
1]There were no routine runway inspections for the departure of British Airways Concorde. However from the early 1980's a rigorous inspection of the parking bay and push back area was imposed, as it was found out that this was where FOD could be most likely found. It was found to include catering objects such as spoons, and baggage pieces such as buckles along with nuts/bolts from engineering.
2] Concorde had high speed tyres fitted to it, which if I remember correctly had a top speed of 225kts so tyre speed in this incident was not the problem, but it was always in the back of your mind
3] Concorde did have a tyre deflation warning system, but only up to 132 kts after which it was inhibited. The reason for this was that most of the tyre problems experienced in the early days was from slow tyre deflation due to FOD on the ramp or in some case on the taxi way without the crew being aware of it. This led to the other tyre on that axle being overloaded and giving way / shredding during the take off run. From many test done it was found that a tyre could easily withstand an overload for a certain period and it was determined that if a tyre deflated after 132 kts it's partner could stand the overload for longer than it took the aircraft to get airbourne, so to prevent high speed rejects the tyre warning was inhibited above this speed. Therefore in this case as the tyre rupture happened above 151 kts there would have been no warning.
4] Taxing fast was accepted if not the norm on Concorde, but not for 100% of the time. The recommended proceedure so as to save brake wear and high temps was to allow the speed to build quite high and then brake almost to a stop, before allowing the speed to rise again. You might have seen the high speed bit!! In fact getting to the runway too quick was not always benificial as often it just meant sitting waiting for space in the tanks to transfer fuel for C of G reasons
5]From the wreckage a C of G gauge was found showing 54.2 % which is within the Take off allowable range. In this case they were taking off at 54% so the aft limit was 54.3% for take off. However this indication was a gauge to check the C of G was withing range after you had transferred the correct amount of fuel from tank 11. If the C of G was not then within the correct range it meant there was something wrong with the load sheet. Now all this is in the ideal world and of coarse there was a certain amount of flexibilty used, but not much.
6] What has been called here the fidlle of putting on extra fuel was no such thing, but rather an approved manufacture's proceedure, and in BA was used rarely, mainly when trying to get the official paperwork figure on for say LHR to BGI. However as you topped up the tanks slighty over normal max full level, but still leaving airspace in the tank, it did mean the the F/E had to wait during taxi out for some of this extra fuel to be burnt off for him to transfer fuel for C of G reasons as his transfer fuel valves would not open until the fuel level had dropped below the normal high level switches. So this was a good proceedure, but it did rely on the Dispatcher loading the aircraft in such a manner that very little fuel transfer [burn off] was needed to achieve the C of G for take off, otherwise you just held waiting for the burn off to take place to allow transfer
Opps sorry gone on for longer than I realised, hope it helps
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The way to go...
If you happen to find yourself anywhere between .5 and 5 tons overweight for takeoff then:
A. Ignore the reported wind because it probably isn't correct anyway.
B. If the book says that you are going to have a tire failure due to overspeed due to overweight due to A, above, ignore the book because, because...
I don't know why, exactly and I probably couldn't explain this very well to a Training Captain or a Ramp Inspector or, God forbid, some Flight Operations Inspector on the jump seat but if the book stops a man doing what a man's got to do, well... Did you ever see John Wayne sweating over loadsheet calculations or using the Flight Crew Operating Manual in "The High and the Mighty"?
I understand about the aircraft being anywhere from 528 to 5,298 kilos overweight at the very minimum, just going by the numbers provided by someone arguing against this awkward fact!
How, then, did some of you arrive at this notion that the aircraft was out of its aft CG limit of 54%? What assumptions were used for that? I assume that would have to be something to do with payload, since the post above states that the CG indication was within limits when that would have depended on fuel state. Or is there still a way to have "hidden fuel" as well?
A. Ignore the reported wind because it probably isn't correct anyway.
B. If the book says that you are going to have a tire failure due to overspeed due to overweight due to A, above, ignore the book because, because...
I don't know why, exactly and I probably couldn't explain this very well to a Training Captain or a Ramp Inspector or, God forbid, some Flight Operations Inspector on the jump seat but if the book stops a man doing what a man's got to do, well... Did you ever see John Wayne sweating over loadsheet calculations or using the Flight Crew Operating Manual in "The High and the Mighty"?
I understand about the aircraft being anywhere from 528 to 5,298 kilos overweight at the very minimum, just going by the numbers provided by someone arguing against this awkward fact!
