MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Dunnunda & Godzone
Age: 74
Posts: 4,275
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
barit1
Sadly what was once a routine part of the TO calcs and sentinels, no longer seems to be so
Still as a passenger, apart from paying attention to the safety brief I am in the habit of keeping track of the time from TO thrust applied to rotation.
For most of the places I travel, 30 seconds seems to work, although of course Denver on a hot day and suchlike take forever. No panic just a heightened sense of awareness if it goes on longer than it should.
In the cockpit 'nother story, no data available, except my internal clock and personal kidney cramp alarm system, which is surprisingly accurate.
It has picked up two possibly disastrous events that were not in the least bit obvious to anyone, before they could become a serious issue.
Sadly what was once a routine part of the TO calcs and sentinels, no longer seems to be so
Still as a passenger, apart from paying attention to the safety brief I am in the habit of keeping track of the time from TO thrust applied to rotation.
For most of the places I travel, 30 seconds seems to work, although of course Denver on a hot day and suchlike take forever. No panic just a heightened sense of awareness if it goes on longer than it should.
In the cockpit 'nother story, no data available, except my internal clock and personal kidney cramp alarm system, which is surprisingly accurate.
It has picked up two possibly disastrous events that were not in the least bit obvious to anyone, before they could become a serious issue.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Didn't take very long for the lawsuit to be filed. Except from an article in the "The Brandon Sun" newspaper.
"HALIFAX (CP) - A multimillion-dollar lawsuit has been launched against a British-based cargo airline by the families of crew killed in a fiery crash in Halifax one year ago. Seven crew members died in the MK Airlines crash on Oct. 14, after the heavily loaded jumbo jet failed to gain sufficient altitude, struck its tail on a berm at the end of a runway and crashed into nearby woodlands."
Full article: http://www.brandonsun.com/story.php?story_id=6770
"HALIFAX (CP) - A multimillion-dollar lawsuit has been launched against a British-based cargo airline by the families of crew killed in a fiery crash in Halifax one year ago. Seven crew members died in the MK Airlines crash on Oct. 14, after the heavily loaded jumbo jet failed to gain sufficient altitude, struck its tail on a berm at the end of a runway and crashed into nearby woodlands."
Full article: http://www.brandonsun.com/story.php?story_id=6770
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Dublin
Posts: 105
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How much is R3500 in USD/€?. No money is worth the price of a human life. May all 7 crew RIP. May Mr Anderson & associates get their just desserts either in this life or the next.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: uk
Posts: 260
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax
Flight International 18 Oct '05 has an article blaming inadequate training and fatigue for the crash. The interim findings of the TSB Canada, focusses on the introduction of the Boeing Lap-top and long duty hours as the likely principal factors of the accident. Both have been refuted by an MK Airlines spokesman (as Mandy Rice-Davies said so memorably many years ago "well he would say that wouldn't he?").
This accident came hot on the heels of an SIA 747-400 which also started its' take-off run with power settings and take-off safety speeds set for a TOW more than 100 tonnes below actual weight. In both cases, neither crew realised the significance of the lower than expected performance figures, nor did they call for or set maximum power when it was realised that all was not well. Both resulted in tailscrapes, sadly for the MK crew there was insufficient runway left to achieve lift-off.
We are all aware of approach and landing accidents and the recent efforts to highlight the need for stable approaches and touchdowns commensurate with the prevailing conditions; also there has been much comment on taxiway and runway incursions, with the need to be extra vigilant.
But what about highlighting the need for cross-checking the departure phase? How many of us know the approximate power settings and speeds for a heavy take-off and for a light take-off? In the case of the two 747 accidents, both errors resulted in a V2 discrepancy of about 30 knots.
Perhaps the legacy of the loss of the seven MK crew might be to re-emphasise the need to make our own last-minute cross-check of the runway in use, its' conditions, the flap set for take-off and the power/speeds as expected for the weight. Experience on type certainly helps, as can a clip-board or card memo with relevant figures as a guide. Safety is enhanced by learning from our own mistakes as well as those of others.
This accident came hot on the heels of an SIA 747-400 which also started its' take-off run with power settings and take-off safety speeds set for a TOW more than 100 tonnes below actual weight. In both cases, neither crew realised the significance of the lower than expected performance figures, nor did they call for or set maximum power when it was realised that all was not well. Both resulted in tailscrapes, sadly for the MK crew there was insufficient runway left to achieve lift-off.
We are all aware of approach and landing accidents and the recent efforts to highlight the need for stable approaches and touchdowns commensurate with the prevailing conditions; also there has been much comment on taxiway and runway incursions, with the need to be extra vigilant.
But what about highlighting the need for cross-checking the departure phase? How many of us know the approximate power settings and speeds for a heavy take-off and for a light take-off? In the case of the two 747 accidents, both errors resulted in a V2 discrepancy of about 30 knots.
