Swiss Air 111
materials standards
We spent a couple of days at Peggys Cove last year & camping within sight of the area & 111 memorial was a very emotional experience - just the thought of what they went through breaks me out in a cold sweat, RIP guys you did your very best to the end.
What happened about the flammable insulation material, I hope an improved material standard came about - does anyone know ? (& aoplogies in advance if I've already missed this in an earlier reply)
It makes a firm case for nothing less than non-flammabel materials, smoke hoods / masks, fire gloves & extinguishers in the cockpit & cabin areas.
Take care folks.
What happened about the flammable insulation material, I hope an improved material standard came about - does anyone know ? (& aoplogies in advance if I've already missed this in an earlier reply)
It makes a firm case for nothing less than non-flammabel materials, smoke hoods / masks, fire gloves & extinguishers in the cockpit & cabin areas.
Take care folks.
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bubbers44,
I have a holy terror of electrical fires......
The very latest one I witnessed was just a car in the sidestreet next to where we live. Took only about 5 minutes to make a monumental mess of what was once a nice car (not mine, thank goodness). And that was 12V, not 28V.
I have a holy terror of electrical fires......
The very latest one I witnessed was just a car in the sidestreet next to where we live. Took only about 5 minutes to make a monumental mess of what was once a nice car (not mine, thank goodness). And that was 12V, not 28V.
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We were at Peggys Cove too and felt what they must have went through in those last minutes. I know they did everything in their power to save those people. They did all that they could to save them but couldn't. I can't imagine what that must have been like. We have all been responsible for the lives of hundreds on our plane but what does it feel like to know that you can't help them any more?
P2J,
This was indeed one of the theories. It had to do with an air conditioning tube which was sealed with a silicon cap which melted when the fire started, then sucked the fire and smoke towards the recirculation fans in the cabin. This is why they believe the crew first saw something, but were not sure what, and the smoke then dissipated but they decided to land anyhow. The theory sais that moments after the cabin bus was shut down, the real serious problems began, so they link shutting down the cabin bus and the recirculation fans with it to the propagation of the fire within the aft bulkhead and the overhead area, causing a breakdown in the electrical system and eventually loss of all instruments.
This would explain a lot. If I remember right, the cabin bus was shut down as a part of the smoke of unknown origins checklist just before or during the turn to HDG 180 to dump fuel. From then on, things went out of control VERY fast.
Needless to say, the crew had absolutely NO WAY of knowing what was going on....
I think this theory was propagated in an excellent tv documentation about the crash, some coproduction of Swiss and Canadian TV. In my view one of the better documentaries of that accident.
Best regards
AN2 Driver.
I understand from one source that the MD11 Smoke of Unknown Origin checklist by shutting down airflow to the cabin (aft of the fire source) actually reversed the airflow so that the smoke and fire progressed forward, to the cockpit. Perhaps some MD11 crews here can comment on this.
This would explain a lot. If I remember right, the cabin bus was shut down as a part of the smoke of unknown origins checklist just before or during the turn to HDG 180 to dump fuel. From then on, things went out of control VERY fast.
Needless to say, the crew had absolutely NO WAY of knowing what was going on....
I think this theory was propagated in an excellent tv documentation about the crash, some coproduction of Swiss and Canadian TV. In my view one of the better documentaries of that accident.
Best regards
AN2 Driver.
It's useful from a flight safety point of view to hear these transcripts. I'm in the sim later today, the LOFT - smoke and fumes! I will needless be bringing it up as a learning point.
As an aside ATC were very professional, and the Speedbird getting the Halifax weather and chipping in with very useful info, excellent work chaps.
As an aside ATC were very professional, and the Speedbird getting the Halifax weather and chipping in with very useful info, excellent work chaps.
AN2 Driver;
The documentary can be found at:
http://www.cbc.ca/natureofthings/swi...air_flash.html
The 3D graphics showing the progress of the fire are quite good. The caution of course is, animations and graphics are very powerful to an image-driven population. Is it the truth?
Here, I strongly suspect it is, given the outcome of the investigation (where the fire first began, how it spread...soot path and wiring insulation burn) and knowing that the checklist was being actioned and what the results would be.
It has been suggested that shutting off the generators/busses would have put the fire out which, while perhaps (and perhaps not) true in the very initial stages, is academic once the fire is self-sustaining. "Smoke decreases" checklist items are a sucker's game and have largely disappeared from emergency SOPs.
