BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
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maxy101, was that an inboard or an outboard? It makes a difference in trim drag.
Also, what was your typical altitude differential 3 vs. 4?
It'll be nice to get some real data.
Also, what was your typical altitude differential 3 vs. 4?
It'll be nice to get some real data.
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Just read articles about the incident in flight magazine.
One by Mr learmont and another in the letters page.
Both contain incorrect information.
Is it not about time Mr L went out to pasture and flight checked to see that it has its facts right ?.
One by Mr learmont and another in the letters page.
Both contain incorrect information.
Is it not about time Mr L went out to pasture and flight checked to see that it has its facts right ?.
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Herald Tribune states following this morning :
U.S. plans to act after 'careless' BA flight
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
Tuesday, March 8, 2005
link : http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/07/news/faa.html
FAA weighs steps over 747's long route with one engine out
WASHINGTON Federal Aviation Administration officials said on Monday that they were preparing to take strong action against British Airways, including a charge of "careless and reckless operation of an aircraft," because of the airline's decision to allow a Boeing 747 to fly from California to England with one engine inoperable. Under normal circumstances, the United States would not take action against British Airways because such issues would be handled by Britain.
.
But senior U.S. aviation officials have become so concerned about the actions of the flight crew and its supervisors in London that they were preparing direct action.
.
"We will pursue every legal option available to us," said an FAA spokeswoman, Laura Brown.
.
British Airways expressed surprise over the developments.
.
"I am surprised that anyone at the FAA would make such statements," said Steve Shelterline, general manager for the 747 program with British Airways.
.
Shelterline said it was clear that even the portions of the federal aviation rules cited to a reporter by the Federal Aviation Administration would not prevent a four-engine airplane like the 747 from continuing flight with one engine out.
.
"The 747 is fully certificated to operate on three engines," he said. "There is no requirement to land."
.
Based on their investigation so far, U.S. aviation officials said they doubt that the crew's decision had anything to do with new European Union rules on monetary compensation to passengers for canceled flights and lengthy delays.
.
"It is our understanding of the rules that they would not apply in a situation like this," said an official who requested anonymity. That may make the decision even more difficult to comprehend, the U.S. officials said.
.
BA Flight 268 took off from Los Angeles on Feb. 19 and quickly developed trouble with one engine. Shelterline said this was caused by an engine surge.
.
Such surges sometimes happen in jet engines when the mixture of air and fuel is suddenly incorrect. The crew considered attempting to restart the engine, but decided instead to shut it down and continue to London.
.
However, partly because the plane could not climb to its planned altitude with one engine out, it used extra fuel in the thicker air at 29,000 feet.
.
As the fuel level decreased approaching the English coast, the crew decided to declare an emergency and land early in Manchester.
.
Senior U.S. aviation officials, who asked not to be quoted by name because they would be directly involved in legal actions against the airline, said the actions would be based on sections of U.S. aviation law dealing with careless and reckless operation of an aircraft and continuing operation of an aircraft in an unairworthy condition.
.
"There was an absence of judgment," said a senior official. "This is an indictment of the safety culture of British Airways."
.
Shelterline said a careful reading of the regulations cited by the Federal Aviation Administration to a reporter show that the British Airways pilot took actions that are specifically allowed.
.
Senior officials said the United States always has the right to block entry to the United States by British Airways, but that action is unlikely. Instead, a heavy fine seems more likely, they said. The U.S. agency was still considering its penalty options on Monday.
.
The officials said there is simply no way the airline could claim that continued operation of the flight was safe. The crew could not determine whether there might have been other damage in the area, the officials said.
.
"The crew could not assess why the engine failed, nor could they determine damage," said an official. In addition, with only three engines operating, the plane was forced to fly at lower altitudes in more dense air.
.
"You are sucking fuel like you are Exxon itself," an official said.
.
It is clear that the crew should have dumped fuel and returned to the airport in Los Angeles, the official said. On Feb. 25, six days later, the same BA 747 flew 11 hours on three engines when an engine gave out on a flight from Singapore to London. However, in that case, the aircraft had been in flight several hours before the engine stopped functioning.
U.S. plans to act after 'careless' BA flight
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
Tuesday, March 8, 2005
link : http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/07/news/faa.html
FAA weighs steps over 747's long route with one engine out
WASHINGTON Federal Aviation Administration officials said on Monday that they were preparing to take strong action against British Airways, including a charge of "careless and reckless operation of an aircraft," because of the airline's decision to allow a Boeing 747 to fly from California to England with one engine inoperable. Under normal circumstances, the United States would not take action against British Airways because such issues would be handled by Britain.
.
But senior U.S. aviation officials have become so concerned about the actions of the flight crew and its supervisors in London that they were preparing direct action.
.