How, then, did some of you arrive at this notion that the aircraft was out of its aft CG limit of 54%? What assumptions were used for that? I assume that would have to be something to do with payload, since the post above states that the CG indication was within limits when that would have depended on fuel state. Or is there still a way to have "hidden fuel" as well?
Last edited by chuks; 7th Feb 2010 at 10:03.
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I take issue with any tribunal that utilizes it's administrative arm to determine issues of fact.
While a panel of administrative judges may very well discount these questions a jury (even a French one) is much more apt to contemplate these issues honestly. Jury nulification is the very real counterbalance to administrative judicial process that can place the "letter of the law" over the spirit of the law
But I do hope that your technical aviation knowledge is on a sounder footing than your knowledge of French constitution.
Where do you get the term "administrative judge" from?
The French Republic has a legislative arm, and an administrative arm and a judicial arm. All three are separate.
The hearing in Pontoise is under the authority of the judicial arm.
In most societies, the judicial arm exists to resolve questions of importance to that society. For example, guilt or innocence over an alleged crime, or responsibilty for something going wrong, or disputes between two parties or whatever.
The judicial arm is the one to determine "issues of fact". The judges in Pontoise are part of the judicial arm.
Different judicial systems may use different methods to determine "fact".
Some indeed use juries.
Given the disagreements expressed between, no doubt sincere and well informed contributors, about exactly what happened, how do you rate the chances of a random jury of lay people to determine which of all the highly technical evidence presented was correct and which was not?
The judges in this hearing are not aviation experts, but they have a staggeringly fierce training in the assessment of evidence.
You may be making the fairly common mistake of assuming that all the rest of the world is like the US, and if it is not, it should be.
Your condescending, flippant, irrelevant remark: "a jury (even a French one)" reveals a great deal about your agenda.
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Well, I have to admit that a jury trial in the States can often be a real crap-shoot (a simple form of gambling using a pair of dice). You can read about decisions that contradict common sense, where the jury obviously bought some bogus argument that was very well put and handed some clown millions for something he most likely brought upon himself. It can be much better if what you care about is a fair and technically correct decision to have a case tried by a judge or judges alone. In fact, I think our National Transportation Safety Board does things that way in the cases they bring so that this might not be that far from American practice in some ways.
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This thread had now become full of comments, some of them a little colourful regarding the disaster, and a few more taking pops at me personally again; it’s ok, I’m a big boy and can take it. I’ll try and put my ‘pennies worth’ in here and answer, from MY perspective, as many of the points that I can. To save writing a veritable odyssey in one go, I’ll deal with a couple of points at a time, working backwards;
- WINGSFOLDED Not much to say about your legal points, don't profess to be a legal person, but my point never was one of French Bashing. It is possible to obsess on both sides of this particualar issue, my point always was the way that Concorde was operated there, and the outright refutal by the BEA of some fairly critical points. I hope most people would want not to indulge in such things.
- Chucks; the indicated CG was derived from the ‘fuel CG’, derived from the FQI fuel weight from each tank, modifying this for the individual tank CG moment arm and also total fuel weight. The Formula used by the CG computer was( (ZFW*ZFCG) + all 13 FQI fuel mass moment sums))/(ZFW + total fuel weight). This data was then modified by manually inputting zero fuel weight (obviously the weight of the A/C itself plus payload), and zero fuel CG (the individual A/C CG (known from periodic A/C weighing) and actual payload distribution). The manually inputted data, obtained from ‘dispatch load control’ depended on its accuracy on accurate payload data (as well of course as accurately stored individual A/C weight data) ACCURACY HERE WAS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL!! . A/C CG was then computed and displayed as a percentage of the aerodynamic chord line, Co. The FQIS data was obviously dependant on the FQIS being able to ‘see’ all of the fuel also. Of particular interest here is ZFCG; As you say, the ‘frozen’ CG here is 54.2 %, this in itself although 3.7% total in error, is within the operational tolerance.. (There is a historic issue regarding the 54% limit; when the A/C initially entered service in 1979 T/O CG was limited to 53.5 %, but to enable higher T/O weights a modification was embodied to extend the limit, when required only, the limit was extended to 54%. The limit had to be manually selected by the FE, via a solenoid latched switch. The latch was broken once either Tank 9 Trim Pump operated. Now the limits on CG were presented on the CG indicator