No checklist can handle a situation where the fire is self-sustaining (a point in the emergency which the crew will likely never know has been reached), and getting on the ground as quickly as possible is the only chance for survival. Further, given the complete inability to know what's going on behind the panels and the added inability to predict outcomes when departing from the manufacturer's/airline's standard emergency checklist, I think making up "alternative" checklists on one's own is wandering in engineering and test-pilot territory.
I hastily add, we know that successful outcomes have come from such ad-hoc individual solutions and that both manufacturers and airlines can be slow to change even in the face of an accident such as SR111. Ultimately, when faced with what this crew was faced with, that's what command authority, experience and training is all about. Our own smoke removal and smoke of unknown origin checklists were revised some time ago, are in very big, black font (although not at the front of the QRH..they're the first item behind the "EMERGENCY" tab).
Anyone besides airline managements around here supporting MCPL yet?....
The documentary can be found at:
http://www.cbc.ca/natureofthings/swi...air_flash.html
The 3D graphics showing the progress of the fire are quite good. The caution of course is, animations and graphics are very powerful to an image-driven population. Is it the truth?
Here, I strongly suspect it is, given the outcome of the investigation (where the fire first began, how it spread...soot path and wiring insulation burn) and knowing that the checklist was being actioned and what the results would be.
It has been suggested that shutting off the generators/busses would have put the fire out which, while perhaps (and perhaps not) true in the very initial stages, is academic once the fire is self-sustaining. "Smoke decreases" checklist items are a sucker's game and have largely disappeared from emergency SOPs.
No checklist can handle a situation where the fire is self-sustaining (a point in the emergency which the crew will likely never know has been reached), and getting on the ground as quickly as possible is the only chance for survival. Further, given the complete inability to know what's going on behind the panels and the added inability to predict outcomes when departing from the manufacturer's/airline's standard emergency checklist, I think making up "alternative" checklists on one's own is wandering in engineering and test-pilot territory.
I hastily add, we know that successful outcomes have come from such ad-hoc individual solutions and that both manufacturers and airlines can be slow to change even in the face of an accident such as SR111. Ultimately, when faced with what this crew was faced with, that's what command authority, experience and training is all about. Our own smoke removal and smoke of unknown origin checklists were revised some time ago, are in very big, black font (although not at the front of the QRH..they're the first item behind the "EMERGENCY" tab).
Anyone besides airline managements around here supporting MCPL yet?....
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I think you were implying my test pilot change to my check list was wrong. Well it was because of SwissAir 111 that I changed it because our procecure was wrong and would not have prevented another event like that. One week after my smoke in cockpit situation our big company changed our checklist. I knew our procedure would not work if we had the same problem. The Swissair event had happened 6 months prior to mine and nothing was changed. Sometimes if management doesn't do anything you have to protect yourself. I don't know if we would have fried if we had followed our procedure or not, all I know is I did what was safe by shutting down nonessential busses immediately before the smoke got worse. We shut down the faulty galley bus. By the way retirement is wonderful.
Bubbers44;
Thanks for the reply. No, I wasn't implying it was wrong, I was suggesting that individual changes to checklists, especially emergency ones, come with heightened risk and using the term "test pilot" was intended to convey the notion that the process may not have been tested or even authorized (for whatever reason) by the manufacturer.
The change can be successful or could be unsuccessful depending upon many circumstances including one's personal knowledge of one's aircraft which, these days is basic "need-to-know" only, with AOM's that have the barest systems detail for pilots.
That is perhaps the key to my response, especially considering there may be those reading here who may just be beginning a career at an airline. I know all too well how long "suggested changes" to checklists and other SOPs take. Given the issue under review here can well understand the urgency to "think about what one would do" as Captain faced with such a dire emergency. I certainly have.
That said, my Airbus experience has shown that the ECAM is exceptionally well thought out and needs to be followed completely to the end for a successful outcome. This doesn't mean that one does so unquestioningly I grant and in the smoke drill, unlike Airbus' ECAM design it's a paper QRH so the airline can mess with it.
The key here is discussion, not criticism and if you've understood it that way, please forgive my clumsiness.
Re, "By the way retirement is wonderful."
Glad to hear it. Five months...
PJ2
Thanks for the reply. No, I wasn't implying it was wrong, I was suggesting that individual changes to checklists, especially emergency ones, come with heightened risk and using the term "test pilot" was intended to convey the notion that the process may not have been tested or even authorized (for whatever reason) by the manufacturer.
