British Airways A319 loses displays
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British Airways A319 loses displays
UK investigators are trying to establish the reasons why a British Airways Airbus A319 suffered a serious loss of electrical power last month shortly after departing from London Heathrow at night.
The aircraft, G-EUOB, was eight minutes into the flight to Budapest at about 19:26, and nearing FL200, when there was “an audible clunk” noise, several electrical systems ceased to operate, and the cockpit became dark.
Among the electrical systems which failed were the primary flight displays and navigation displays on both the captain’s and first officer’s instrument panels. The crew also lost the upper electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM) display, the autopilot and auto-thrust, intercom and general flight-deck lighting.
An attempted ‘Mayday’ transmission was not received by air traffic controllers because the aircraft’s radio was no longer powered. The highly experienced captain maintained aircraft attitude by the external horizon and standby instruments. Investigators believe the standby horizon was probably “not powered or lighted” and in any case should have remained usable for only another five minutes.
In a special bulletin on the 22 October incident the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) states that the aircraft remained in the “degraded condition” for about two minutes.
After carrying out ECAM procedures the crew managed to restore the primary flight instruments and most other capabilities, including air-ground communication, although a number of other less-important systems remained inoperative.
Following a 40min hold for further checks the aircraft was cleared to continue to Budapest, where it landed safely. There were no injuries among the 76 passengers and six crew.
Maintenance engineers reset all the affected systems and the aircraft – a four-year old example registered G-EUOB, with International Aero Engines V2500 powerplants – remained in operation for another six days with no reported electric problems.
The AAIB became aware of the event only through the crew’s mandatory occurrence report and the aircraft was then taken out of service for further inspection under AAIB supervision. Integrity checks on the electrical power system and checks on the engine pylons’ integrated drive generator feed connectors yielded nothing unusual. Before the aircraft was returned to service inspectors removed several components including the three display management computers, a generator control unit, a system data acquisition concentrator unit and a flight warning computer.
Investigators are still carrying out studies into the incident, in co-operation with Airbus and British Airways, and expect to publish a more detailed report once their work is complete.
The aircraft, G-EUOB, was eight minutes into the flight to Budapest at about 19:26, and nearing FL200, when there was “an audible clunk” noise, several electrical systems ceased to operate, and the cockpit became dark.
Among the electrical systems which failed were the primary flight displays and navigation displays on both the captain’s and first officer’s instrument panels. The crew also lost the upper electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM) display, the autopilot and auto-thrust, intercom and general flight-deck lighting.
An attempted ‘Mayday’ transmission was not received by air traffic controllers because the aircraft’s radio was no longer powered. The highly experienced captain maintained aircraft attitude by the external horizon and standby instruments. Investigators believe the standby horizon was probably “not powered or lighted” and in any case should have remained usable for only another five minutes.
In a special bulletin on the 22 October incident the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) states that the aircraft remained in the “degraded condition” for about two minutes.
After carrying out ECAM procedures the crew managed to restore the primary flight instruments and most other capabilities, including air-ground communication, although a number of other less-important systems remained inoperative.
Following a 40min hold for further checks the aircraft was cleared to continue to Budapest, where it landed safely. There were no injuries among the 76 passengers and six crew.
Maintenance engineers reset all the affected systems and the aircraft – a four-year old example registered G-EUOB, with International Aero Engines V2500 powerplants – remained in operation for another six days with no reported electric problems.
The AAIB became aware of the event only through the crew’s mandatory occurrence report and the aircraft was then taken out of service for further inspection under AAIB supervision. Integrity checks on the electrical power system and checks on the engine pylons’ integrated drive generator feed connectors yielded nothing unusual. Before the aircraft was returned to service inspectors removed several components including the three display management computers, a generator control unit, a system data acquisition concentrator unit and a flight warning computer.
Investigators are still carrying out studies into the incident, in co-operation with Airbus and British Airways, and expect to publish a more detailed report once their work is complete.
