Update on Thai Airways Flt 261 A310 Crash Surat Thani
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Update on Thai Airways Flt 261 A310 Crash Surat Thani
Have had an approach from the makers of the Mayday Program series asking if any further information has been forthcoming on this very aged investigation. They evidently deem it worthy of an episode.
I cannot seem to locate anything, so perhaps someone here knows something that I could pass on. ([email protected]).
I would have dredged up the thread but the Pprune search function has been disabled.
I think that this FAA AD (based on an Airbus input) may be relevant.
UNC
I cannot seem to locate anything, so perhaps someone here knows something that I could pass on. ([email protected]).
I would have dredged up the thread but the Pprune search function has been disabled.
I think that this FAA AD (based on an Airbus input) may be relevant.
UNC
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Gotta question
Can anybody tell me who makes the flight control computer for the A-310 and the A-300-600?
Last edited by Lu Zuckerman; 23rd Jan 2004 at 09:00.
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Hi, the A300-600 is not FBW neither the A310 as I fly both, the FD take many signals, like for attitude from the IRS, speeds and alt from CADC ( Central Air Data Comp ) and protections from FAC ( flight Augumentation Comp ) but to be honest I have no clue who makes them,
ciao
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Gentlemen,
A 310-200/300 and A 300-600(R) aircraft have nothing to do with FBW!!!
Nevertheless there are two identical Flight Control Computers(FCC1 and FCC2) Systems each of which allows to select the following APFD functions:
-stabilizing the airplane around its center of gravity while holding VS and heading(basic modes).
-flying the airplane on an acquired flight path(hold modes).
-aquisition of a new flight path(modes with arming,capture and hold/track/active phases).
-automatic landing with roll out.
-automatic selection of a related autothrust mode in accordance with selected APFP vertical mode.
-flying the airplane in accordance with FMS commands in a vertical(PROFILE) and/or horizontal(NAV) mode.
Does that help?
A 310-200/300 and A 300-600(R) aircraft have nothing to do with FBW!!!
Nevertheless there are two identical Flight Control Computers(FCC1 and FCC2) Systems each of which allows to select the following APFD functions:
-stabilizing the airplane around its center of gravity while holding VS and heading(basic modes).
-flying the airplane on an acquired flight path(hold modes).
-aquisition of a new flight path(modes with arming,capture and hold/track/active phases).
-automatic landing with roll out.
-automatic selection of a related autothrust mode in accordance with selected APFP vertical mode.
-flying the airplane in accordance with FMS commands in a vertical(PROFILE) and/or horizontal(NAV) mode.
Does that help?
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Information overload
Captain104
That being the case, can you tell me who makes the flight control computers??
That being the case, can you tell me who makes the flight control computers??
There must be many non-pilots on Pprune who don't even know what a flight mgmt computer (FMC) is.
And they can't understand the difference between a FCC and a FMC?
Does Airbus use the acronym FCC for what Boeing and others manufacturers call FMC? If these terms are interchangeable in this context, then it could be confusing. Beginning with the B-757/767, the autopilot(s) have the autopilot/flight director systems (AFDS), as described by others here, and IRS for navigation, using VORs to cross-check.
Without fly-by-wire systems, pilots must use awareness and airmanship to avoid exceeding safety/system limitations, i.e. stalling or exceeding g-limits or maximum speeds. Many of us hand-flew the 757 up to FL 180 or even higher. We flew most visual and ILS (with my HSI in the VOR mode) approaches by hand, only very rarely letting the airplane land itself-contrary to many passengers' flawed assumptions (as with so many of their misconceptions).
And they can't understand the difference between a FCC and a FMC?
Does Airbus use the acronym FCC for what Boeing and others manufacturers call FMC? If these terms are interchangeable in this context, then it could be confusing. Beginning with the B-757/767, the autopilot(s) have the autopilot/flight director systems (AFDS), as described by others here, and IRS for navigation, using VORs to cross-check.
Without fly-by-wire systems, pilots must use awareness and airmanship to avoid exceeding safety/system limitations, i.e. stalling or exceeding g-limits or maximum speeds. Many of us hand-flew the 757 up to FL 180 or even higher. We flew most visual and ILS (with my HSI in the VOR mode) approaches by hand, only very rarely letting the airplane land itself-contrary to many passengers' flawed assumptions (as with so many of their misconceptions).
Last edited by Ignition Override; 24th Jan 2004 at 09:31.
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Over FIVE YEARS later.......and??
11 Dec 1998 ( over 5 years ago) A310-200 of Thai Airways International crashes on its third go-round on a non-precision approach in poor visibility from a steep very nose-high attitude killing 101 of the 146 pax and crew. The ILS was out of service at the time due to works in progress.
I had heard rumours that a high-ranking Thai politician had "invaded" the cockpit to insist that the pilot land and there was speculation that the known use of onboard mobile phones may have affected the aircraft's flight instrumentation. This latter idea may not be that far off base considering that two 747-400 incidents (SIA and QF) had inexplicable losses of PFD's across the cockpit in the last two years.
Anybody have any aeromed / physiological explanation for such a gross pitchup (stab? runaway trim?). Pilot incapacitation? Struggle in the cockpit?
But over five years later and Airbus/French BEA and the Thai authorities are no closer to delivering a Report? What did the CVR and DFDR disclose? What about the Abidjan A310 accident? What is the bottom line there? Aviation regulators seem to be able to mark time on investigations where the manufacturer doesn't want any notoriety or disclosure of proprietary safety matters.
