Fairchild Merlin twinprop disappeard off coast in Norway
Sounds similar in some aspects to the DC8 ABX ferry flight at night in icy weather
Somebody needs to be thinking ahead of the trainee before you get a significant altitude loss rate.
Somebody needs to be thinking ahead of the trainee before you get a significant altitude loss rate.
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Someone needs to be (re) thinking about doing slow flight and/or approach to stalls in IMC.
The whole AOA thing is much easier in day VMC.
The whole AOA thing is much easier in day VMC.
Last edited by misd-agin; 7th Dec 2011 at 04:55. Reason: added (re)
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Used to do all my lpcs on be 1900 and Sa227 on the actual airplane.
Slow flights,steep turns,approach to stall along with all other required maneuvers were done in VMC,sometimes at night.(single pilot ops).
NEVER did my check airman ever came close to mentionning some as stupid as pulling any CBs,and god knows i was working in a freight dogs ops....
Slow flights,steep turns,approach to stall along with all other required maneuvers were done in VMC,sometimes at night.(single pilot ops).
NEVER did my check airman ever came close to mentionning some as stupid as pulling any CBs,and god knows i was working in a freight dogs ops....
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Also, it's been at least two years since the FAA have been leaning away from the "min height loss in a stall" technique, and quite rightly so in my opinion.
simultaneously reducing the angle of attack, increasing power to maximum allowable, and leveling the wings to return to a straight- and-level flight attitude with a minimum loss of altitude appropriate for the airplane. How training is conducted later during FAA type ratings (SIC-ratings) I don't know, but from early in there training the minimum altitude loss is still emphasized by many instructors.
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40&80:
Are you referring to the Toulouse runup accident? I think the c/b rumor has been discarded as nonsense in this case.
I recall seeing a picture of a A340 wrecked because of this pulling a c/b unauthorized nonsense.
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Confusing. Much of this post concerns "Inge," a Scandinavian name that I always assumed to be female, yet one poster claims that he knew a man named Inge in flight school.
Then there are references to the candidate being flight checked not having the upper-body strength to handle the airplane in a stall recovery, again suggesting that it was a woman. The first accident report refers to "he," the second one "she."
Then there are references to the candidate being flight checked not having the upper-body strength to handle the airplane in a stall recovery, again suggesting that it was a woman. The first accident report refers to "he," the second one "she."
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Norwegian names
Inge is a mans name in Norway. The day prior a female was tested, she was the one with the upper body strength issue. (Assuming that I still can read Norsk).
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Inge is a mans name in Norway. The day prior a female was tested, she was the one with the upper body strength issue. (Assuming that I still can read Norsk).
I used to operate the Metro III, it had a SAS (stall avoidance system) which consisted of a stalling warning horn, light and stick pusher.... there was a very good reason for having such a system on this type, it had nasty wing tip stall characteristics, placarded in front of my seat was the message 'Do not stall this aircraft'.
Now as it happens I have been in this aircraft in a stall and it wasn't pleasant. We carried out an airtest at 18000', all was well. Engineers had asked us to check the SAS operation in flight as spurious SAS fault lights had been seen. Very experienced Captain was handling, however as we approached the stall speed our speed crept back perhaps just a little quicker that the required 1kt/sec, just as we felt the first bit of buffet, the SAS fault light illuminated and a wing tip stalled, I remember it vividly as the nose dropped through the horizon and the wing dropped giving a bank angle of 90 to 100 degrees. Full opposite rudder was applied, the power left at idle, we eventually recovered wings level (rudder very ineffective for good few seconds) and eased out of about a 15 to 20 degree dive recovering by approx 13000' (if my memory serves me correctly, this was about 8 years ago).
That airtest scared the s**t out of me, I flew the aircraft for a few more years, but boy did I respect its characteristics!
Now as it happens I have been in this aircraft in a stall and it wasn't pleasant. We carried out an airtest at 18000', all was well. Engineers had asked us to check the SAS operation in flight as spurious SAS fault lights had been seen. Very experienced Captain was handling, however as we approached the stall speed our speed crept back perhaps just a little quicker that the required 1kt/sec, just as we felt the first bit of buffet, the SAS fault light illuminated and a wing tip stalled, I remember it vividly as the nose dropped through the horizon and the wing dropped giving a bank angle of 90 to 100 degrees. Full opposite rudder was applied, the power left at idle, we eventually recovered wings level (rudder very ineffective for good few seconds) and eased out of about a 15 to 20 degree dive recovering by approx 13000' (if my memory serves me correctly, this was about 8 years ago).
That airtest scared the s**t out of me, I flew the aircraft for a few more years, but boy did I respect its characteristics!
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AUGMENTATION!!?? 
The last thing you want! I'd go with Joshua on that one - it is AVOIDANCE we want, not 'Augmentation', particularly in view of Metro Tech - Stall Avoidance System Manual , and Fatal Merlin crash puts spotlight back on stall recovery who seem to agree with us. I imagine a translator has missed a trick here?
