BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
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I'm not a prefessional pilot, and not quite a PPL yet, but in my ignorance, I'll throw in my two pennies worth.
As a passenger, on a 747, given the option of either turning back due to engine failure, or continuing on three healthy engines, I'd happily continue. I would not want all the grief to be had in turning back...a slower, lower flight to my original destination would be the better of two evils.
As for fuel, I'm guessing that in this case the pilot could not know for sure whether the prevailing conditions would allow him to reach Heathrow. But he must have been sure that, given any conditions (including possible 2nd failure), he had enough fuel to get as far as BFS / PIK / MAN / SNN etc. So worst case, the a/c doesn't reach LHR, but at least gets the right side of the pond.
And given that PAN and MAYDAY are the only 'emergency' options available, what else could the crew do but to do what they did? Maybe they could have diverted a little earlier (BFS maybe), but would that have avoided the MAYDAY call, or would the fuel level have been low enough even then to trigger the 'emergency'?
Now, I say all of this as someone with some aviation knowledge...an ordinary passenger, just wanting to get home, may not have been quite so relaxed!
As a passenger, on a 747, given the option of either turning back due to engine failure, or continuing on three healthy engines, I'd happily continue. I would not want all the grief to be had in turning back...a slower, lower flight to my original destination would be the better of two evils.
As for fuel, I'm guessing that in this case the pilot could not know for sure whether the prevailing conditions would allow him to reach Heathrow. But he must have been sure that, given any conditions (including possible 2nd failure), he had enough fuel to get as far as BFS / PIK / MAN / SNN etc. So worst case, the a/c doesn't reach LHR, but at least gets the right side of the pond.
And given that PAN and MAYDAY are the only 'emergency' options available, what else could the crew do but to do what they did? Maybe they could have diverted a little earlier (BFS maybe), but would that have avoided the MAYDAY call, or would the fuel level have been low enough even then to trigger the 'emergency'?
Now, I say all of this as someone with some aviation knowledge...an ordinary passenger, just wanting to get home, may not have been quite so relaxed!
Controversial, moi?
EL Grifo
Well I am pleased that you believe the utter twaddle written in The Times was accurate.
I see that you are a professional photographer, if you need any advice please ask because, as pilots, we are surely as qualified to tell you how to do your job as you are to tell us how to do ours.
Well I am pleased that you believe the utter twaddle written in The Times was accurate.
I see that you are a professional photographer, if you need any advice please ask because, as pilots, we are surely as qualified to tell you how to do your job as you are to tell us how to do ours.
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Lunatic Fringe and Hobie
Here is the US FAR that I spoke about.(Sorry about the delay. Had to sleep). Note that if the crew of a 3 or more engine aircraft (or any aircraft for that matter) goes further than the nearest suitable airport in point of time, that they have to give their reasons why what they did was as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport. (Paragraph d).
¤ 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an engine of an airplane fails or whenever the rotation of an engine is stopped to prevent possible damage, the pilot in command shall land the airplane at the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, at which a safe landing can be made.
(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:
(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage.
(3) The weather conditions en route and at possible landing points.
(4) The air traffic congestion.
(5) The kind of terrain.
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.
(c) The pilot in command shall report each stoppage of engine rotation in flight to the appropriate ground radio station as soon as practicable and shall keep that station fully informed of the progress of the flight.
(d) If the pilot in command lands at an airport other than the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, he or she shall (upon completing the trip) send a written report, in duplicate, to his or her director of operations stating the reasons for determining that the selection of an airport, other than the nearest airport, was as safe a course of action as landing at the nearest suitable airport. The director of operations shall, within 10 days after the pilot returns to his or her home base, send a copy of this report with the director of operation's comments to the certificate-holding district office.
Here is the US FAR that I spoke about.(Sorry about the delay. Had to sleep). Note that if the crew of a 3 or more engine aircraft (or any aircraft for that matter) goes further than the nearest suitable airport in point of time, that they have to give their reasons why what they did was as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport. (Paragraph d).
¤ 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an engine of an airplane fails or whenever the rotation of an engine is stopped to prevent possible damage, the pilot in command shall land the airplane at the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, at which a safe landing can be made.
(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:
(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage.
(3) The weather conditions en route and at possible landing points.
(4) The air traffic congestion.
(5) The kind of terrain.
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.
(c) The pilot in command shall report each stoppage of engine rotation in flight to the appropriate ground radio station as soon as practicable and shall keep that station fully informed of the progress of the flight.
