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AF358 at YYZ report to come out

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AF358 at YYZ report to come out

Old 13th Dec 2007, 14:47
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I am not promoting The Toronto Star, but these guys are far ahead of The National Post regarding this matter..
http://www.thestar.com/article/284891
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 14:58
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Air France Flight Animation (A05H0002)

The following is a flight animation that was created with the data collected during the Air France investigation (A05H0002). The animation is available in the rearview and the side view profiles.
Warning: This video is over 40 MB and could take a long time to download.
1. Right click on the link of the video format you wish to download.
2. When prompted, select "Save Target As...".
3. Choose a location on your PC to save the file.
4. Click "Save".


Air Investigation Video for Windows Media

Side View
* Download [WMV format, 16.0 MB]
* Stream [WMV only]
Rear View
* Download [WMV format, 13.5 MB]
* Stream [WMV only]


Air Investigation Video for QuickTime

Side View
* Download [MOV format, 6.6 MB]
Rear View
* Download [MOV format, 11.7 MB]

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/video_...0002/index.asp
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/photo_...002_thumbs.asp
.
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 17:45
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I keep hoping someday Canada will try another novel invention from the South: grooved runways.

Thanks for posting the accident board video links. As always, they are chilling to watch.
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 21:17
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it is possible that if they went around, things might have been worse...look at CLT DC9 crash about a dozen years ago)
Keep in mind that this accident included very improper windshear recovery technique.
I keep hoping someday Canada will try another novel invention from the South: grooved runways.
Would definitely improve safety along with a windshear alert system. Of course so would not landing in a thunderstorm.
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 21:37
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Yes, the CLT crash was quite improper after the go around started...insufficient thrust, delay going to firewall power...illusions

The question about the Toronto crash simply has to be: if these guys didn't take into account extra speed, possible shifting winds and the like for the approach, could they have done a proper go around...call me doubting.
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 22:36
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2.4.2 Weather Information Provided by Air Traffic Control
........ Information concerning poor braking action was passed
on several occasions. The radar used in the Toronto tower by ATC is not specialized weather
radar and does not provide highly detailed weather information. Therefore, the crew of AFR358
had a better view of radar-derived weather information from their aircraft’s weather radar than
the controllers did from their own display.
There is no indication that more sophisticated weather radar information, had it been available
to ATC and communicated to the crew of AFR358, would have altered their decision to
continue to land.
However, without some indication of the speed and direction of intense,
rapidly moving weather phenomena, controllers are limited in their ability to provide
information that might be of assistance to aircrew.
Controllers attempt to use the runway most
nearly aligned into the wind. However, because of weather and ILS outages due to lightning
strikes, the landing runway had been changed several times.
At 1856, the ILS localizer for Runway 24R became unserviceable, forcing the use of Runway 23
for some time. Some arriving aircraft, however, were refusing the approach to Runway 23
because of the nearness of the storms north of the approach path. At 1913, the ILS glideslope for
Runway 23 became unserviceable and, with the unserviceability of the glideslope for
Runway 24R, the only remaining runway aligned into wind was Runway 24L. Under normal
circumstances, the preferred approach and landing runway is announced in the ATIS broadcast.
Equipment outages for extended periods are advertised by NOTAMs. There was no indication
from the crew that use of Runway 24L was unacceptable. The final decision on the acceptability
of a particular runway rests with the aircraft captain.

Given the limitations of the information available on board, crews may require assistance in
projecting the weather situation into the future and may look to ATC for additional
information. This was certainly the case in the accident flight because the crew made multiple
requests to ATC during the initial approach phase for information with respect to the
developing weather conditions. Crews may believe that ATC will be able to provide the most
up-to-date information as they have local climatological knowledge, are located at the airport
(in the case of tower controllers), and may be aware of what other aircraft are experiencing.
However, ATC’s ability to provide up-to-date weather information during rapidly changing
conditions observed with thunderstorm activity is quite limited. Further, some crews have an
inaccurate belief that ATC will close airports based on weather conditions.

.
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Old 13th Dec 2007, 23:42
  #27 (permalink)  
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Still, the board said its report was not about placing blame.
Which is not to say that Toronto Pravda isn't quick to place blame:
Runways at Canadian airports are falling short of international standards, and Ottawa needs to mandate extended safety zones to prevent crashes like the one that sent an Air France jet hurtling into a ravine in stormy weather, a report said today.
 