as two orange limit bugs. These bugs would move rearwards as a function of Mach Number and total A/C weight, and at Mach 2 the aft limit would be 59.2%. If the CG deviated from the limits, a ‘Mach CG’ limit warning would be generated. To enable the 54% limit. Because of the criticality of the system, the three trim transfer tanks had dual gauging channels, for added accuracy. Now, we have an indicated CG of 54.2, but , leaving aside any other issues of conjecture, there are 19 suitcases in the rear hold NOT ON THE LOADSHEET. Now these poor souls are German tourists going on a world cruise, one can only speculate the average weight of the cases; if you assume a minimum of, say, 20kg, you have an unaccounted weight of 380 KG. If you assume 25KG, then you have 475 KG, getting on for half a tonne overweight. But this additional weight was in the aft hold, situated just forward of the aft trim tank; we are significantly aft of the 54% limit, without considering any other factors
- BRIT312; Very good points made here. Your point regarding the load sheet is particularly valid here; you relied totally on the accuracy of the data you were given. As you say, although no runway check was normally carried out, there was a rigid FOD check done, both on the stands at LHR and JFK. The JFK check even extended into the confines of the initial taxiway, the rest of course being down to PONYA. Your point about the tank override switches are taken, ununreservedly withdraw my previous comments about this, I cannot use this as part of the arguement. I apologise to anyone who disagreed with me in any way on this particular issue. The Concorde Tyre Deflation Warning System, installed in the early 80’s (as part of the ongoing issue of preventing tyre failures). It was far cruder than the modern TPIS sensors used in present day Boeing and Airbus A/C. It worked on a differential strain gauge system, where the front and rear bogie loads were compared on each side. As crude as it was, it was good enough to detect a 10% deflation, and helped prevent many taxiing tyre failures. As you point out, above 130 KTS, the system was inhibited for the reasons stated.
Last edited by M2dude; 7th Feb 2010 at 14:52.
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SFLY; I've explained about CG, and what the display means. The whole point about the tyre being destroyed (no destructed?) was the COMBINATION of an overweight A/C, with a defective rolling set of wheels, initially running over an inferior runway surface. nb: this surface was repaired immediately after the dister.
The whole point is a COMBINATION of factors, not just one, get it?.
The whole point is a COMBINATION of factors, not just one, get it?.
Last edited by M2dude; 7th Feb 2010 at 16:09.
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That makes sense to me...
36 kilos is the usual limit for a suitcase (Health and Safety for the baggage handlers who might be injured picking up a too-heavy suitcase) so we could probably guess something like 680 kilos in this case and feel correct in that loose assumption, that our well-heeled Germans were on the limit with their bags.
Anyway, I never met a prosperous German male who tipped the scales at 76 kilos fully dressed with his carry-on stuff, there is that, too. (I worked for a while for a German construction company, flying a small aircraft, when I would get actual passenger weights. Some of the numbers were frightening.)
Then the bags would have been slung into the rear hold without being noted on the load sheet, not trying to kill anyone but still overlooking two critical points, the weight and the balance, in the rush to get away on time. That might make another plausible assumption, with the FE then looking at a nice, tidy loadsheet and a cockpit indication that both showed what he wanted to see, 54%. The first real sign of trouble would have been during the take off, I suppose, when the steering was ineffective.
It will be interesting to see what comes out in court. Is this a closed proceeding?
Anyway, I never met a prosperous German male who tipped the scales at 76 kilos fully dressed with his carry-on stuff, there is that, too. (I worked for a while for a German construction company, flying a small aircraft, when I would get actual passenger weights. Some of the numbers were frightening.)
Then the bags would have been slung into the rear hold without being noted on the load sheet, not trying to kill anyone but still overlooking two critical points, the weight and the balance, in the rush to get away on time. That might make another plausible assumption, with the FE then looking at a nice, tidy loadsheet and a cockpit indication that both showed what he wanted to see, 54%. The first real sign of trouble would have been during the take off, I suppose, when the steering was ineffective.
It will be interesting to see what comes out in court. Is this a closed proceeding?
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"Concorde TYRE" "Concorde TIRE" integrity
"Concorde had high speed tyres fitted to it, which if I remember correctly had a top speed of 225kts so tyre speed in this incident was not the problem, but it was always in the back of your mind"
DUNLOP
MICHELIN
KLEBER?
GOODYEAR?
Crossply
Radial
I hope reps of ANY company supplying tyres to Concorde are called to give evidence at the trial.
DUNLOP
MICHELIN
KLEBER?
GOODYEAR?
Crossply
Radial
I hope reps of ANY company supplying tyres to Concorde are called to give evidence at the trial.
