JAA thwarting strengthened cockpit doors?

[Gantenbein]

It appears that JAA is blocking measures that would allow strengthening cockpit doors on European airliners, similar to US measures that became possible after dispensation was given by the FAA. The reason being that a decompression caused by a broken flight deck window is considered to be more threatening than a hijacking performed by people who want nothing more than to crash.

Without wanting to open a debate on which airlines have actually strengthened their cockpit doors, which would be a breach of general security precautions (especially for those airlines that haven’t&#8230 , I’d like to ask if anyone has any useful information on this. In my company, pilots are becoming frustrated by the absence of tangible measures to counter the threats as we perceive them. If this is a European thing, it takes on very different proportions.

[bugg smasher]

There are several possibilities that come to mind when considering the insanity of such a decision; either it is shareholder pressure to keep costs down, or merely a CAA/LBA/DGAC etc inter-departmental turf war. In the case of the former, it’s certainly high time the bean counters took a seat in economy class and realized that the flying public is not likely to return to the skies in profitable numbers until such measures are fully implemented, in the case of the latter, not many surprises there I am sorry to say.

A rapid decompression in the cockpit is an extremely rare event. Should the relevant authority insist on measures to mitigate the possibility of pilot incapacitation due to same, the solution surely lies in more stringent rules regarding the use of supplemental oxygen in the cruise phase of flight. An airliner with unconscious pilots is certainly a dire circumstance. We have witnessed, however, the infinitely more destructive consequences of an airliner with suicidal terrorists in control.

Until the threat of being bombed, poisoned and otherwise terrorized back into the Stone Age is completely and mercifully extirpated, there exists a very clear and present danger. I visited Ground Zero yesterday to pay my sorrowful respects; I would rue the day that Buckingham Palace, Frankfurt Terminal One or any number of nuclear powerplant installations resembled that God-forsaken tragedy, and merely as a shockingly incompetent result of obtuse and shamefully short-sighted bureaucratic dithering. The Aces, Ace, appear to be missing from a few decks around here.

In the starkest of terms, the cockpit has been taken from us in a number of ways. Perhaps it’s high time we took it back.

[wysiwyg]

Firstly, my condolences for the events of the past couple of months. Your nation has been exceedingly fortunate to almost entirely keep clear of attrocities like these for years while for the rest of us they are regrettably an all too common occurrance. As a result of this, most of the rest of the world took steps to improve security at source (i.e. on the ground) while America chose to allow people to wander all through their airports. Now that the worst has happened we are all expected to follow whatever the US decides is an appropriate way of acting, are we? It's funny how I have no recollection of any change in US security taking place after any UK or European terrorist attacks.

With full respect but also remembering that the world extends beyond American shores.
wizzy

[Plastique]

The cockpit door is designed to break open in both directions in case of a decompression. On Airbus aircraft, if a flight deck window blows out the door is designed to pop open inwards, otherwise the cockpit floor comes up and the control cables get taken out (for the rudder and THS on FBW a/c).

The Authorities are doing the right thing by trying to avoid a KJR which results in possibly greater hazards.

[Whippersnapper]

Definately a case of industry pressure.

You can have a strong door with no blow-out panels which does not cause pressure problems in a decompression - a louvred or slatted door, of the same principle as the radiator grille on armoured vehicles, made of a steel frame and Kevlar slats for weight reduction, where each slat overlaps the next to provide a projectile blocking screen. A simple curtain would keep any light from the cabin out of the flight deck at night.

[RatherBeFlying]

Cockpit window blowouts do happen and the door has to accommodate this. Also it would be nice if the cabin crew can gain entry to help keep pilot x from going all the way out the window so that pilot y can get on with the job of flying the airplane.

With a strengthened door, it will be important to ensure that two crew members are always present in case of incapacitation or decompression. It won't do for the captain to have a heart attack while the co-pilot is visiting the lav and can't get back in.

[Roadtrip]

It seems the CAA is just as buearucratic, sloth-like, and incompetant as the FAA.

[AA SLF]

RatherBeFlying -

AA here in the USA has a new policy that when one of the two (2) flight deck crew leave the cockpit (lav visit, etc.) that one (1) of the cabin crew comes into the cockpit to be available to open the door. This frees the other flight deck officer to be able to remain "in control" of the a/c.