"We will pursue every legal option available to us," said an FAA spokeswoman, Laura Brown.
.
British Airways expressed surprise over the developments.
.
"I am surprised that anyone at the FAA would make such statements," said Steve Shelterline, general manager for the 747 program with British Airways.
.
Shelterline said it was clear that even the portions of the federal aviation rules cited to a reporter by the Federal Aviation Administration would not prevent a four-engine airplane like the 747 from continuing flight with one engine out.
.
"The 747 is fully certificated to operate on three engines," he said. "There is no requirement to land."
.
Based on their investigation so far, U.S. aviation officials said they doubt that the crew's decision had anything to do with new European Union rules on monetary compensation to passengers for canceled flights and lengthy delays.
.
"It is our understanding of the rules that they would not apply in a situation like this," said an official who requested anonymity. That may make the decision even more difficult to comprehend, the U.S. officials said.
.
BA Flight 268 took off from Los Angeles on Feb. 19 and quickly developed trouble with one engine. Shelterline said this was caused by an engine surge.
.
Such surges sometimes happen in jet engines when the mixture of air and fuel is suddenly incorrect. The crew considered attempting to restart the engine, but decided instead to shut it down and continue to London.
.
However, partly because the plane could not climb to its planned altitude with one engine out, it used extra fuel in the thicker air at 29,000 feet.
.
As the fuel level decreased approaching the English coast, the crew decided to declare an emergency and land early in Manchester.
.
Senior U.S. aviation officials, who asked not to be quoted by name because they would be directly involved in legal actions against the airline, said the actions would be based on sections of U.S. aviation law dealing with careless and reckless operation of an aircraft and continuing operation of an aircraft in an unairworthy condition.
.
"There was an absence of judgment," said a senior official. "This is an indictment of the safety culture of British Airways."
.
Shelterline said a careful reading of the regulations cited by the Federal Aviation Administration to a reporter show that the British Airways pilot took actions that are specifically allowed.
.
Senior officials said the United States always has the right to block entry to the United States by British Airways, but that action is unlikely. Instead, a heavy fine seems more likely, they said. The U.S. agency was still considering its penalty options on Monday.
.
The officials said there is simply no way the airline could claim that continued operation of the flight was safe. The crew could not determine whether there might have been other damage in the area, the officials said.
.
"The crew could not assess why the engine failed, nor could they determine damage," said an official. In addition, with only three engines operating, the plane was forced to fly at lower altitudes in more dense air.
.
"You are sucking fuel like you are Exxon itself," an official said.
.
It is clear that the crew should have dumped fuel and returned to the airport in Los Angeles, the official said. On Feb. 25, six days later, the same BA 747 flew 11 hours on three engines when an engine gave out on a flight from Singapore to London. However, in that case, the aircraft had been in flight several hours before the engine stopped functioning.
Last edited by Montt; 8th Mar 2005 at 08:20.
Warning Toxic!
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Is this the same FAA that permitted the 737 to keep operating following 2 fatal mysterious rudder hardover accidents plus several more non fatal hardovers, that licensed the DC10 with a definitely non-failsafe leading edge slat system? One could go on. They have licensed a US aircraft which Boeing have sold to the world based on failsafe- ie operate perfectly safely in the event of engine failure. If they are implying that the 747 has a reduced safety margin because of an engine out, then it will be necessary to re-examine the whole question of 747 failsafe operation and the basis under which Boeing have sold the aeroplane to the world.
I think this is a question of the big bully FAA wishing to demonstrate its administration over the whole world's 747 operations. Until it understands its control doesn't stretch far from the US borders, there will be disagreement.
I think they would be better served actually taking action over events that are physically killing people.
The quality of the information they are working from is suspect. You 'are sucking fuel like Exxon itself'.....can one really listen to such an 'expert'? Fuel flow increases about 6% for an inboard engine out and up to 17% for an outboard. To make serious accusations against an airline's safety culture in view of that very airline's almost perfect safety record, particularly in comparison to US airlines is serious- BA has the world's most advanced Safety reporting system and analysis (BASIS). They have got to be joking!
I think this is a question of the big bully FAA wishing to demonstrate its administration over the whole world's 747 operations. Until it understands its control doesn't stretch far from the US borders, there will be disagreement.
I think they would be better served actually taking action over events that are physically killing people.
The quality of the information they are working from is suspect. You 'are sucking fuel like Exxon itself'.....can one really listen to such an 'expert'? Fuel flow increases about 6% for an inboard engine out and up to 17% for an outboard. To make serious accusations against an airline's safety culture in view of that very airline's almost perfect safety record, particularly in comparison to US airlines is serious- BA has the world's most advanced Safety reporting system and analysis (BASIS). They have got to be joking!