The change can be successful or could be unsuccessful depending upon many circumstances including one's personal knowledge of one's aircraft which, these days is basic "need-to-know" only, with AOM's that have the barest systems detail for pilots.
That is perhaps the key to my response, especially considering there may be those reading here who may just be beginning a career at an airline. I know all too well how long "suggested changes" to checklists and other SOPs take. Given the issue under review here can well understand the urgency to "think about what one would do" as Captain faced with such a dire emergency. I certainly have.
That said, my Airbus experience has shown that the ECAM is exceptionally well thought out and needs to be followed completely to the end for a successful outcome. This doesn't mean that one does so unquestioningly I grant and in the smoke drill, unlike Airbus' ECAM design it's a paper QRH so the airline can mess with it.
The key here is discussion, not criticism and if you've understood it that way, please forgive my clumsiness.
Re, "By the way retirement is wonderful."
Glad to hear it. Five months...
PJ2
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The latest [revised] checklists on electrical fire/smoke of unknown origin are still based on the philosophical premise that the origin can be traced by following a logical chain of "isolating" and "load shedding" of circuits and busses. The dangerous presumption of this approach is that somehow the fire/smoke can be identified and stopped before total electrical shutdown [all generators turned OFF] becomes necessary.
As demonstrated by the SR111 calamity, the Air Canada DC-9 at Cinncinati, . . . The first trace of smoke in all cases must be treated as an extreme emergency, as an imminent catastrophic event.
In the case of electrics, the new checklists should be taylored to that presumption: All electrical power OFF as an immediate action item. Troubleshoot electrical smoke/fire of unknown origin in reverse order of today's checklist logic.
As demonstrated by the SR111 calamity, the Air Canada DC-9 at Cinncinati, . . . The first trace of smoke in all cases must be treated as an extreme emergency, as an imminent catastrophic event.
In the case of electrics, the new checklists should be taylored to that presumption: All electrical power OFF as an immediate action item. Troubleshoot electrical smoke/fire of unknown origin in reverse order of today's checklist logic.
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Coming from the 727 when we had a flight engineer to efficiently download systems to isolate faulty circuits I think the new checklist mentality is to not overload the two pilots with checklists but just say leave it powered and get on the ground as soon as possible. Hopefully we will never have single pilot airliners or we will have to sacrifice even more safety to keep costs down. Yes, retirement is the answer. Actually, I quit 5 months early because of lump sum payout and it was sweet. No checklists at all. Hope your retirement is as great as mine. I loved every minute of my flying career but this is better. Doug
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ex-Tanker
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"Latest checklists" - the need for improvisation
Hi Glueball,
The latest checklists in the airline I was longest with, are no longer of the diagnostic loadshedding and waiting type, but a total electrical shut down to emergency bus (essential bus according type) and then if required during the diversion a selective rebuild could be attempted. Don't forget the battery will only last a guaranteed 30min.
There was a philosophical difference between the FAA approved checklist and the manufacturers' checklist on this very point. An airline could base it's QRM on whichever of these it preferred. We changed.
However, in the MD-80 case, the emergency power circuit itself was the trouble maker (a short in the EMER PWR switch, which became hot to the touch - and before the battery switch). In order to get the battery off line, it would have been neccessary to descend to the electrical compartment - leaving a single pilot at controls, through a very small hatch, wearing the oxygen equipment and then, with no prior knowledge, to find and trip the 80A main battery CB. This may work in a James Bond film but not in reality.
So in this case, all the checklists in the world don't apply and the first line "Consider immediate descent and landing" (plus some cool flying and thinking under frightening conditions) are all that can help.
If airlines are still using the diagnostic loadshed to trace smoke origins, they are, in my opinion putting the lives of people at risk. I think all airlines / authorities should get together on this one and thrash out the best policy.
FC.
The latest checklists in the airline I was longest with, are no longer of the diagnostic loadshedding and waiting type, but a total electrical shut down to emergency bus (essential bus according type) and then if required during the diversion a selective rebuild could be attempted. Don't forget the battery will only last a guaranteed 30min.
There was a philosophical difference between the FAA approved checklist and the manufacturers' checklist on this very point. An airline could base it's QRM on whichever of these it preferred. We changed.
