BBC investigation into fatigue, working culture & safety standards
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I would be interested to know why you are concentrating on the low cost Airlines.
I work for the National Dutch carrier cityhopper,The cap371 and the new proposed european FTL is much more restrictive than our FTL.
We are legally allowed to work a 16 hour day,Reduced rest is as little as 7.5 hours.
The flight safety department a few years back produced a graph to demonstrate how detrimental the different types of FTL were. KLM was by far the most challenging
I work for the National Dutch carrier cityhopper,The cap371 and the new proposed european FTL is much more restrictive than our FTL.
We are legally allowed to work a 16 hour day,Reduced rest is as little as 7.5 hours.
The flight safety department a few years back produced a graph to demonstrate how detrimental the different types of FTL were. KLM was by far the most challenging
JF, you have, as ever, hit the nail on the head.
As an airline Captain I have had to deal with the following:
* Being personally told by my Fleet Manager to defer technical effects to the last sector of the day to improve time keeping.
* Giving my First Officer a shove because he dropped off on the climb out from Heathrow.
As a First Officer I had to deal with:
* Landing (with 326 POB) off a non precision approach in the Caribbean, 2 hours 57 minutes into discretion, when my Captain claimed he was too exhausted to continue.
* Being harassed in the Flight Deck by my Fleet Manager to extend duty hours.
All of the above were safety threats. We might term them latent errors in the system. The academic importance of them would be explained by Prof. James Reason as holes in the swiss cheese that are waiting to line up and cause an accident. The job of an airline crew is to monitor the overall operation and thwart the events that might make the aforementioned holes line up.
Pilots at the sharp end fully understand this working practice. It's our survival mechanism to make sure we never leave a little back door open that could embarrass us.
This role is made a lot more difficult when you are very, very tired and working in climate of perceived fear from the management.
The problem is that the managers don't see that they have a role to play in preventing the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up. If they sweat the crews to the maximum and give discreet little hints that they want time keeping improved OR ELSE it wouldn't really enter in to their psyche that they might compound a situation such as low fuel, bad weather and wheels that don't retract on the go around at the end of the day . . .
The same minor incident can occur a hundred times without threat. However, keep operating with that ' aft fuel pump inop', factor in an inexperienced First Officer, a tired out Captain, a tricky diversion and some other random factor and you have an accident waiting to happen. THEN it becomes important that the crew should have snagged the defect and insisted it was rectified.
Of course, commercial aviation is statistically very safe these days and there hasn't been a major accident in Britain for a long time. However, a total hull loss is a frightful thing to deal with.
However, the experienced guys at the sharp end know the envirnoment has become a lot more hostile in recent years.
I don't believe there is any political will whatsoever to deal with this problem. The great British public have quite a high tolerance to risk when offered cheap flights. For ten quid well, you would go wouldn't you?
However, if some of the industries senior people could articulate the problem some progress could be made. The alternative of waiting for the evidence is insupportable to those of us in the know.
Regards,
WW
As an airline Captain I have had to deal with the following:
* Being personally told by my Fleet Manager to defer technical effects to the last sector of the day to improve time keeping.
* Giving my First Officer a shove because he dropped off on the climb out from Heathrow.
As a First Officer I had to deal with:
* Landing (with 326 POB) off a non precision approach in the Caribbean, 2 hours 57 minutes into discretion, when my Captain claimed he was too exhausted to continue.
* Being harassed in the Flight Deck by my Fleet Manager to extend duty hours.
All of the above were safety threats. We might term them latent errors in the system. The academic importance of them would be explained by Prof. James Reason as holes in the swiss cheese that are waiting to line up and cause an accident. The job of an airline crew is to monitor the overall operation and thwart the events that might make the aforementioned holes line up.
Pilots at the sharp end fully understand this working practice. It's our survival mechanism to make sure we never leave a little back door open that could embarrass us.
This role is made a lot more difficult when you are very, very tired and working in climate of perceived fear from the management.
