Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)
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Autoland limits.
In severe turbulence, my experience is A/P is not even able to fly along ILS on final approach, so I can't imagine CAT II could be expected to work until landing.
Does Air France have diferent minimums for first officers vs captains? In my company captain must be PF if weather is lower than first officer minimus of a landing RVR of 3000 feet/900 meters and a max crosswind component of 23 knots.
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alf, I fear that it won't be seen as a human factors invest8igation, rather than with a pilot error slant.
It seems to me that the decision to divert may have been left way too long, and the holes in the swiss cheese started to line up. He seems to have closed off an option early in the event. Couyple that with an approach into conditions which may have prevented a go around (EVERY landing should be considered a potential go around), landing long, landing fast, wet runway, quartering tailwind, possibly a touch of get home-itis, and there are enough holes to give a logical conclusion.
Not saying it will never happen to me, but it looks like a number of cases of pilot error at this stage. Of course I'm relyingon what is reported here to be close to the facts.
It seems to me that the decision to divert may have been left way too long, and the holes in the swiss cheese started to line up. He seems to have closed off an option early in the event. Couyple that with an approach into conditions which may have prevented a go around (EVERY landing should be considered a potential go around), landing long, landing fast, wet runway, quartering tailwind, possibly a touch of get home-itis, and there are enough holes to give a logical conclusion.
Not saying it will never happen to me, but it looks like a number of cases of pilot error at this stage. Of course I'm relyingon what is reported here to be close to the facts.
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FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F
TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500
/A340-600 OPERATORS
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: AF358 A340-300 ACCIDENT
OUR REF.: AF358 AIT 3 DATED 17th August 2005
OUR PREVIOUS REF.:
- AF358 AIT 1
- AF358 AIT 2
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR data indicates the
following sequence of events:
The short final and landing were performed manually with the
autopilot (AP) and autothrust (ATHR) disconnected at about 300
feet AGL. The aircraft was in configuration FULL with auto-brake
selected to MED.
There was a right variable crosswind of about 20 kts and a tail
wind component during the final stage of the approach.
At the time of touchdown, the airspeed was 143 kts and the
ground speed 148 kts. Visibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25
NM in heavy rain.
The touchdown zone is located approximately 4000 feet from the
threshold of the 9000-foot runway.
Following the MLG touchdown, the ground spoilers normally
extended.
Soon after touchdown, the autobrake was overridden upon pilot
maximum brake pedal inputs which were kept to the end.
Consistent with the tyre marks left on the runway, the DFDR
confirms that brake pressure was normally applied to the brakes
and that the antiskid function operated normally.
Upon activation, the 4 engines thrust reversers fully deployed
and remained in this position until the aircraft came to a stop.
At the end of the runway the aircraft ground speed was 79 kts.
Based on the preliminary DFDR analysis and consistent with on-
site observations:
- the braking performances are consistent with a contaminated
runway condition in line with heavy rain conditions.
- there is no indication that any aircraft systems or engine
anomalies existed at the time of the accident.
The detailed investigation work will continue under the
leadership of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
At this stage of the investigation, Airbus has no specific
recommendations to give to operators.
When appropriate and upon Canadian TSB approval, additional
information about this event will be issued through the normal
Airbus to Operators communication channels.
YANNICK MALINGE
VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
AIRBUS
TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500
/A340-600 OPERATORS
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: AF358 A340-300 ACCIDENT
OUR REF.: AF358 AIT 3 DATED 17th August 2005
OUR PREVIOUS REF.:
- AF358 AIT 1
- AF358 AIT 2
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR data indicates the
following sequence of events:
The short final and landing were performed manually with the
autopilot (AP) and autothrust (ATHR) disconnected at about 300
feet AGL. The aircraft was in configuration FULL with auto-brake
selected to MED.
There was a right variable crosswind of about 20 kts and a tail
wind component during the final stage of the approach.
At the time of touchdown, the airspeed was 143 kts and the
ground speed 148 kts. Visibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25
NM in heavy rain.
The touchdown zone is located approximately 4000 feet from the
threshold of the 9000-foot runway.
Following the MLG touchdown, the ground spoilers normally
extended.
