SQ Incident?
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My mother was on the flight and I've just picked her up from Perth airport.
She said one hour out of Sin cabin crew service was stopped. The captain said something along the lines of the electronics are over heating and they're going to dump fuel and go to Jakarta. The mother commented upon landing no reverse thrust or spoilers (she travels quite often and was on the wing) and seemed to float upon landing.
Approx four hours later left Jakarta for Perth.
It was a Boeing 777-200
She said one hour out of Sin cabin crew service was stopped. The captain said something along the lines of the electronics are over heating and they're going to dump fuel and go to Jakarta. The mother commented upon landing no reverse thrust or spoilers (she travels quite often and was on the wing) and seemed to float upon landing.
Approx four hours later left Jakarta for Perth.
It was a Boeing 777-200
Last edited by Comoman; 24th Feb 2008 at 12:17. Reason: Edit for Typo
Join Date: Nov 2001
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I missed seeing the aircraft, it wasn't there when I went to the airport... I didn't know anything about it until I came back... but the info I got on it was that someone mentioned an LCD problem on the flight displays... 
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To revert to the original posting - what happened in Lahore that made a SQ B-777 descent to less than 500 feet more than 5 miles out?
Someone mentioned that it a miscalculation with the airfield elevation - that should account for about 700 feet (712 to be precise) of the 2800 that is the 'Platform Altitude'. I do not understand where the airfield elevation would come into the picture, but for some folks in SQ, it seems it did.
I wish the Safety boards there could let the rest of the world know the whats and the whys, so that the errors are not repeated by them as well as others.
But then, they would need to the find time for this, away from shielding SQ's ETOPS after 3 IFSDs in 2 weeks.
Someone mentioned that it a miscalculation with the airfield elevation - that should account for about 700 feet (712 to be precise) of the 2800 that is the 'Platform Altitude'. I do not understand where the airfield elevation would come into the picture, but for some folks in SQ, it seems it did.
I wish the Safety boards there could let the rest of the world know the whats and the whys, so that the errors are not repeated by them as well as others.
But then, they would need to the find time for this, away from shielding SQ's ETOPS after 3 IFSDs in 2 weeks.
Prop - heard that he ADDED the 700 feet to his calculation instead of taking it off!! That's now 1400 feet in error. I know it seems hard to believe. How the co-pilot didn't pick it up is also a mystery. It's also the 19+ seconds of GPWS that has their (managements) attention.
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19+ secs of the GPWS!!!!
I cannot believe that they considered the elevation for the maintenence of the intermediate altitude!
Sacking the pilots would be the simplest and stupidest thing that the management could do (akin to shooting the messenger): what they should be doing is holding a thorough inquiry of the ills in the training, checking and line audits that would let such incidents pass.
It is better to have a realistic and true measure of the the ills than the sugar coating that covers all what is bitter.
I cannot believe that they considered the elevation for the maintenence of the intermediate altitude!
Sacking the pilots would be the simplest and stupidest thing that the management could do (akin to shooting the messenger): what they should be doing is holding a thorough inquiry of the ills in the training, checking and line audits that would let such incidents pass.
It is better to have a realistic and true measure of the the ills than the sugar coating that covers all what is bitter.
Join Date: Mar 2001
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SQ incident At OPLA
Hey guys do you all still remember in good old days it was insisted that, In the tewrminal area descend to MSA and then to IAF altitude and always try and capture the G/S from below. This was one way to avoid the capture of false G/S. If the G/S is showing fly up, never descend below one's Initial app. altitude. Integrity of the G/S signal could be verified in time. Otherwise, by following the track dist. on finals versus height check and changing to G/S out minma, one could complete the approach.
Lahore elevation app. 750' was hazy as usual but what these guy in the SQ
B777 were doing with 3 radio altimeters indicating RA, 2 FMC telling them the dist. to go(this is subject to if no ILS/VOR DME present at OPLA on that day) before the EGPWS warning came. Its very difficult for any one to figure out why they kept descending below the G/S intercept alt. when tower seems to have conirmed to them that G/S was operating normal as per remot indications in TWR. I believe these guys ignored the "Pull Up" warning also for a considerable amout of time on so called final approach with no visual clues........... God bless another CFIT averted in time
. Just a sheer good luck for these guys and every one else on board.
Lahore elevation app. 750' was hazy as usual but what these guy in the SQ
B777 were doing with 3 radio altimeters indicating RA, 2 FMC telling them the dist. to go(this is subject to if no ILS/VOR DME present at OPLA on that day) before the EGPWS warning came. Its very difficult for any one to figure out why they kept descending below the G/S intercept alt. when tower seems to have conirmed to them that G/S was operating normal as per remot indications in TWR. I believe these guys ignored the "Pull Up" warning also for a considerable amout of time on so called final approach with no visual clues........... God bless another CFIT averted in time
. Just a sheer good luck for these guys and every one else on board.