The problem is that the managers don't see that they have a role to play in preventing the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up. If they sweat the crews to the maximum and give discreet little hints that they want time keeping improved OR ELSE it wouldn't really enter in to their psyche that they might compound a situation such as low fuel, bad weather and wheels that don't retract on the go around at the end of the day . . .
The same minor incident can occur a hundred times without threat. However, keep operating with that ' aft fuel pump inop', factor in an inexperienced First Officer, a tired out Captain, a tricky diversion and some other random factor and you have an accident waiting to happen. THEN it becomes important that the crew should have snagged the defect and insisted it was rectified.
Of course, commercial aviation is statistically very safe these days and there hasn't been a major accident in Britain for a long time. However, a total hull loss is a frightful thing to deal with.
However, the experienced guys at the sharp end know the envirnoment has become a lot more hostile in recent years.
I don't believe there is any political will whatsoever to deal with this problem. The great British public have quite a high tolerance to risk when offered cheap flights. For ten quid well, you would go wouldn't you?
However, if some of the industries senior people could articulate the problem some progress could be made. The alternative of waiting for the evidence is insupportable to those of us in the know.
Regards,
WW
Last edited by Wig Wag; 3rd Mar 2007 at 20:21.
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What we are allowed to do is very different from what we actually end up doing. We also have the backing of a good union(s), Chief Pilots that you can actually talk to and generally reasonable rosters that can be flown. Personally, I don't think we have too much to worry about when you compare our position with others. And then we have the calling in "unfit for duty" which you MUST do if you are. We have many subjects which need discussion with the company but (IMO) having to fly when you are too knackered is not one of them.
PM.
PM.
Paxing All Over The World
Pax speaking. I think that Wig Wag says it all. I have seen exactly that kind of behaviour from management but I have had the good fortune to work in telecommunications and when the system ground to a halt - it was still sitting comfortably on the floor of the equipment room. It is rather easier to fix something when you can stop for a cup of tea ...
In general commerce, I have seen management (both IT and general) move from a stance of:
Let us prevent problems occuring. Let us maintain equipment and train staff so that our operation runs smoothly.
To one that is harsh and unforgiving and short sighted:
Let us cut back on routine maintenance to save money and just fix things when they break. It is cheaper to apologise to the customer and give them a voucher.
Perhaps this sounds familiar to those in the airlines?
In the past 20 years I have seen several examples of UK management allowing safety to slide until it actually falls. Here are two prominent ones where, after the event, it came to light that brave staff had spoken up and warned the company that they were, to use an old fashioned nautical term, "Standing into danger".
Herald of Free Enterprise. Ro-Ro ferry 6th March 1987. Dead: 193
Kings Cross Tube fire. 18th November 1987. Dead: 31
Having followed this debate from the outset (and having a nephew who is a commercial pilot outside of the UK) I have long since come to the conclusion that UK and Irish airline business' are, Standing into danger. I expect a hull loss sooner not later.
In general commerce, I have seen management (both IT and general) move from a stance of:
Let us prevent problems occuring. Let us maintain equipment and train staff so that our operation runs smoothly.
To one that is harsh and unforgiving and short sighted:
Let us cut back on routine maintenance to save money and just fix things when they break. It is cheaper to apologise to the customer and give them a voucher.
Perhaps this sounds familiar to those in the airlines?
In the past 20 years I have seen several examples of UK management allowing safety to slide until it actually falls. Here are two prominent ones where, after the event, it came to light that brave staff had spoken up and warned the company that they were, to use an old fashioned nautical term, "Standing into danger".
Herald of Free Enterprise. Ro-Ro ferry 6th March 1987. Dead: 193
Kings Cross Tube fire. 18th November 1987. Dead: 31
Having followed this debate from the outset (and having a nephew who is a commercial pilot outside of the UK) I have long since come to the conclusion that UK and Irish airline business' are, Standing into danger. I expect a hull loss sooner not later.
