Cathay Pacific Absence Management Program
Guest
Posts: n/a
My suggestion to David is that he will find the cognitive research answers to his questions in such books as 'Managing the Risk of Organisational Accidents' (Reason), or 'Beyond Aviation Human Factors' by Maurino et al.
Before giving an oversimplified summary, one point of clarification. My understanding is that CX is not just MONITORING its pilots, but applying sanctions at an arbitrary cutoff point.
Now - David is correct that pilots are just like other people. But unfortunately they are ordinary people who do a job which has extraordinary consequences if they fail.
So - what do 'ordinary' people do? Their lives are dominated by pressures which are 100% certain - mortgages, raising children, etc. When confronted by a potential material sanction for calling in sick they will be most likely to adopt the cognitive strategy called 'frequency gambling'. That is - "even when sick I am highly unlikely to crash the aeroplane, but the mortgage payment is 100% certain." So - they go to work.
This may not be very nice for passengers, but pilots are just ordinary people like you and me. Statistically a sick pilot (where sick is defined as having a condition which impairs normal sensory perceptions) is 7.5 times more likely to commit a safety critical error than one who is not sick in that way. This means (statistically) that a safety critical error will occur about once every 10,000 flight cycles instead of once every 75,000 cycles (the industry average. About 1 in 10 safety critical errors lead to an actual accident).
Some pilots will behave as David advocates. Most - being ordinary human beings - will not. That is not a statement about how people OUGHT to behave. It is just the reality of how most people are. The frequency across the whole profession is reflected in these figures. We know from the stats that punitive management regimes where pilots are put under pressure to work against their better judgement, produce exactly these increases in the frequency of critical incidents.
So those are the kind of odds that CX risk managers are playing with. When David says that that is OK, he is saying that those sorts of odds are OK. That is his judgement call. It isn't mine. I will also be thoroughly pissed off if the accident, when it happens, is one where a CX plane runs into the one I am flying in.
What David cannot do is have it both ways. He cannot on the one had insist that pilots are just like other people, and then expect them to behave in ways that other people do not.
Before giving an oversimplified summary, one point of clarification. My understanding is that CX is not just MONITORING its pilots, but applying sanctions at an arbitrary cutoff point.
Now - David is correct that pilots are just like other people. But unfortunately they are ordinary people who do a job which has extraordinary consequences if they fail.
So - what do 'ordinary' people do? Their lives are dominated by pressures which are 100% certain - mortgages, raising children, etc. When confronted by a potential material sanction for calling in sick they will be most likely to adopt the cognitive strategy called 'frequency gambling'. That is - "even when sick I am highly unlikely to crash the aeroplane, but the mortgage payment is 100% certain." So - they go to work.
This may not be very nice for passengers, but pilots are just ordinary people like you and me. Statistically a sick pilot (where sick is defined as having a condition which impairs normal sensory perceptions) is 7.5 times more likely to commit a safety critical error than one who is not sick in that way. This means (statistically) that a safety critical error will occur about once every 10,000 flight cycles instead of once every 75,000 cycles (the industry average. About 1 in 10 safety critical errors lead to an actual accident).
Some pilots will behave as David advocates. Most - being ordinary human beings - will not. That is not a statement about how people OUGHT to behave. It is just the reality of how most people are. The frequency across the whole profession is reflected in these figures. We know from the stats that punitive management regimes where pilots are put under pressure to work against their better judgement, produce exactly these increases in the frequency of critical incidents.
So those are the kind of odds that CX risk managers are playing with. When David says that that is OK, he is saying that those sorts of odds are OK. That is his judgement call. It isn't mine. I will also be thoroughly pissed off if the accident, when it happens, is one where a CX plane runs into the one I am flying in.
What David cannot do is have it both ways. He cannot on the one had insist that pilots are just like other people, and then expect them to behave in ways that other people do not.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Mr Checksix, a rather human posting. I commend you for it.
Mr Rongotai. David can have it both ways as he is trying to activate a discussion rather than give sentimental views.