Last edited by DERG; 7th Feb 2010 at 13:11. Reason: missing quote
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DERG; Good point about the tyres. The problem was that Concorde (like any other practical SST) was a delta design, amd of course the wheels are going to be totally covered by the wing. Without any flaps or slats. complete reliance is placed on the lift characteristics of the delta. This requires relatively high take-off speeds (typical VR of around 200 KTS and a V2 of 220KTS). This necessitated high pressure/high speed tyres. Also due to the large wing area involved with any delta, relatively thin wing alloy thickness has to be employed due to weight concerns. This applies to any SST. If only Kevlar sheeting had been available from the early days, then critical areas of the wing tanks could have been protected. (Any idea of armour plating here would have been a non-starter for any SST design). As far as tyres go, with the technology available in the '70's & 80's, the only real available units tended to be relatively fragmentive when punctured. All you could really do was minimise the chances of tyre failure, and protect vital systems from damage. Note that after 1993, modifications to the BA fleet prevented any further wing damage due to tyre failure. It is arguable that the advent of the brilliant Michellin NZG design should have been available earlier, but such is the pace of technological progress.
LOMAPASEO; whether you consider me an expert or not is irrelevant here. (You do not know me, what do you know?).
These issues are not a matter of opinion, they actually happened. Copying and pasting is easy to do. Oh, and as far as the expert witnesses for the defence goes, you may welll find their opinions generally similar to mine; wait and see.
SFLY the patches issue, as you say relates to the whole question of the AF engineering standards in regard to Concorde. Do you understand? The hydraulic contamination post was the reply to the previous one.
SLFinAZ; Problem was here that the A/C required full length of the runway. Because of a tech' delay, the captain wanted to get airborne ASAP. In all fairnes to him, wrong as his decision of not requesting another runway (This runway condition was of course known by all, and remember the tailwind issue also) he was en extremely experienced pilot who is not here to defend himself. Maybe he was the victim of commercial pressures I guess, we'll never know. Irrespective of ANYTHING else, this was such a tragedy.
STICKYB; I think you will find MOST of my points will be aired in court by expert witnesses. I know personally two of them and they are incredibaly respected and knowledgable gentlemen indeed.
ATCWATCHER The U/C distortion issue is a perception, due to the lack of lateral control of the A/C on the runway (16 to 22 degrees of right rudder applied with little effect on the path of the A/C), coupled with a major component being missing from the U/C, due to a major error of maintenance. So many people (not suggesting for a second that yourself is included here) with little knowledge of the Concorde U/C makeup seem determined to disagree with this point. As far as the thrust issue goes, #2 engine surged and recovered, the theory being that the surges were due to massive fuel ingestion by the LP compressor. It was still producing thrust when shut down. But point well made sir.
GOBONASTICK Airport firefighters are professional people, not just members of the public. Your comments are an insult to their professionalism. You think that you should discount eveidence supplied by these very brave folks?
CHUKS; I completely take your point regarding the difficulties involved in the 'shutting down engine' case. With Concorde, Just like most other fleets, an engine shutdown should only be carried out ONLY when safe flying speed was obtained. Not the case here, ever.
LOMAPASEO; whether you consider me an expert or not is irrelevant here. (You do not know me, what do you know?).
These issues are not a matter of opinion, they actually happened. Copying and pasting is easy to do. Oh, and as far as the expert witnesses for the defence goes, you may welll find their opinions generally similar to mine; wait and see.
SFLY the patches issue, as you say relates to the whole question of the AF engineering standards in regard to Concorde. Do you understand? The hydraulic contamination post was the reply to the previous one.
SLFinAZ; Problem was here that the A/C required full length of the runway. Because of a tech' delay, the captain wanted to get airborne ASAP. In all fairnes to him, wrong as his decision of not requesting another runway (This runway condition was of course known by all, and remember the tailwind issue also) he was en extremely experienced pilot who is not here to defend himself. Maybe he was the victim of commercial pressures I guess, we'll never know. Irrespective of ANYTHING else, this was such a tragedy.
STICKYB; I think you will find MOST of my points will be aired in court by expert witnesses. I know personally two of them and they are incredibaly respected and knowledgable gentlemen indeed.