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The Swiss Cheese and James Reason are once again quoted. A fine expample and one which is discussed at every CRM course I've been on. Pilots are often the last slice in the cheese. A fundamental charateristic of a good airman is to anticipate the traps and avoid them. Remember the old adage that 'a skillful pilot is one who avoids the scenarios where they need their skills to cope with it.'
We attend these CRM courses because it is legal we do so. IMHO they would not be run if not legally required; non revenue generating cost. Management speak with great pride about the safety culture of their airline. "We ain't had a crash so we are 100% safe." Why, oh Why do they then operate with the complete opposite philosophy to our CRM teachings. They do not want to anticipate problems and be procative. That will cost money and they may never happen; so it would have been a waste of money. They let the holes line up and hope the crews will act as the final safety net they are; and boy, do they make even that difficult at times.
CRM = Company Resource Management = All the links in the Chain.
There are too many weak links at the top end and it is the stong links at the tail end; ops, engineering, distaptch, flight crew and others, who sort out the dros sent downstairs.
When was the last time anyone even close to management was sited as contributory to a crash/incident? Occaisionally a 'culture' is commented on, but even then it has not been nailed as the cause. It was sited as being unhelpful, but the crews and others should have been able to cope. I wonder how many near misses there were, due to the 'culutre', before the final smoking hole.
We attend these CRM courses because it is legal we do so. IMHO they would not be run if not legally required; non revenue generating cost. Management speak with great pride about the safety culture of their airline. "We ain't had a crash so we are 100% safe." Why, oh Why do they then operate with the complete opposite philosophy to our CRM teachings. They do not want to anticipate problems and be procative. That will cost money and they may never happen; so it would have been a waste of money. They let the holes line up and hope the crews will act as the final safety net they are; and boy, do they make even that difficult at times.
CRM = Company Resource Management = All the links in the Chain.
There are too many weak links at the top end and it is the stong links at the tail end; ops, engineering, distaptch, flight crew and others, who sort out the dros sent downstairs.
When was the last time anyone even close to management was sited as contributory to a crash/incident? Occaisionally a 'culture' is commented on, but even then it has not been nailed as the cause. It was sited as being unhelpful, but the crews and others should have been able to cope. I wonder how many near misses there were, due to the 'culutre', before the final smoking hole.
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However a TV programme that investigated what lay behind the safety - not the risks - of air travel would clearly not attract many viewers among the general public.
I'd be interested to know how many actually came froward thus far with facts, if only a few, then of course the programme will have a poor content and less interest, however I think it's too simple to say that the general public, as opposed to the aviation industry, won't watch.
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I know that this was not asked, however, a friend of mine used to be a busjet pilot. He flew 750h in 6 months and in one instance that I know of he was on duty for 20h non stop. He is no more as he worked himself to death.
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Which, of course, raises the issue of whether the responsibility for his situation lay with himself or with somebody else.
If you can say no, and should say no, then it is up to the individual. The individual has clear responsibilities, as per his licence.
If you cannot say no, but should say no, then it is about the operator and the safety regulator. Everybody has responsibilities in this case, most especially the latter two.
The difference between both cases is the proper focus of an independent and non-hysterical examination.
If you can say no, and should say no, then it is up to the individual. The individual has clear responsibilities, as per his licence.
If you cannot say no, but should say no, then it is about the operator and the safety regulator. Everybody has responsibilities in this case, most especially the latter two.
The difference between both cases is the proper focus of an independent and non-hysterical examination.
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WigWag;
Can you or any of the other crews operating under the conditions you describe, tell me if your company operates under a Transportation Ministry which has embodied a self regulated safety system. Here in Canada we are moving ahead with SMS (Safety Management Systems) which in theory will allow safety concerns from within all areas of the company to be met and dealt with by company management. As well, in each company, there is an appointed Accountable Executive who. presumably, will have to answer for all safety concerns within the company.
They are even trying to enact a whistleblower protection scheme to force action.
There is real concern about this issue here as to whether it will be effective or is just another government ministry downloading of it's responsibilities, let alone what whistleblowing problems may arise.
