TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
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... wonder if the PF (capt) was in the right seat?
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... a somewhat different feel to the left i.e. throttles lefthand, stick righthand ... opposite their normal (left seat)!
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Throttle retard may feel very different from that seat??
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... a somewhat different feel to the left i.e. throttles lefthand, stick righthand ... opposite their normal (left seat)!
.
Throttle retard may feel very different from that seat??
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Airbus should hang for this stupid setup
Leaving aside this accident, and looking at the matters under discussion:
- If the Crew do not select TL(s) to idle, on your Boeing does the thrust idle or remain? I guess remain...
- If the TL(s) are out of idle on touchdown, on your Boeing, do the spoilers deploy automatically, or stow? I suspect stow...
- If the TL(s) are out of idle on touchdown, do the Autobrakes apply? I suspect not...
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TransAsia had two A320 series accidents
Just to clarify. Transasia had a hull loss accident with an A321 on 3.22.2003 at Tainan Airport when it ran over a truck on landing. This incident has no relevance to the Congonhas accident.
The A320 accident in Taipei that MAY be relevant to the TAM Congonhas accident was on October 18, 2004 and that aircraft is still in operation today.
The A320 accident in Taipei that MAY be relevant to the TAM Congonhas accident was on October 18, 2004 and that aircraft is still in operation today.
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The MEL states that ‘It is recommended not to select reverse thrust on the affected engine’ is it an SOP to brief for this. If not should there be one?
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Earlier on (a few pages back), in this thread I was trying to reconcile the speed of the aircraft in comparison to the preceding in the video. Whilst obviously there can be differences as a function of landing weight etc, the speed of the accident aircraft was obviously extreme.
Now Airbus have issued a reminder to operators about the requirement to close all thrust levers it seems clear to me that this was not done in this case, which goes a long way to explaining the subsequent crash.
I understand the poster defending colleagues saying that any 'blaming the pilots and their families is heresy', but we have to be open to facts, and whilst Airbus system design may not help, closing the thrust levers is a damn good first step that allows spoilers, brakes, reverse to help to mitigate what was clearly a slippery surface at an airfield where there was little safety margin at all.
I'm sure that more recommendations will follow with the detailed analysis being undertaken, but to me, the initial causal factor is clearly not closing the thrust levers.
RIP
Now Airbus have issued a reminder to operators about the requirement to close all thrust levers it seems clear to me that this was not done in this case, which goes a long way to explaining the subsequent crash.
I understand the poster defending colleagues saying that any 'blaming the pilots and their families is heresy', but we have to be open to facts, and whilst Airbus system design may not help, closing the thrust levers is a damn good first step that allows spoilers, brakes, reverse to help to mitigate what was clearly a slippery surface at an airfield where there was little safety margin at all.
I'm sure that more recommendations will follow with the detailed analysis being undertaken, but to me, the initial causal factor is clearly not closing the thrust levers.
RIP
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Spoiler extension
Would the TL position inhibit the spoilers, autobrakes and perhaps even the "Retard" announcement?
Looking at page 13 of the document linked to earlier, it is very clear from the logic diagram that having one TL not at or near idle will totally inhibit spoiler extension, even if armed amd mlg compressed.
The same condition will also inhibit partial spoiler extension, designed to be triggered when only one mlg is compressed
From reading the notes, it would appear that TL position has to be <15 degrees and the aircraft < 10 ft altitude to count as at or near idle.
I have no idea where 15 degrees is in relation to the "normal" setting.
Elsewhere, on page 3 of 1.32.30 there is a statement that says autobrake function will not work if ground spoilers not extended, therefore with TL not at idle there is no autobrake either
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From the Folha de Sao Paulo :
TAM Pilot José Eduardo Batalha Brosco who was PF on PR-MBK the day before the accident was interrogated by the Police in Sao Paulo.
Upon touch down Brosco applied full brakes because he felt the deceleration would not be sufficient for a stop within the threshold.