ATCWATCHER The U/C distortion issue is a perception, due to the lack of lateral control of the A/C on the runway (16 to 22 degrees of right rudder applied with little effect on the path of the A/C), coupled with a major component being missing from the U/C, due to a major error of maintenance. So many people (not suggesting for a second that yourself is included here) with little knowledge of the Concorde U/C makeup seem determined to disagree with this point. As far as the thrust issue goes, #2 engine surged and recovered, the theory being that the surges were due to massive fuel ingestion by the LP compressor. It was still producing thrust when shut down. But point well made sir.
GOBONASTICK Airport firefighters are professional people, not just members of the public. Your comments are an insult to their professionalism. You think that you should discount eveidence supplied by these very brave folks?
CHUKS; I completely take your point regarding the difficulties involved in the 'shutting down engine' case. With Concorde, Just like most other fleets, an engine shutdown should only be carried out ONLY when safe flying speed was obtained. Not the case here, ever.
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It will be interesting to see what comes out in court. Is this a closed proceeding?
But if you turn up without being an interested party, it is not likely that there will be room for you.
Matter of space simply.
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#236 chuks ->
That was actually calculated at BEA report.
Taking into account the 19 "missing" bags (and using 88 kg per male passenger) the CG at taxi with fuel was estimated to be at 54.25, when as per load-sheet that was supposed to be 54.2. Therefore, when the crew fixed the CG before take-off they thought they ended up at 54 when in reality you can estimate that it was about 54.03.
Cannot say if that difference has any effect on aircraft performance, but it DOES sound tiny, especially when taking into account that there has to be some margin to accommodate e.g. the fact that you do not actually weigh every passenger.
Taking into account the 19 "missing" bags (and using 88 kg per male passenger) the CG at taxi with fuel was estimated to be at 54.25, when as per load-sheet that was supposed to be 54.2. Therefore, when the crew fixed the CG before take-off they thought they ended up at 54 when in reality you can estimate that it was about 54.03.
Cannot say if that difference has any effect on aircraft performance, but it DOES sound tiny, especially when taking into account that there has to be some margin to accommodate e.g. the fact that you do not actually weigh every passenger.
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From my reading here it's clear that the captain was highly respected and very experienced (as would be expected). My interest here is twofold. 1st a natural curiosity with regard to identifying what the true holes in the cheese were and an interest in the mechanism of the inquiry.
With regard to the 1st the reduction in weight being specific to the tires indicates just how close to tolerance the typical demands were. The real concern is heat...not speed. The combination of a rough initial surface and improper loading (we can confirm the COG issue by interpolation of the ineffectiveness of control input during the takeoff roll that the nose wheels had less then ideal contact. So we had more weight (more heat), More friction due to surface conditions (more heat) more stress do to improper tracking (more heat) and well above normal torque on the sidewalls (more heat). So at the end of the day we have the basic formula - more heat x 4 = MORE HEAT.
To me the failure to mandate runway inspections for FO's prior to all concorde takeoff rolls (regardless of airline) is a disaster in the making.
Moving on to my comment specific to the "administrative arm". In a trial system the judge administers the trial in accordance to applicable law. He applies the "law" to the stipulated facts. In a jury system the jury weighs the evidence presented to reach a determination of "truth". Can this lead to poor results...sure. BUT it can also lead to the correct outcome. In fact it was fought for for the very reason that over hundreds of years trials were simply viewed as rubber stamp procedures. Reading the BEA report somethings jump out at you...as much for whats omitted as whats clearly stated. However even sticking to the official report certain things jump out procedurally. The most intriguing is the lack of attention to mandated operating parameters that were exceeded.
So once you have a formal criminal indictment that provides no mechanism to weigh the role of such clearly outlined transgressions or assign any blame you have an official witch hunt. The underlying questions specific to why bags were placed in the worst possible place with regard to COG (and not included on the load sheet). Why a runway unsuitable for use was ever assigned (and not rejected by the captain out of hand)? Why a plane with an incorrect undercarriage assembly (when tire failure has such catastrophic possibilities) was even in service? For a true and fair outcome these questions all need to be weighed against the other variables in play.
Instead we have a preset combination that clearly pre-states "Mr Continental in the Library with a titanium strip" as the primary culprit backed up by a few poor sods who got politically railroaded decades ago because no way no how would those planes have been pulled out of service by either nation for any reason.
With regard to the 1st the reduction in weight being specific to the tires indicates just how close to tolerance the typical demands were. The real concern is heat...not speed. The combination of a rough initial surface and improper loading (we can confirm the COG issue by interpolation of the ineffectiveness of control input during the takeoff roll that the nose wheels had less then ideal contact. So we had more weight (more heat), More friction due to surface conditions (more heat) more stress do to improper tracking (more heat) and well above normal torque on the sidewalls (more heat). So at the end of the day we have the basic formula - more heat x 4 = MORE HEAT.
