Are Boeing's Big Jets Safe?
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Are Boeing's Big Jets Safe?
Documents made public in a whistleblower lawsuit filed against The Boeing Company suggest that thousands of unsafe and unapproved parts have been installed on jets the company produced between 1994 and 2001—and perhaps longer.
In U.S. ex rel Smith et al v. Boeing and Ducommun, which is slowly unfolding in a Wichita, Kansas federal courthouse, three former Boeing auditors accuse the company of accepting defective and uninspected parts from Ducommun, a supplier based in Carson, California. The whistleblowers, Jeannine Prewitt, Taylor Smith and James Ailes, allege that Boeing installed these unsafe and unapproved components on 32 jets built for the government. Because the case was filed under the False Claims Act, it is restricted to military jets and other airplanes sold to the government.
But Mother Jones has ascertained that the alleged structural defects in these parts, some classified as “flight safety critical” by the government, could likewise threaten the airworthiness of at least 1,600 commercial airplanes manufactured between 1994 and 2004—and still flying. In a recent motion to dismiss the case, Ducommun actually argues that the whistleblowers cannot prove that anyone in their company knew the parts were being sold to military or government buyers, because they also routinely supply commercial jets.
The whistleblowers reported an array of problems in 11 different components that Boeing uses to construct fuselages. Some of the most troubling allegations concern bear straps, which are a type of doubler, or reinforcement, used to support doorways; chords, which are arrayed radially around the contour of an aircraft and serve as the ribs of the fuselage; and failsafe chords, which are reinforced chords designed for particular locations on the airframe.
Some of the allegations involve Ducommun’s purported quality assurance deficiencies, among them a failure to conduct requisite inspections or to follow proper quality control procedures. Components manufactured without those assurances would not meet FAA approval. More serious than charges of uninspected parts are charges that parts were actually used that were known to be imperfect, with incorrectly drilled holes or other physical defects. Of particular significance are bear straps delivered by Ducommun, which, according to the plaintiffs, “were physically nonconforming because of shy-edge margins…and by virtue of the lack of statistical process control data and improper/inadequate and nonexistent inspection.” Additionally, they said, the fail-safe chords for the 737 series 600, 700 and 800, were defective because of “shy-edge margins, mislocated advanced technical assembly holes and were out of contour per engineering requirements,’’ with at least one in the forward bulkhead off the mark by two inches. “The defective doublers and triplers resulted in shy-edge margins, causing the fasteners to ride too close to the edge of the skin material,’’ which can cause cracking, particularly as the planes age.
A letter from Boeing to the FAA obtained by Mother Jones under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), dated September 7, 2001, confirms that the skins on some of the manufacturer’s earlier model 737’s, which may have had Ducommun parts, had already started to crack. “Our review suggests that the cracking of the skin and doublers common to the bear strap around the entry and service doors may be caused by the hinge cutouts,” wrote Joseph M. Romanosky for G.K. Dial, Boeing manager of “continued airworthiness.”
The auditors charge that Ducommun’s quality control system was so poor that none of the parts in question made there between 1994 and 2004, and installed on Boeing 737s, 747s, 757s and 767s, should be considered approved, rendering them all, in industry parlance, bogus. Prewitt, Taylor and Smith also say that Ducommun used two sets of books to hide its fraud, that Boeing knew for years that many of Ducommun’s parts were bogus, and that Boeing personnel deleted from the company’s records a report explaining how serious the problems were and noting a need to “begin disengagement” with Ducommun. Because of these problems, the plaintiffs say, “Boeing aircraft with Ducommun unapproved parts are not airworthy, are not safe and must be grounded.”
Fears about the safety of the nation’s air fleet extend beyond the confines of the courtroom. “We’re very concerned about this,” says Tomaso DiPaolo, national aircraft certification representative for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. “What we don’t know is how this really affects the commercial fleet.... If any of these parts fail, you can compromise the aircraft.”
Mother Jones’ repeated calls to Ducommun over a period of six weeks were not returned. Boeing said the allegations are false and that all its airplanes are safe. But the aviation giant refused to answer Mother Jones’ specific questions raised by documents piling up in the case, among them internal memos showing that Boeing employees besides the three plaintiffs had no confidence in Ducommun and wanted to stop accepting its parts until the problems were resolved, and a sworn statement by a recently retired procurement agent that his supervisor asked him if he could “lose” a document referring to its Ducommun investigation. The supervisor in question denies it.