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The Herald Tribune isn't given to inventing stories, so we can be pretty sure that someone in the FAA made the statements.
BA has every right to go ballistic on this one - it will have done untold damage to their safety image in the US - and the best defence is attack!
How can the FAA argue that a 747 on 3 is unsafe when they allow ETOPS. What is it now? 3 hours from the nearest 'suitable' airfield with 300+ passengers - and one donk?
I'm not the biggest fan of BA - but I'm with them on this one.
Go for it BA - in spades! Insist on an immediate retraction, today.
FAA statement - "You are sucking fuel like you are Exxon itself," an official said. Official what. Duty Prat?
BA has every right to go ballistic on this one - it will have done untold damage to their safety image in the US - and the best defence is attack!
How can the FAA argue that a 747 on 3 is unsafe when they allow ETOPS. What is it now? 3 hours from the nearest 'suitable' airfield with 300+ passengers - and one donk?
I'm not the biggest fan of BA - but I'm with them on this one.
Go for it BA - in spades! Insist on an immediate retraction, today.
FAA statement - "You are sucking fuel like you are Exxon itself," an official said. Official what. Duty Prat?
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On this basis the FAA are guilty of "careless and reckless" certification of all ETOPS twins.
On any analysis I would suggest that dumping fuel and a return landing at a high weight at LAX is many times more risky (all be it a very small one) than flying on 3 engines for 12 hours. In the last 4 hours of the flight (i.e. North Atlantic) the power to weight of the aircraft on 3 would be the same as on 4 at TOC.
Does the BA Captain have the right to sue the FAA for defamation, because what has been said seems to be coming very close to it?
On any analysis I would suggest that dumping fuel and a return landing at a high weight at LAX is many times more risky (all be it a very small one) than flying on 3 engines for 12 hours. In the last 4 hours of the flight (i.e. North Atlantic) the power to weight of the aircraft on 3 would be the same as on 4 at TOC.
Does the BA Captain have the right to sue the FAA for defamation, because what has been said seems to be coming very close to it?
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Just a reminder, the engine in question was an inboard, with probably just 1 division rudder trim needed in cruise (4 with an outboard). Total increase in fuel requirement over the flight would be about 5 tonnes due to very minor trim drag and slightly lower cruise altitude.
The surge problem happens in jet engines- big bang, the engine is basically 'hiccuping' and coughing forward. It can look spectacular, especially at night with instantaneous flames/smoke, maybe even sparks. Usually it just recovers straight away and all parameters return to normal. Sometimes the exhaust gas temperature carries on rising, and first action would be to retard the thrust lever to see if that stops it, and cut off the fuel if that doesn't. It doesn't mean anything has broken. There are valves in the engine that open to relieve excess pressure and stop too large a pressure differential building up over a short distance in the engine. If the valves stick or just don't operate, excess pressure relieves itself with a resounding burp. The perceived wisdom used to be that if the event occured during thrust lever movement, then if shutdown, it was OK to relight, if the surge occured with no change of thrust, then it was likely the valve failure was a little more serious and best not to attempt a relight.
I would guess in this case, they knew it was just a surge, there was no damage, better not to relight, but should another problem occur, they always had the option to attempt to relight it, and they would highly likely have had the thing back again.
Before anybody makes anything out of surges, I have had some 30-40 over my career. The VC10 Conway engines used to cough something awful- always self recovered. I've shut down and relit several Pratt & Whitney and RR RB211 engines on Classics when they haven't self recovered. It's no more of a traumatic event to an engine than a car backfire is. That is why BA pilots are so vigorously defending the crew's actions- we know the engine, we know the aircraft capability- we have families of our own we want to get back to in one piece, we value our own safety just as high as anybody else values their safety. Delay cost issues and compensation just did not come into it- those people wanted to get to London, the pilots knew it was safe to continue.
The surge problem happens in jet engines- big bang, the engine is basically 'hiccuping' and coughing forward. It can look spectacular, especially at night with instantaneous flames/smoke, maybe even sparks. Usually it just recovers straight away and all parameters return to normal. Sometimes the exhaust gas temperature carries on rising, and first action would be to retard the thrust lever to see if that stops it, and cut off the fuel if that doesn't. It doesn't mean anything has broken. There are valves in the engine that open to relieve excess pressure and stop too large a pressure differential building up over a short distance in the engine. If the valves stick or just don't operate, excess pressure relieves itself with a resounding burp. The perceived wisdom used to be that if the event occured during thrust lever movement, then if shutdown, it was OK to relight, if the surge occured with no change of thrust, then it was likely the valve failure was a little more serious and best not to attempt a relight.
I would guess in this case, they knew it was just a surge, there was no damage, better not to relight, but should another problem occur, they always had the option to attempt to relight it, and they would highly likely have had the thing back again.