To me the failure to mandate runway inspections for FO's prior to all concorde takeoff rolls (regardless of airline) is a disaster in the making.
Moving on to my comment specific to the "administrative arm". In a trial system the judge administers the trial in accordance to applicable law. He applies the "law" to the stipulated facts. In a jury system the jury weighs the evidence presented to reach a determination of "truth". Can this lead to poor results...sure. BUT it can also lead to the correct outcome. In fact it was fought for for the very reason that over hundreds of years trials were simply viewed as rubber stamp procedures. Reading the BEA report somethings jump out at you...as much for whats omitted as whats clearly stated. However even sticking to the official report certain things jump out procedurally. The most intriguing is the lack of attention to mandated operating parameters that were exceeded.
So once you have a formal criminal indictment that provides no mechanism to weigh the role of such clearly outlined transgressions or assign any blame you have an official witch hunt. The underlying questions specific to why bags were placed in the worst possible place with regard to COG (and not included on the load sheet). Why a runway unsuitable for use was ever assigned (and not rejected by the captain out of hand)? Why a plane with an incorrect undercarriage assembly (when tire failure has such catastrophic possibilities) was even in service? For a true and fair outcome these questions all need to be weighed against the other variables in play.
Instead we have a preset combination that clearly pre-states "Mr Continental in the Library with a titanium strip" as the primary culprit backed up by a few poor sods who got politically railroaded decades ago because no way no how would those planes have been pulled out of service by either nation for any reason.
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Thanks for the information, Bubi. From that it reads as if the C.G. was in range even with the extra bags and all. I guess that just leaves the question of the missing spacer and why the aircraft didn't track the centreline.
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Moving on to my comment specific to the "administrative arm". In a trial system the judge administers the trial in accordance to applicable law. In a jury system the jury weighs the evidence presented to reach a determination of "truth".
I do not know. I will not comment.
France is not the US.
In France a judge does not "administer" the trial. Amongst other tasks, he attempts to reach a determination of truth. And there are three of them to perform this task in this context.
Laws and procedures are different between different countries and cultures.
Are you as assured in knowing the difference between an inquisitorial system and an adverserial system as you assert to be about CofG calculations, for example?
No, I am sorry, SLFinAZ, I will not accept your rabid anti French musings.
You may be entirely correct about the underlying causes of this tragedy. Or you may be entirely wrong. Or you may be somewhere in between.
But you should hold a little respect for a judicial system which has just an illustrious history as yours.
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And there in lies the problem. The judges motivations and perception of the law can (and often does) undermine or reflect on what he feels the "truth" is. Specific to this trial the nature of the indictment shapes the judges handling and potentially points him in a specific direction with regard to his findings of "truth". One need look no further then the case in Italy to see this at work. As for your comment on an inquisition vs an actual trial I agree whole heartedly. What you have here is exactly that, an inquisition. I have no bias against the French at all. As an observation I find all too many hide behind both a charge of a bias and a defense of an "illustrious" history when confronted with a moment of stupidity...this is not confined to France by any means.
As for the COG I am 100% sure. That is nothing more then math and physics and can be easily demonstrated by reviewing the effect of control input cause and effect. nose wheel steering efficiency is directly effected by COG and if it is subpar then regardless of a preconceived "number" the COG was out of balance to the point that it had a direct effect on steering. So as a matter of provable fact the nose gear steering was compromised enough to both require above normal control inputs and for those inputs to have less then expected impact on directional control.
The difference here in my perspective and yours is also the underlying issue at hand in the trial. All I want is the truth while you want an "acceptable truth". In the end a search for acceptability defeats a search for fact.
As for the COG I am 100% sure. That is nothing more then math and physics and can be easily demonstrated by reviewing the effect of control input cause and effect. nose wheel steering efficiency is directly effected by COG and if it is subpar then regardless of a preconceived "number" the COG was out of balance to the point that it had a direct effect on steering. So as a matter of provable fact the nose gear steering was compromised enough to both require above normal control inputs and for those inputs to have less then expected impact on directional control.
The difference here in my perspective and yours is also the underlying issue at hand in the trial. All I want is the truth while you want an "acceptable truth". In the end a search for acceptability defeats a search for fact.
