China Air / Anchorage tape released
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China Air / Anchorage tape released
From the Anchorage Daily News for Monday, February 18. A link gives a transcript of the tower communications.<a href="http://www.adn.com/front/story/766173p-818755c.html" target="_blank">http://www.adn.com/front/sto ry/766173p-818755c.html</a>
At one point, the printout says China Air reports airborne.. . [quote](portion of transcript not printed)<hr></blockquote> I can only imagine what must have been on it.
[ 18 February 2002: Message edited by: RiverCity ]</p>
At one point, the printout says China Air reports airborne.. . [quote](portion of transcript not printed)<hr></blockquote> I can only imagine what must have been on it.
[ 18 February 2002: Message edited by: RiverCity ]</p>
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The best bit was this exchange between the local controller and the North Radar controller:-
2:46:38 North Radar Controller
did he hit anything out there
2:46:39 Local Controller
we're still checking
2:46:40 North Radar Controller
huh he's not climbing real good
2:46:43 Local Controller
no he wasn't taxiing very well
. .Classic.
2:46:38 North Radar Controller
did he hit anything out there
2:46:39 Local Controller
we're still checking
2:46:40 North Radar Controller
huh he's not climbing real good
2:46:43 Local Controller
no he wasn't taxiing very well
. .Classic.
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Does anyone know the status of the CVR? Any usable data recovered? Tape or digital? Did the crew pull the CB after takeoff to preserve it? (I think I know the answer to that one).
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Shore guy, . .CVR have only very limited range ( 30 min to 1 hour )before getting re-used again. The flight ANC to TPE was 11 hours..no need to pull any tricks there. . .Ironically, if they had pull the CB they would have preserved the interesting conversation that possibly led to the mistake.
As to anyone (pilot or other ) that wants to throw the first stone to the CAL crew make sure that you will never ever make a similar mistake .... .This one gets attention because it was mediatised.. .There were many similar cases in the past, including landing at the wrong airport and/ or on taxi ways...
As to anyone (pilot or other ) that wants to throw the first stone to the CAL crew make sure that you will never ever make a similar mistake .... .This one gets attention because it was mediatised.. .There were many similar cases in the past, including landing at the wrong airport and/ or on taxi ways...
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So true, ATC.... .All of us (ATC, cockpit crew, etc) in the course of a 30 year career, will experience that pit-of-the-stomach feeling that leads to the universal: "oh Sh*****t!"; some more serious than others. The same is expressed in Wolfe's classic: "God, Please don't let me F*ck Up!". When you realize, it's just too late. Can you imagine the conversation (or lack of same) on that 10-11 flight to TPE, knowing what awaited at the end of the line? Gentlemen & Gentlewomen, it can happen to any of us. We know about the f*-ups that have happened. A good thread might be, "what f*ck-ups have been PREVENTED by a last-minute personal cross-check"- (heading bug vrs. runway hdg, for TO and Landing, last-minute gear down check, etc & etc.
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ATC Watcher,
You are telling Shore Guy what he already knows.... .He meant that he doubted that the crew would have pulled the CB, as they for sure would NOT have wanted it preserved.
You are telling Shore Guy what he already knows.... .He meant that he doubted that the crew would have pulled the CB, as they for sure would NOT have wanted it preserved.
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I'm sure such incidents are not uncommon, except for the size of the A/C involved. Why else would the CFS entry for Montréal/St-Hubert include a warning that a certain taxiway can be mistaken for one of the runways?
I've also heard of bigger gaffes than this. Around here it was a regular occurrence for student drivers to land not just at the wrong airport, but in the wrong country <img src="eek.gif" border="0"> I also heard of an incident at KAGS where a B737 was cleared to land, then put down at an airfield four miles away with a 3700' runway.
I've also heard of bigger gaffes than this. Around here it was a regular occurrence for student drivers to land not just at the wrong airport, but in the wrong country <img src="eek.gif" border="0"> I also heard of an incident at KAGS where a B737 was cleared to land, then put down at an airfield four miles away with a 3700' runway.