The last thing you want! I'd go with Joshua on that one - it is AVOIDANCE we want, not 'Augmentation', particularly in view of Metro Tech - Stall Avoidance System Manual , and Fatal Merlin crash puts spotlight back on stall recovery who seem to agree with us. I imagine a translator has missed a trick here?
Now then chaps; I have been watching this disertation for a few days and I sadly feel that I need to correct some misunderstandings about stall recovery in transport aircraft.
For those of you out there who don't know me, I was still instructing and examining on 4 engined jet aircraft until two years ago.
There seems to be a growing argument that the technique of "powering out of a stall" in such aircraft is a crap idea and that the only answer is to stuff the nose down like you were taught in a Cessna 150.
I am extremely familiar with teaching and examining the license requirements and for obtaining a type rating on such aircraft.
Recovery from an approaching stall with either a clean wing or a wing with minimum flap was taught as "relax the back pressure on the control column and apply full power". If conducted properly, the loss of height was in the order of 200 ft.
If you stuffed the control column forward and carried out a Cessna 150 recovery, the loss of height would be about 1,000 ft.
Why?
Well, it is very simple. The parameters required by JARs etc were that the exercise began with the onset of the stickshaker. Now every MS Pilot who has decided to infect our website will be able to tell you that the stick shaker will activate at approximately 11 knots or so above the actual stall.
Therefore, the recovery from stick shake by applying full power and easing forward on the control column is perfectly valid for the aircraft has not actually got anywhere near stalling.
In other words, the aircraft was never stalled in the first place.
So when did the candidate actually have to deal with a proper stall?
The final stall on the type rating test consisted of turning on to base leg (for example) with 30 degrees of bank, the gear and land flap down and with the power set at approach setting but at the same time maintaining height (intead of descending) right through the stick shaker, to pulling and pulling and pulling until the stick push activated. The average height loss through this manoeuvre was 700 - 900 feet.
For those of you out there who don't know me, I was still instructing and examining on 4 engined jet aircraft until two years ago.
There seems to be a growing argument that the technique of "powering out of a stall" in such aircraft is a crap idea and that the only answer is to stuff the nose down like you were taught in a Cessna 150.
I am extremely familiar with teaching and examining the license requirements and for obtaining a type rating on such aircraft.
Recovery from an approaching stall with either a clean wing or a wing with minimum flap was taught as "relax the back pressure on the control column and apply full power". If conducted properly, the loss of height was in the order of 200 ft.
If you stuffed the control column forward and carried out a Cessna 150 recovery, the loss of height would be about 1,000 ft.
Why?
Well, it is very simple. The parameters required by JARs etc were that the exercise began with the onset of the stickshaker. Now every MS Pilot who has decided to infect our website will be able to tell you that the stick shaker will activate at approximately 11 knots or so above the actual stall.
Therefore, the recovery from stick shake by applying full power and easing forward on the control column is perfectly valid for the aircraft has not actually got anywhere near stalling.
In other words, the aircraft was never stalled in the first place.
So when did the candidate actually have to deal with a proper stall?
The final stall on the type rating test consisted of turning on to base leg (for example) with 30 degrees of bank, the gear and land flap down and with the power set at approach setting but at the same time maintaining height (intead of descending) right through the stick shaker, to pulling and pulling and pulling until the stick push activated. The average height loss through this manoeuvre was 700 - 900 feet.
Airbus changed its stall recovery last year to lower the nose to get out of the stall, then add power, then wings level, then stow speed brakes. It also has a note stating that if below FL200 consider flap 1.
The stall recovery was changed as it was found that the addition of power on under slung engines could pitch the nose further into the stall (as happened on a 320). In the sim average altitude lost is between 300' to 500' (A330/340). Recovery is still started upon activation of the stall warning (JAR).
The stall recovery was changed as it was found that the addition of power on under slung engines could pitch the nose further into the stall (as happened on a 320). In the sim average altitude lost is between 300' to 500' (A330/340). Recovery is still started upon activation of the stall warning (JAR).
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donpizmeov
It was not just Airbus, but Boeing and the other manufacturers as well. Stall recovery has ALWAYS been lower the nose first to reduce AOA and it was NOT a NEW technique it was to emphasise STALL recovery. Training on the Airbus prior to that was for low speed recovery, in Normal law, NOT stall recovery. Big difference.
It was not just Airbus, but Boeing and the other manufacturers as well. Stall recovery has ALWAYS been lower the nose first to reduce AOA and it was NOT a NEW technique it was to emphasise STALL recovery. Training on the Airbus prior to that was for low speed recovery, in Normal law, NOT stall recovery. Big difference.
Last edited by iceman50; 8th Dec 2011 at 22:36. Reason: speeling
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Yeaa Metro...
Maybe juust a little bit of the topic but i feel i have to let it out and shear it with you.