Before anybody makes anything out of surges, I have had some 30-40 over my career. The VC10 Conway engines used to cough something awful- always self recovered. I've shut down and relit several Pratt & Whitney and RR RB211 engines on Classics when they haven't self recovered. It's no more of a traumatic event to an engine than a car backfire is. That is why BA pilots are so vigorously defending the crew's actions- we know the engine, we know the aircraft capability- we have families of our own we want to get back to in one piece, we value our own safety just as high as anybody else values their safety. Delay cost issues and compensation just did not come into it- those people wanted to get to London, the pilots knew it was safe to continue.
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What astonishes me here is that some people, aircrew and FAA included, believe that two sensible pilots have accepted 'orders' from their Head Shed to cross the Atlantic with, according to the FAA, a fair chance that they wouldn't actually make it. FAA quote - 'careless and reckless operation of an aircraft and continuing operation of an aircraft in an unairworthy condition'.
Get real people! Those same pilots know better than most precisely what a winter North Atlantic has to offer in terms of hospitality.
After the engine hiccuped they concluded, in agreement with billions of $ worth of engineering back-up at Heathrow, that there was no additional risk in continuing to UK. None. Pity about the eventual shortfall in range but, as they say, them's the breaks.
Get real people! Those same pilots know better than most precisely what a winter North Atlantic has to offer in terms of hospitality.
After the engine hiccuped they concluded, in agreement with billions of $ worth of engineering back-up at Heathrow, that there was no additional risk in continuing to UK. None. Pity about the eventual shortfall in range but, as they say, them's the breaks.
From the NTSB "factual report"
What event was reckless in US airspace ?
Does the FAA statement have any jurisdiction for events outside the US/US airspace in non-US flaged aircraft, and pilots using non-US licences, and an aircraft operating on a non-US AOC ?
Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstances pertinent to the accident/incident:
On February 20, 2005, a British Airways Boeing 757-400, registration G-BNLG, experienced an engine
failure shortly after takeoff from Los Angeles International Airport, called PAN, and request
divert to Manchester, United Kingdom. The point of intended landing was Heathrow International
Airport, London, United Kingdom. There were no injuries to the 370 persons on board and
airplane landed safely.
The incident is being investigated by the United Kingdom's Air Accident Investigation Branch.
On February 20, 2005, a British Airways Boeing 757-400, registration G-BNLG, experienced an engine
failure shortly after takeoff from Los Angeles International Airport, called PAN, and request
divert to Manchester, United Kingdom. The point of intended landing was Heathrow International
Airport, London, United Kingdom. There were no injuries to the 370 persons on board and
airplane landed safely.
The incident is being investigated by the United Kingdom's Air Accident Investigation Branch.
Does the FAA statement have any jurisdiction for events outside the US/US airspace in non-US flaged aircraft, and pilots using non-US licences, and an aircraft operating on a non-US AOC ?
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A passenger's view
My wife & I were passengers on BA268 on 19 February 2005. Now that I finally have a few minutes to spare, I thought I would give you a quick passenger’s eye view of the incident. (When reading it, it might be worth bearing in mind that I am a pretty “laid back” individual who doesn’t easily get stressed – so other passengers may have a different point of view.)
My wife & I were in the “World Traveller Plus” (Premium Economy) cabin, sitting over the front of the starboard wing, so unfortunately (or is that fortunately!) we couldn’t see the affected engine from where we sat. We were, however, well aware of the problem a few seconds after take-off when we heard a loud (but muffled) “bang, bang, bang, bang…” noise and felt a violent vibration which went on for what I would estimate was about 5 or 6 seconds (this would tie in with reports I have read from an eyewitness on the ground, who reported a 20 ft jet of flame coming from the inner engine on the port wing, lasting for about 6 seconds). The noise and vibration then stopped and the plane continued its ascent – but it was climbing VERY slowly, so it seemed pretty obvious to me that the pilot must have shut down one of the engines.
There were a lot of anxious looking passengers at this point (not least my wife) – but I was surprised to see that (at least within my field of view and hearing distance) there was no sign of panic or screaming. I’m not sure if it was any different at the back of the plane (from where the flames would have been easily visible). Not surprisingly, the captain hadn’t made any announcement at this point (I assumed he had much more important things to think about at that time, so I was quite happy to wait!).
We continued to climb slowly and headed out to sea. At some point later (as I remember it, it seemed quite soon after takeoff, but it may have been after we started circling over the Pacific) we went through two more sequences of the loud banging and violent shaking – which I assumed was caused by the pilot trying (and failing) to get the engine running again, although I have no proof of this. I don’t know whether there were any more flames present during these events.