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I don't know why everyone is so judgemental- there may be a perfectly good reason why the captain elected to use a 6000 foot taxy-way with a snowbank at the end for take off instead of a 10,499 foot runway. It is gross impertinance to. .criticise him until we hear his side of the story. Then we'll nail him.
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There is also the possibility that the crew on that airplane prefer blue edge lighting as it is easier on the eyes than bright white.
I know I prefer blue light to bright white I find it more relaxing.
We must be careful here and not expect to much from the crew on a heavy jet, we don't want to be to demanding you know.
Furthermore the final decision is the Captains and you have to hand it to him, for that takeoff he had the required rwy. lenght figured right to the inch.
.............. .
The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no.
I know I prefer blue light to bright white I find it more relaxing.
We must be careful here and not expect to much from the crew on a heavy jet, we don't want to be to demanding you know.
Furthermore the final decision is the Captains and you have to hand it to him, for that takeoff he had the required rwy. lenght figured right to the inch.
.............. .
The hardest thing about flying is knowing when to say no.
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> there may be a perfectly good reason why the >captain elected to use a 6000 foot taxy-way with >a snowbank at the end for take off instead of a >10,499 foot runway..
I think it was that 'takeoff over a 50 foot obstacle' test. <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
I think it was that 'takeoff over a 50 foot obstacle' test. <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
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All,
The China Airline situation in ANC leaves them open for a little bashing because (1) no one was killed or injured (by luck) (2) Their already poor accident/incident record.
However, incursion incidents/accidents are one of the largest threats in airline operations. I have written a couple of articles on the subject for our in house publication and have read the reports on many, many incursions.
There seems to me to be a few different major reasons for incursions. Some are obvious, some not.
(1) Crew not following proper company and _____ (regulatory authority) procedure. Most carriers now require a taxi briefing and having all crewmembers have a taxi diagram in view. Evidence suggests this is not always done.
(2) Loss of situational awareness while taxiing – at a glance this seems to be a major contributing factor in the China Airline incident. Some airports have extremely confusing taxiway/runway setups, and poor markings/lighting.
In the U.S., the FAA has made this MAJOR item for both pilot and controller education, new and better signage and lighting aids, and warning devices that combine ASR and surface radar data to predict incursions (nicknamed AMASS), Standardized Taxi Routes (STR’s), and a proposed Surface Management System (SMS). As with most regulatory agencies, progress is slow, but it is happening. (I’m not trying to be patronizing here, but our British friends seem to be way ahead of us on these procedures/hardware/software – the notorious fogs in G.B. no doubt the motivation).
Now I’m going to get into the “touchy, feely” area. CRM, or lack of it during taxi operations. Taxiing a transport aircraft is regarded in many cockpits as a “Captain only” event, which is reinforced by the fact that on most aircraft there is only a tiller on one side – the captains. While in all other regimes of operation, the F/O has access to equal control of the aircraft (he/she may have to move a priority switch in some of the newer aircraft), during taxi in most transport aircraft, only the captain can truly control the aircraft. And I believe that this, in many cases, contributes to taking the rest of the crew out of the loop. The only direct input an F/O has in most aircraft to influence taxi is to step on the brakes – and no doubt produce a confrontation. However, in many of the incursion events, there was a “warning shot across the bow” from another crewmember (including and in particular Tenerife), but not direct action by the other crewmember. How may incursion incidents/accidents were prevented by a direct input by another crewmember (brakes)? We will never know.
I have always been of the opinion that the toughest call in aviation is taking control of an aircraft (air or ground) when you are not the PIC. But the incursion history shows this would have saved many lives. There is very little guidance/training in this area. A simulator scenario/training syllabus during annual recurrent that would require the F/O to take control of the aircraft would be helpful in this regard.
Comments? Criticisms? The traditional PPRUNE bashings?