You are correct I have not read the literature to which you refer and quite frankly I do not think I will. I find it distressing that people can spend years studying something that (for example) a pilot had only a few minutes or seconds to study and then come to the conclusion that the pilot was at fault. I appreciate that this situation is different to the above example but you get my drift.
The statistics you give are interesting but not totally revealing. Infact, the way you word it is rather sensational. What must be remembered is that not all pilots working for CX are sick 365 days per year. Most Pilots would call in sick if they were sick. That leaves the odd pilot, who because of this policy would go to work and increase his chances of disaster because of this. Surely this man should not be flying.
Pilots do not go to work saying, "I hope I don't crash today." When I get in a car I do not say that. It must be pointed out here that the consequences of the two things on a personal level are pretty much equal. (Give me a little scope here!) If I die alone I will not feel any different to if I die with another 400 people. Maybe in the pilots case, death is the easier option.
This is sensationalism and totally pointless.
Putting aside the CX management for a minute, just how many pilots would this affect? In principal it affects you all but in reality it will have consequences for very few.
No doubt as this discussion develops I will have the chance to provoke the arguement further. (I do like a good discussion.)
I am not into giving advice but I feel my 2d worth might be well headed in this instance.
That is:-
The policy sucks! However people have pride. If you don't give people the chance to back down gently the chances are they won't back down. The term 'Losing Face' comes to mind here.
Think about it.
As for Game Set and Match. Please get up earlier in the morning.
Mr Rongotai. David can have it both ways as he is trying to activate a discussion rather than give sentimental views.
You are correct I have not read the literature to which you refer and quite frankly I do not think I will. I find it distressing that people can spend years studying something that (for example) a pilot had only a few minutes or seconds to study and then come to the conclusion that the pilot was at fault. I appreciate that this situation is different to the above example but you get my drift.
The statistics you give are interesting but not totally revealing. Infact, the way you word it is rather sensational. What must be remembered is that not all pilots working for CX are sick 365 days per year. Most Pilots would call in sick if they were sick. That leaves the odd pilot, who because of this policy would go to work and increase his chances of disaster because of this. Surely this man should not be flying.
Pilots do not go to work saying, "I hope I don't crash today." When I get in a car I do not say that. It must be pointed out here that the consequences of the two things on a personal level are pretty much equal. (Give me a little scope here!) If I die alone I will not feel any different to if I die with another 400 people. Maybe in the pilots case, death is the easier option.
This is sensationalism and totally pointless.
Putting aside the CX management for a minute, just how many pilots would this affect? In principal it affects you all but in reality it will have consequences for very few.
No doubt as this discussion develops I will have the chance to provoke the arguement further. (I do like a good discussion.)
I am not into giving advice but I feel my 2d worth might be well headed in this instance.
That is:-
The policy sucks! However people have pride. If you don't give people the chance to back down gently the chances are they won't back down. The term 'Losing Face' comes to mind here.
Think about it.
As for Game Set and Match. Please get up earlier in the morning.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I'm not sure that I understand what you are trying to say, David.
The main point I will take up, though, is your assertion about 'the odd pilot' who would behave in the way you describe. This is NOT the case to any statistically significant extent. The research is absolutely clear. MOST pilots (and most employees in other safety critical industries such as power generation and railways) behave in the way I described (but not quite in the way you interpreted it - see below).
Unfortunately, without rewriting all the books, one has to use shorthand in an email. You are correct in saying that pilots do not consciously say to themselves 'I hope I won't crash today'. Frequency gambling is mostly an unconscious cognitive process. At a certain frequency the unconscious becomes conscious. There is a stretch of highway near where I live which is notorious for accidents. When I drive on it I am conscious of the risk of accident in a way that I am not on most other roads. Pilots landing at the old Kai Tak were usually consciously aware of the risk of accident as the chequer board loomed up.