I think it must have been a short time after this that the captain made an announcement to the effect that (I’m paraphrasing) “as the people on the left hand side of the plane must be only too aware, there was a ‘surge’ in one of the engines just after take off, so I have shut it down. I am now going to circle over the ocean for about 10 minutes while I assess the situation and contact BA headquarters before deciding how best to proceed”.
The cabin crew then started moving about the cabin to help to reassure anxious passengers. I heard one of the cabin stewards suggest to one passenger that he thought we would dump fuel over the ocean then return to Los Angeles – little did he know…
After circling for about 15 minutes(?), the captain made a second announcement to say that, having assessed the situation and spoken to the people on the ground, he had decided to continue to London on three engines. He did say that in his opinion it was perfectly safe to do this and we could be assured that if he had had any safety concerns he would not be taking this course of action. He also said that having recomputed the flight plan, he was confident that we had sufficient fuel for the journey. The new flight plan gave a landing time of 4:20pm (rather than the scheduled landing time of 2:55pm).
I think the cabin crew were somewhat surprised by this announcement, but they soon got into their cheery, “continue as normal” mode and quickly set about handing out the free booze! (although I did later hear from a passenger nearer the back of the plane that things had not been quite as cheerful back there). There was some muttering amongst the passengers, but on the whole I think most people (at least within my earshot in the small World Traveller Plus cabin) were willing to trust the captain’s judgement on this (not that there was much we could do about it, anyway).
Watching the “moving map” display, it was interesting to see that the plane headed off across the USA in a much more easterly direction than might be expected (the solid line showing where we had been was heading roughly east, but the dotted, great circle continuation line was much more northerly). I assumed at the time that the pilot was keeping his options open with regards to possible alternative landing sites in the US, but it did worry me slightly that he might run short of fuel if he took a longer route. Having thought about it since, I suppose the easterly course might also have been to avoid any mountains that might be higher than we could fly over if we lost another engine – but I have no way of knowing what the pilot was actually thinking.
Unfortunately I didn’t spend much time studying the moving map during the flight, since it seemed to make my wife more anxious – so I thought it was better to keep her calm than it was to study the flight in great detail. I did occasionally look at it though – and the two things that stuck in my mind were that we seemed to spend a lot of time at only 27,000ft (although we did get higher later), and we were flying through almost still air (without the tail wind we would have expected if we had been in the jet stream). The display often showed headwinds of, say, 4mph or tailwinds of, say, 3mph – tiny figures. I therefore made a mental note to myself that I would be surprised if we made it all the way to Heathrow (although I thought it best not to mention it to my wife). Another interesting piece of information from the flight display was that our arrival time stayed pretty constant at about 4:20pm or 4:30pm – so we can’t have been losing too much time due to the unexpectedly low altitude or unfavourable winds. Indeed we finally landed at Manchester at about 4:04pm (so not much later than the flight plan had predicted 10 or so hours earlier) – but presumably only by burning more fuel to keep our speed up.
I didn’t notice the precise time that our destination on the moving map changed from Heathrow to Manchester – but I think it was very late on (only a few minutes (maybe 20 minutes?) before we landed there). The captain made an announcement that we were running low on fuel so he had decided to divert to Manchester “where we would be met by an army of ground staff who would help us with our onward travel arrangements to either Heathrow or other destinations for which we had missed our connections”. He said that our shortage of fuel was because Canadian air traffic control had been unable to allocate him the altitude he needed (I assumed at the time that he meant over Canada, but I suppose he might have meant over the Atlantic).
At Manchester we made a pretty good landing (past a group of fire engines, with lights flashing) although we did seem to brake very hard and stop very quickly. I can only guess that this was because we needed to leave the runway at one of the early exits, to keep us well away from the terminal building. We sat on the tarmac for quite a while before the doors were finally opened and we transferred to buses to drive us to the terminal. We were told we needed to collect our luggage (which took quite a long time) then check in at the BA desks for a shuttle flight down to Heathrow (they had sent a plane up from Gatwick to pick us up, and said there would be a later flight for anyone who didn’t make it onto this first plane). There was an enormous (but surprisingly calm) queue of people checking in for this flight. The ground staff coped pretty well (as the cabin staff had done on the flight). In addition to this special BA flight, some people were put on a British Midland flight; I’m not sure how many people failed to make it onto one of these first two flights (nor how many people decided to continue their journey by road or rail). The original intention was that the BA flight would leave Manchester at about 6pm, but people weren’t being checked in that quickly. My wife and I got onto the plane at about 6:15pm but had to wait there for over an hour until the final wheelchair-bound passenger could be carried to her seat. We finally reached Heathrow at about 8pm (5 hours later than scheduled, but glad to be home).