None of the 30 Boeing staffers mentioned in the records would discuss the case. When reached for comment, several noted that company management warned them not to talk about it. In June, Boeing sold its Wichita commercial aviation division to Onexcorp, of Canada. The facility, now known as Spirit Aerosystems, retains many former Boeing employees and serves as a Boeing contractor. Spirit Aerosystems and Onexcorp likewise declined comment. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which investigated the matter in 2002 and concluded in 2004 there was no safety concern, has reopened its inquiry.
In 2003, Boeing named Ducommun one of its top suppliers of the year.
Coming Soon: The FAA and the Whistleblowers.
link
In U.S. ex rel Smith et al v. Boeing and Ducommun, which is slowly unfolding in a Wichita, Kansas federal courthouse, three former Boeing auditors accuse the company of accepting defective and uninspected parts from Ducommun, a supplier based in Carson, California. The whistleblowers, Jeannine Prewitt, Taylor Smith and James Ailes, allege that Boeing installed these unsafe and unapproved components on 32 jets built for the government. Because the case was filed under the False Claims Act, it is restricted to military jets and other airplanes sold to the government.
But Mother Jones has ascertained that the alleged structural defects in these parts, some classified as “flight safety critical” by the government, could likewise threaten the airworthiness of at least 1,600 commercial airplanes manufactured between 1994 and 2004—and still flying. In a recent motion to dismiss the case, Ducommun actually argues that the whistleblowers cannot prove that anyone in their company knew the parts were being sold to military or government buyers, because they also routinely supply commercial jets.
The whistleblowers reported an array of problems in 11 different components that Boeing uses to construct fuselages. Some of the most troubling allegations concern bear straps, which are a type of doubler, or reinforcement, used to support doorways; chords, which are arrayed radially around the contour of an aircraft and serve as the ribs of the fuselage; and failsafe chords, which are reinforced chords designed for particular locations on the airframe.
Some of the allegations involve Ducommun’s purported quality assurance deficiencies, among them a failure to conduct requisite inspections or to follow proper quality control procedures. Components manufactured without those assurances would not meet FAA approval. More serious than charges of uninspected parts are charges that parts were actually used that were known to be imperfect, with incorrectly drilled holes or other physical defects. Of particular significance are bear straps delivered by Ducommun, which, according to the plaintiffs, “were physically nonconforming because of shy-edge margins…and by virtue of the lack of statistical process control data and improper/inadequate and nonexistent inspection.” Additionally, they said, the fail-safe chords for the 737 series 600, 700 and 800, were defective because of “shy-edge margins, mislocated advanced technical assembly holes and were out of contour per engineering requirements,’’ with at least one in the forward bulkhead off the mark by two inches. “The defective doublers and triplers resulted in shy-edge margins, causing the fasteners to ride too close to the edge of the skin material,’’ which can cause cracking, particularly as the planes age.
A letter from Boeing to the FAA obtained by Mother Jones under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), dated September 7, 2001, confirms that the skins on some of the manufacturer’s earlier model 737’s, which may have had Ducommun parts, had already started to crack. “Our review suggests that the cracking of the skin and doublers common to the bear strap around the entry and service doors may be caused by the hinge cutouts,” wrote Joseph M. Romanosky for G.K. Dial, Boeing manager of “continued airworthiness.”
The auditors charge that Ducommun’s quality control system was so poor that none of the parts in question made there between 1994 and 2004, and installed on Boeing 737s, 747s, 757s and 767s, should be considered approved, rendering them all, in industry parlance, bogus. Prewitt, Taylor and Smith also say that Ducommun used two sets of books to hide its fraud, that Boeing knew for years that many of Ducommun’s parts were bogus, and that Boeing personnel deleted from the company’s records a report explaining how serious the problems were and noting a need to “begin disengagement” with Ducommun. Because of these problems, the plaintiffs say, “Boeing aircraft with Ducommun unapproved parts are not airworthy, are not safe and must be grounded.”