When I first saw this happen a couple of weeks ago I almost had a heart attack thinking that the F cabin FA was going to fly the plane. Took me a while to "wise-up". Second time I saw it happen I also noticed that it was always an FA in "pants" rather than one dressed in a skirt. I am guessing this is because they have to "climb over" the yoke??

dAAvid -

[RatherBeFlying]

AA SLF

That would be the centre console. Can't have the ladies offering an Elmer Batters glimpse to the pilots while getting in and out of the seat. Messes up the instrument scan when hand flying and may cause vertigo.

In two crew airliners, a cabin crew member is often trained to assist with cockpit duties in case of incapacitation.

AA's SOP in this regard will likely end up as a regulation.

[The Guvnor]

Hmmm, remember that BA BAC1-11 that lost a windscreen (and very nearly its Captain) over BHX about 15 years ago? The Captain was held by the cabin crew, who were able to gain instant access to the flight deck - any slower than that and he would have gone.

Frankly, the chances of something like this happening are infinitely higher than the chances of another September 11-style hijacking; and I think it's essential that the baby isn't thrown out with the bathwater on this issue.

[Anti-ice]

True about the BA 111 event some time back now, but in times since then am I not right in saying that when in the F/D , the Flight crew are strapped in at all times, at least by the lap belt if nothing else?

Also, I think it's true to say that that poor Captain was involved in a highly unusual event which we have not seen the like of since.

There have been more attempted / successful
intrusions on to the Flight deck since then .

Agree with whippersnapper - in these days of hi-tech matireals and devices a door could be developed that would be effective,secure,and approved by the pilots it is designed to protect (and the other *** feet of airliner behind them)

[ 28 October 2001: Message edited by: Anti-ice ]

[Human Factor]

Guv,

Luckily for the captain on the 111, the purser was already in the flight deck. However, as you say, the other cabin crew were able to get in fairly sharpish.

[bugg smasher]

Greetings Wizzy,

Admonition acknowledged, you are quite correct in pointing out the peculiar myopia that can be prevalent here when viewing events that occur beyond these shores, indeed it is a subject that appears to be one of the primary sources of the ongoing trans-Atlantic squabble you refer to. I leave that discussion, however, to those that are so inclined.

Your comments regarding European airport security are noted with some alarm, you will recall, for example, that the Lockerbie disaster occurred due to a bomb passing undetected through both Frankfurt and Heathrow airports. Securing something the size and complexity of an international airport terminal is a daunting task, and given all the variables, can never be made wholly secure I should think.

That being the case, it has been quite correctly stated that the cockpit is, in fact, the last line of defense. If you are absolutely certain that your cockpit is not at risk, what is your solution for those carriers whose flight decks are?

Your kind condolences are appreciated with thanks, but not to worry my friend, although the New Yorkers may be myopic, they are tenacious to a fault.

Warmest Regards

[Max Angle]

From reading various articles about flight deck doors over the past few weeks it would seem that the problem of decompression has been solved with the doors that are now being fitted by Jet Blue and a few other US airlines. We have to face the fact that if somebody wants to gain access to the flightdeck be it a hijacker or any other crazy the ONLY thing that will stop them is a door that is designed for the purpose. The current doors are not designed for that purpose and need to be got rid of ASAP and replaced with one that is. If the FAA can find a way round the problem the JAA should be able to as well. The thought of being attacked whilst strapped into your seat in the flightdeck is a truly awfull one and I for one would welcome something that radically decreases the chance of that happening. The UK goverment should go the same way as the US and set a date for all doors to be changed, the airlines won't do it on their own.

[Blacksheep]

And the evidence that the JAA is indeed blocking the adoption of secure flight compartment doors is...? The designs that I've had a chance to review so far are either pretty useless at keeping unauthorised people out of the flight compartment, or are they pose significant risks to safe normal operations. Perhaps the JAA (and other) regulatory authorities are simply waiting for an effective design that does not reduce airworthiness and safety?

Knee-jerk reactions seldom result in satisfactory solutions. Why don't we just wait until Friday and lock all Mr. bin Laden's terrorist chappies into their Mosques? That would be just as sensible as most of the "Katy-bar" bodge jobs being inflicted on US registered aircraft.

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[bugg smasher]

Interesting plan, Blacksheep, but what shall we do with their bicycles?

[Agaricus bisporus]

Aren't we all barking up the wrong tree?

Unless I'm much mistaken this debate is related to preventing atrocities following the style of those of Sept 11th. (On the assumption that we were well enough prepared for threats extant before Sept11)

The modus operandi of those terrs was to take physical control of the aeroplane by getting one of their number into one of the driver's seats. It is generally accepted that this is not possible by force - ie you cannot drag an uncooperative pilot fron his seat be he unwilling or dead. They thus formulated a plan that no normal human being could resist, ie the disembowelling of cabin crew that the flight deck felt they had to react to. Thus a seat was vacated.