Regards
carholme
Can you or any of the other crews operating under the conditions you describe, tell me if your company operates under a Transportation Ministry which has embodied a self regulated safety system. Here in Canada we are moving ahead with SMS (Safety Management Systems) which in theory will allow safety concerns from within all areas of the company to be met and dealt with by company management. As well, in each company, there is an appointed Accountable Executive who. presumably, will have to answer for all safety concerns within the company.
They are even trying to enact a whistleblower protection scheme to force action.
There is real concern about this issue here as to whether it will be effective or is just another government ministry downloading of it's responsibilities, let alone what whistleblowing problems may arise.
Regards
carholme
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http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/zt....Abstract.html
This a thread which details the sleep/wake/duty pattern leading up to the Guantanamo Bay crash.
Seems VERY familiar to me, as I'm sure it will to many others in our industry.
The CAP371 hours do seem to be treated as a target by my lot but the botttom line is that the great unwashed expect to fly for very little money, thanks to the likes of Easy and Ryanair, and consequently have dragged our profession into the gutter, along with the lifestyle we have all worked so hard to achieve over the years.
The number of times a Sharm or other Middle East flight is rostered exactly on the allowed FDP is amazing - and 9 times out of 10 we have to use discretion or we'd have to land at somewhere on the way back each time and rest for 10 hours which would not go down well, either in flight ops, with the pax or with the domestic manager who's cooked a nice roast....
Hike the fares back up and let's all get back to normal.
Thrush
This a thread which details the sleep/wake/duty pattern leading up to the Guantanamo Bay crash.
Seems VERY familiar to me, as I'm sure it will to many others in our industry.
The CAP371 hours do seem to be treated as a target by my lot but the botttom line is that the great unwashed expect to fly for very little money, thanks to the likes of Easy and Ryanair, and consequently have dragged our profession into the gutter, along with the lifestyle we have all worked so hard to achieve over the years.
The number of times a Sharm or other Middle East flight is rostered exactly on the allowed FDP is amazing - and 9 times out of 10 we have to use discretion or we'd have to land at somewhere on the way back each time and rest for 10 hours which would not go down well, either in flight ops, with the pax or with the domestic manager who's cooked a nice roast....
Hike the fares back up and let's all get back to normal.
Thrush
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Time pressure
The effect of time pressure on the operational safety of intense short-haul multi-sector operations could do with a good examination.
Anyone else seen a major jet operator arrive next door on stand, throw the passengers off, chuck the next load on, then pushback and go ?
All in 10 minutes or so and without a standard pre-departure external aircraft examination by anyone.....
Anyone else seen a major jet operator arrive next door on stand, throw the passengers off, chuck the next load on, then pushback and go ?
All in 10 minutes or so and without a standard pre-departure external aircraft examination by anyone.....
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research bullying and contracts
What i would like to see researched is bullying within this company, there are to many management style people withinn the company that feel that they can intimadate, humiliate and cause undue stress to there workers. I also believe that contracts and treatment towards these contracts should be investigated. We all understood what we were suppose to get, but the annoying part is that when you either get promotion from second officer to first officer and captain they try to reduce your terms or do not give you a contract for months. they say you have to wait till april 1st, example you start with the company as a cadet in may, you finish line training in november and you do not get second officer contract till december, you then have 12 months probation in the company until the following december but you wont get your first officer contract till april the following year. It is soul destroying, I have known pilots and cabin crew who are deeply in debt and have to sleep in cars, missing mortgage payments, owing thousands on credit cards to live. This company has to be investigated, by someone that has b**ls and guts. I urge cadets and all pilots please please be very carefull when you consider a move to ryanair. Look at other possiblities such as sponsorship with other small or even companies like easy,flybe thomson. If you have lots of money to spend and are wealthy when then you have nothing to loose in ryanair, its aircraft are brilliant and the procedures and safety is good, but think in the back of your mind how the managers and mol make remarks about everybody from gordon brown to british airways and even there pilots and crew, but when some other party investigates them they get very very very upset.