Fears about the safety of the nation’s air fleet extend beyond the confines of the courtroom. “We’re very concerned about this,” says Tomaso DiPaolo, national aircraft certification representative for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. “What we don’t know is how this really affects the commercial fleet.... If any of these parts fail, you can compromise the aircraft.”
Mother Jones’ repeated calls to Ducommun over a period of six weeks were not returned. Boeing said the allegations are false and that all its airplanes are safe. But the aviation giant refused to answer Mother Jones’ specific questions raised by documents piling up in the case, among them internal memos showing that Boeing employees besides the three plaintiffs had no confidence in Ducommun and wanted to stop accepting its parts until the problems were resolved, and a sworn statement by a recently retired procurement agent that his supervisor asked him if he could “lose” a document referring to its Ducommun investigation. The supervisor in question denies it.
None of the 30 Boeing staffers mentioned in the records would discuss the case. When reached for comment, several noted that company management warned them not to talk about it. In June, Boeing sold its Wichita commercial aviation division to Onexcorp, of Canada. The facility, now known as Spirit Aerosystems, retains many former Boeing employees and serves as a Boeing contractor. Spirit Aerosystems and Onexcorp likewise declined comment. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which investigated the matter in 2002 and concluded in 2004 there was no safety concern, has reopened its inquiry.
In 2003, Boeing named Ducommun one of its top suppliers of the year.
Coming Soon: The FAA and the Whistleblowers.
link
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That makes for some interesting reading. For all the hours that I have flown in Boeing jets I was unaware of these issues but have always arrived at my destination of choice in one piece.
Yes, I think Boeing is a safe aircraft, that is not to say that it may not have a latent problem that needs to be looked at.
I guess in the worst case a "progressive" AD will have to be issued.
Yes, I think Boeing is a safe aircraft, that is not to say that it may not have a latent problem that needs to be looked at.
I guess in the worst case a "progressive" AD will have to be issued.
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The media are oft inclined to take simplistic view of complex subjects; the "safe" v. "unsafe" divide is one of these. Professionals use a quantitative measure of safety, but this is 'way beyond a journalist's ken. Unless we can hold their feet to the fire and make them understand, they will keep making this logical error.
Even though they decry airlines as "unsafe", we have the numbers to prove commercial aviation is the safest form of travel EVER DEVISED.
Even though they decry airlines as "unsafe", we have the numbers to prove commercial aviation is the safest form of travel EVER DEVISED.
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Let's be thankful of the whistleblower laws that protect people such as Prewitt, Smith and Ailes, who in turn protect the public from safety concerns that we, without such protections, would not know a 
thing about otherwise.
Boeing's manufacturing and design operations are unique in regards to US whistleblower protection laws - laws that alter the degree of secrecy allowed to exist in an industry entrusted with providing safe transport aircraft for the world's millions. IMO, the SOX act and related legislation are good laws to have around.
SOX act 1
Ducommun 0
thing about otherwise.Boeing's manufacturing and design operations are unique in regards to US whistleblower protection laws - laws that alter the degree of secrecy allowed to exist in an industry entrusted with providing safe transport aircraft for the world's millions. IMO, the SOX act and related legislation are good laws to have around.
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vapilot2004
I agree protection for whistle blowers is a must - been there, done that, got the scars and the t-shirt - but IMHO and most others I know, SOX in general is a waste of time and money and only benefits the auditors and consulting companies - even worse than the consulting ISO 9000 bonanza.
It’s costing my company literally millions and is not providing any significant protection to the share holders, just their money away and wasting my time. 
I agree protection for whistle blowers is a must - been there, done that, got the scars and the t-shirt - but IMHO and most others I know, SOX in general is a waste of time and money and only benefits the auditors and consulting companies - even worse than the consulting ISO 9000 bonanza.
It’s costing my company literally millions and is not providing any significant protection to the share holders, just
their money away and wasting my time.
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I think then, Egbt, after some reflection, that I now agree that the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley law should be referred to as (dirty) SOX ? Auditing and SEC rule changes no fun then ? Perhaps they (US Congress) should have left those items out and just included the Obstruction of Justice provisions et al.
I know the UK has the powerful Public Interest Disclosure Act - good law for public protection - German whistleblowers also have reasonable legal status. The EU has considered in "Criminal and the Civil Law Conventions on Corruption of the Council of Europe" such protections, but has no signatories on board yet. Anyone know of similar statutes in Spain or France ?