Has anyone been advised by the British Government (or any other, for that matter) of the impotance of never vacating your seat under coercion? The Hell we have! Surely this is the ONLY advice that matters, yet NOBODY has given it. What the **** are the safety regulators playing at? They confiscate our teaspoons and Swiss Army knives, ignore our fire axes and utterly fail to advise on the most critical event of all! This is an international scandal.

Now just how does fitting Titanium doors address all this?

It does not, nor can it. EVER.

Whilst pilots need to leave the flight deck, for access or for physiological reasons then no amount of armour plating can have the least effect, can it? Add to that the need for occasional food and drink to be brought in a further breach is introduced, that of cabin crew having access. Access which can be coerced with a knife or gun. What price armoured doors?

Come on fellas, armoured doors is utterly impractical media-appeasing humbug. It will not work because it cannot.

Unless you lock and bolt the poor pilots in hours before take off and run psychological checks to ascertain just exactly who you actually have up there, force them to fly the entire route with no food, drink or toilet and only unlock them as the securicor van comes alongside at the end of the day....

"I was locked into a metal cell 5' by 5' by 5',for 12 hrs at atime, fed day old cold food and made to crap in the same bucket as my cellmate. I was virtually strip searched each end of the day and allowed no contact with my colleagues during that time. Amnesty International would raise merry hell at the UN over such barbaric torture. But I describe the proposed life of an Airline Pilot, not a political prisoner. Can you see the difference?

Perhaps we'd be better examining the causes of the problem before inventing irrational and useless fixes?

[ 30 October 2001: Message edited by: Agaricus bisporus ]

[Roadtrip]

More manta from the Europeans and Brits that unless something is perfect, it's not worth doing at all.

What a bunch of naive, defeatist, stupid, handwringing hogwash.

Security has to be a layered. Each layer sieves out more and more. A breach resistant cockpit door is the next to the last layer. Procedures for access (curtains/intercom, etc) can provide minimum risk for being caught with the door unbolted. The final layer before command of the aircraft is lost is armed pilots. With the primary layers (profiling, physical searches) and the secondary layers (aircraft), the probability of losing command of the aircraft is very low.

Sweating nonsense like rapid D when faced with a clear and present danger like today is irresponsible. We can get better engineered doors later. Lets get breach resistant doors in place now that can at least give the pilots a plenty of warning to take appropriate, including, if they feel necessary, lethal action. It's not perfect, but it would be as good as we can do to keep flying RIGHT NOW.

[bugg smasher]

The European community, Roadtrip, also see the problem at hand and are doing their level best to address it, it does not serve anyone’s interest to further inflame the somewhat embarrassing and puerile trans-Atlantic taunting matches that characterize more than a few of the threads on this board. Highly counter-productive in my view.

Agoricus, I see the point you are attempting to make. You are absolutely correct in stating that a permanent solution can only involve addressing the root causes of terrorism, of fundamentalist tribalism, and of the deeply addictive and suicidal beliefs that compulsively urge the so-anointed to destroy our way of life and everything we have achieved thus far. But you speak of a process that will not likely resolve itself in our lifetimes, of a steadfastly rooted human condition so deeply complex and darkly destructive as to defy intelligent analysis and resolution any time soon. What would you have us do? We require, with terrible urgency, a defensible cockpit. Right now.

Given the choice of travel options for my wife and kids between your aircraft and Roadtrip’s, and this despite my previously voiced objections to the arming of flight crew, take us home Roadtrip. My lovely children have far, far too much to lose.

[Blacksheep]

Europeans have been living with terrorism for decades, the Americans have just had it shoved in their faces big-time. The reason why British streets are full of litter is because there are no litter bins. The same goes for Spain. Those security cameras aimed at everyone, everywhere, on the streets of UK aren't there to spot pickpockets and shoplifters.

There is no more danger of being killed by a terrorist on the streets of Tel Aviv than there is on the streets of London or Madrid. We have grown used to living with terrorism and the Americans will soon get used to it too. In the mean time stop bleating and worrying and waving your guns in everyone's faces. Terrorists must be faced with dignity and persistance.

Mainland USA has never been bombed and American civilians have never been under fire before, that is not the case for Europeans. So, American friends, do not dare to tell us how to deal with terrorists. We have plenty of first hand experience - for once unfortunately, we are the experts.

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