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The different overweight values weren't a range (between 500 and 5000 kg). These numbers were given by using different approved calculation methods (male, female, infants with specific values or all at 76 kg each). Since the 500 kg results from an "approved" calculation method, it basically represent the "legal overweight" with no need to consider higher value in regard to "book operations".
There was a "high legal overweight" of 500kg, no runway inspection and a missing spacer which all played a role in the tire destruction. Which of the elements leading to fuel tank damages and fuel ignition following this tire destruction could have been 100% avoided by BA and not AF?
Considering the runway FOD and since BA wasn't conducting much runway inspections, it wouldn't have been avoided by a BA concorde. Again, what in such case would have led a BA aircraft to an 100% safe outcome?
I know that AF is definitely responsible for the violations that led to the tire destruction (the missing spacer above all) and that the BEA obviously failed to highlight it. I still want to look beyond that and I'm not convinced that such tragedy could have been avoided in all cases by a BA concorde bursting a tire.
It's my personal opinion to believe that there was a basic weakness within the aircraft's design which had little to do with the airline. Blaming AF's poor operational qualities doesn't demonstrate the aircraft wasn't presenting an unacceptable risk level.
There was a "high legal overweight" of 500kg, no runway inspection and a missing spacer which all played a role in the tire destruction. Which of the elements leading to fuel tank damages and fuel ignition following this tire destruction could have been 100% avoided by BA and not AF?
Considering the runway FOD and since BA wasn't conducting much runway inspections, it wouldn't have been avoided by a BA concorde. Again, what in such case would have led a BA aircraft to an 100% safe outcome?
I know that AF is definitely responsible for the violations that led to the tire destruction (the missing spacer above all) and that the BEA obviously failed to highlight it. I still want to look beyond that and I'm not convinced that such tragedy could have been avoided in all cases by a BA concorde bursting a tire.
It's my personal opinion to believe that there was a basic weakness within the aircraft's design which had little to do with the airline. Blaming AF's poor operational qualities doesn't demonstrate the aircraft wasn't presenting an unacceptable risk level.
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And therein lies your problem, SLFinAz:
There is more than one method of conducting a trial.
The method will depend upon the legal regime in place.
You obviously think that an inquisatorial system means that it it is per se an "inquisition". Otherwise, in the contrary, it is what you term "an actual trial"
What is taking place in Pontoise is "an actual trial".
It is taking place according to the locally applicable law which you neither embrace nor understand.
Inquisatorial or adversarial methods of trial have co-existed for centuries.
You seem only to be aware of one method.
Your general knowledge is the poorer for that. And your ability to understand other systems is seriously undermined.
I did say that I will not contest your CofG conclusions. I still will not. You may well be correct. Why raise it again with me?
What entitles you to make such an outrageous remark?
For your edification, there was 100 deaths of passengers.
There was 9 deaths of crew.
There was 4 deaths on the ground.
And you think that I am concerned with "acceptable truth"?
I want this never to happen again.
You just want to appear clever and right.
As for your comment on an inquisition vs an actual trial
The method will depend upon the legal regime in place.
You obviously think that an inquisatorial system means that it it is per se an "inquisition". Otherwise, in the contrary, it is what you term "an actual trial"
What is taking place in Pontoise is "an actual trial".
It is taking place according to the locally applicable law which you neither embrace nor understand.
Inquisatorial or adversarial methods of trial have co-existed for centuries.
You seem only to be aware of one method.
Your general knowledge is the poorer for that. And your ability to understand other systems is seriously undermined.
I did say that I will not contest your CofG conclusions. I still will not. You may well be correct. Why raise it again with me?
All I want is the truth while you want an "acceptable truth".
For your edification, there was 100 deaths of passengers.
There was 9 deaths of crew.
There was 4 deaths on the ground.
And you think that I am concerned with "acceptable truth"?
I want this never to happen again.
You just want to appear clever and right.
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"The problem was that Concorde (like any other practical SST) .........."
The problem was that Concorde was never a practical design, it was a white elephant from the start and was only kept aloft, despite it's many design flaws and technical problems, at enormous cost to the taxpayer in a fruitless effort to save face.
The problem was that Concorde was never a practical design, it was a white elephant from the start and was only kept aloft, despite it's many design flaws and technical problems, at enormous cost to the taxpayer in a fruitless effort to save face.
SLFinAZ
Some good points
But let us not rush to judgement that this is a witch hunt.
It could be as simple as weighing the facts as weighted contributors argued by expert witnesses, and only afterwards finding the extent of contributing factors which may or may not support criminal findings.