While I understand the general (and rather ugly) lack of confidentiality in the US is rampant, there are good things to be said for our corporate chicken little and his squawks that the sky (or things from it) may indeed be falling.
cheers,
vapilot
I know the UK has the powerful Public Interest Disclosure Act - good law for public protection - German whistleblowers also have reasonable legal status. The EU has considered in "Criminal and the Civil Law Conventions on Corruption of the Council of Europe" such protections, but has no signatories on board yet. Anyone know of similar statutes in Spain or France ?
While I understand the general (and rather ugly) lack of confidentiality in the US is rampant, there are good things to be said for our corporate chicken little and his squawks that the sky (or things from it) may indeed be falling.
cheers,
vapilot
Boeing jets are as safe as could reasonably be expected of a human/machine interface given the physical and economic conditions under which large airplanes are built and operated. The same might be said of Airbus. Headlines like "Are Boeing's big jets safe?" change nothing except perhaps the perceptions of those individuals who accept sound bites and headlines as the basis for their opinions. I think most of us will agree that this mentality is a little too common. I am not familiar with this "Mother Jones" either. I did not find the writer's choice to quote a representative of the air traffic controllers union on matters of aircraft structural parts specifications conformity to to be a particularily well informed one.
So it appears that some aircraft parts supplied by a Boeing vendor probably required re-inspection after airplanes were delivered to assure that they were airworthy. This apparently resulted at least in part from allegations by some individuals involved in the vendor/OEM parts acceptance process that structural parts delivered to Boeing for installation on production aircraft did not meet design specifications. I have no information as to the accuracy of these allegations and no information is offered in the articles to support or refute the claims. If a problem exists, it will be addressed by Boeing under the scrutiny of the FAA.
In the rather unlikely case that fraud can be proven against any individual, sanctions may be imposed by the FAA and the case may be referred to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. The whistleblower case is limited to the issue of unfavorable or discriminatory actions taken by an employer against an employee as a result of the employee engaging in the "protected activity" of reporting safety violations. That case is tried in Federal Labor Court and may result in compensatory damage awards for the employees if they win.
So it is really three separate issues that must be decided. The airworthiness issues must be addressed by the OEM, the vendor and the FAA. If violations are found, sanctions may be imposed on the non-compliant parties. The fraud issue may be investigated by any of several agencies with cooperation from the FAA. Sanctions and/or criminal charges can result if evidence of conspiricy or willful fraud is found. (not very likely) Finally, the whistleblowers will have their day in labor court as they seek money from their employers to offset any damages incurred as the result of their reporting activity. Whistleblower protections exist with the stated pupose to promote open reporting of safety concerns without fear of reprisal. While it is not a perfect solution and is open to abuses, it is still better than some of the alternatives.
Meanwhile, the Boeings will continue to fly as usual. The straps will be inspected as determined necessary. It may cost Boeing some money if cracking in these straps becomes common and they have to replace them. Whatever else happens, I don't expect that anything very sensational will occur as a result of this issue. But it might be a good basis for one of those evil corporate empire conspiracy thriller books!
Best regards,
Westhawk
So it appears that some aircraft parts supplied by a Boeing vendor probably required re-inspection after airplanes were delivered to assure that they were airworthy. This apparently resulted at least in part from allegations by some individuals involved in the vendor/OEM parts acceptance process that structural parts delivered to Boeing for installation on production aircraft did not meet design specifications. I have no information as to the accuracy of these allegations and no information is offered in the articles to support or refute the claims. If a problem exists, it will be addressed by Boeing under the scrutiny of the FAA.
In the rather unlikely case that fraud can be proven against any individual, sanctions may be imposed by the FAA and the case may be referred to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. The whistleblower case is limited to the issue of unfavorable or discriminatory actions taken by an employer against an employee as a result of the employee engaging in the "protected activity" of reporting safety violations. That case is tried in Federal Labor Court and may result in compensatory damage awards for the employees if they win.