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There are a lot of pilots flying shiny new jets who have simply forgotten basic GP/DTG cross checks, awareness of false glide slopes etc. That's the problem with multi crew licencees progressing to wide bodies with very little handling experience. Give a few years of daily multi sector flights on a trusty classic B737 classic taking off and landing in various marginal airfields and all the basics will be deeply ingrained in one's hard drive...this all become very useful later when one gets command of a jet.
IIRC one of the incidents in ‘EPGWS events and analysis’ occurred in India; does anyone have a link to the Lahore approach chart that can be used to see if there are any similarities?
Propeller, I have posted comments on the use of ‘an intermediate altitude’ in http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=312341&page=3. I agree with your implication that an immediate climb is required without thought of why the warning has occurred, why an error has occurred, or where the aircraft might be; these can be considered later at a safe altitude or on the ground after flight.
I also agree that an in-depth investigation is required, preferably by the national authority so that we might all learn from the event. However, I wonder if the national culture, or indeed the operator’s culture will permit identification of the ‘interesting’ contributions to the crew’s error.
A training / operational issue is that many pilots do not appreciate the amount by which EGPWS has been improved over GPWS. I am mildly irritated in this respect by the continuing use of GPWS as a generic term for the Enhanced system - no blame ascribed. The use of incorrect terminology can contribute to misunderstandings and incorrect use of systems. In this instance TAWS is the generic term, but “Enhanced GPWS” (EGPWS) means much more - that the aircraft is fitted with a highly reliable system which leaves no doubt at all about the validity of any warning.
Molokai, I agree with your points. One of the common sources of error in the use of modern technology for non-precision approaches is the use of pressure altitude. A simple mistake in altimeter pressure setting can affect both the instrument displays and VNAV path calculations, thus the crew have no immediate means of checking for an error. Similarly altitude miscalculation can induce errors, but if the pressure setting was correct, then someone should have detected the error with the basic crosschecks as you indicate. Thus the problem might be with the procedures / checking process, or even the altimeter setting procedure / crosschecking and subsequent monitoring of the critical parameters during the approach.
Propeller, I have posted comments on the use of ‘an intermediate altitude’ in http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=312341&page=3. I agree with your implication that an immediate climb is required without thought of why the warning has occurred, why an error has occurred, or where the aircraft might be; these can be considered later at a safe altitude or on the ground after flight.
I also agree that an in-depth investigation is required, preferably by the national authority so that we might all learn from the event. However, I wonder if the national culture, or indeed the operator’s culture will permit identification of the ‘interesting’ contributions to the crew’s error.
A training / operational issue is that many pilots do not appreciate the amount by which EGPWS has been improved over GPWS. I am mildly irritated in this respect by the continuing use of GPWS as a generic term for the Enhanced system - no blame ascribed. The use of incorrect terminology can contribute to misunderstandings and incorrect use of systems. In this instance TAWS is the generic term, but “Enhanced GPWS” (EGPWS) means much more - that the aircraft is fitted with a highly reliable system which leaves no doubt at all about the validity of any warning.
Molokai, I agree with your points. One of the common sources of error in the use of modern technology for non-precision approaches is the use of pressure altitude. A simple mistake in altimeter pressure setting can affect both the instrument displays and VNAV path calculations, thus the crew have no immediate means of checking for an error. Similarly altitude miscalculation can induce errors, but if the pressure setting was correct, then someone should have detected the error with the basic crosschecks as you indicate. Thus the problem might be with the procedures / checking process, or even the altimeter setting procedure / crosschecking and subsequent monitoring of the critical parameters during the approach.
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One of the 777's got to 300ft AGL about 10 nm from Lahore. Three GPWS warnings were received before the Capt. took any action and commenced a missed approach. Unfortunately the Glide Slope then came into view and the guy then tried to capture it off the missed approach leading to a further balls up.
SIA are worried because, throughout the whole proceedings (including 19 secs of EGPWS warnings), not one word of caution or help came from the F/O. Sound familiar ??
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The above came from inside the SQ camp.
SIA are worried because, throughout the whole proceedings (including 19 secs of EGPWS warnings), not one word of caution or help came from the F/O. Sound familiar ??
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The above came from inside the SQ camp.
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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422
Only just spotted this post:
Not details yet, but looks like the trend of bad servicing is prompting CAAS to jump on SQ and SIAEC.
422, please enlighten us about this 'trend of bad servicing'.
Not details yet, but looks like the trend of bad servicing is prompting CAAS to jump on SQ and SIAEC.
422, please enlighten us about this 'trend of bad servicing'.