Brosco said he and PNF were very tense, as the feeling was that the aircraft was not going to stop.
He added that a reverse was inop but that was not an issue to land that way.
Also, Brosco told that there was no problem with the brakes. According to him the problem was the main runway of Congonhas.
"Even with the use of the reverse thrust, the feeling was the same, that the aircraft would not stop" he said.
TAM Pilot José Eduardo Batalha Brosco who was PF on PR-MBK the day before the accident was interrogated by the Police in Sao Paulo.
Upon touch down Brosco applied full brakes because he felt the deceleration would not be sufficient for a stop within the threshold.
Brosco said he and PNF were very tense, as the feeling was that the aircraft was not going to stop.
He added that a reverse was inop but that was not an issue to land that way.
Also, Brosco told that there was no problem with the brakes. According to him the problem was the main runway of Congonhas.
"Even with the use of the reverse thrust, the feeling was the same, that the aircraft would not stop" he said.
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From Folha de Sao Paulo again and according to Jorge Kersul Filho, Director of the CENIPA (Brazilian equivalent of the NTSB)
The first data recovered in the DFDR show aircraft speed on approach and just prior to touch down to be within SOP.
Exact speed on touch down could not be determined for the moment.
Aircraft was decelerating but the rate of deceleration was too low.
The aircraft hit a concrete element on the side of the runway then a column.
Deceleration was insufficient and aircraft hit the building at approximately 94 kts.
To be taken as is as we know the media...
The first data recovered in the DFDR show aircraft speed on approach and just prior to touch down to be within SOP.
Exact speed on touch down could not be determined for the moment.
Aircraft was decelerating but the rate of deceleration was too low.
The aircraft hit a concrete element on the side of the runway then a column.
Deceleration was insufficient and aircraft hit the building at approximately 94 kts.
To be taken as is as we know the media...
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@ACMS
Thrust Lever logic on A320 is indeed kind of funny. E.g. if you are in cruise, both TL in CLB notch, and you advance let's say #2 TL to TO/GA, what do you think Eng #1 will do?
NigelOnDraft: Any aeroplane that takes the Pilot out of the loop is not good.
Airbus Thrust levers in a "forward" detent on landing is not logical to a Pilot, I don't care what you say.
A Boeing has thrust levers that MOVE, and it's my assertion that an accident of this kind could not happen in a Boeing.
If you were landing with the Auto Throttle engaged in Speed mode and the levers didn't close in the FLARE you would have you hand on them monitoring their movement and would know, then you would close them both. Simple
The Boeing has a nice big Speedbrake Lever right beside the Captain, when it moves you can 1/ see it clearly in your peripheral vision and 2/ hear it.
IF it doesn't move because the landing is too smooth then you grab it and move it yourself. Simple.
On a Boeing if you tried to select Reverse and one or both levers were slightly forward you simply pull the levers back ( still holding the reversers part of the throttles ) and select reverse. Simple.
Autobrakes on a Boeing work: after both thrust levers are at idle
and both wheels have spun up.
But my assertion is that on a Boeing the chances of landing with one or even both levers not in idle is very remote.
Airbus Thrust levers in a "forward" detent on landing is not logical to a Pilot, I don't care what you say.
A Boeing has thrust levers that MOVE, and it's my assertion that an accident of this kind could not happen in a Boeing.
If you were landing with the Auto Throttle engaged in Speed mode and the levers didn't close in the FLARE you would have you hand on them monitoring their movement and would know, then you would close them both. Simple
The Boeing has a nice big Speedbrake Lever right beside the Captain, when it moves you can 1/ see it clearly in your peripheral vision and 2/ hear it.
IF it doesn't move because the landing is too smooth then you grab it and move it yourself. Simple.
On a Boeing if you tried to select Reverse and one or both levers were slightly forward you simply pull the levers back ( still holding the reversers part of the throttles ) and select reverse. Simple.
Autobrakes on a Boeing work: after both thrust levers are at idle
and both wheels have spun up.