Old 14th Dec 2007, 15:51
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The Star's post-incident reporting was appalling - and did not go unnoticed here.

Oh and here too.
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Old 14th Dec 2007, 17:18
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The radar used in the Toronto tower by ATC is not specialized weather radar and does not provide highly detailed weather information. Therefore, the crew of AFR358 had a better view of radar-derived weather information from their aircraft’s weather radar than
the controllers did from their own display.
There is no indication that more sophisticated weather radar information, had it been available to ATC and communicated to the crew of AFR358, would have altered their decision to continue to land. However, without some indication of the speed and direction of intense, rapidly moving weather phenomena, controllers are limited in their ability to provide information that might be of assistance to aircrew...
Given the limitations of the information available on board, crews may require assistance in projecting the weather situation into the future and may look to ATC for additional information. This was certainly the case in the accident flight because the crew made multiple requests to ATC during the initial approach phase for information with respect to the developing weather conditions. Crews may believe that ATC will be able to provide the most up-to-date information as they have local climatological knowledge, are located at the airport (in the case of tower controllers), and may be aware of what other aircraft are experiencing. However, ATC’s ability to provide up-to-date weather information during rapidly changing conditions observed with thunderstorm activity is quite limited.
Meanwhile at my office I had been entertaining myself with the NWS Buffalo radar images until just before the crash. These images made it perfectly clear that severe thunderstorms were developing and moving rapidly around the airport.

I definitely support the crew's reluctance to accept a goaround into the red return that their onboard radar showed on their missed approach path. Hindsight tells us that the downburst behind them shut the door on the trap.

So how does the crew get the information on thunderstorm activity they need? XMWX does offer this information from US and Canadian radars to onboard receivers. Sample below:

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Old 14th Dec 2007, 23:32
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I definitely support the crew's reluctance to accept a goaround into the red return that their onboard radar showed on their missed approach path. Hindsight tells us that the downburst behind them shut the door on the trap.
Okay, maybe I'm picking the fly poop out of the pepper shaker. But, if your missed approach path is covered by weather that you don't want to fly through, shouldn't you abandon the approach altogether? You can fly a perfectly stabilised approach and still need to go around because of elements beyond your control. If you wouldn't fly through such weather between the FAF and the runway threshold, why set yourself up to have to do so during the go around when somebody taxis onto the runway in front of you?

Food for thought.

Jeff
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Old 15th Dec 2007, 00:43
  #31 (permalink)  
 
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RBF.
So instead of making a go around you should rather crash and burn? A very strange way of thinking I'd say...
J.O is right, if you can't make a go around then you don't do the approach.
Or, (in case you didn't notice until you're already at the outer marker) you change the go around.
I have several times on final informed ATC that "in case of a go around we will start an immediate left/right turn due to weather". Some times they ask me to change direction of turn but in every case it has been acknowledged as a good idea.
Missed approach procedures are not set in stone. You are the commander!

Last edited by expat400; 16th Dec 2007 at 03:58.
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Old 15th Dec 2007, 03:28
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This are the sections that drew my attention:-

From the Air France MANEX performance information, the predicted landing distance needed for the landing in Toronto on a contaminated runway with zero wind and no thrust reverser was 8780 feet. For Runway 24L, the extra margin was only 220 feet. This very small landing distance margin was eaten up by the long flare during the landing. With a tailwind, there was negative margin, which would mean an overrun
Derived from MANEX Chart TU 04.02.50. 13 A340-313
Full Flaps Landing Distance for Toronto (CYYZ)
Pressure Altitude 500 Feet asl, Manual Braking Wind No Reversers Using Four Reversers
0 2670 m (8780 feet) 2403 m (7883 feet)
5-knot tailwind 3071 m (10 075 feet) 2764 m (9068 feet)
10-knot tailwind 3471 m (11 388 feet) 3124 m (10 249 feet)
The Airbus flight crew training manual (FCTM) states that passing over the runway threshold at 100 feet altitude rather than 50 feet will increase the total landing distance by approximately 950 feet (300 m).
Layman's view :- This would seem to indicate that once Runway 23 (3389m) was out of commission that an approach to 24L (2743m) probably should not have been attempted if the crew had taken into account the surface state of the runway reported by other aircraft.