(d) If the pilot in command lands at an airport other than the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, he or she shall (upon completing the trip) send a written report, in duplicate, to his or her director of operations stating the reasons for determining that the selection of an airport, other than the nearest airport, was as safe a course of action as landing at the nearest suitable airport. The director of operations shall, within 10 days after the pilot returns to his or her home base, send a copy of this report with the director of operation's comments to the certificate-holding district office.
Mr Mouse,
This is precisely where folks of your ilk (and of them, there are many) fall firmly on their arse.
I categoricaly did NOT state that the Times article was "accurate"
As for your parting shot, well, let others be the judges.
Live and learn.
This is precisely where folks of your ilk (and of them, there are many) fall firmly on their arse.
I categoricaly did NOT state that the Times article was "accurate"
As for your parting shot, well, let others be the judges.
Live and learn.
Thank you for a most interesting post, kellmark. One which should certainly stimulate further debate, doubtless to the chagrin of some?
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Brand new member here - but been around the aviation game many decades.
I am amused by the 2 vs 3 vs 4 engine issue. Remember the late 60's when Douglas & Lockheed were trying to sell trijets for Transatlantic ops, and many of the more conservative operators were HIGHLY skeptical that the public would EVER accept anything less than FOUR engines?
Yet - only 10 years later Swissair set some kind of record flying a DC-10 from Karachi to Athens after #1 went south on takeoff! The captain had to write a LONG report, but he was not disciplined.
I am amused by the 2 vs 3 vs 4 engine issue. Remember the late 60's when Douglas & Lockheed were trying to sell trijets for Transatlantic ops, and many of the more conservative operators were HIGHLY skeptical that the public would EVER accept anything less than FOUR engines?
Yet - only 10 years later Swissair set some kind of record flying a DC-10 from Karachi to Athens after #1 went south on takeoff! The captain had to write a LONG report, but he was not disciplined.
Just another number
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kellmark
The JAR regualations are similar, except that I believe that the report has to reach the CAA within three days. I can assure you that the UK CAA will go through the paperwork in minute detail. As all of the company communications were by ACARS, these will also be available in hard copy, so any commercial pressure will be evident. The crew will also be interviewed by the company and the CAA. I'm sure that the eventual report will be factual, unbiased and just, unlike some of the comments here on PPRuNe.
Airclues
The JAR regualations are similar, except that I believe that the report has to reach the CAA within three days. I can assure you that the UK CAA will go through the paperwork in minute detail. As all of the company communications were by ACARS, these will also be available in hard copy, so any commercial pressure will be evident. The crew will also be interviewed by the company and the CAA. I'm sure that the eventual report will be factual, unbiased and just, unlike some of the comments here on PPRuNe.
Airclues
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That Swissair DC-10 Saga
Yet - only 10 years later Swissair set some kind of record flying a DC-10 from Karachi to Athens after #1 went south on takeoff! The captain had to write a LONG report, but he was not disciplined.
Anywhere one could read the details of that episode?
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Capt Airclues.
Thanks for your information. Do you know where that is located in the JAR-OPS? I have looked through what I have and cannot find it. It would be helpful if you could let me know.
Thanks
kellmark
Thanks for your information. Do you know where that is located in the JAR-OPS? I have looked through what I have and cannot find it. It would be helpful if you could let me know.
Thanks
kellmark
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I have followed the debate on this thread with some interest, albeit as slf, as I was on board a 744 that went down to 3 (or maybe 2) engines a little while ago.
It seems to me though that all the debate about were the crew right or wrong is totaly irrelevant. The first question that has to be answered is surely "did the crew follow the relevant SOPS, etc" If they did, then they must, presumably, be blameless. If they didn't, they I would expect a large book to be thrown at them.
If they did follow the rules, then the debate hinges on "are the rules correct?" and I would presume that as the rules have been around for a while without seeming to cause major mishap, they must be by and large correct.
All the people who want to criticise the crew for carrying on presumably should actually be criticising the rule book, and campaigning to get it changed.
Do I make sense?
It seems to me though that all the debate about were the crew right or wrong is totaly irrelevant. The first question that has to be answered is surely "did the crew follow the relevant SOPS, etc" If they did, then they must, presumably, be blameless. If they didn't, they I would expect a large book to be thrown at them.
If they did follow the rules, then the debate hinges on "are the rules correct?" and I would presume that as the rules have been around for a while without seeming to cause major mishap, they must be by and large correct.
All the people who want to criticise the crew for carrying on presumably should actually be criticising the rule book, and campaigning to get it changed.
Do I make sense?