So it is really three separate issues that must be decided. The airworthiness issues must be addressed by the OEM, the vendor and the FAA. If violations are found, sanctions may be imposed on the non-compliant parties. The fraud issue may be investigated by any of several agencies with cooperation from the FAA. Sanctions and/or criminal charges can result if evidence of conspiricy or willful fraud is found. (not very likely) Finally, the whistleblowers will have their day in labor court as they seek money from their employers to offset any damages incurred as the result of their reporting activity. Whistleblower protections exist with the stated pupose to promote open reporting of safety concerns without fear of reprisal. While it is not a perfect solution and is open to abuses, it is still better than some of the alternatives.
Meanwhile, the Boeings will continue to fly as usual. The straps will be inspected as determined necessary. It may cost Boeing some money if cracking in these straps becomes common and they have to replace them. Whatever else happens, I don't expect that anything very sensational will occur as a result of this issue. But it might be a good basis for one of those evil corporate empire conspiracy thriller books!
Best regards,
Westhawk
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The "Mother Jones" report talks of some 1600 commercial aircraft potentially being affected. What has me wondering is the fact that no airline has come up with that issue since 1994 as the allegation states this malpractice to have started.
Most if not all airlines, to my knowledge, send their own engineering team to the manufactures plants for construction supervision. These team also meet on a regular basis, on location, to exchange their findings and potential problems within a given fleet. Issues, especially such as shy-edge margin riveting, structural integrity, tolerances etc. are closely scrutinized by those teams.
Even if not every airlines construction supervision team checks on every little detail or were to slack of in some cases – which I know isn’t the case – at 1600 aircraft somebody would have found a potential, latent problems.
If I were to assume that fraud was in play, successfully coordinated by Boeing and its vendor, then I would be safe to assume that such malpractice would have surfaced by the first D check. But yet again, there has been no such case to my knowledge thus far.
I wouldn’t rule out bad parts though. Wrong and bad (uncertified or non-airworthy) parts have always been an issue within construction and maintenance. I sure that if such is the case, it will be brought to light upon and audit and inspection and the appropriate measures will be taken.
As I have mentioned before and has been reiterated by westhawk, this "Mother Jones" report makes for an interesting read, but does not by any stretch of imagination mean that Boeing is not safe.
Most if not all airlines, to my knowledge, send their own engineering team to the manufactures plants for construction supervision. These team also meet on a regular basis, on location, to exchange their findings and potential problems within a given fleet. Issues, especially such as shy-edge margin riveting, structural integrity, tolerances etc. are closely scrutinized by those teams.
Even if not every airlines construction supervision team checks on every little detail or were to slack of in some cases – which I know isn’t the case – at 1600 aircraft somebody would have found a potential, latent problems.
If I were to assume that fraud was in play, successfully coordinated by Boeing and its vendor, then I would be safe to assume that such malpractice would have surfaced by the first D check. But yet again, there has been no such case to my knowledge thus far.
I wouldn’t rule out bad parts though. Wrong and bad (uncertified or non-airworthy) parts have always been an issue within construction and maintenance. I sure that if such is the case, it will be brought to light upon and audit and inspection and the appropriate measures will be taken.
As I have mentioned before and has been reiterated by westhawk, this "Mother Jones" report makes for an interesting read, but does not by any stretch of imagination mean that Boeing is not safe.
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Mother Jones
A fair description of "Mother Jones" from Wikipedia:
Mother Jones is a U.S.-based left-wing magazine which advocates many of the social views that labor organizer Mother Jones espoused. Founded in 1976 and published bimonthly out of San Francisco, it currently has a circulation of about 250,000. It features primarily investigative journalism and is considered to be a left-of-center periodical, perhaps somewhere between The New Republic and The Nation.
Mother Jones (Mary Harris Jones) was popularly known as the "Grandmother of All Agitators". Her grandfather was hanged by the British for participating in Irish republicanism.
Mother Jones is a U.S.-based left-wing magazine which advocates many of the social views that labor organizer Mother Jones espoused. Founded in 1976 and published bimonthly out of San Francisco, it currently has a circulation of about 250,000. It features primarily investigative journalism and is considered to be a left-of-center periodical, perhaps somewhere between The New Republic and The Nation.
Mother Jones (Mary Harris Jones) was popularly known as the "Grandmother of All Agitators". Her grandfather was hanged by the British for participating in Irish republicanism.
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Hello.