Perhaps the legacy of the loss of the seven MK crew might be to re-emphasise the need to make our own last-minute cross-check of the runway in use, its' conditions, the flap set for take-off and the power/speeds as expected for the weight. Experience on type certainly helps, as can a clip-board or card memo with relevant figures as a guide. Safety is enhanced by learning from our own mistakes as well as those of others.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: In da north country
Age: 62
Posts: 452
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
747 classics, flap 10, 100,000 lbs error equates to 15 knots. I have taken the time to memorize a few numbers, because we use this new fangled computer program to figure out all our speeds, and like any computer; $hit in,$hit out! I don't want what happened to them to happen to me. The old charts worked for many years, and they will continue to be my backup.
I was an engineer for many years, and the 100,000 lb mistake is a common and classic mistake. I encourage pilots to memorize a few max weight numbers, and ask yourself; does this look reasonable?
I was an engineer for many years, and the 100,000 lb mistake is a common and classic mistake. I encourage pilots to memorize a few max weight numbers, and ask yourself; does this look reasonable?
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: here and there but mostly lgw
Posts: 166
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The answer is in the first sentence of the post by skiesfull.
Oh and a flag of convenience so only lip service need be paid to industry safety/training/crm conventions. AND IN GENERAL IN THIS OUFIT ,for icing on the cake have an ex mil captain and a f/o who will do anything to get off a bush twin otter straight onto a 747 with no experince of a real airline culture. Back this with a squadron closed shop mentality Result a cockpit gradient that eddie the eagle would be happy to ski down. Et voila, the cake is ready.
Oh and a flag of convenience so only lip service need be paid to industry safety/training/crm conventions. AND IN GENERAL IN THIS OUFIT ,for icing on the cake have an ex mil captain and a f/o who will do anything to get off a bush twin otter straight onto a 747 with no experince of a real airline culture. Back this with a squadron closed shop mentality Result a cockpit gradient that eddie the eagle would be happy to ski down. Et voila, the cake is ready.
Last edited by Farty Flaps; 21st Oct 2005 at 17:20.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Chicago, IL, USA
Posts: 518
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Play the game
Actually, I'd submit the answer is in the last sentence by Willit Run.
Anyone remember Tom Cook from Southern and Atlas?
When I flew with him he'd make a game out of guessing the V2 speed and the Stab Trim Setting.
I'll be damned if he couldn't guess it within one knot and one tenth of a unit on every flight just by looking at the weight and CG.
Like the man said, look at it and ask yourself, does it look reasonable?
Thanks for teaching me the game, Tom.
Anyone remember Tom Cook from Southern and Atlas?
When I flew with him he'd make a game out of guessing the V2 speed and the Stab Trim Setting.
I'll be damned if he couldn't guess it within one knot and one tenth of a unit on every flight just by looking at the weight and CG.
Like the man said, look at it and ask yourself, does it look reasonable?
Thanks for teaching me the game, Tom.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Used to be the Beer Store, now the dépanneur
Posts: 114
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Canadian TSB released its report
Gatineau - The fatal crash of an MK Airlines Limited freight transport plane at Halifax International Airport, Nova Scotia, underscores the need for better systems to ensure correct take-off speed and thrust, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) said in its final report (A04H0004) released today.
The report concluded that the speed and thrust settings selected by the crew members in preparation for their October 14, 2004 flight to Spain were incorrect for the weight of the Boeing 747-244SF, a converted jumbo jet. The aircraft did not achieve sufficient altitude, hit a berm at the end of the runway, crashed into the adjacent forest, and burned. All seven crew members died.
The investigation found that the crew did not receive adequate training on the Boeing Laptop Tool, a computer program used to calculate the take-off velocity and power necessary in light of factors such as fuel weight, payload, and environmental conditions. TSB investigators found that crew fatigue and a dark take-off environment may have compounded the likelihood of error. As a consequence, the Board called on Canadian and international regulatory authorities to ensure that crews of large aircraft will be alerted in time when there is not enough power to take off safely.
The Board recommended that: The Department of Transport, in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Aviation Safety Agency, and other regulatory organizations, establish a requirement for transport category aircraft to be equipped with a take-off performance monitoring system that would provide flight crews with an accurate and timely indication of inadequate take-off performance.
"We are asking the world's regulatory agencies to ensure that crews of large aircraft will be alerted in time when there is not enough power to take off safely," said TSB Acting Chair Wendy Tadros. "Our investigation uncovered the causes and contributing factors. We now need to work to ensure that this type of accident doesn't happen again."
The report concluded that the speed and thrust settings selected by the crew members in preparation for their October 14, 2004 flight to Spain were incorrect for the weight of the Boeing 747-244SF, a converted jumbo jet. The aircraft did not achieve sufficient altitude, hit a berm at the end of the runway, crashed into the adjacent forest, and burned. All seven crew members died.
The investigation found that the crew did not receive adequate training on the Boeing Laptop Tool, a computer program used to calculate the take-off velocity and power necessary in light of factors such as fuel weight, payload, and environmental conditions. TSB investigators found that crew fatigue and a dark take-off environment may have compounded the likelihood of error. As a consequence, the Board called on Canadian and international regulatory authorities to ensure that crews of large aircraft will be alerted in time when there is not enough power to take off safely.