Last edited by 3202b; 21st Dec 2005 at 21:35.
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Maintenance engineers reset all the affected systems and the aircraft – a four-year old example registered G-EUOB, with International Aero Engines V2500 powerplants – remained in operation for another six days with no reported electric problems.
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OK, I'm only going on the above info but: Night time, major unexplained electrical failure, held for 40 mins and then pressed on! Go ahead and flame me all you want guys but I have grave doubts about that decision. I trust that it was at least a full moon and VMC all the way to and at the destination (should it have re-occured).
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The only thing I can think of that would cause this problem, is DMC2 being powered from the captains side (Switching panel selection) followed by the the loss of AC Bus 1.
In this case, you would have exactly what is described above.
Interestingly, Airbus does not cover this situation in the FCOM's or the QRH.
It's something to be very concious of when operating with DMC2 MEL'ed. Since, if you then lost AC Bus 1, you would have a pretty black aircraft, but for the AC ESS BUS FEED fault light. Pushing that single illuminated button, brings light back to the Aircraft quite quickly.
Next ......
Hmmm, reference the following quote, isn't this the same company who flew a "three engine" Boeing 747 across the USA, then on to the UK just few months ago???.
"...OK, I' only going on the above info but: Night time, major unexplained electrical failure, held for 40 mins and then pressed on! Go ahead and flame me all you want guys but I have grave doubts about that decision. I trust that it was at least a full moon and VMC all the way to and at the destination (should it have re-occured)..."
In this case, you would have exactly what is described above.
Interestingly, Airbus does not cover this situation in the FCOM's or the QRH.
It's something to be very concious of when operating with DMC2 MEL'ed. Since, if you then lost AC Bus 1, you would have a pretty black aircraft, but for the AC ESS BUS FEED fault light. Pushing that single illuminated button, brings light back to the Aircraft quite quickly.
Next ......
Hmmm, reference the following quote, isn't this the same company who flew a "three engine" Boeing 747 across the USA, then on to the UK just few months ago???.
"...OK, I' only going on the above info but: Night time, major unexplained electrical failure, held for 40 mins and then pressed on! Go ahead and flame me all you want guys but I have grave doubts about that decision. I trust that it was at least a full moon and VMC all the way to and at the destination (should it have re-occured)..."
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Fuel? Hold? Amber light on thrust reverser? It's all a very official statement:
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...5%20G-EUOB.pdf
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...5%20G-EUOB.pdf
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'Twas a PAN call not a Mayday.
Any professional pilot will understand the ramifications of losing the AC Ess bus - unwarned. He will also with some thought, undestand the reason why the changeover to #2 is pilot selected and not automatic.
Any professional pilot will understand the ramifications of losing the AC Ess bus - unwarned. He will also with some thought, undestand the reason why the changeover to #2 is pilot selected and not automatic.
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'Twas a PAN call not a Mayday
"The commander transmitted a ‘MAYDAY’ call on VHF No 1"
Source Here
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Strange that Aircraft was ok to fly for 6 days, then AAIB got involved and checks had to be actioned.
Why did the Airline not action the checks before.???.
Did the crew seek advice from Engineering.???.
I wonder if the crew were X 744 fleet.???.
Lets hope Lady Luck keeps her eyes open.......!!!!!!!!!!!.
Why did the Airline not action the checks before.???.
Did the crew seek advice from Engineering.???.
I wonder if the crew were X 744 fleet.???.
Lets hope Lady Luck keeps her eyes open.......!!!!!!!!!!!.
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Not necessarily directly related to this particular incident, but I would like to know... how many of the inflight computer-related incidents get thoroughly investigated (for example, down to a few, but very precisely situated possible root causes) as opposed to reset-everything and forget that it happened? If I understand correctly, many complex control units are equipped with static memory to store all sorts of logs etc. Are these logs ever examined as part of routine maintenance, or only in case of abnormal operations?
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Blueloo – the ICAO requirements post is in http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...hreadid=199871