As to whether the captain made right decision in the circumstances, I’m not really in a position to say. I’m inclined to think he did (at least from an operational point of view – although the resulting bad publicity might make it less good from a commercial point of view). After all, it was his life on the line just as much as ours, so I doubt he would wilfully have made a reckless decision. I’m also not as sure as some of the armchair experts seem to be that the alternatives were that much safer (and they were almost certainly less convenient).
Some people seem to believe that we should have immediately returned to LAX – but, as I understand it, we would have been too heavy to land immediately, so that meant that we would have had to spend an appreciable amount of time either burning up or dumping fuel prior to landing. I don’t understand the mechanics of dumping fuel, but I am not sure that I fancy the idea of dumping it anywhere near an engine that has recently been emitting a sheet of flame! In any case, if we could stay in the air long enough to do that, why shouldn’t we be heading in the right direction while doing it (and assessing the situation as the flight progressed)?
One thing that might make me change my mind about it being the right decision is if it turns out that the engine suffered something other than a simple “surge”. Is the banging & vibration a normal feature of a surge? – and is it normal for engine to cause the same noises & vibration if the pilot tries to re-start it?
If I had been given the chance to vote on it, I think I might have chosen to land somewhere like New York or Chicago, rather than flying across the Atlantic on 3 engines (has there ever been a successful landing of a 747 on water?) – but I am willing to believe that the pilot understood the situation better than anyone else, and so was the best person to make the decision as to how to continue. As it turned out, we all got home in one piece – and even on the right day, so I didn’t have to take an extra day off work :o)
It’s unfortunate that we had to land at Manchester rather than actually making it to Heathrow in one go, but in the great scheme of things it wasn’t a big problem.
As to the amount of fuel remaining, I don’t understand how a 747’s fuel system works, but I have seen suggestions that (despite still having about 5 tons of fuel) there might have been some doubt in the captain’s mind as to whether the fuel pumps could get all of the fuel to where he needed it for the remaining three engines. It therefore seems only good sense to get the plane on the ground as quickly as possible.
A lot has been made of the fact that the captain made a mayday call (although we weren’t aware of this as passengers) and didn’t want to “go around” – but as I see it, that was a sensible precaution to ensure that he had a clear runway to land on. I have also seen it suggested by someone who seemed to know what he was talking about, that it is best to avoid flying “nose up” (as when “going around”) when fuel is low – something to do with the way that fuel is fed from the tanks.
All in all, this was a pretty dramatic flight, and not one that I would care to repeat any time soon, but it hasn’t put me off flying BA – in fact I’m flying to Baltimore with them next week. I will however be interested to see the final report into this incident if it’s ever made public (particularly given that the same plane appears to have had a problem with the replacement engine in the same position, only a few days after our flight – so there is at least a suspicion of a fault with something other than the engine itself).
My wife & I were in the “World Traveller Plus” (Premium Economy) cabin, sitting over the front of the starboard wing, so unfortunately (or is that fortunately!) we couldn’t see the affected engine from where we sat. We were, however, well aware of the problem a few seconds after take-off when we heard a loud (but muffled) “bang, bang, bang, bang…” noise and felt a violent vibration which went on for what I would estimate was about 5 or 6 seconds (this would tie in with reports I have read from an eyewitness on the ground, who reported a 20 ft jet of flame coming from the inner engine on the port wing, lasting for about 6 seconds). The noise and vibration then stopped and the plane continued its ascent – but it was climbing VERY slowly, so it seemed pretty obvious to me that the pilot must have shut down one of the engines.
There were a lot of anxious looking passengers at this point (not least my wife) – but I was surprised to see that (at least within my field of view and hearing distance) there was no sign of panic or screaming. I’m not sure if it was any different at the back of the plane (from where the flames would have been easily visible). Not surprisingly, the captain hadn’t made any announcement at this point (I assumed he had much more important things to think about at that time, so I was quite happy to wait!).
We continued to climb slowly and headed out to sea. At some point later (as I remember it, it seemed quite soon after takeoff, but it may have been after we started circling over the Pacific) we went through two more sequences of the loud banging and violent shaking – which I assumed was caused by the pilot trying (and failing) to get the engine running again, although I have no proof of this. I don’t know whether there were any more flames present during these events.
I think it must have been a short time after this that the captain made an announcement to the effect that (I’m paraphrasing) “as the people on the left hand side of the plane must be only too aware, there was a ‘surge’ in one of the engines just after take off, so I have shut it down. I am now going to circle over the ocean for about 10 minutes while I assess the situation and contact BA headquarters before deciding how best to proceed”.
