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TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil

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TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil

Old 24th Jul 2007, 10:42
  #441 (permalink)  
 
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since the Airbus note is the first public pronouncement to apparently benefit from DFDR evidence, I'm sure it is highly significant.
I would certainly concur.

Should we infer that for some reason the pilots maintained some significant forward thrust ? What else do you understand from the Airbus statement ?

AlexT
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:05
  #442 (permalink)  
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This is what happens when you try to reinvent the wheel.

Landing an airplane with the thrust levers fully advanced is NOT natural.

I hate Airbus.

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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:05
  #443 (permalink)  
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From the MEL
78-30 Thrust Reverser
30-01 Thrust Reverser
At Landing:
Note: It is recommended not to select reverse thrust on the affected engine.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:06
  #444 (permalink)  
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Following 4HP's post at #424 and the subsequent I feel we really should all wait now for the answer from the FDR which I think will be conclusive.

My only comment would be that, clever as the AB philosophy is, it may be necessary to retain some basic flying techniques in its operation and not be 'seduced' by its 'sophistication'?
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:07
  #445 (permalink)  
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I hate Airbus
What does a mistake like that have to do with Airbus?
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:29
  #446 (permalink)  
 
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Dream Land
Your 30-01 seems to differ completely unless I'm misreading?
http://www.taminforma.com.br/noticia.aspx?id=1497

Last edited by Max Tow; 24th Jul 2007 at 11:40.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:33
  #447 (permalink)  
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Apologies, was not using the current revision.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 11:42
  #448 (permalink)  
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For investigated landing overrun incidents to the A320, we have seen the following leading causal phenomena:

* Technical fault (Ibiza)
* Mod Confusion (Bilbao)
* Pilot-handling confusion (Phoenix)
* Overly-fast touchdown (Warsaw)
* Unknown (to me) + pilot handling (Bacolod)

What we *don't* know yet about the Congonhas accident:

* Touchdown speed (guessed from video: 130 kts +- 10)
* Touchdown point
* Whether reverse was used (guessed from video: on port)
* What the starboard engine did
* Whether airbrakes (5+5 spoilers) activated
* What braking action was selected (guessed: manual)
* Whether antiskid was activated

Given that we don't even these basic parameters, BOAC's suggestion that we'll just have to wait for the FDR readout seems right on the mark. Until we know these, we can't even begin to judge whether the accident has any causally relevant similarities to any of the other overrun incidents above.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 12:34
  #449 (permalink)  
 
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@PBL
So you believe Airbus statement was some sort of "generic reminder" not linked to their first understanding of the FDR readings ?

Last edited by atakacs; 24th Jul 2007 at 13:16.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 12:53
  #450 (permalink)  
 
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Pictures

Different view of end rwy 35L, TAM 3054 overran ahead of the TAM A320, left of INFRAERO marking.
Picture taken in april 2007.
http://img410.imageshack.us/img410/6...spavr07jq2.jpg

1 shot from the INFRAERO video showing TAM 3054 rolling out (Camera 10)
http://img77.imageshack.us/img77/4158/tam11zm2.jpg

The same, closeup.
http://img443.imageshack.us/img443/8656/tam2av9.jpg

2 shots showing deployed ground spoilers on same type of aircraft
http://img515.imageshack.us/img515/5949/fig1zn6.jpg
http://img517.imageshack.us/img517/3329/fig2yt0.jpg

Brazilian Federal Police on the scene where TAM 3054 overran. See the broken little wall.
http://img443.imageshack.us/img443/1...enormalys7.jpg
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 12:56
  #451 (permalink)  
 
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There seems to be some confusion in interpreting the Airbus communication about thrust lever position and exactly how it relates to reverse/autobrake/spoiler behavior in a possible overrun situation. A careful read of posts 424, 426, and some pages of the "GE 536 Occurrence Investigation Report" (link below) from Taipei is informative. The A320 at Taipei landed with #2 reverse disabled, and #2 thrust lever was left at 22.5 degrees after touchdown. Being somewhat above the throttle lever angle defined as "idle", spoiler extension was prevented even though reverse was used on #1. See the ground spoiler extension logic diagrams provided in both the factual and final reports. Autobraking was also suppressed, and diagnosis/response took approx 15 sec before manual braking began. For the busier who don't have the time to read all of it, see Section 2.3 Flight Operations, and Section 2.4 Stopping Distance (pages 83-93) of the final investigation report. This contains a good summary as well as a stopping distance analysis. Note especially in Table 2.4-1 that the combination of delayed braking, no spoilers, and somewhat higher EPR on #2 added up to a required rolling distance of 7800 feet for a 55,000 kg landing weight (although there appears to be some tailwind component). This was more than 4000 feet beyond what would have been required if #2 throttle lever had been closed and autobraking and ground spoilers deployed as planned. The calculations predict the Taipei A/C was at 67 kts at overrun on an 8550 ft (2600 m) runway with touchdown at 1750 ft (533 m), leaving 6800 ft (2072 m) usable.