Westhawk, you're right. In addition, compliance issues for parts submitted by non-OEM production facilities are serious business under watchful eyes of DERs and ARs.
Part, however, always DO MEET specs, at least according to appropriate documentation that follows. Otherwise there are mechanisms to prevent them from being used. Inspectors that were upset for their treatment have no link to acceptance definition process and therefore no delegation for the high tier of that process.
What I mean is that engineering is the one which defines criteria for acceptance based on the appropriate set of rules and regulations (FAR, JAR). So, if someone complains issue becomes very big since automatically DERs and ARs are involved.
Maybe you can say with higher probability that fraud is possible at MRO since OEM has no control over its actions apart from sending them SBs and ADs.
As for what N380UA says on the fact that airlines send their engineering reps to control the design process - I can just very politely say, hardly.
The bulk of knowledge regarding the design and usage is in the hands of OEM. All the lessons learned plus all data from the fleet are coming to one and only one point. An airline has just a portion of info no matter how big is their fleet.
Also, to add to that, and with all due respect, FAA in case of Boeing or JAA in case of Airbus can say far few opinions on what to do and how. They can simply follow and try to make everything look as it was scrutinized properly.
Simply ,the one with less knowledge and experience (most of engineering staff at regulatory bodies) can never fully control OEMs.
One who controls the information (OEM) has all the power and the bureaucrat (CAA) can just try to make its life hard. So many protective mechanisms are embedded in order to increas safety and reliability for an aircraft/helicopter that there is absolotely no meaning in the topic of this thread.
Regards all,
Westhawk, you're right. In addition, compliance issues for parts submitted by non-OEM production facilities are serious business under watchful eyes of DERs and ARs.
Part, however, always DO MEET specs, at least according to appropriate documentation that follows. Otherwise there are mechanisms to prevent them from being used. Inspectors that were upset for their treatment have no link to acceptance definition process and therefore no delegation for the high tier of that process.
What I mean is that engineering is the one which defines criteria for acceptance based on the appropriate set of rules and regulations (FAR, JAR). So, if someone complains issue becomes very big since automatically DERs and ARs are involved.
Maybe you can say with higher probability that fraud is possible at MRO since OEM has no control over its actions apart from sending them SBs and ADs.
As for what N380UA says on the fact that airlines send their engineering reps to control the design process - I can just very politely say, hardly.
The bulk of knowledge regarding the design and usage is in the hands of OEM. All the lessons learned plus all data from the fleet are coming to one and only one point. An airline has just a portion of info no matter how big is their fleet.
Also, to add to that, and with all due respect, FAA in case of Boeing or JAA in case of Airbus can say far few opinions on what to do and how. They can simply follow and try to make everything look as it was scrutinized properly.
Simply ,the one with less knowledge and experience (most of engineering staff at regulatory bodies) can never fully control OEMs.
One who controls the information (OEM) has all the power and the bureaucrat (CAA) can just try to make its life hard. So many protective mechanisms are embedded in order to increas safety and reliability for an aircraft/helicopter that there is absolotely no meaning in the topic of this thread.
Regards all,
Last edited by Grunf; 27th Oct 2005 at 14:44.
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I think Grunf and some others are overlooking the fact that Boeing and Airbus (& Bombardier & Embraer & BAE etc.) are in intense competition with each other - and none can allow their safety reputation to be seriously compromised.
The engineering process in aircraft & systems design is either to make an item prime reliable (wing spar, turbine disc, etc.), or else incorporate fail-safe features that will stop or mitigate a failure long enough to be detected and mended. The media, and the lawyers listening to the whistleblowers, cannot comprehend the implications (or lack thereof) of the failings of an OEM; all they can see is "safe" or "unsafe". (Give me a break!)
Is any other engineering discipline required to meet such criteria under the commercial constraints of minimum weight, very high unit performance, economical operation etc?
And in a successful design such as a Boeing or Airbus, so many units are built and sold to so many customers, that secrets don't remain secret very long. Pprune is ample evidence of this.
The engineering process in aircraft & systems design is either to make an item prime reliable (wing spar, turbine disc, etc.), or else incorporate fail-safe features that will stop or mitigate a failure long enough to be detected and mended. The media, and the lawyers listening to the whistleblowers, cannot comprehend the implications (or lack thereof) of the failings of an OEM; all they can see is "safe" or "unsafe". (Give me a break!)