The cabin crew then started moving about the cabin to help to reassure anxious passengers. I heard one of the cabin stewards suggest to one passenger that he thought we would dump fuel over the ocean then return to Los Angeles – little did he know…
After circling for about 15 minutes(?), the captain made a second announcement to say that, having assessed the situation and spoken to the people on the ground, he had decided to continue to London on three engines. He did say that in his opinion it was perfectly safe to do this and we could be assured that if he had had any safety concerns he would not be taking this course of action. He also said that having recomputed the flight plan, he was confident that we had sufficient fuel for the journey. The new flight plan gave a landing time of 4:20pm (rather than the scheduled landing time of 2:55pm).
I think the cabin crew were somewhat surprised by this announcement, but they soon got into their cheery, “continue as normal” mode and quickly set about handing out the free booze! (although I did later hear from a passenger nearer the back of the plane that things had not been quite as cheerful back there). There was some muttering amongst the passengers, but on the whole I think most people (at least within my earshot in the small World Traveller Plus cabin) were willing to trust the captain’s judgement on this (not that there was much we could do about it, anyway).
Watching the “moving map” display, it was interesting to see that the plane headed off across the USA in a much more easterly direction than might be expected (the solid line showing where we had been was heading roughly east, but the dotted, great circle continuation line was much more northerly). I assumed at the time that the pilot was keeping his options open with regards to possible alternative landing sites in the US, but it did worry me slightly that he might run short of fuel if he took a longer route. Having thought about it since, I suppose the easterly course might also have been to avoid any mountains that might be higher than we could fly over if we lost another engine – but I have no way of knowing what the pilot was actually thinking.
Unfortunately I didn’t spend much time studying the moving map during the flight, since it seemed to make my wife more anxious – so I thought it was better to keep her calm than it was to study the flight in great detail. I did occasionally look at it though – and the two things that stuck in my mind were that we seemed to spend a lot of time at only 27,000ft (although we did get higher later), and we were flying through almost still air (without the tail wind we would have expected if we had been in the jet stream). The display often showed headwinds of, say, 4mph or tailwinds of, say, 3mph – tiny figures. I therefore made a mental note to myself that I would be surprised if we made it all the way to Heathrow (although I thought it best not to mention it to my wife). Another interesting piece of information from the flight display was that our arrival time stayed pretty constant at about 4:20pm or 4:30pm – so we can’t have been losing too much time due to the unexpectedly low altitude or unfavourable winds. Indeed we finally landed at Manchester at about 4:04pm (so not much later than the flight plan had predicted 10 or so hours earlier) – but presumably only by burning more fuel to keep our speed up.
I didn’t notice the precise time that our destination on the moving map changed from Heathrow to Manchester – but I think it was very late on (only a few minutes (maybe 20 minutes?) before we landed there). The captain made an announcement that we were running low on fuel so he had decided to divert to Manchester “where we would be met by an army of ground staff who would help us with our onward travel arrangements to either Heathrow or other destinations for which we had missed our connections”. He said that our shortage of fuel was because Canadian air traffic control had been unable to allocate him the altitude he needed (I assumed at the time that he meant over Canada, but I suppose he might have meant over the Atlantic).
At Manchester we made a pretty good landing (past a group of fire engines, with lights flashing) although we did seem to brake very hard and stop very quickly. I can only guess that this was because we needed to leave the runway at one of the early exits, to keep us well away from the terminal building. We sat on the tarmac for quite a while before the doors were finally opened and we transferred to buses to drive us to the terminal. We were told we needed to collect our luggage (which took quite a long time) then check in at the BA desks for a shuttle flight down to Heathrow (they had sent a plane up from Gatwick to pick us up, and said there would be a later flight for anyone who didn’t make it onto this first plane). There was an enormous (but surprisingly calm) queue of people checking in for this flight. The ground staff coped pretty well (as the cabin staff had done on the flight). In addition to this special BA flight, some people were put on a British Midland flight; I’m not sure how many people failed to make it onto one of these first two flights (nor how many people decided to continue their journey by road or rail). The original intention was that the BA flight would leave Manchester at about 6pm, but people weren’t being checked in that quickly. My wife and I got onto the plane at about 6:15pm but had to wait there for over an hour until the final wheelchair-bound passenger could be carried to her seat. We finally reached Heathrow at about 8pm (5 hours later than scheduled, but glad to be home).
As to whether the captain made right decision in the circumstances, I’m not really in a position to say. I’m inclined to think he did (at least from an operational point of view – although the resulting bad publicity might make it less good from a commercial point of view). After all, it was his life on the line just as much as ours, so I doubt he would wilfully have made a reckless decision. I’m also not as sure as some of the armchair experts seem to be that the alternatives were that much safer (and they were almost certainly less convenient).