But my assertion is that on a Boeing the chances of landing with one or even both levers not in idle is very remote.
Last edited by ACMS; 25th Jul 2007 at 09:58.
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Airbus Thrust levers in a "forward" detent on landing is not logical to a Pilot, I don't care what you say
If they are not at idle, we have an HF issue, like a certain B type confusing people regualrly with the same horn for Takeoff Config and excess Cabin Alt
you still have to move them from a detent located way way forward back to idle in the last 40 odd feet, not very natural.
The T/O config horn sounding the same as the Cabin alt horn on the 73 is not a great thing but..............IF you hear it at the start of the T/O roll:- you stop........
IF you hear it in flt:-- you check the pressurization........
not too difficult I would think.
Maybe it's a little more complicated if you T/O from an airfield above 10,000'?
I guess the horn would go as soon as you start up? don't know.
The T/O config horn sounding the same as the Cabin alt horn on the 73 is not a great thing but..............IF you hear it at the start of the T/O roll:- you stop........
IF you hear it in flt:-- you check the pressurization........
not too difficult I would think.
Maybe it's a little more complicated if you T/O from an airfield above 10,000'?
I guess the horn would go as soon as you start up? don't know.
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NOD - or anyone - no-one has yet explained why on the AB some pilots are not closing the throttle/s on landing? Surely this is BASIC flying, and I have only seen it in pre-solo single-piston stuff where I quickly eradicated it
. To have it issued as a 'warning' to crew by AB puzzles me.
. To have it issued as a 'warning' to crew by AB puzzles me.
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This thread is amazing
there is NEVER a landing on the Bus where you do not close the thrust levers.I have over 6000 hours on FBW aircraft and neither i or anybody i have flown with has had any problem in closing the thrust levers on landing. There are people on here who have no airbus experience making ill informed stupid comments about an aircraft which has an excellent safety record. At the end of the day pilots will make mistakes no matter how fail safe the aircraft is, that is why we continue to be paid well in order to make correct decisions and try and avoid accidents like these.
The investigation will hopefully find out what went went wrong so ALL pilots can learn from what happened.
RIP to all involved.
there is NEVER a landing on the Bus where you do not close the thrust levers.I have over 6000 hours on FBW aircraft and neither i or anybody i have flown with has had any problem in closing the thrust levers on landing. There are people on here who have no airbus experience making ill informed stupid comments about an aircraft which has an excellent safety record. At the end of the day pilots will make mistakes no matter how fail safe the aircraft is, that is why we continue to be paid well in order to make correct decisions and try and avoid accidents like these.The investigation will hopefully find out what went went wrong so ALL pilots can learn from what happened.
RIP to all involved.
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In Climb detent or in Idle, it’s a dead stick ......... If it moved, they wouldn’t have been able to leave it up in the first place, or if thrust would have gone up again, for any thinkable reason, they would have recognized the situation instantly and pulled the throttles back again.
On a earlier thread (march) I stated the following:
“Two very sound principals of professional aviation have been "best practice" or "optimum use of equipment". Not installing even the simplest feedback on AT does definitely not fit these principals, therefore the Airbus layout is not optimal."
and:
“……… I strongly believe that, with the same protections and performance, a moving AT, where the pilot can assist or interfere, is safer than a fixed one where he can either only observe or disconnect."
finally:
“I am still waiting for a VALUABLE argument as to why “dead” controls enhance safety”."
Here’s apparently one why not.
On a earlier thread (march) I stated the following:
“Two very sound principals of professional aviation have been "best practice" or "optimum use of equipment". Not installing even the simplest feedback on AT does definitely not fit these principals, therefore the Airbus layout is not optimal."
and:
“……… I strongly believe that, with the same protections and performance, a moving AT, where the pilot can assist or interfere, is safer than a fixed one where he can either only observe or disconnect."
finally:
“I am still waiting for a VALUABLE argument as to why “dead” controls enhance safety”."
Here’s apparently one why not.