But the way it actually works is around scenarios like ----
'I have had flu for 4 days, and I still don't feel right. Now am I well enough to go back to work or not?' The answer to that question is more likely to be 'yes' if I know that I am running out of my 'bank' of legitimate sick days. We also know from the research that thousands of pilots making those sorts of decisions, produce an increase in incident frequency if there are management pressures to return early.
But the evidence is also that there are a few people (in high morale companies it is about 2-3%) who will abuse liberal sick leave provisions. When companies do the sorts of things that CX has reportedly done, then there are usually one or more of three explanations:
(a) there is a deeply seated management culture of mistrust of employees; or
(b) there are budget line by line approaches to cost control which take no account of the inter-related nature of the system under review;
(c) management are fixated on the 3% of abusers and don't care how much damage they do to their relationship with the other 97% in order to eliminate them.
Whichever way the effect is usually counter productive - that is, the costs of personnel non-compliance go up, not down. This is because of the negative feedback loop that is set up. Most people in professionally self motivated occupations will behave in a trustworthy manner until it is unequivocally demonstrated that they are not trusted. At that point a significant number of them will cease behaving in a trustworthy way.
In the airline business one side effect of breakdowns in trust between management and staff is increased frequency of safety critical incidents. My own frequency gambling involves my trying to avoid using airlines where I know that there is poor management, but without getting obsessive about it. When my business takes me to Alma Ata I have little choice and I don't fret about it. But in the meantime I'll probably go to Hong Kong two hours later than is optimal for me in order to not use CX.
I have provided simple, verifiable, research demonstrated, statistically recorded information, and my point is that competent management will always adopt policies which are informed by information which has those qualities. If you don't want to test your opinions against it, there isn't any basis for a discussion. If you have verifiable evidence to the contrary, let us hear it. Then you will give me cause to reassess my own views.
The main point I will take up, though, is your assertion about 'the odd pilot' who would behave in the way you describe. This is NOT the case to any statistically significant extent. The research is absolutely clear. MOST pilots (and most employees in other safety critical industries such as power generation and railways) behave in the way I described (but not quite in the way you interpreted it - see below).
Unfortunately, without rewriting all the books, one has to use shorthand in an email. You are correct in saying that pilots do not consciously say to themselves 'I hope I won't crash today'. Frequency gambling is mostly an unconscious cognitive process. At a certain frequency the unconscious becomes conscious. There is a stretch of highway near where I live which is notorious for accidents. When I drive on it I am conscious of the risk of accident in a way that I am not on most other roads. Pilots landing at the old Kai Tak were usually consciously aware of the risk of accident as the chequer board loomed up.
But the way it actually works is around scenarios like ----
'I have had flu for 4 days, and I still don't feel right. Now am I well enough to go back to work or not?' The answer to that question is more likely to be 'yes' if I know that I am running out of my 'bank' of legitimate sick days. We also know from the research that thousands of pilots making those sorts of decisions, produce an increase in incident frequency if there are management pressures to return early.
But the evidence is also that there are a few people (in high morale companies it is about 2-3%) who will abuse liberal sick leave provisions. When companies do the sorts of things that CX has reportedly done, then there are usually one or more of three explanations:
(a) there is a deeply seated management culture of mistrust of employees; or
(b) there are budget line by line approaches to cost control which take no account of the inter-related nature of the system under review;
(c) management are fixated on the 3% of abusers and don't care how much damage they do to their relationship with the other 97% in order to eliminate them.
Whichever way the effect is usually counter productive - that is, the costs of personnel non-compliance go up, not down. This is because of the negative feedback loop that is set up. Most people in professionally self motivated occupations will behave in a trustworthy manner until it is unequivocally demonstrated that they are not trusted. At that point a significant number of them will cease behaving in a trustworthy way.
In the airline business one side effect of breakdowns in trust between management and staff is increased frequency of safety critical incidents. My own frequency gambling involves my trying to avoid using airlines where I know that there is poor management, but without getting obsessive about it. When my business takes me to Alma Ata I have little choice and I don't fret about it. But in the meantime I'll probably go to Hong Kong two hours later than is optimal for me in order to not use CX.