The Board recommended that: The Department of Transport, in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Aviation Safety Agency, and other regulatory organizations, establish a requirement for transport category aircraft to be equipped with a take-off performance monitoring system that would provide flight crews with an accurate and timely indication of inadequate take-off performance.
"We are asking the world's regulatory agencies to ensure that crews of large aircraft will be alerted in time when there is not enough power to take off safely," said TSB Acting Chair Wendy Tadros. "Our investigation uncovered the causes and contributing factors. We now need to work to ensure that this type of accident doesn't happen again."
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: North America
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sims Fly Virtually
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Used to be 3rd Sand Dune from the Left - But now I'm somewhere else somewhere else.
Posts: 704
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
(from the above newspaper link)Dave Wilson, a spokesman for the company, insisted the training on the takeoff software was sufficient.
"When we took the (software) we actually asked the manufacturer for guidance and we unilaterally developed a self-study training program, which included a 46-page guide for flight crews," he said.
"When we took the (software) we actually asked the manufacturer for guidance and we unilaterally developed a self-study training program, which included a 46-page guide for flight crews," he said.
I've read almost all this thread and, if they were a pax arline, I'd certainly not want to fly with them!
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: leafy suburbs
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Some more from The Globe and MAil
"A news release from MK Airlines says the report's findings cannot be regarded as conclusive because there was no cockpit voice recording of the pilots and first officers final words."
and
"Dave Wilson, a spokesman for the company. Mr. Wilson responded that when at the point of the crash, "they (the crew) were within their time limits at the time.""
and
"The report noted that at the time of the accident, the crew had been on duty for 24 hours, the maximum allowed under MK's own operating manual."
Seems like a bit of pedantic management wriggling to me.
"A news release from MK Airlines says the report's findings cannot be regarded as conclusive because there was no cockpit voice recording of the pilots and first officers final words."
and
"Dave Wilson, a spokesman for the company. Mr. Wilson responded that when at the point of the crash, "they (the crew) were within their time limits at the time.""
and
"The report noted that at the time of the accident, the crew had been on duty for 24 hours, the maximum allowed under MK's own operating manual."
Seems like a bit of pedantic management wriggling to me.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Globiser and all,
No, the TSB doesn't make it easy to find......
Truly a sad story and condolences to friends and family of those involved....fatigue is such an insideous killer.
No, the TSB doesn't make it easy to find......
Truly a sad story and condolences to friends and family of those involved....fatigue is such an insideous killer.
ex-Tanker
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Luton Beds UK
Posts: 907
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Quite a report
It took over 30 minutes to read that but the sense of foreboding increased all the way.
It is yet another warning that everything must be got right, to go flying.
It is perhaps the most convincing documentation yet of the need for wide awake crews and management that understands this.
It must have been terrible.
RIP.
It is yet another warning that everything must be got right, to go flying.
It is perhaps the most convincing documentation yet of the need for wide awake crews and management that understands this.
It must have been terrible.
RIP.
Last edited by Few Cloudy; 1st Jul 2006 at 14:36.
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The final accident report, as usual, makes fascinating - and sobering - reading. A topic was raised on this thread around 27 Nov 2004 and continued for ca. two weeks concerning the origin of the ground markings (scars) between the end of the runway and the berm, and beyond. Were they created by impact of the fuselage and/or the tires? Did the MK aircraft actually become airborne before reaching the berm? Interestingly, the TSB report states:
A scrape mark [made by contact of the aft fuselage with the ground] began 412 feet from the end of the runway...continued through the paved runway overrun area and across the grassy area...[and] disappeared at a point approximately 315 feet before the berm, indicating that the aircraft became airborne. The only indication of aircraft contact with the ground was the ground scar caused by the lower aft fuselage. There was no indication that the tires contacted the ground beyond the paved surface. Fuselage structure...was found embedded in the berm.
The report goes on to state that the only tire marks found in the area of the berm were on broken pieces of the ILS antenna that was fixed on the berm. "No similar marks were observed across the concrete pad on top of the berm, indicating that the tires were above the concrete pad as the aircraft passed over it".
Quite a few of us discussants have been proved way off the mark on these issues.
Excuse me while I finish this rather tired-looking morsel of crow...
Rockhound
A scrape mark [made by contact of the aft fuselage with the ground] began 412 feet from the end of the runway...continued through the paved runway overrun area and across the grassy area...[and] disappeared at a point approximately 315 feet before the berm, indicating that the aircraft became airborne. The only indication of aircraft contact with the ground was the ground scar caused by the lower aft fuselage. There was no indication that the tires contacted the ground beyond the paved surface. Fuselage structure...was found embedded in the berm.
The report goes on to state that the only tire marks found in the area of the berm were on broken pieces of the ILS antenna that was fixed on the berm. "No similar marks were observed across the concrete pad on top of the berm, indicating that the tires were above the concrete pad as the aircraft passed over it".
Quite a few of us discussants have been proved way off the mark on these issues.
Excuse me while I finish this rather tired-looking morsel of crow...
Rockhound