Rebel PPRuNer
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stickyb
makes sense to me. I have flown on BA 744s as SLF several times in the last three years and I would do so again tomorrow if I had a ticket for it, since as you put it, the rules are the same so they are wrong for everyone or no-one.
makes sense to me. I have flown on BA 744s as SLF several times in the last three years and I would do so again tomorrow if I had a ticket for it, since as you put it, the rules are the same so they are wrong for everyone or no-one.
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"(d) If the pilot in command lands at an airport other than the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, he or she shall (upon completing the trip),"send a written report , in duplicate, to his or her director of operations, stating the reasons for determining that the selection of an airport, other than the nearest airport, was as safe a course of action as landing at the nearest suitable airport. The director of operations shall, within 10 days after the pilot returns to his or her home base, send a copy of this report with the director of operation's comments to the certificate-holding district office."
It is amazing how defensive some of you are.
Disclaimer: I have flown long-haul worldwide for many years but would never claim to have as much knowledge as some of you seem to have on the subject.
Here's my take on it. Part of my mental checklist in any abnormal situation is to cover my ass (unless it is life-threatening of course). If I were to read the above section and saw that I would have to defend my decision to not land at the nearest suitable airport, I think my ticket takes precedence. That language says to me, "It's OK to continue, but you better pray nothing goes wrong."
Well, obviously this crew rolled the dice and it bit them in the butt. How do you explain flying across the US, Atlantic Ocean with the end result being a fuel emergency? I am sure they did not foresee this but my point is, why take the chance?
Would they have been overweight for a fuel stop in Gander? Was it worth it now in retrospect to continue on? What if they arrived only to find the airport closed due to some unforeseen circumstance?
My airline teaches that it is better to err on the side of safety; A policy that I am thankful that they embrace.
It is amazing how defensive some of you are.
Disclaimer: I have flown long-haul worldwide for many years but would never claim to have as much knowledge as some of you seem to have on the subject.
Here's my take on it. Part of my mental checklist in any abnormal situation is to cover my ass (unless it is life-threatening of course). If I were to read the above section and saw that I would have to defend my decision to not land at the nearest suitable airport, I think my ticket takes precedence. That language says to me, "It's OK to continue, but you better pray nothing goes wrong."
Well, obviously this crew rolled the dice and it bit them in the butt. How do you explain flying across the US, Atlantic Ocean with the end result being a fuel emergency? I am sure they did not foresee this but my point is, why take the chance?
Would they have been overweight for a fuel stop in Gander? Was it worth it now in retrospect to continue on? What if they arrived only to find the airport closed due to some unforeseen circumstance?
My airline teaches that it is better to err on the side of safety; A policy that I am thankful that they embrace.
So it looks like the Times article was pretty much on the mark, reporting the situation as it was, rather than how it could have been, which in itself is a refreshing change.
Unless Mr Mouse is reading it differently of course. If so, where does the newspaper drift from fairly factual reporting into alleged "twaddle" I have read it over several times an it seems fairly straightforward to me.
Unless Mr Mouse is reading it differently of course. If so, where does the newspaper drift from fairly factual reporting into alleged "twaddle" I have read it over several times an it seems fairly straightforward to me.
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Incredible.....16 pages of speculation on an incident that took place little more than a few days ago....
Managed Nav.....
It's pointless quoting from an FAA publication....BA will have an Ops manual that will be the deciding factor in the actions of the crew....that and any comms with their base....And as for stopping in Gander.....
"Oh...hi there chaps just fill her up would you....then we'll take off on three engines and...."
Please....let's give the crew the benefit of the doubt until the incident is investigated.....IF they made a bad decision then they're not the first....certainly won't be the last...and let's hope that we're not the next to do the same....
Managed Nav.....
It's pointless quoting from an FAA publication....BA will have an Ops manual that will be the deciding factor in the actions of the crew....that and any comms with their base....And as for stopping in Gander.....
"Oh...hi there chaps just fill her up would you....then we'll take off on three engines and...."
Please....let's give the crew the benefit of the doubt until the incident is investigated.....IF they made a bad decision then they're not the first....certainly won't be the last...and let's hope that we're not the next to do the same....
aka Capt PPRuNe
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In yet another attempt to try and bring back to this thread some sense of perspective, I would like to suggest that anyone making comments without 'obviously' having read the whole thread (never mind admitting to not having done so) please refrain from doing so. Also, aside from the enthusiasts who claim an interest in this debate, there appear to be a number of professional pilots who have never flown 4 engine LR ops and keep postulating about differences between ETOPS which is not quite the same thing.
Perhaps you should just leave it to the professionals who do have experience in 4 engined ops, particularly those with B744 experience. The level of 'hand wringing' and obvious emotional distress that this thread is causing some of you only goes to show that arguing the toss with someone who has experience in B744 ops and those who don't, only leads to long threads with much hype, uninformed speculation and comments by a few so called professionals that would be worthy of the gutter press.