Is any other engineering discipline required to meet such criteria under the commercial constraints of minimum weight, very high unit performance, economical operation etc?
And in a successful design such as a Boeing or Airbus, so many units are built and sold to so many customers, that secrets don't remain secret very long. Pprune is ample evidence of this.
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Grunf
It may be handled differently nowadays under the pretext of saving money but it wasn’t too long ago that that was standard practice. I have seen Swissair, Lufthansa, Alitalia, ANA, and a bunch of other airlines on site doing just that, construction supervision.
As for what N380UA says on the fact that airlines send their engineering reps to control the design process - I can just very politely say, hardly.
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During a "C" check on a 757 a few years ago, a stringer near L4 was found to be fitted undrilled (ergo, not rivetted). The aircraft was nearly 20 years old at the time and had had several heavy checks in that time. These things happen.
I also recall a Boeing engineer telling me that he had found an elevator pulley in an in-service 747-400 that was retained by "Clico" clamps instead of Hi-Loks. (Clicos are temporary clamps used during metal work)
I also recall a Boeing engineer telling me that he had found an elevator pulley in an in-service 747-400 that was retained by "Clico" clamps instead of Hi-Loks. (Clicos are temporary clamps used during metal work)
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Hello all.
N380UA, I am aware of what you're saying and let me correct myself. Airlines do take their part especially in the development process since after all they are the customers and the bigger the (potential) customer the more influence they can make.
However I did not see one of their representatives while working on development programs (Bombardier, Boeing).
If there was some involvement it was on the side of engine decisions (which performance is the customer interested in etc) and also on the side of interior arrangement. For all other stuff it was mostly involvement at the preliminary level.
What I mean is that I have never seen an airline engineer taking part in the engineering process for its early phase (setting DR&O).
I have seen their involvement only at the marketing level (MR&O), before anything was put on the table.
Currently I do not see any of them on one of the new, development, projects and I am aware of the same situation on at least two more which are either in their early phase or in flight test (Boeing, Bombardier and Airbus, respectively).
Bus429:
For example you gave us, probably MRB (Liaison) group left this hole although it should have been plugged. It is strange that all inspections required did not catch that error.
As for the structural integrity that does not create a big problem, for a short time. Therefore, as you say it is strange it was not picked during "C" or "D" check. Not to mention factory QA and QC.
N380UA, I am aware of what you're saying and let me correct myself. Airlines do take their part especially in the development process since after all they are the customers and the bigger the (potential) customer the more influence they can make.
However I did not see one of their representatives while working on development programs (Bombardier, Boeing).
If there was some involvement it was on the side of engine decisions (which performance is the customer interested in etc) and also on the side of interior arrangement. For all other stuff it was mostly involvement at the preliminary level.
What I mean is that I have never seen an airline engineer taking part in the engineering process for its early phase (setting DR&O).
I have seen their involvement only at the marketing level (MR&O), before anything was put on the table.
Currently I do not see any of them on one of the new, development, projects and I am aware of the same situation on at least two more which are either in their early phase or in flight test (Boeing, Bombardier and Airbus, respectively).
Bus429:
For example you gave us, probably MRB (Liaison) group left this hole although it should have been plugged. It is strange that all inspections required did not catch that error.
As for the structural integrity that does not create a big problem, for a short time. Therefore, as you say it is strange it was not picked during "C" or "D" check. Not to mention factory QA and QC.
Last edited by Grunf; 28th Oct 2005 at 20:51.
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Grunf
Thanks for the info. I perhaps must clarify, I'm in particular am talking of the Douglas plants in conjunction with the MD11 in the early 90's. I therefore assumed that the same would hold true with other manufactures. This may have been further limited to the carriers launch aircraft where the entire ship is being closely scrutinized. Regular production thereafter may have been handled differently.
Cheers
Thanks for the info. I perhaps must clarify, I'm in particular am talking of the Douglas plants in conjunction with the MD11 in the early 90's. I therefore assumed that the same would hold true with other manufactures. This may have been further limited to the carriers launch aircraft where the entire ship is being closely scrutinized. Regular production thereafter may have been handled differently.
Cheers