Soon after touchdown, the autobrake was overridden upon pilot
maximum brake pedal inputs which were kept to the end.
Consistent with the tyre marks left on the runway, the DFDR
confirms that brake pressure was normally applied to the brakes
and that the antiskid function operated normally.
Upon activation, the 4 engines thrust reversers fully deployed
and remained in this position until the aircraft came to a stop.
At the end of the runway the aircraft ground speed was 79 kts.
Based on the preliminary DFDR analysis and consistent with on-
site observations:
- the braking performances are consistent with a contaminated
runway condition in line with heavy rain conditions.
- there is no indication that any aircraft systems or engine
anomalies existed at the time of the accident.
The detailed investigation work will continue under the
leadership of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
At this stage of the investigation, Airbus has no specific
recommendations to give to operators.
When appropriate and upon Canadian TSB approval, additional
information about this event will be issued through the normal
Airbus to Operators communication channels.
YANNICK MALINGE
VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
AIRBUS
Paxing All Over The World
luc Air France rules state that F/O can't perform approach if visibility <800 m ( regardless of wind)
Flying.Coyote, quoting FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526FVisibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25 NM in heavy rain.
Working a conversion from International Nautical Miles to Metres gives:
.25 inm = 463m
.50 inm = 926m
Flying.Coyote, quoting FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526FVisibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25 NM in heavy rain.
Working a conversion from International Nautical Miles to Metres gives:
.25 inm = 463m
.50 inm = 926m
Do Air France and other airlines have different visibility and wind limitations for ALL FOs, even if they are experienced people (who possibly have flown more legs/years in the A-340 than some Captains), or only for those in their first 100 hours or so on a given type?
Do the FOs fly an equal number of approaches/landings, or does a second Captain fly some of these landings?
Many 747-400 First Officers fly very few legs per month, and due to the fact that Captains "fly" most of the legs, the FOs must maintain currency each year in the simulator.
Although I know almost nothing about the accident at YYZ, a 747-400 almost crashed after takeoff at SFO years ago, which many Pprune members are aware of, with highly-experienced pilots in both seats. Engine vibrations made the EICAS and flight instruments difficult to read. Regulatory requirements for FOs, even for Captains (!) (six simulated approaches/landings each 6 months) do not necessarily equal hands-on proficiency.
Do the FOs fly an equal number of approaches/landings, or does a second Captain fly some of these landings?
Many 747-400 First Officers fly very few legs per month, and due to the fact that Captains "fly" most of the legs, the FOs must maintain currency each year in the simulator.
Although I know almost nothing about the accident at YYZ, a 747-400 almost crashed after takeoff at SFO years ago, which many Pprune members are aware of, with highly-experienced pilots in both seats. Engine vibrations made the EICAS and flight instruments difficult to read. Regulatory requirements for FOs, even for Captains (!) (six simulated approaches/landings each 6 months) do not necessarily equal hands-on proficiency.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 19th Aug 2005 at 06:10.
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Flying.Coyote
Was there any information as to the range for "short-final" (how far before threshold)?
Was there any information as to atltitude at the time of turn-in to intercept localiser?
Was there any information as to range at the time of aborted auto-couple . . . @ 300-ft AGL I believe you said?
RESA
Was there any information as to the range for "short-final" (how far before threshold)?
Was there any information as to atltitude at the time of turn-in to intercept localiser?
Was there any information as to range at the time of aborted auto-couple . . . @ 300-ft AGL I believe you said?
RESA
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To PAXboy
The visibility taken into account to decide whether F/O can or can not perform the approach is not visibility at threshold mentionned in Airbus message but the one at a specified point of the approach.
Refer to all Metar's mentionned in this forum and every where else, you will see that F/O was entitled to land.
The visibility taken into account to decide whether F/O can or can not perform the approach is not visibility at threshold mentionned in Airbus message but the one at a specified point of the approach.
Refer to all Metar's mentionned in this forum and every where else, you will see that F/O was entitled to land.
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From page 19 (sorry, I'm still catching-up):-
"Ravine may have saved flight from worse fate
THE 309 passsengers and crew of Air France Flight 358 may have survived the crash landing because of — not despite — the ravine at the end of the runway.........
