SAS Q400 gear collaps CPH 27/10
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compensation negotiated between the two parties for Bombardier`s mistake of selling SAS an aircraft that SAS mechanics couldn`t maintain properly.
It's not a question of pride, but both sides won!
Issue settled.....life goes on!
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to Ladusvala....
"Can´t we just wait till the reports come out!"
We might have to wait for a long time; I have just read that SAS have found some fatigue cracks in the wing bolts of one of their DHC-8`s. According to the news report (in Norwegian, sorry) they are checking the whole fleet, on the advice or direction of the Canadian and U.S. (?) authorities.
"Can´t we just wait till the reports come out!"
We might have to wait for a long time; I have just read that SAS have found some fatigue cracks in the wing bolts of one of their DHC-8`s. According to the news report (in Norwegian, sorry) they are checking the whole fleet, on the advice or direction of the Canadian and U.S. (?) authorities.
pineridge,
for your amusement and others enlightenment:
"At least a at the airplanes as became put on the bare ground owned according to Canadian and American luftfartsmyndigheter saw earnest blemish that the blade be able have fell of today air , draw up politiken.dk. The metal in hylsemutterne as attach the blade at flyskroget owned danger crack down and flaws , any SAS stayed unacquainted with as the airplanes became put on the bare ground. – We have inspect 17 at our Dash 8 airplane and found crack down in resign four hylsemuttere at a at the airplanes , say kommunikasjonsdirektør Claus Sonberg in SAS. Six airplane am yet no matter gransket , amid them they three as sea-damaged. Neither at they danger the airplanes avail further in passasjertrafikk , accentuates SAS. SAS became acquainted with vingeproblemene at Dash 8 in an warning at Canadian luftfartsmyndigheter in February. IN the caution stepped facts forward that dates back to no matter named the airline connection with ordinarily maintenance owned found crack down with the significant hylsemutterne as attach the blade at flyskroget. The cause stayed metalltretthet. Both Canadian and American luftfartsmyndigheter was imposing the airline to as soon as analyzed all airplane at this breed. Else able facts imply that the blade crash down at , am heating facts in the caution at American FAA. It is the dim about Widerøe has analyzed her Dash 8- airplane and about it is the found"
I wish to thank Inter Tran for the translation.
Per
for your amusement and others enlightenment:
"At least a at the airplanes as became put on the bare ground owned according to Canadian and American luftfartsmyndigheter saw earnest blemish that the blade be able have fell of today air , draw up politiken.dk. The metal in hylsemutterne as attach the blade at flyskroget owned danger crack down and flaws , any SAS stayed unacquainted with as the airplanes became put on the bare ground. – We have inspect 17 at our Dash 8 airplane and found crack down in resign four hylsemuttere at a at the airplanes , say kommunikasjonsdirektør Claus Sonberg in SAS. Six airplane am yet no matter gransket , amid them they three as sea-damaged. Neither at they danger the airplanes avail further in passasjertrafikk , accentuates SAS. SAS became acquainted with vingeproblemene at Dash 8 in an warning at Canadian luftfartsmyndigheter in February. IN the caution stepped facts forward that dates back to no matter named the airline connection with ordinarily maintenance owned found crack down with the significant hylsemutterne as attach the blade at flyskroget. The cause stayed metalltretthet. Both Canadian and American luftfartsmyndigheter was imposing the airline to as soon as analyzed all airplane at this breed. Else able facts imply that the blade crash down at , am heating facts in the caution at American FAA. It is the dim about Widerøe has analyzed her Dash 8- airplane and about it is the found"
I wish to thank Inter Tran for the translation.
Per
The March 2007 nose gear incident in Japan has been investigated, and turns out some Bombardier mechanics forgot to install a bolt while repairing the ANA Q400 in question. Happens sometimes, I guess.
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/...8-75332ac790e1
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/...8-75332ac790e1
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Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.
The Danish newspaper, Berlingske Tidene, has reported that it has received information about the incident on the 27th October 2007 at Copenhagen Airport where a DHC-8 400 aircraft belonging to SAS had a main gear collapse on landing.
The subsequent investigation by the Danish authorities (SLV) placed responsibility for the gear failure at the door of the manufacturer, Bombardier, who have not accepted the blame. The investigation found a rubber O-ring, foreign to the system, in the gear.
The head of the SLV office in Copenhagen, Peter Udsen, apparently wrote several times to his superiors that in his opinion the cause of the incident was that the SAS mechanics had used an unapproved procedure when changing two valves in the gear system.
Apparently, SLV`s technical director, Per Veingberg, replied to Udsen that they were not interested in his personal opinion in the matter and thereafter kept the correspondence with Udsen secret. Udsen has since left the SLV`s employ.
The contribution of the SAS mechanics to the incident was not included in the accident report because, according to Veingberg, SAS does everything by the book.
The accident inspector responsible, Kurt Færch Madsen, denies that the mechanics at SAS can have made a mistake but thinks that the rules regarding changing the valves were perhaps unclear.