Many years ago i did my Metro III left seat training in the aeroplane before the CAA checkride ( did SIM at FS International ). However, after a normal ILS in simulated IMC ie blocked windscreen, just when full thrust/torque was applied at minima 200ft. And as the gear was rising my instructor pulled the right power lever down to flight idle, in normal conditions the NTS system would have kicked in and eased it a little bit before feather but he tought that i could manage flight idle then simulate feather. We never got to that point! Now things started to happen pretty quick. Remember minimum airspeed at 200ft.
Flightcontrols at full deflection the aircraft just wanted to flip over i slowly pushed the nose forward and shouted " give me my freaking engine back".
His hands was already there and pushed the right engine slowly back to max torque still with my my controls at full deflection and about 75 degrees of bank before i slowly managed to get it wings level again.
We climbed out of it and aborted session naturally with brown skidmarks in the throusers. On the way back to the base airport we tried the same manuvre at 12000ft with the exakt same result.
The problem was that right engine flight idle was set to low ( dont remember how much ) and simultanesly right gear took an eternety to go back up when selected, those two in combination with actual training in A/C at low AS and 200 ft is still my most horrifying near death experience. Just a few years before this incident same company we bought this Metro from did an almost exactly the same turned over during a pull up with devastating result ( no survivors ) oboy did i had that one in my mind during the trip back home.
I was fortunate that time, thats for sure.
Had to release my hart with this one
Many years ago i did my Metro III left seat training in the aeroplane before the CAA checkride ( did SIM at FS International ). However, after a normal ILS in simulated IMC ie blocked windscreen, just when full thrust/torque was applied at minima 200ft. And as the gear was rising my instructor pulled the right power lever down to flight idle, in normal conditions the NTS system would have kicked in and eased it a little bit before feather but he tought that i could manage flight idle then simulate feather. We never got to that point! Now things started to happen pretty quick. Remember minimum airspeed at 200ft.
Flightcontrols at full deflection the aircraft just wanted to flip over i slowly pushed the nose forward and shouted " give me my freaking engine back".
His hands was already there and pushed the right engine slowly back to max torque still with my my controls at full deflection and about 75 degrees of bank before i slowly managed to get it wings level again.
We climbed out of it and aborted session naturally with brown skidmarks in the throusers. On the way back to the base airport we tried the same manuvre at 12000ft with the exakt same result.
The problem was that right engine flight idle was set to low ( dont remember how much ) and simultanesly right gear took an eternety to go back up when selected, those two in combination with actual training in A/C at low AS and 200 ft is still my most horrifying near death experience. Just a few years before this incident same company we bought this Metro from did an almost exactly the same turned over during a pull up with devastating result ( no survivors ) oboy did i had that one in my mind during the trip back home.
I was fortunate that time, thats for sure.
Had to release my hart with this one
I can't comment on the technical aspects of differing stall recovery techniques, but I will comment on the human factors element of this accident.
It seems to be quite clear that the candidates were not comfortable with the test environment, whether that was due to IMC or the test regime we don't know, I'd suspect a touch of both. I would question the judgement of the commander and to a lessor extent, the examiner in this instance, it must have been obvious that the candidate was stressed, why push it further?
It stinks of either get it done-itis or macho flying imho. A needless accident.
It seems to be quite clear that the candidates were not comfortable with the test environment, whether that was due to IMC or the test regime we don't know, I'd suspect a touch of both. I would question the judgement of the commander and to a lessor extent, the examiner in this instance, it must have been obvious that the candidate was stressed, why push it further?
It stinks of either get it done-itis or macho flying imho. A needless accident.
Josh, I think you need to re-read your 227 manual.
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SAS=stall avoidance system..installed on all SA-226/227 aircraft..SAS2= a combination of a SAS and a Stability Augmentation System that was initially installed on the SA-227TT (merlinIII), (a similar system was installed on the Piper Cheyenne-2)..the SAS2 system was required for certain European authorities..SAS2 was standard in the SA-227BC the FAA/JAR part 23 certified SA-227..(Metro23)
If the aircraft in the accident is SA-226, then it is a "short-wing" Merlin/Metro, and take it from experience, has nasty wing drop when flown to a full aerodynamic stall...if the rudder was even slightly displaced one might find themselves inverted...The SA-227 in my experience..4K+hrs, exhibited relatively benign full stall characteristics, and no wing drop when the controls were pushed forward in a positive fashion to "unload" reduce the AOA..in any event, "push and roll" is the order of the day...
If the aircraft in the accident is SA-226, then it is a "short-wing" Merlin/Metro, and take it from experience, has nasty wing drop when flown to a full aerodynamic stall...if the rudder was even slightly displaced one might find themselves inverted...The SA-227 in my experience..4K+hrs, exhibited relatively benign full stall characteristics, and no wing drop when the controls were pushed forward in a positive fashion to "unload" reduce the AOA..in any event, "push and roll" is the order of the day...