aircraft crash in Stord, Norway
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Stord accident probably never solved
The final accident report will be released one of the first days, without a definite conclusion as to the cause of the braking failure.
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Producing a (possibly inconclusive ) accident report nearly 6 years after the accident , and this coming from one of the most advanced and richest country on the planet is not sending a very good signal I would say.
Accident investigation does not seem to have higest priority /adequate funding anymore in many countries. If one can perhaps find excuses for States like Lybia Commorros or Ivory Coast, I am surprised to see Norway on that list.
Accident investigation does not seem to have higest priority /adequate funding anymore in many countries. If one can perhaps find excuses for States like Lybia Commorros or Ivory Coast, I am surprised to see Norway on that list.
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Preliminary report was released in 2007
I don't think the delay is caused by insufficient public funding. The Investigation Board has been heavily criticized for the delay in this special case and a few others. A spokesman for the Board blames the delay on their internal organization.
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A preliminary report was released in October 2007 and can be downloaded in English here:
http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporte...-File&attach=1
The final report of 150 pages to be released next week is not expected to give any new dramatic conclusions, but several theories.
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A preliminary report was released in October 2007 and can be downloaded in English here:
http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporte...-File&attach=1
The final report of 150 pages to be released next week is not expected to give any new dramatic conclusions, but several theories.
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Aerotoxic syndrome?
In a mail, from November 24. 2006, the former, then brand new, leader of the norwegian accident board Grete Myhre promissed me, that she would do her best to be a speedy authority.
In a mail, from May 2. 2011, Grete Myhre told me, that the final report on AA-670 (at STORD) was almost ready for internal use.
I have no writen promise, but I have asked twice (2006 and 2011) that the blood of the crew, should be testet, for alcohol and nerve-gas, and publisted.
The BAe-146 engines have a very bad history of leaking oil-seals.
Grete Myhre is no longer head of AIBN (since June 1. 2011) and I expect no answer to blood-content of alcohol and nerve-gas.
I hope to be wrong!
In a mail, from May 2. 2011, Grete Myhre told me, that the final report on AA-670 (at STORD) was almost ready for internal use.
I have no writen promise, but I have asked twice (2006 and 2011) that the blood of the crew, should be testet, for alcohol and nerve-gas, and publisted.
The BAe-146 engines have a very bad history of leaking oil-seals.
Grete Myhre is no longer head of AIBN (since June 1. 2011) and I expect no answer to blood-content of alcohol and nerve-gas.
I hope to be wrong!
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Safety margins at Stord Airport were insufficient
From the report released today:
At the time of the accident, the runway was 1,460 m long and 30 m wide. Both thresholds 20 were 130 m from the asphalt edges. The landing distance available (LDA) was stated to be 1,200 m for both runway directions and the take-off distance available (TODA21) was stated to be 1,330 m for both runway directions. This means that at both ends of the runway there was a paved safety area of 130 m. Beyond the safety areas, there was a steep downhill slope in both runway directions. OY-CRG ran off the runway at the north-western end.
SUMMARY
During normal approach and landing at Stord Airport Sørstokken OY-CRG ran off the runway and plunged down a steep slope. The aircraft sustained considerable damage and caught fire immediately. The fire spread so fast that there was not enough time for everybody to evacuate the aircraft. Four people died and six were seriously injured. In its investigation of the accident, the AIBN found that several factors contributed to the accident. The accident was initiated when none of the aircraft's six lift spoilers were deployed after landing.
The AIBN believes it has found two possible technical reasons for this. The wings continued to produce lift, so that the weight of the aircraft was not sufficiently transferred to the landing wheels. Hence, the main wheels did not get sufficient contact with the runway and the braking effect was reduced. The pilots perceived this as wheel brake failure and the emergency brakes were engaged. The emergency brakes do not have anti-skid protection, and the wheels locked. In combination with the damp runway this led to 'reverted rubber hydroplaning' (the rubber in the tyres started boiling), and the aircraft was unable to stop on the runway.