So at this point let's hope the expert witnesses argue their points in a less colorful fashion then some on this thread and after the fact we may make our own judgements of justice served.
Moving on to my comment specific to the "administrative arm". In a trial system the judge administers the trial in accordance to applicable law. He applies the "law" to the stipulated facts. In a jury system the jury weighs the evidence presented to reach a determination of "truth". Can this lead to poor results...sure. BUT it can also lead to the correct outcome. In fact it was fought for for the very reason that over hundreds of years trials were simply viewed as rubber stamp procedures. Reading the BEA report somethings jump out at you...as much for whats omitted as whats clearly stated. However even sticking to the official report certain things jump out procedurally. The most intriguing is the lack of attention to mandated operating parameters that were exceeded.
So once you have a formal criminal indictment that provides no mechanism to weigh the role of such clearly outlined transgressions or assign any blame you have an official witch hunt. The underlying questions specific to why bags were placed in the worst possible place with regard to COG (and not included on the load sheet). Why a runway unsuitable for use was ever assigned (and not rejected by the captain out of hand)? Why a plane with an incorrect undercarriage assembly (when tire failure has such catastrophic possibilities) was even in service? For a true and fair outcome these questions all need to be weighed against the other variables in play.
So once you have a formal criminal indictment that provides no mechanism to weigh the role of such clearly outlined transgressions or assign any blame you have an official witch hunt. The underlying questions specific to why bags were placed in the worst possible place with regard to COG (and not included on the load sheet). Why a runway unsuitable for use was ever assigned (and not rejected by the captain out of hand)? Why a plane with an incorrect undercarriage assembly (when tire failure has such catastrophic possibilities) was even in service? For a true and fair outcome these questions all need to be weighed against the other variables in play.
But let us not rush to judgement that this is a witch hunt.
It could be as simple as weighing the facts as weighted contributors argued by expert witnesses, and only afterwards finding the extent of contributing factors which may or may not support criminal findings.
So at this point let's hope the expert witnesses argue their points in a less colorful fashion then some on this thread and after the fact we may make our own judgements of justice served.
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You have a bit of an anti-BA obsession little S.F.L.Y.
No discussion on this accident is possible without you dragging BA into the argument.
No discussion on Turkish Airlines is possible without you somewhat myopically comparing it to BA038.
I will tell you two differences in what would have happened, the BA flight engineer would assuredly not have "jumped the gun " and shut down engine No2, and there was no Le Bourget at the end of any of Heathrows runways, so, endgame possibly all dead anyhow.
This is of course pre-assuming the BA aircraft would have left the hangar with a missing spacer & made its way to the runway for an illegal downwind take -off, in any case probably overweight & possibly out of C.G., with possibly unaccounted for baggage, and using a runway that was at best substandard in its surface characteristics.
If you want to slag off BA Concorde operations at least find decent ammunition & remind us all again about the erstwhile fleet-god who landed @ LHR & had to be towed to stand courtesy of his unwillingness to listen to the rest of the crew & divert to SNN/PIK (anywhere ) but instead complete the mission to LHR.Of course, as a mere "teenager" in this business, perhaps your memory doesn't go that far back, or wasn't it mentioned on wikipedia ?
That however does not I believe reflect on the overall comparitive levels of professionalism in the decades of operation, there are "black sheep" in every flock.
No discussion on this accident is possible without you dragging BA into the argument.
No discussion on Turkish Airlines is possible without you somewhat myopically comparing it to BA038.
I will tell you two differences in what would have happened, the BA flight engineer would assuredly not have "jumped the gun " and shut down engine No2, and there was no Le Bourget at the end of any of Heathrows runways, so, endgame possibly all dead anyhow.
This is of course pre-assuming the BA aircraft would have left the hangar with a missing spacer & made its way to the runway for an illegal downwind take -off, in any case probably overweight & possibly out of C.G., with possibly unaccounted for baggage, and using a runway that was at best substandard in its surface characteristics.
If you want to slag off BA Concorde operations at least find decent ammunition & remind us all again about the erstwhile fleet-god who landed @ LHR & had to be towed to stand courtesy of his unwillingness to listen to the rest of the crew & divert to SNN/PIK (anywhere ) but instead complete the mission to LHR.Of course, as a mere "teenager" in this business, perhaps your memory doesn't go that far back, or wasn't it mentioned on wikipedia ?
That however does not I believe reflect on the overall comparitive levels of professionalism in the decades of operation, there are "black sheep" in every flock.