For full story click here:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/articl...1720252,00.html
Ravines, moats or other gullies around airports, anyone ?? Amazing....."
The Times are SO wrong when suggesting that there could be ANY comparison with Kegworth. Kegworth was NOT an overshoot, but an undershoot (caused by lack of thrust when the FD crew shut down the remaining good engine!). Furthermore, despite landing on (or just after) the M1 motorway, there was NO vehicle involvement. The a/c just failed to make the Airport and was stopped by the motorway embankment.
Back to catching-up (page 20).
"Ravine may have saved flight from worse fate
THE 309 passsengers and crew of Air France Flight 358 may have survived the crash landing because of — not despite — the ravine at the end of the runway.........
For full story click here:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/articl...1720252,00.html
Ravines, moats or other gullies around airports, anyone ?? Amazing....."
The Times are SO wrong when suggesting that there could be ANY comparison with Kegworth. Kegworth was NOT an overshoot, but an undershoot (caused by lack of thrust when the FD crew shut down the remaining good engine!). Furthermore, despite landing on (or just after) the M1 motorway, there was NO vehicle involvement. The a/c just failed to make the Airport and was stopped by the motorway embankment.
Back to catching-up (page 20).
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From the "Los Angeles Times" By Meghan Daum
August 6, 2005
TO ANYONE WHO'S ever smirked, snapped, whined, yelled or (you know who you are) thrown things at a flight attendant, let's consider this: Last Tuesday, the cabin crew of Air France Flight 358 evacuated all 297 passengers after a crash landing in Toronto. They did this in less than two minutes. Moments later, the plane burst into flames.
I know what you're thinking: "If they can get 300 people off in under two minutes, why does it take 45 minutes to board a plane?" As in all things air travel-related, the lame jokes abound. ("I tried to jump down the slide, but they stopped me because the seat-belt sign was on!")
But maybe seeing 10 flight attendants save about 300 lives in less time than it took to watch the safety demonstration will put an end to the jokes. It's been a long time coming. Somehow, passengers have been lulled into thinking that flight attendants are there primarily to serve as waiters and arbiters of luggage space. But accidents have a way of reducing inconveniences like pillow shortages and paltry snacks to shamefully petty concerns.
Several years ago, while researching a magazine article about the "secret world of flight attendants," I spent a week at the flight attendant training school of a major airline. Granted, this was three years before 9/11, back when the combination of dreary mundanity and diminishing leg room had left people with about as much respect for air travel as they had for pre-owned Yugos. "Air rage" was the coinage of the day, and incidents of violence against airline personnel had risen dramatically.
I visited the school because I was a smug young journalist working for a smug glossy magazine and I was hoping for some salacious details about a profession that had fascinated the public since the early days of commercial flight. Since airline industry deregulation in 1978, the archetypal sex-kitten stewardess made famous by books such as the 1960s-era "Coffee, Tea or Me" had devolved into a haggard assortment of short-tempered corporate drones. The heyday of air travel, when flight attendants were required to be female, slim, unmarried and possessed of the uncanny ability to cook eggs to order during turbulence, was long gone.
But my assignment was doomed. The courses I observed had less to do with applying makeup and charming businessmen than with something far less sensational: safety.
The drills went on and on and on. We practiced verbal instructions until we could recite them like Beatles lyrics. We rehearsed procedures until every exit door and window, every inflatable slide and alarm bell felt as familiar as the dashboard controls on a car we'd owned for a decade.
I can still remember the sensation of opening the hatch of the exit window in the cabin simulator. I can still hear the siren and the exact wording of the evacuation commands for the slides. "Keep your feet together, jump into the slide," the students yelled until they were hoarse. I watched as they learned how to inflate rafts. I ran around the simulator with them as they enacted crash after crash, knowing full well that no matter how intensive the training, nothing but focus and sheer guts would see them through the real thing.
Among the other things I learned about flight attendants was that their starting salaries could be as low as $15,000 a year. They regularly have to work 14-hour days but are often paid for only eight hours. Most have to buy their own uniforms for hundreds of dollars. That means they often have only one, which they have to wash out in hotel sinks.