As has been said before, any relevance to TAM 3054 will have to wait for the final analysis, but Airbus' release of the throttle lever guidance suggests it's important for A3xx pilots to clearly understand the implications.

GE 536 Occurrence Investigation Report
http://www.asc.gov.tw/acd_files/189-c1contupload.pdf
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 13:04
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Question

Most air incidents are caused by five or more reasons.
Therefore:-
The runway was resurfaced incorrectly.
The aircraft was serviced incorrectly.
The weather conditions were below the minima for that runway.
Air Traffic was at fault.
The pilot was at fault.
The Brasiliian authorities were at fault.
This always combines into a tragedy.

There is never just one reason or one person at fault ?
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 13:56
  #453 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by PBL
* Technical fault (Ibiza)
* Mod Confusion (Bilbao)
* Pilot-handling confusion (Phoenix)
* Overly-fast touchdown (Warsaw)
* Unknown (to me) + pilot handling (Bacolod)
Add to these
Taipei and Irkutsk (engine with disabled reverser left in above idle thrust)

You can also group together at least Ibiza and Warsaw with those in that the monitoring pilot failed to recognise that the insufficient deceleration was due to all retarding systems not being fully deployed. But as has already been stated in the thread, with a short runway you just don't have the time to troubleshoot your failing/misconfigured systems before you already run over the end.

Also the Bacolod accident was according to unofficial reports due to one engine throttle not being moved to idle, but that was a fault in autothrottle disengagement and it appears the crew took the right action in shutting the offending engine down, but still ran over the end.

Last edited by EFHF; 24th Jul 2007 at 14:12. Reason: Added info about the Bacolod accident
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 13:58
  #454 (permalink)  
 
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Description Of Fly-By-Wire: (Flight Crew Training Manual A320)


1.The Fly-by-Wire was designed and certified the to render the
new generation of Aircraft
2. Even more safe, cost and effective, and pleasant to fly.

Basic Principles of the Fly-By-Wire:

The Flight Control Surfaces are all:
- Electrically-controlled, and
- Hydraulically-activated

- The Stabilizers and Rudder can be mechanically-controlled
- Pilots use sidestick to fly the aircraft in pitch and roll (and yaw indirectly, through turn coordinations)
- Computers Interpret pilot input and move the Flight Control surfaces, as necessary, to follow their orders.
- However, when in normal law, regardless of the pilot's input, the computers will prevent excessive maneuvers and exceedance of the
safe envelope in pitch and roll axis.
- However, as on coventional aircraft, the rudder has no such protection


GO AROUND IF:
1.Approach is not properly stabilized
2.Doubt about situation awareness
3.Malfunction
4.ATC changes the final approach clearance
5.Adequate visual cues not obtained at MDH or DH
6.Any GPWS/TCAS or Windshear alert occurs.


Consider Engine Damage If you Notice:

1.High Vibration prior to engine stopped, loud noise
2.Stall
3.Any Abnormal On Eng Page (N1, N2~0)




The Questions right now are the ff:

1.Did The Pilots Armed The Spoilers? or they forgot it?

2.When the Aircraft touches on the ground, did the engine suffers a FOD? due to excessive water and other contaminants coming in to the fan blades going to the compressor??? resulting the thrust reverser INOP?

3.Did the Engine Stop During/after the the aircraft touches the ground?
resulting the some hydraulics/electrical system to fail??

4.If the Spoilers deploy during touchdown??

5.Did The Computers take over the commands of the pilot?
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 14:10
  #455 (permalink)  
 
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The Questions right now are the ff:


1.Did The Pilots Armed The Spoilers? or they forgot it?

2.When the Aircraft touches on the ground, did the engine suffers a FOD? due to excessive water and other contaminants coming in to the fan blades going to the compressor??? resulting the thrust reverser INOP?

3.Did the Engine Stop During/after the the aircraft touches the ground?
resulting the some hydraulics system to fail??

4.If the Spoilers deploy during touchdown??

5.Did The Computers take over the commands of the pilot?
Some answers,

1- Arming the spoilers is part of the final app preparation (gear down, spoilers armed, and lights on). At TAM, there is a FINAL checklist. The items:

- Cabin crew........advised
- Auto thrust.......speed
- ECAM memo......landing, no blue

Landing, no blue means that the landing items are all done (the ECAM memo displays all "essential" items to be armed / prepared for landing. If one forgets to arm the spoilers, the line "spoilers" will be like this:
Spoilers.......ARM (in blue)
So, before the PF calls - landing, no blue - he has to check the ECAM memo. (Sorry my lack of English skills, I hope the answer it is clear enough)

2- FOD is not an issue here, I believe.