Even if the approach had been perfect the tailwind would have still resulted in an overrun.
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Old 15th Dec 2007, 13:35
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Do those distances include the JAR-OPS 15% margin on contaminated?
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Old 15th Dec 2007, 13:44
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Expat400,

A very french way of thinking I'd say...
I'm french, thank you very much for such an insightful and accurate comment.

I would like to say that, as convinced as i am concerning precise touchdown or mandatory go-around when conditions deteriorate, i will remain very MODEST because i know this crew and many others felt exactly the same just before it happened.

Last edited by alcorfr; 17th Dec 2007 at 06:57.
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Old 16th Dec 2007, 03:57
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Alcorfr.

My sincere apologies. I intended to be "funny". However, looking at it in this context I failed.

I have no issues with french people or french pilots, only with the statement that it should be better to land long and fast on a critical runway than make a go around.

I will edit my post.
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Old 16th Dec 2007, 07:06
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This is a continuation of Miraz's idea..... you mention a 220 ft margin but you ignore reverse thrust which improves this numbers by 900 ft.

I know that NOW (recently), since the Chicago incident, the rules are changing about the use of Reversers in the calculations.

I find the report, but e.g. especially certain details about runway braking distance very frustrating !!! And I have hours to read the charts and report and yet the pilots have much less !!??

From the report:
The calculated landing distance for a runway that is covered with less than 3 mm of water (wet runway), using the airport elevation for CYYZ, using autobrakes “low,” and assuming no wind, full flaps, and without the use of thrust reversers, is 2196 m (7203 feet).........
and yet

......The calculated landing distance5 for Runway 24L at CYYZ for the conditions at the time of landing, assuming ¼-inch (approximately 6 to 7 mm) of water on the runway (contaminated), using manual braking, is summarized in the table below........
shouldn't they be using more black-and-white numbers !!?? Is it 3mm or 6-7 mm ??

They have a chart in a commercial A340 that is not for official use !!??

Appendix H TU 04.01.64.14 313

"Pour Information Seulement (non certifie)"
Can someone show me how to calculate the exact minimum landing distance.

I would have thought that it would be black and white and quick to calculate landing distance.

Poor pilots who have to use these non-100% clear tables and weather reports.
.

Last edited by alph2z; 17th Dec 2007 at 17:26.
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Old 16th Dec 2007, 17:49
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It isn't black and white about the water depth because no-one goes out and measures the exact depth of standing water along the entire length of a runway. It's a judgement call.

The contaminated distances are not "official" or approved because there is no certification requirement to provide them. If there was, we'd be adding the 67% padding to the distances and effectively banning operations on contaminated surfaces. Again, there's an element of airmanship expected.

And there's no way to calculate the "exact" minimum landing distance because there's no way to fly the "exact" landing required to obtain it. All performance data presented to pilots has an element of "fudge" in it. Anyone calculating a required distance one foot under what they have and feeling good about the result is fooling themselves.
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Old 16th Dec 2007, 23:00
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In hindsight, the risk presented by the rapidly deteriorating weather conditions was greater than most pilots would deem acceptable. However, when the AFR358 pilots assessed the available weather information and the traffic flow into the airport, they did not expect that such a severe deterioration in the weather was imminent...

the crew made multiple requests to ATC during the initial approach phase for information with respect to the developing weather conditions...

Until the decision height of 200 feet, the aircraft was stabilized, although an airspeed increase and a deviation above the glideslope were beginning to occur around this height. From then on, the deviations were below the threshold at which the PNF was required to make a call regarding the deviations.

The point at which the situation changed from normal and manageable to abnormal and critical was near the runway threshold when the aircraft entered the perimeter of the cell activity. At this time, a number of circumstances combined, leading directly to the accident...

As they crossed the runway threshold, with the heavy rain, low visibility, lightning, and shifting winds, the flight crew members became overwhelmed by the severe weather conditions and became task saturated, making a normal landing difficult. The pilots, who were by this time both focusing primarily outside the aircraft, were not aware that a wind shift was also occurring. While they were in the flare and the initial float, the pilots did not appreciate how much of the runway was being used up. The tailwind component contributed to the aircraft going above the glideslope and to the overall landing distance required.

The heavy rain obscured vision through the windshield and severely reduced the forward visibility. Both pilots were relying heavily on the side windows to try to determine the position of the aircraft, laterally and vertically. This caused the additional problem in that both of them were now fully concentrating on trying to determine the position of the aircraft. This might partially account for the slow reaction time of the PF to reduce power to idle. In such circumstances, it can be difficult to keep a trajectory toward, or even distinguish, the normal aiming point on the runway...