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The Rules
Many of you are quoting the CAA avoidance of fatigue document as if it were a set of rules, this is factually incorrect
In order to obtain an air operators certificate, licence to operate, each ailine submits to the CAA a set of manuals containing the rules it intends to use in governing flight activities these rules may of may not be the same as those in the CAA documnt
The CAA then grants airlines an operators certificate against the proposed rules
Essentially the CAA document is irrelevant to crews because it does not govern their activities unless their company happens to use it exactly as published, none do
To discover what actually happens in airlines you need to examine the manual of the airline concerned
Hold tight
In order to obtain an air operators certificate, licence to operate, each ailine submits to the CAA a set of manuals containing the rules it intends to use in governing flight activities these rules may of may not be the same as those in the CAA documnt
The CAA then grants airlines an operators certificate against the proposed rules
Essentially the CAA document is irrelevant to crews because it does not govern their activities unless their company happens to use it exactly as published, none do
To discover what actually happens in airlines you need to examine the manual of the airline concerned
Hold tight
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One of the biggest problems, IMHO, is the classic conflict of interest the various CAA's have. Not only they obliged to police the rules they make, they also decide upon the commercial viability of the very companies who pay their income. Stick rigidly to the rules and a company may not survive in harsh times. (I've flown with various companies who asked for dispensations to limits to overcome difficulties of their own making.) That strands huge numbers of pax, dumps loads of people onto the job market, reduces the income of the 'AA' and generally inconveniences huge numbers of people.
A blind eye for a short period might avert the commercial fallout. Once that is done the relaxation of the rules becomes the norm for that company. Rules are bent everyday, constantly. In general the 'AA's monitor paperwork. In every airline I've worked for the annual audit has only flushed out record keeping and other paperwork errors. Working conditions being outside the guidelines not even noticed or reviewed. In other words, a joke. The "AA's put far too much self regulation on the airlines. An airline applies for an AOC under a raft of proposals. The spectrum is massive. As long as they appear to follow the general guidelines it is approved. Often the terminology is so vague it can be interpreted different ways on different days. Flexibility? Yes. Abuse? Also.
Remember Valujet. The NTSB ridiculed the FAA for having excatly this same conflict of interest in its oversight. It procalimed that the 2 issues, commercialism and operational standards MUST BE DIVIDED. I'm not sure if it ever happened, but it sure as hell ain't been approached in EU. It's about time!!
A blind eye for a short period might avert the commercial fallout. Once that is done the relaxation of the rules becomes the norm for that company. Rules are bent everyday, constantly. In general the 'AA's monitor paperwork. In every airline I've worked for the annual audit has only flushed out record keeping and other paperwork errors. Working conditions being outside the guidelines not even noticed or reviewed. In other words, a joke. The "AA's put far too much self regulation on the airlines. An airline applies for an AOC under a raft of proposals. The spectrum is massive. As long as they appear to follow the general guidelines it is approved. Often the terminology is so vague it can be interpreted different ways on different days. Flexibility? Yes. Abuse? Also.
Remember Valujet. The NTSB ridiculed the FAA for having excatly this same conflict of interest in its oversight. It procalimed that the 2 issues, commercialism and operational standards MUST BE DIVIDED. I'm not sure if it ever happened, but it sure as hell ain't been approached in EU. It's about time!!
Rebel PPRuNer
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A system where company officials were forbidden at pain of prosecution to make requests of crew to extend except in writing (delivered in person on flt deck) or by fax (at remote bases) might be a good thing - then there is a chain of evidence to back up investigations of overuse of the discretion principle using verbal demands which can't be discovered in an audit.
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JF
"there seems to be a NEW safety THREAT emerging which only arises BECAUSE of this successful past which has allowed civil aviation to become a commodity in the literal sense of the word. This commodity is in danger of being exploited by managers who are too young to remember when aviation was not safe. These people (perhaps rather naturally) take safety as a given and just try and improve the bottom line by cost cutting."