I have provided simple, verifiable, research demonstrated, statistically recorded information, and my point is that competent management will always adopt policies which are informed by information which has those qualities. If you don't want to test your opinions against it, there isn't any basis for a discussion. If you have verifiable evidence to the contrary, let us hear it. Then you will give me cause to reassess my own views.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Mr Rongotai,
You ask me for verifiable evidence. Verifiable evidence is based on situations that have happened before. Each situation is unique. If I knew what the problem was then maybe I coud do the research. You yourself say you do not know what the underlying motive is behind this repot. I quote,
(a) there is a deeply seated management culture of mistrust of employees; or
(b) there are budget line by line approaches to cost control which take no account of the inter-related nature of the system under review;
(c) management are fixated on the 3% of abusers and don't care how much damage they do to their relationship with the other 97% in order to eliminate them.
My 'guess' is answer C but I would not put it so bluntly. If you would like to know how I would put it, I can tell you but it really isn't interesting. Answer A is a worlwide situation in every industry and you should not take it personally.
You ask me what my point is. Here it is.
Irrespective of the profession you are in there are management and there are the workers. Management RARELY trust the workers and workers RARELY trust management. In the airline industry, pilots are workers and as such will be subject to the same scrutiny as any other worker.
That is my point.
Why the honest 97% of you are getting wound up about a policy that is going to disappear as quickly as it arrived is a little beyond me.
May I digress?
You are quoting the increased risk to the fare paying public (and presumably those that lie beneath your flight path) by reporting to work a little sicker than you should be.
However, psychological problems effect people doing risky things more than medical problems. I would rather fly in an aeroplane piloted by a pilot with mild flu symptoms than in one piloted by a person who has returned from a trip to find his / her wife / husband in bed with his best mate or one that has found his / her 14 year old daughter pregnant to her drug dealing boyfriend or one that has had his / her dog run down by a bus that morning.
Do you guys call in sick when this happens???
Just a thought.
Hope my point is clearer.
Thanks for being polite enough to ask me what my point is when you didn't find it clear. Too many people in these chat forums assume too much and have a tendancy to go off at a tangent.
[This message has been edited by davidmccracken (edited 04 May 2001).]
You ask me for verifiable evidence. Verifiable evidence is based on situations that have happened before. Each situation is unique. If I knew what the problem was then maybe I coud do the research. You yourself say you do not know what the underlying motive is behind this repot. I quote,
(a) there is a deeply seated management culture of mistrust of employees; or
(b) there are budget line by line approaches to cost control which take no account of the inter-related nature of the system under review;
(c) management are fixated on the 3% of abusers and don't care how much damage they do to their relationship with the other 97% in order to eliminate them.
My 'guess' is answer C but I would not put it so bluntly. If you would like to know how I would put it, I can tell you but it really isn't interesting. Answer A is a worlwide situation in every industry and you should not take it personally.
You ask me what my point is. Here it is.
Irrespective of the profession you are in there are management and there are the workers. Management RARELY trust the workers and workers RARELY trust management. In the airline industry, pilots are workers and as such will be subject to the same scrutiny as any other worker.
That is my point.
Why the honest 97% of you are getting wound up about a policy that is going to disappear as quickly as it arrived is a little beyond me.
May I digress?
You are quoting the increased risk to the fare paying public (and presumably those that lie beneath your flight path) by reporting to work a little sicker than you should be.
However, psychological problems effect people doing risky things more than medical problems. I would rather fly in an aeroplane piloted by a pilot with mild flu symptoms than in one piloted by a person who has returned from a trip to find his / her wife / husband in bed with his best mate or one that has found his / her 14 year old daughter pregnant to her drug dealing boyfriend or one that has had his / her dog run down by a bus that morning.
Do you guys call in sick when this happens???
Just a thought.
Hope my point is clearer.
Thanks for being polite enough to ask me what my point is when you didn't find it clear. Too many people in these chat forums assume too much and have a tendancy to go off at a tangent.
[This message has been edited by davidmccracken (edited 04 May 2001).]