Air France Airbus A340 crews have the option of conducting a go-around during an approach when it becomes evident that it is unsafe to land. In theory, the decision to go around can be made as late as when the aircraft is on the ground, as long as reversers are not yet selected. Under normal conditions, this is not a problem.

When the aircraft was near the threshold, there were ominous thunderstorms with lightning strikes on the missed approach path. At this point, the crew members became committed to landing and believed that their option to go around no longer existed...

It was not until very short final that there were clear indications available to the crew that the flight had progressed to a point where landing was not advisable - the aircraft had departed the glideslope and entered an area of intense precipitation and reduced visibility. The crew had two courses of action with potentially undesirable outcomes: proceed with an approach that was becoming increasingly difficult, or conduct a missed approach into potentially dangerous conditions. At that moment, although Air France procedures called for a go-around anytime the ideal trajectory is not maintained up to thrust reverser deployment, the captain, doubting that a go-around could be conducted safely, committed to continue with the landing.
Survival odds going off the end at 80 some kt. are much better than in a failed go-around.
Aircraft landed on Runway 24L approximately 9, 6, 4, and 2 minutes before the landing of AFR358 and there was at least one additional aircraft on approach behind the occurrence flight. It is noteworthy that all these crews had also elected to conduct their approaches in conditions similar to those encountered by AFR358.
Now how should we characterise the five other crews that accepted the same approach who obviously had better luck? Are they all professionals doing their best with the available information or did they fall equally short? How many other crews would have accepted the approach in those conditions?
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Old 18th Dec 2007, 01:06
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Based on TSB data, I calculate the main landing gear (and plane) left the "flat" grass at 60 mph, WOW.

Can you imagine driving off into the abyss of a deep ditch at that speed.....and surviving.

Now, that's good fuselage designing .....

To come to a full stop they would have needed an extra 1460 feet of concrete beyond the threshold lights.

So even if the 300 m (984 ft) long RESA (ICAO) or RSA (FAA) had been there it would have been (477 ft) too short and they would still have 47 knots to dissipate beyond the RESA.
.

Last edited by alph2z; 18th Dec 2007 at 01:55.
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Old 19th Dec 2007, 00:33
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WTF !!!??????? Is AF still living in the era of the Wright brothers.

I always assumed it was a legal requirement to calculate proper landing distance for the specific runway used, wet/dry conditions, etc.... before each landing; assuming auto and manual braking, and no reverse.

Some management heads should roll.

Can anyone explain to me how this can happen after 100 years of flying !!??
I think I'll do the calculation myself and supply it to the pilots on my next flight as a passenger.

They're flying A340's as if they were flying C152's !!??

4.2.3 Landing Distance Considerations
The crew was not aware of the landing distance required to land safely on a contaminated
runway. This was due in part to some ambiguities in the landing distance information provided
to the crew and an absence of direction by Air France regarding the need for crews to determine
landing distances required.

When the aircraft was on departure from Paris, the Air France Octave system provided the crew
with a maximum permissible landing weight value for the aircraft’s arrival at Toronto. This
weight was 190 000 kg, which was the maximum allowable weight based on structural
considerations. It appears that this was the only landing performance calculation carried out

during the operation of AFR358.
In the latter portions of the approach, the crew actions indicate a concern regarding landing
distance when faced with landing on Runway 24L. From the investigation, it is clear that the
pilots were aware of the landing distance available for Runway 24L. There is no indication that
they had calculated the landing distances required for the arrival, nor are there any direct and
specific Air France procedures that would require such calculations by the crew.

A review of the landing performance charts available to the crew revealed some potential
problems. For example, the application of some of the corrections such as the use of thrust
reversers and other variables were not necessarily intuitive and were sometimes applied
incorrectly.

This accident clearly shows the need for pilots to know the landing distance required by their
aircraft for the conditions to be encountered at the expected time of landing, and to compare
this figure to the length of the runway assigned for the landing. It is essential that both figures
be known to enable crews to calculate the margin of error available so that they are better
prepared to make the correct decision when they encounter deteriorating conditions. In this
occurrence, the crew members realized at some time during the landing sequence that the
landing was going to be long. Had they known that the margin for error was slim, or indeed
non-existent,
the crew would likely have executed a go-around.
.
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