It is obvious that continuing after an engine 'failure' (as opposed to a catastrophic failure) on a B744 does not require an immediate land at the nearest suitable airport. The crew will base their decisions on all the information available which includes the indications in front of them, other parameters that are accessible through various on-board systems and advice from their maintrol. Shutting down an engine and continuing on 3 on a B744 is not the dire emergency that some of you think it is. The decision to continue to cross the Atlantic will also have been based on many other parameters including wx and other commercial reasons.
Can we now please leave the debate to those with experience in B744 ops as the signal to noise ratio on this thread is getting uncomfortable with the sensationalist remarks from enthusiasts and a few professionals alike.
Perhaps you should just leave it to the professionals who do have experience in 4 engined ops, particularly those with B744 experience. The level of 'hand wringing' and obvious emotional distress that this thread is causing some of you only goes to show that arguing the toss with someone who has experience in B744 ops and those who don't, only leads to long threads with much hype, uninformed speculation and comments by a few so called professionals that would be worthy of the gutter press.
It is obvious that continuing after an engine 'failure' (as opposed to a catastrophic failure) on a B744 does not require an immediate land at the nearest suitable airport. The crew will base their decisions on all the information available which includes the indications in front of them, other parameters that are accessible through various on-board systems and advice from their maintrol. Shutting down an engine and continuing on 3 on a B744 is not the dire emergency that some of you think it is. The decision to continue to cross the Atlantic will also have been based on many other parameters including wx and other commercial reasons.
Can we now please leave the debate to those with experience in B744 ops as the signal to noise ratio on this thread is getting uncomfortable with the sensationalist remarks from enthusiasts and a few professionals alike.
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747 engine out
The 747 AFM does not classify an engine failure as an emergency procedure in itself. (At least it didn't during the first 15 years or so of 747 ops) Performance curves, cruise control tables, etc. are provided for engine-out operations.
And if the failure is indeed #2 engine (left inboard), then the trim drag is relatively small. If an outboard engine were shut down, trim drag would be somewhat greater (and thus greater fuel burn).
Considering the Jumbo's redundancy of systems, the only real concern is terrain clearance in the event of another failure. Over the Atlantic that's hardly an issue.
And I'll bet BA engineering dept. had a good look at the telemetered performance and health of #1, 3, & 4 before they passed Gander.
And if the failure is indeed #2 engine (left inboard), then the trim drag is relatively small. If an outboard engine were shut down, trim drag would be somewhat greater (and thus greater fuel burn).
Considering the Jumbo's redundancy of systems, the only real concern is terrain clearance in the event of another failure. Over the Atlantic that's hardly an issue.
And I'll bet BA engineering dept. had a good look at the telemetered performance and health of #1, 3, & 4 before they passed Gander.
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Danny...
I don't know if you were including me in the group of non-worthy pilots (sarcasm intended) who have never flown LR 4 eng ops, but for the record I have a decade of experience flying DC-8's around the globe.
My point was and is that there must have been a gross miscalculation of the EFOA or else it would not have ended up in a fuel emergency. Some are quicker than others to accomplish the mission even if it means reducing the margin of safety a little. I'm pretty sure that they felt they could make it, but they had to know it was going to be close. I contend that it is far better to pop into a MX base (Gander was a bad choice, JFK?) and err on the side of safety than to be the subject of Monday morning quarterback discussion.
This could happen to any of us, but the heat will always come down on the crew if things don't work out. It is easy to be led down a path that you may consider to be your second or third choice initially. If we conduct the flight with a threshold of safety that we will never cross, then we lessen the likelyhood of getting to know the CP on a first name basis.
I don't know if you were including me in the group of non-worthy pilots (sarcasm intended) who have never flown LR 4 eng ops, but for the record I have a decade of experience flying DC-8's around the globe.
My point was and is that there must have been a gross miscalculation of the EFOA or else it would not have ended up in a fuel emergency. Some are quicker than others to accomplish the mission even if it means reducing the margin of safety a little. I'm pretty sure that they felt they could make it, but they had to know it was going to be close. I contend that it is far better to pop into a MX base (Gander was a bad choice, JFK?) and err on the side of safety than to be the subject of Monday morning quarterback discussion.
This could happen to any of us, but the heat will always come down on the crew if things don't work out. It is easy to be led down a path that you may consider to be your second or third choice initially. If we conduct the flight with a threshold of safety that we will never cross, then we lessen the likelyhood of getting to know the CP on a first name basis.