3- With flaps extended, the ignition system is on, and therefore, engine failure is unlikely (but it can happen, sure). About the hydraulics, the system has more than 1 pump (one engine pump and one electric pump) and also a PTU, so the complete loss of hydraulic pressure due to engine failure is unlikely.
(Green and yellow hydraulic systems)

4- I never had this problem on the Bus (no spoiler deployment at touchdown).

5- See, there is an "urban legend" about the airbus. There is not such thing as "computers taking over....”
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 14:16
  #456 (permalink)  
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Most air incidents are caused by five or more reasons.
…. Rubbish …. most only need two concurrent triggers … some only 1
Therefore:-
The runway was resurfaced incorrectly.
I would be fairly certain the runway was resurfaced correctly … wether it was fit for use in certain conditions before grooving remains to be seen!
The aircraft was serviced incorrectly.
It has been confirm in this and other threads many times by experts flying these things that these aircraft (in fact most aircraft fitted with TR’s) can fly and land safely without TR’s
The weather conditions were below the minima for that runway.
Garbage …. That suggests a wilful breach of landing weather minima … no such suggestion has been inferred here or elsewhere … an outrageous slur on the deceased crew!
Air Traffic was at fault.
… an outrageous slur on the air traffic controllers who like pilots are working in difficult conditions in a very pressurised environment in Brazil given recent events …. Nothing, I repeat nothing of this appalling tragedy has been pointed at Air Traffic Control!
The pilot was at fault.
…. Again, an outrageous slur on their memories and that of their families … It is becoming quite clear from this and other events carefully listed here, that this was not the first crew to experience an unexpected (although not unique) set of circumstances with little time to analyse and correct the situation … read the information presented here … the AB circular is instructive!
The Brasiliian authorities were at fault.
… it takes two to tango, and many to fill a ballroom
This always combines into a tragedy.
… based on your summary of events … I would suggest 'tragedy' takes on a whole new meaning!
There is never just one reason or one person at fault ?
… except when it comes to a keyboard being used without supervision!
.
Mods … pppppleeease!
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 14:21
  #457 (permalink)  
 
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I think it would be beneficial if you could manually extend the flight spoilers with the lever to transfer some weight and at least get the very complex deceleration sequence started. You may do that in config 3 but not in config Full but with short & slippery conditions the extra speed of config 3 is not acceptable.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 14:33
  #458 (permalink)  

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Some general questions

- At what point (...mm water on the RW) does your company assume
aquaplaning? (one of mine used to be >3mm then they went to >1mm)

- What correction does your company require to be made for aquaplaning?

- Does your company require the ship to be 100% for aquaplaning ops?

- Have you ever asked for the runway state on a rainy summer day and been
greeted by surprise (well sir, it is wet) when you really want to know the
depth of water?

- Have you ever asked for the runway state outside of winter ops? Maybe if
we did that more often airfields would become sensibilised.

- Have all the Airbusses now been modified, so that mainwheel spinup on one
side only will cause spoiler deployment?

Thanks,

FC.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 15:28
  #459 (permalink)  
 
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@4HolerPoler

Based from the preliminary analysis of the DFDR, and in agreement with the Brazilian investigation authorities, Airbus remind all operators to strictly comply with the following procedures:

A- During the flare at thrust reduction select ALL thrust levers to IDLE.

B- For the use of the thrust reversers when landing with one Engine Reverser inhibited refer to :
- For A320 MMEL 02-78-30 Rev 30
- For A310/A300-600 MMEL 02-78 Rev 15
- For A330 MMEL 02-78-30 Rev 17
- For A340 200/300/500/600 MMEL 02-78-3O Rev 19

Where did you get that? To whom is it addresed?

The 300/310 has a totally different thrust lever/reverser design compared to 320/330/340.
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Old 24th Jul 2007, 15:30
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* Overly-fast touchdown (Warsaw)
* Unknown (to me) + pilot handling (Bacolod)
PBL,

The overly fast touchdown in Warsaw was not the issue per se.

What happened is that the landing was too gentle to apply the required pressure on the main gear oleo struts in order to get the flight logic "understand" that the aircraft had actually touched down.

Automatic braking systems began to work only at the recorded contact of the left main gear : the spoilers and the reverse thrusts began to operate as required, but with a delay.

Furthermore, the wheel brakes began to operate about 4 seconds later, as they were dependent upon the wheels rotating at a speed equal or higher than 72 kts, condition that was not met earlier in the rollout.

The report stated at the time that " in emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers."

Regarding Bacolod, as far as I know there was a glitch in the computer that prevented one of the engines to be set to idle. By the time the crew shut down the erratic engine, the flight systems prevented the automatic braking systems to operate normally.
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