The AIBN believes that the lift spoilers’ failure to deploy in isolation would not have caused the aircraft running off the end of the runway. The aircraft could have stopped within the available runway length if optimum braking had been utilised. The AIBN therefore considers that the excursion could have been prevented by a better system understanding related to failures of the lift spoilers and the effect that it has on the aircrafts’ stopping distance.
The AIBN also believes that grooves in the runway surface could have improved the braking action in this case. The accident has shown that the safety margins at Stord Airport were insufficient. The paved safety area did not extend far enough past the end of the runway in accordance with the requirements of Norwegian BSL E 3-2 and ended in a slope that was steeper than prescribed. These deficiencies were major contributors to the severity of the accident.
The topography caused the aircraft to catch fire. Moreover, the steep terrain was an obstruction to the fire-fighting and rescue work. The AIBN sees this accident as the accumulated effect of three factors – the aircraft design, the airport and operational factors, which, seen as a whole, may have been unacceptable at the time of the accident. The AIBN submits two safety recommendations on the basis of its investigation of this accident.
At the time of the accident, the runway was 1,460 m long and 30 m wide. Both thresholds 20 were 130 m from the asphalt edges. The landing distance available (LDA) was stated to be 1,200 m for both runway directions and the take-off distance available (TODA21) was stated to be 1,330 m for both runway directions. This means that at both ends of the runway there was a paved safety area of 130 m. Beyond the safety areas, there was a steep downhill slope in both runway directions. OY-CRG ran off the runway at the north-western end.
SUMMARY
During normal approach and landing at Stord Airport Sørstokken OY-CRG ran off the runway and plunged down a steep slope. The aircraft sustained considerable damage and caught fire immediately. The fire spread so fast that there was not enough time for everybody to evacuate the aircraft. Four people died and six were seriously injured. In its investigation of the accident, the AIBN found that several factors contributed to the accident. The accident was initiated when none of the aircraft's six lift spoilers were deployed after landing.
The AIBN believes it has found two possible technical reasons for this. The wings continued to produce lift, so that the weight of the aircraft was not sufficiently transferred to the landing wheels. Hence, the main wheels did not get sufficient contact with the runway and the braking effect was reduced. The pilots perceived this as wheel brake failure and the emergency brakes were engaged. The emergency brakes do not have anti-skid protection, and the wheels locked. In combination with the damp runway this led to 'reverted rubber hydroplaning' (the rubber in the tyres started boiling), and the aircraft was unable to stop on the runway.
The AIBN believes that the lift spoilers’ failure to deploy in isolation would not have caused the aircraft running off the end of the runway. The aircraft could have stopped within the available runway length if optimum braking had been utilised. The AIBN therefore considers that the excursion could have been prevented by a better system understanding related to failures of the lift spoilers and the effect that it has on the aircrafts’ stopping distance.
The AIBN also believes that grooves in the runway surface could have improved the braking action in this case. The accident has shown that the safety margins at Stord Airport were insufficient. The paved safety area did not extend far enough past the end of the runway in accordance with the requirements of Norwegian BSL E 3-2 and ended in a slope that was steeper than prescribed. These deficiencies were major contributors to the severity of the accident.
The topography caused the aircraft to catch fire. Moreover, the steep terrain was an obstruction to the fire-fighting and rescue work. The AIBN sees this accident as the accumulated effect of three factors – the aircraft design, the airport and operational factors, which, seen as a whole, may have been unacceptable at the time of the accident. The AIBN submits two safety recommendations on the basis of its investigation of this accident.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 24th Apr 2012 at 15:23.
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Years and years and years .....
This report has taken 5 1/2 years to be published.
1.13.2 There have been incidents with the BAe146 aircraft type in which air contaminated with organophosphates from the engines have entered the cabin and people are believed to have become unwell or sick as a consequence. On the day of the accident, the AIBN therefore requested that the authorised medical examiner at the Norwegian CAA aeromedical section was consulted before blood samples were taken. No medical findings indicate that there was any contamination of the cabin air prior to the accident with OY-CRG.