Some people seem to believe that we should have immediately returned to LAX – but, as I understand it, we would have been too heavy to land immediately, so that meant that we would have had to spend an appreciable amount of time either burning up or dumping fuel prior to landing. I don’t understand the mechanics of dumping fuel, but I am not sure that I fancy the idea of dumping it anywhere near an engine that has recently been emitting a sheet of flame! In any case, if we could stay in the air long enough to do that, why shouldn’t we be heading in the right direction while doing it (and assessing the situation as the flight progressed)?
One thing that might make me change my mind about it being the right decision is if it turns out that the engine suffered something other than a simple “surge”. Is the banging & vibration a normal feature of a surge? – and is it normal for engine to cause the same noises & vibration if the pilot tries to re-start it?
If I had been given the chance to vote on it, I think I might have chosen to land somewhere like New York or Chicago, rather than flying across the Atlantic on 3 engines (has there ever been a successful landing of a 747 on water?) – but I am willing to believe that the pilot understood the situation better than anyone else, and so was the best person to make the decision as to how to continue. As it turned out, we all got home in one piece – and even on the right day, so I didn’t have to take an extra day off work :o)
It’s unfortunate that we had to land at Manchester rather than actually making it to Heathrow in one go, but in the great scheme of things it wasn’t a big problem.
As to the amount of fuel remaining, I don’t understand how a 747’s fuel system works, but I have seen suggestions that (despite still having about 5 tons of fuel) there might have been some doubt in the captain’s mind as to whether the fuel pumps could get all of the fuel to where he needed it for the remaining three engines. It therefore seems only good sense to get the plane on the ground as quickly as possible.
A lot has been made of the fact that the captain made a mayday call (although we weren’t aware of this as passengers) and didn’t want to “go around” – but as I see it, that was a sensible precaution to ensure that he had a clear runway to land on. I have also seen it suggested by someone who seemed to know what he was talking about, that it is best to avoid flying “nose up” (as when “going around”) when fuel is low – something to do with the way that fuel is fed from the tanks.
All in all, this was a pretty dramatic flight, and not one that I would care to repeat any time soon, but it hasn’t put me off flying BA – in fact I’m flying to Baltimore with them next week. I will however be interested to see the final report into this incident if it’s ever made public (particularly given that the same plane appears to have had a problem with the replacement engine in the same position, only a few days after our flight – so there is at least a suspicion of a fault with something other than the engine itself).
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BA268Pax
Thanks for your sensible account from an actual passengers perspective. If I may just point out that the map display does not 'know' the flight plan, and merely draws the Great Circle route from present position to destination. Therefore it can vary quite considerably on the day due to the jet streams, and the fact that you routed more to the south should not be taken as an indication of anything else.
Depending on the LAX departure routing, there are various altitudes required to be met out of LAX which are quite onerous on a heavy 4-engined 747, therefore it would not surprise me to hear that some extended routing was necessary to gain the altitudes necessary.
Thanks for your sensible account from an actual passengers perspective. If I may just point out that the map display does not 'know' the flight plan, and merely draws the Great Circle route from present position to destination. Therefore it can vary quite considerably on the day due to the jet streams, and the fact that you routed more to the south should not be taken as an indication of anything else.
Depending on the LAX departure routing, there are various altitudes required to be met out of LAX which are quite onerous on a heavy 4-engined 747, therefore it would not surprise me to hear that some extended routing was necessary to gain the altitudes necessary.
Está servira para distraerle.
268. Thoroughly enjoyed your letter.Hope by now that you have received massive compensation for possible aortic imbalance perhaps caused by decision of BA and/or, its servants..
Have seldom seen so much unadulterated balderdash as has appeared on this steamy thread, much of it from chaps who disengage autopilot after twelve hours and land. Precious Platignum, fly up the Wild Coast with me in an Islander.
No doubt, more later.
Usual disclaimers apply!
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particularly given that the same plane appears to have had a problem with the replacement engine in the same position, only a few days after our flight – so there is at least a suspicion of a fault with something other than the engine itself).
The cause of the second failure is being taken up with the overhaul facility GE.
Re:
A well respected aviation reporter. However. please do not read into this an FAA decision or opinion has been made and released. What you have here, is one or two FAA officials (aren't they all) expressed their opinion to the reporter off-the-record.
This may or may not procede to an FAA action. If in fact that it does, then there is going to be a much bigger problem between the FAA and CAA about juristiction and I am afraid of great retribution if that happens.
I prefer to believe that calmer heads will prevail in both the FAA and on this forum.
Herald Tribune states following this morning :
U.S. plans to act after 'careless' BA flight
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
Tuesday, March 8, 2005
U.S. plans to act after 'careless' BA flight
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
Tuesday, March 8, 2005
This may or may not procede to an FAA action. If in fact that it does, then there is going to be a much bigger problem between the FAA and CAA about juristiction and I am afraid of great retribution if that happens.
I prefer to believe that calmer heads will prevail in both the FAA and on this forum.