SAS`s communications director says that they have followed all the rules exactly.
The final report is expected this Summer, ass-covering operations have already begun.
.
The subsequent investigation by the Danish authorities (SLV) placed responsibility for the gear failure at the door of the manufacturer, Bombardier, who have not accepted the blame. The investigation found a rubber O-ring, foreign to the system, in the gear.
The head of the SLV office in Copenhagen, Peter Udsen, apparently wrote several times to his superiors that in his opinion the cause of the incident was that the SAS mechanics had used an unapproved procedure when changing two valves in the gear system.
Apparently, SLV`s technical director, Per Veingberg, replied to Udsen that they were not interested in his personal opinion in the matter and thereafter kept the correspondence with Udsen secret. Udsen has since left the SLV`s employ.
The contribution of the SAS mechanics to the incident was not included in the accident report because, according to Veingberg, SAS does everything by the book.
The accident inspector responsible, Kurt Færch Madsen, denies that the mechanics at SAS can have made a mistake but thinks that the rules regarding changing the valves were perhaps unclear.
SAS`s communications director says that they have followed all the rules exactly.
The final report is expected this Summer, ass-covering operations have already begun.
.
Warning Toxic!
Disgusted of Tunbridge
Disgusted of Tunbridge
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3 identical gear failures, one type, one airline only. There are bigger operators of the Q400 without any gear failures. Conclusion...........?
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The final report is expected this Summer
That leaves us with about 3 months to speculate, guess, rant, slag, bitch, moan and bs about what "really" happened, all based on what yet another journo claims happened behind closed doors somewhere, including a "he said/he said" and hopefully a conspiracy or two.
Good Grief.
Last edited by Bigmouth; 23rd Feb 2009 at 07:15.
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While the media can stuff up a story, they can also be right on something very significant. For example, the media that eventually brought down the Queenland Government through the (IIRC) Wood Royal Commission on police corruption.
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Rainboe
It´s not 3 identical gear failures. The final report for the first one is released. See http://www.hcl.dk/graphics/Synkron-L...t%20LN-RDK.pdf
Read it and see factors leading to the accident and safety recommendations. Conclusion.....?
Still waitning for the final report on the third.
It´s not 3 identical gear failures. The final report for the first one is released. See http://www.hcl.dk/graphics/Synkron-L...t%20LN-RDK.pdf
Read it and see factors leading to the accident and safety recommendations. Conclusion.....?
Still waitning for the final report on the third.
Warning Toxic!
Disgusted of Tunbridge
Disgusted of Tunbridge
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Flybe is the world's biggest Q400 operator. No gear failures. No Canadian failures, so local conditions are not a factor. What inference should you make? Maybe production line changes for a particular series? Maybe local maintenance practices?
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Rainboe, I still recommend you to read the report.
It´s not production line changes, local conditions or local maintenance practices behind the FIRST incident. It was a problem with the design of the acuator and rod end.
It´s not production line changes, local conditions or local maintenance practices behind the FIRST incident. It was a problem with the design of the acuator and rod end.
Last edited by F_Hercules; 22nd Feb 2009 at 13:58.
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SAS was the launch customer, and struggled for a long time with the first deliveries. The two first accidents were due to a design fault admitted by Bombardier.
This third accident was different. The so called new and withheld information was already included in the preliminary accident report from November 2007.
http://www.hcl.dk/graphics/Synkron-L...K_03112007.pdf
Prior to the accident the SAS mechanics used a component from a spare part pre-assembled for the nose gear, on the main gear. This may have contributed to the failure in the hydraulic system, which was initially caused by a loose O-ring traveling in the system.
The Danish authorities mentioned (SLV) is the Danish CAA. They are not responsible for the accident investigations in Denmark, and therefore it makes little sense to question what information they excluded or will exclude from their report.
The question now is whether the procedure used by the SAS was an allowed procedure or not. The representative from the Danish Accident Investigation Board stated that there is no evidence of sloppiness within SAS, but that the guidelines may have been unclear. If he was referring to SAS or Bombardier guidelines is not clear.
This third accident was different. The so called new and withheld information was already included in the preliminary accident report from November 2007.
http://www.hcl.dk/graphics/Synkron-L...K_03112007.pdf
Prior to the accident the SAS mechanics used a component from a spare part pre-assembled for the nose gear, on the main gear. This may have contributed to the failure in the hydraulic system, which was initially caused by a loose O-ring traveling in the system.
The Danish authorities mentioned (SLV) is the Danish CAA. They are not responsible for the accident investigations in Denmark, and therefore it makes little sense to question what information they excluded or will exclude from their report.
The question now is whether the procedure used by the SAS was an allowed procedure or not. The representative from the Danish Accident Investigation Board stated that there is no evidence of sloppiness within SAS, but that the guidelines may have been unclear. If he was referring to SAS or Bombardier guidelines is not clear.