Organophosphates are not BELIEVED to have caused sickness to countless people - it has been PROVED in a High Court Judgement:
East West Airlines Limited v Turner [2010] NSWCA 53
This only took 18 years.
Many people will be pleased to know that there is now unsurprisingly a blood test which can PROVE exposure to organophosphates - plus it's NOT only the BAe 146:
Accident: Germania B737 near Milano on Nov 18th 2011, first officer partially incapacitated by fumes
Germania B737 Flight: First Officer Partially Incapacitated By Fumes
1.13.2 There have been incidents with the BAe146 aircraft type in which air contaminated with organophosphates from the engines have entered the cabin and people are believed to have become unwell or sick as a consequence. On the day of the accident, the AIBN therefore requested that the authorised medical examiner at the Norwegian CAA aeromedical section was consulted before blood samples were taken. No medical findings indicate that there was any contamination of the cabin air prior to the accident with OY-CRG.
Organophosphates are not BELIEVED to have caused sickness to countless people - it has been PROVED in a High Court Judgement:
East West Airlines Limited v Turner [2010] NSWCA 53
This only took 18 years.
Many people will be pleased to know that there is now unsurprisingly a blood test which can PROVE exposure to organophosphates - plus it's NOT only the BAe 146:
Accident: Germania B737 near Milano on Nov 18th 2011, first officer partially incapacitated by fumes
Germania B737 Flight: First Officer Partially Incapacitated By Fumes
English language version: http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporte...tFile&attach=1
Well worth reading the report (particularly section 1.15.2) for aspects of flight and cabin crew emergency evacuation. Things don’t always go as planned; well done this crew.
Also, note issues with the locked flightdeck door - life saver or ... .
Any further info on the differing views on the applicability of dry/wet/damp landing performance discussed at para 1.6.5.5.
Is this a follow on problem from EU-OPS 1.475 (d) “for performance purposes damp may be considered dry” and 1.480 (a) 3, “a runway is damp when it is not dry”,i.e. it's wet; operator view vs certification (manufacturer) view … [EU OPS 1 vs CS 25].
Well worth reading the report (particularly section 1.15.2) for aspects of flight and cabin crew emergency evacuation. Things don’t always go as planned; well done this crew.
Also, note issues with the locked flightdeck door - life saver or ... .
Any further info on the differing views on the applicability of dry/wet/damp landing performance discussed at para 1.6.5.5.
Is this a follow on problem from EU-OPS 1.475 (d) “for performance purposes damp may be considered dry” and 1.480 (a) 3, “a runway is damp when it is not dry”,i.e. it's wet; operator view vs certification (manufacturer) view … [EU OPS 1 vs CS 25].
Last edited by PEI_3721; 20th Apr 2012 at 18:08.
We might assume that if the ‘dry/wet/damp landing-performance’ issue was a problem then a safety recommendation would be made, i.e. EASA to resolve any ambiguity.
Alternatively, comparing the report with most operational practices might suggest that the investigators do not have the same understanding of the operational / certification requirements as operators / manufacturers.
Of interest the UK CAA published guidance on a related subject - damp grooved runways (FODCOM 3/2009 now cancelled, but see CAP 789), which IMHO is interpreted as there is no such thing as a ‘dry’ damp runway, even if grooved.
Also of interest the Norwegian authorities have published considerable research on related contaminated landing performance; which has a striking observation that “The involved parties do not realize that existing rules and regulations are based on simplification of the actual physical conditions.”
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Executive Summary
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Main Body
Alternatively, comparing the report with most operational practices might suggest that the investigators do not have the same understanding of the operational / certification requirements as operators / manufacturers.
Of interest the UK CAA published guidance on a related subject - damp grooved runways (FODCOM 3/2009 now cancelled, but see CAP 789), which IMHO is interpreted as there is no such thing as a ‘dry’ damp runway, even if grooved.
Also of interest the Norwegian authorities have published considerable research on related contaminated landing performance; which has a striking observation that “The involved parties do not realize that existing rules and regulations are based on simplification of the actual physical conditions.”
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Executive Summary
Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and Conditions for Friction Predictions - Main Body