The China Airline situation in ANC leaves them open for a little bashing because (1) no one was killed or injured (by luck) (2) Their already poor accident/incident record.
However, incursion incidents/accidents are one of the largest threats in airline operations. I have written a couple of articles on the subject for our in house publication and have read the reports on many, many incursions.
There seems to me to be a few different major reasons for incursions. Some are obvious, some not.
(1) Crew not following proper company and _____ (regulatory authority) procedure. Most carriers now require a taxi briefing and having all crewmembers have a taxi diagram in view. Evidence suggests this is not always done.
(2) Loss of situational awareness while taxiing – at a glance this seems to be a major contributing factor in the China Airline incident. Some airports have extremely confusing taxiway/runway setups, and poor markings/lighting.
In the U.S., the FAA has made this MAJOR item for both pilot and controller education, new and better signage and lighting aids, and warning devices that combine ASR and surface radar data to predict incursions (nicknamed AMASS), Standardized Taxi Routes (STR’s), and a proposed Surface Management System (SMS). As with most regulatory agencies, progress is slow, but it is happening. (I’m not trying to be patronizing here, but our British friends seem to be way ahead of us on these procedures/hardware/software – the notorious fogs in G.B. no doubt the motivation).
Now I’m going to get into the “touchy, feely” area. CRM, or lack of it during taxi operations. Taxiing a transport aircraft is regarded in many cockpits as a “Captain only” event, which is reinforced by the fact that on most aircraft there is only a tiller on one side – the captains. While in all other regimes of operation, the F/O has access to equal control of the aircraft (he/she may have to move a priority switch in some of the newer aircraft), during taxi in most transport aircraft, only the captain can truly control the aircraft. And I believe that this, in many cases, contributes to taking the rest of the crew out of the loop. The only direct input an F/O has in most aircraft to influence taxi is to step on the brakes – and no doubt produce a confrontation. However, in many of the incursion events, there was a “warning shot across the bow” from another crewmember (including and in particular Tenerife), but not direct action by the other crewmember. How may incursion incidents/accidents were prevented by a direct input by another crewmember (brakes)? We will never know.
I have always been of the opinion that the toughest call in aviation is taking control of an aircraft (air or ground) when you are not the PIC. But the incursion history shows this would have saved many lives. There is very little guidance/training in this area. A simulator scenario/training syllabus during annual recurrent that would require the F/O to take control of the aircraft would be helpful in this regard.
Comments? Criticisms? The traditional PPRUNE bashings?
Pegase Driver
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Flew Cloudy : Check ! I read the post too fast as usual when I am tired...
Shore guy : my apologies , I was asuming you were another journo in disguise ( many of those in this Forum ).
Incidentally those 2 facts ( tired and asuming )might find their way into explaining some of the CAL error on the day .. just a thought.. .Does anyone knows what was the duty / rest time of those guys before making the flight ?
The points about CRM and left seat/ right seat handling of the taxi part is very relevant. . .You will find that most taxi / runway incursions investigated end up by showing that one or both factors played a major role.. .A simple distraction while taxing, combined with poor communications/ CRM techniques within the cockpit aferwards can lead to an error.. .Very senior left hand seats ( always doing the taxi due position of steer ) and very junior right hands are not helping either.. .If I take the preliminary report of the latest tragic runway incursion ( Linate )One the remarks on the R/T by the Captain of the Citation was : "I am familiar with the airport " when the controller tried to give him taxi directions.. .With that kind of remark, what do you say as a junior F/O if you guess something is wrong ( the error in that perticular case was nearly 180 degrees ....)
If after al those cases, someone would look and revise the taxi check lists to eliminate those taxi errors , one would advance safety a big step.. .What is often forgotten is that , as a pilot ( and as a pax )today , you have more chances of getting killed on a runway or a taxi way than while flying..
Shore guy : my apologies , I was asuming you were another journo in disguise ( many of those in this Forum ).