Air France rightfully praised the crew of Flight 358 for its professionalism. But it's the flying public that needs to recognize such contributions. Airline deregulation, which slashed prices along with amenities, legroom and salaries, caused many of us to forget our manners. Then Sept. 11 introduced a narrative that suggested the fates of airliners lay in the hands of passengers, whether terrorists or heroes.
But, as we learned on Tuesday, accidents still occur and we still rely on those who are trained to protect us from potentially tragic outcomes. On airplanes, it so happens that these are the same people who pass out the inedible food and tell us when our bags won't fit overhead. But we've seen they can do a lot more than that. Let's be polite.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/...mment-opinions
August 6, 2005
TO ANYONE WHO'S ever smirked, snapped, whined, yelled or (you know who you are) thrown things at a flight attendant, let's consider this: Last Tuesday, the cabin crew of Air France Flight 358 evacuated all 297 passengers after a crash landing in Toronto. They did this in less than two minutes. Moments later, the plane burst into flames.
I know what you're thinking: "If they can get 300 people off in under two minutes, why does it take 45 minutes to board a plane?" As in all things air travel-related, the lame jokes abound. ("I tried to jump down the slide, but they stopped me because the seat-belt sign was on!")
But maybe seeing 10 flight attendants save about 300 lives in less time than it took to watch the safety demonstration will put an end to the jokes. It's been a long time coming. Somehow, passengers have been lulled into thinking that flight attendants are there primarily to serve as waiters and arbiters of luggage space. But accidents have a way of reducing inconveniences like pillow shortages and paltry snacks to shamefully petty concerns.
Several years ago, while researching a magazine article about the "secret world of flight attendants," I spent a week at the flight attendant training school of a major airline. Granted, this was three years before 9/11, back when the combination of dreary mundanity and diminishing leg room had left people with about as much respect for air travel as they had for pre-owned Yugos. "Air rage" was the coinage of the day, and incidents of violence against airline personnel had risen dramatically.
I visited the school because I was a smug young journalist working for a smug glossy magazine and I was hoping for some salacious details about a profession that had fascinated the public since the early days of commercial flight. Since airline industry deregulation in 1978, the archetypal sex-kitten stewardess made famous by books such as the 1960s-era "Coffee, Tea or Me" had devolved into a haggard assortment of short-tempered corporate drones. The heyday of air travel, when flight attendants were required to be female, slim, unmarried and possessed of the uncanny ability to cook eggs to order during turbulence, was long gone.
But my assignment was doomed. The courses I observed had less to do with applying makeup and charming businessmen than with something far less sensational: safety.
The drills went on and on and on. We practiced verbal instructions until we could recite them like Beatles lyrics. We rehearsed procedures until every exit door and window, every inflatable slide and alarm bell felt as familiar as the dashboard controls on a car we'd owned for a decade.
I can still remember the sensation of opening the hatch of the exit window in the cabin simulator. I can still hear the siren and the exact wording of the evacuation commands for the slides. "Keep your feet together, jump into the slide," the students yelled until they were hoarse. I watched as they learned how to inflate rafts. I ran around the simulator with them as they enacted crash after crash, knowing full well that no matter how intensive the training, nothing but focus and sheer guts would see them through the real thing.
Among the other things I learned about flight attendants was that their starting salaries could be as low as $15,000 a year. They regularly have to work 14-hour days but are often paid for only eight hours. Most have to buy their own uniforms for hundreds of dollars. That means they often have only one, which they have to wash out in hotel sinks.
Air France rightfully praised the crew of Flight 358 for its professionalism. But it's the flying public that needs to recognize such contributions. Airline deregulation, which slashed prices along with amenities, legroom and salaries, caused many of us to forget our manners. Then Sept. 11 introduced a narrative that suggested the fates of airliners lay in the hands of passengers, whether terrorists or heroes.
But, as we learned on Tuesday, accidents still occur and we still rely on those who are trained to protect us from potentially tragic outcomes. On airplanes, it so happens that these are the same people who pass out the inedible food and tell us when our bags won't fit overhead. But we've seen they can do a lot more than that. Let's be polite.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/...mment-opinions