Well said, that man! This rings so true to so many of us, not especially in aviation - Police Service (previously the un-PC "Force"), Education and NHS - all of whom have "managers" who did not come up through the ranks but obtained some sort of degree which was assumed gave them magical powers but who, in their ignorance, had an ability to cut corners and costs. The result - a crime-ridden society with a ham-strung no police visibility, kids leaving school who are unable to read or count and an NHS where you have to wait 5 hours plus in an A&E department and hope you don't have to get admitted as you are likely to contract some nasty disease because of uncleaned wards.
"there seems to be a NEW safety THREAT emerging which only arises BECAUSE of this successful past which has allowed civil aviation to become a commodity in the literal sense of the word. This commodity is in danger of being exploited by managers who are too young to remember when aviation was not safe. These people (perhaps rather naturally) take safety as a given and just try and improve the bottom line by cost cutting."
Well said, that man! This rings so true to so many of us, not especially in aviation - Police Service (previously the un-PC "Force"), Education and NHS - all of whom have "managers" who did not come up through the ranks but obtained some sort of degree which was assumed gave them magical powers but who, in their ignorance, had an ability to cut corners and costs. The result - a crime-ridden society with a ham-strung no police visibility, kids leaving school who are unable to read or count and an NHS where you have to wait 5 hours plus in an A&E department and hope you don't have to get admitted as you are likely to contract some nasty disease because of uncleaned wards.
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There are two issues here that i think are conflated.
1. The "double bind" problem where your company has an "Oh so Good" operations manual with all I's dotted and T's crossed, but an internal culture, perhaps of duty hours and time pressure and bullying, that encourages pilots to break the requirements of the operations manual, punishing those who don't, and rewarding those that do.
To put it another way, requiring absolute obedience to the Ops Manual but at the same time requiring absolute time keeping accuracy and punishing those who cannot achieve this for whatever reason, including adherence to the rules.
Under such circumstances, if you break the rules the company will hang you out to dry, pointing to their rules. Telling the judge you broke the rules in the interests of company profitability will not get you very far.
2. The "race to the bottom " issue where terms and conditions are being gradually squeezed, with the connivance of the regulators. This results in increasing workloads and fatigue and a gradual dumbing down, as the numbers of high quality people prepared to accept these working conditions decreases.
We will find out where the "bottom" is when not one, but four or five accidents in a relatively short period are found to have been caused by (1) combined with (2).
1. The "double bind" problem where your company has an "Oh so Good" operations manual with all I's dotted and T's crossed, but an internal culture, perhaps of duty hours and time pressure and bullying, that encourages pilots to break the requirements of the operations manual, punishing those who don't, and rewarding those that do.
To put it another way, requiring absolute obedience to the Ops Manual but at the same time requiring absolute time keeping accuracy and punishing those who cannot achieve this for whatever reason, including adherence to the rules.
Under such circumstances, if you break the rules the company will hang you out to dry, pointing to their rules. Telling the judge you broke the rules in the interests of company profitability will not get you very far.
2. The "race to the bottom " issue where terms and conditions are being gradually squeezed, with the connivance of the regulators. This results in increasing workloads and fatigue and a gradual dumbing down, as the numbers of high quality people prepared to accept these working conditions decreases.
We will find out where the "bottom" is when not one, but four or five accidents in a relatively short period are found to have been caused by (1) combined with (2).
Paxing All Over The World
Yes, YesTAM, I agree but the people conniving at the breaking of rules now can still influence the fall out from the prangs. Whilst the various 'AA's do not investigate, they are the ones (nominally) running the show and can help spin dirt away from facts.
There are many on these forums who think that - when the prangs happen - fatique is going to be very hard to prove for the same reason that has protected the guilty in years past, the people with fatique get to the prang first.
There are many on these forums who think that - when the prangs happen - fatique is going to be very hard to prove for the same reason that has protected the guilty in years past, the people with fatique get to the prang first.