However, in the MD-80 case, the emergency power circuit itself was the trouble maker (a short in the EMER PWR switch, which became hot to the touch - and before the battery switch). In order to get the battery off line, it would have been neccessary to descend to the electrical compartment - leaving a single pilot at controls, through a very small hatch, wearing the oxygen equipment and then, with no prior knowledge, to find and trip the 80A main battery CB. This may work in a James Bond film but not in reality.
So in this case, all the checklists in the world don't apply and the first line "Consider immediate descent and landing" (plus some cool flying and thinking under frightening conditions) are all that can help.
If airlines are still using the diagnostic loadshed to trace smoke origins, they are, in my opinion putting the lives of people at risk. I think all airlines / authorities should get together on this one and thrash out the best policy.
FC.
Last edited by Few Cloudy; 26th May 2007 at 08:10.
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why so much lack of respect?
your quote: "I agree to an extent, but transcripts don't convey emotion ( probably fortunately). However if anyone still has any doubts about the dangers of smoke in the air, they should listen to these tapes. It is fairly obvious from the R/T early on that these poor guys, RIP, really had no idea how quickly things were going to unravel around them."
The release of those tapes is scandalous. Nothing, nothing at all in them for the public, except for the ones looking for gore details, achieving some obscene desire that are not relevant to mention.
-Transcript don't convey emotion?? well, let-s then end litterature.
-Danger of smoke awareness?? come on, don't make a fool of yourself
-Those poor guys..?? well, they were human beings, experienced flying professionals, so please do show them some respect and dont jump into conclusion, will you.
As for the numerous death linked to this horrible event, they deserve more than a few lines posted by people obviously lacking respect.
The release of those tapes is scandalous. Nothing, nothing at all in them for the public, except for the ones looking for gore details, achieving some obscene desire that are not relevant to mention.
-Transcript don't convey emotion?? well, let-s then end litterature.
-Danger of smoke awareness?? come on, don't make a fool of yourself
-Those poor guys..?? well, they were human beings, experienced flying professionals, so please do show them some respect and dont jump into conclusion, will you.
As for the numerous death linked to this horrible event, they deserve more than a few lines posted by people obviously lacking respect.
N4790P
Bubbers44
Isn't the Hot Battery Bus still live under these circumstances?
Yes, if you turn off the battery too you definately can not have a class C fire. Any fire could be extinguished with water or any fire extinguisher.
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A very different perspective
I am a relative of a victim of an air crash. My perspective on the release of these tapes or any other original information is as follows. My father was killed on the 4th May 1963 (my 11th birthday in fact) in a RAF Belvedere helicopter in the Trusan valley, Sarawak, in wartime conditions. All on board were killed instantly. For some 30 years the MoD refused all relatives any information relating to the crash. Indeed they obstructed relatives who attempted to find out information including where the bodies were buried. To cut a very long story short information became available and the men concerned were eventually given a proper decent burial with many relatives including myself present. The not knowing what went on is very damaging to those left behind and I'm more than happy to discuss it. Suffice to say the release of any, I stress any information, particularly in its original form allows relatives to understand and grieve for their loss. It does not mean relatives want to look at or listen to the original photos, videos, TV or tapes. But, if there is knowledge on the relatives part that they are being given only a transcript there can be suspicions raised that things are being hidden. If they know the original material is out there which they can consult or ask someone they trust to consult to verify its bona fides it allows relatives to trust the investigation process. I myself can give an example. I met the man who in very difficult circumstances took care of my father's, and the others remains on the crash site. He gave me the opportunity to ask any question I wanted about the crash site and the conditions he was working in, what he found and what he did and why. I did not ask anything, nor did any of the other relatives present. It was a privilege to have met the man and to gain the knowledge that our loved ones were looked after. As long as he is alive we can ask him any questions and to my knowledge not one of us has. Many flight crew on this forum are so saddened by the loss of colleagues in the industry who are lost in flying accidents, they understandably put RIP. All I can add is that there is no RIP from a relatives point of view unless transparency of all original information occurs.
I would loved to have followed my father in a having a flying career but that was not to be (poor eyesight) and as you might expect I have nothing but the greatest of respect for flight deck crew, but on the main issue of this thread (the release of the tapes) I strongly disagree with contributors for the reasons I have given.
I would loved to have followed my father in a having a flying career but that was not to be (poor eyesight) and as you might expect I have nothing but the greatest of respect for flight deck crew, but on the main issue of this thread (the release of the tapes) I strongly disagree with contributors for the reasons I have given.