Incidentally those 2 facts ( tired and asuming )might find their way into explaining some of the CAL error on the day .. just a thought.. .Does anyone knows what was the duty / rest time of those guys before making the flight ?
The points about CRM and left seat/ right seat handling of the taxi part is very relevant. . .You will find that most taxi / runway incursions investigated end up by showing that one or both factors played a major role.. .A simple distraction while taxing, combined with poor communications/ CRM techniques within the cockpit aferwards can lead to an error.. .Very senior left hand seats ( always doing the taxi due position of steer ) and very junior right hands are not helping either.. .If I take the preliminary report of the latest tragic runway incursion ( Linate )One the remarks on the R/T by the Captain of the Citation was : "I am familiar with the airport " when the controller tried to give him taxi directions.. .With that kind of remark, what do you say as a junior F/O if you guess something is wrong ( the error in that perticular case was nearly 180 degrees ....)
If after al those cases, someone would look and revise the taxi check lists to eliminate those taxi errors , one would advance safety a big step.. .What is often forgotten is that , as a pilot ( and as a pax )today , you have more chances of getting killed on a runway or a taxi way than while flying..
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Surface radar wouldn't have helped in this case. The aircraft started its takeoff roll at the right point - runway 32 at Kilo taxiway. Controllers (rightly) wouldn't say anything after observing the wrong takeoff direction on radar, for the same reasons the controllers in the tower cab didn't. V1 was probably somewhere around 50 knots!
The fascinating thing about this incident is that taxiway Kilo narrows down significantly after passing the threshhold of 06L. I would estimate 40 foot width or less. These guys could track a centerline, at least.....
The fascinating thing about this incident is that taxiway Kilo narrows down significantly after passing the threshhold of 06L. I would estimate 40 foot width or less. These guys could track a centerline, at least.....
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...in a totally unrelated story, the Chinese Ministry of Population growth, today released a directive.In the future all children will cease to be named after the sound silverware makes when droped on the floor. Intead names such as Moe, Larry and Curly, would be prefferable. <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
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Hiding a Runway to Avoid Landing Mishaps . . . . . .February 21, 2002 10:49 am EST
TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan's airport authorities said on Thursday they planned to camouflage a defunct part of a new runway at Tokyo's Narita international airport in a bid to keep aircraft from landing there by mistake.. .They will contrive to hide the concrete strip with green paint and camouflage netting to make it resemble a field, an airport authority spokesman said.
The New Tokyo International Airport Authority got into its pickle when local farmers refused to sell tracts of land located at what would have been the center of a planned 2,500-yard runway.
Because construction had already begun on either side of the disputed land, it was forced to lengthen the northern strip by 800 yards and abandon the other.
That left a 430-yard-long section of unusable runway -- too short for a plane to land on safely.
In 2000, a Japan Air System passenger jet accidentally landed on an unused strip of new runway at Tokyo's Haneda airport, a precedent that prompted authorities at Narita to take action, the spokesman said.
"It would be a huge problem if an airplane landed in the unused section of the runway," he said.
The new 2,180-yard runway is set to open on April 18.
TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan's airport authorities said on Thursday they planned to camouflage a defunct part of a new runway at Tokyo's Narita international airport in a bid to keep aircraft from landing there by mistake.. .They will contrive to hide the concrete strip with green paint and camouflage netting to make it resemble a field, an airport authority spokesman said.
The New Tokyo International Airport Authority got into its pickle when local farmers refused to sell tracts of land located at what would have been the center of a planned 2,500-yard runway.
Because construction had already begun on either side of the disputed land, it was forced to lengthen the northern strip by 800 yards and abandon the other.
That left a 430-yard-long section of unusable runway -- too short for a plane to land on safely.
In 2000, a Japan Air System passenger jet accidentally landed on an unused strip of new runway at Tokyo's Haneda airport, a precedent that prompted authorities at Narita to take action, the spokesman said.
"It would be a huge problem if an airplane landed in the unused section of the runway," he said.
The new 2,180-yard runway is set to open on April 18.