Opinions......?
I stand corrected. The BEA Abidjan Report (in French only) is here - in a large download pdf file
I had heard rumours that a high-ranking Thai politician had "invaded" the cockpit to insist that the pilot land and there was speculation that the known use of onboard mobile phones may have affected the aircraft's flight instrumentation. This latter idea may not be that far off base considering that two 747-400 incidents (SIA and QF) had inexplicable losses of PFD's across the cockpit in the last two years.
Anybody have any aeromed / physiological explanation for such a gross pitchup (stab? runaway trim?). Pilot incapacitation? Struggle in the cockpit?
But over five years later and Airbus/French BEA and the Thai authorities are no closer to delivering a Report? What did the CVR and DFDR disclose? What about the Abidjan A310 accident? What is the bottom line there? Aviation regulators seem to be able to mark time on investigations where the manufacturer doesn't want any notoriety or disclosure of proprietary safety matters.
Opinions......?
I stand corrected. The BEA Abidjan Report (in French only) is here - in a large download pdf file
Last edited by UNCTUOUS; 24th Jan 2004 at 13:22.
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Hmmmm
Lu:
I don't know. wub could be right(Marconi/BAE).
Ignition Override:
My airline could just survive even taking into account limited knowledges and restricted capabilities of their Ckeck-and Training Captains. And yes, we heard about FMC and FCC once.
BTW: In this case Airbus calls the black box mentioned above FCC1 and FCC2. Look up AOM A306/A310 Chapter 3 "Automatic Flight." For you it might be confusing, but surprise surprise:
We also have a Flight Management System (FMS) to provide automation of flight management tasks on ground and inflight.
The FMS consists of two Flight Management Computers(FMC) and two Control Display Units(CDU). Airbus and Boing use nearly the same idioms and I had the pleasure to fly some of their very fine aircraft without getting confused.
Perrin:
Yes, slats and flaps are electrically signalled by two identical SFCC's(Slats Flaps Control Computers) The power unit motors for flaps are supplied by yellow and green hydraulic systems.
If you call that FBW, feel free. For me an aircraft is FBW type, if the primary flight controls in roll, pitch and yaw (ailrons, elevators, rudders) are controlled by computers and signalled electrically only.
UNCTUOUS:
It is a bit complicated. A Donald Duck explanation: it has to do with the PF who is pushing the yoke down while AP is trimming up more in AF mode(go around initiated by pulling TOGA levers), ending up in a high nose up condition and low airspeed. AP disengagement in due time would have prevented this. It happened to Interflug, Tarom and others who never reported after a lucky recovery. In some cases fatal. Try to find a link for you with a thorough finding. Sorry for Donald Duck.
Have a nice day
I don't know. wub could be right(Marconi/BAE).
Ignition Override:
My airline could just survive even taking into account limited knowledges and restricted capabilities of their Ckeck-and Training Captains. And yes, we heard about FMC and FCC once.
BTW: In this case Airbus calls the black box mentioned above FCC1 and FCC2. Look up AOM A306/A310 Chapter 3 "Automatic Flight." For you it might be confusing, but surprise surprise:
We also have a Flight Management System (FMS) to provide automation of flight management tasks on ground and inflight.
The FMS consists of two Flight Management Computers(FMC) and two Control Display Units(CDU). Airbus and Boing use nearly the same idioms and I had the pleasure to fly some of their very fine aircraft without getting confused.
Perrin:
Yes, slats and flaps are electrically signalled by two identical SFCC's(Slats Flaps Control Computers) The power unit motors for flaps are supplied by yellow and green hydraulic systems.
If you call that FBW, feel free. For me an aircraft is FBW type, if the primary flight controls in roll, pitch and yaw (ailrons, elevators, rudders) are controlled by computers and signalled electrically only.
UNCTUOUS:
It is a bit complicated. A Donald Duck explanation: it has to do with the PF who is pushing the yoke down while AP is trimming up more in AF mode(go around initiated by pulling TOGA levers), ending up in a high nose up condition and low airspeed. AP disengagement in due time would have prevented this. It happened to Interflug, Tarom and others who never reported after a lucky recovery. In some cases fatal. Try to find a link for you with a thorough finding. Sorry for Donald Duck.
Have a nice day
Last edited by Captain104; 24th Jan 2004 at 23:33.
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Surat Thani a Nagoya Replay?
Captain 104
Hadn't realised that it was a replay of Nagoya.There are plenty of analytical links to that (mostly courtesy of Peter Ladkin -see below). Any further evidence anywhere of what was concluded wrt Surat Thani?
link one
link two
link three
link four
link five
link six
link seven
link eight
link nine
Hadn't realised that it was a replay of Nagoya.There are plenty of analytical links to that (mostly courtesy of Peter Ladkin -see below). Any further evidence anywhere of what was concluded wrt Surat Thani?
link one
link two
link three
link four
link five
link six
link seven
link eight
link nine
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You got a real nice link collection there. Even from the UNI Bielefeld.( They have a wast collection of computer related in/accidents). Thank you very much. May I add a Donald Duck approach to data base?
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...ml#A300-Nagoya
To be honest: I don't have any specific reliable information about Thai, its just a strong guess. No further evidence.
Regards
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...ml#A300-Nagoya
To be honest: I don't have any specific reliable information about Thai, its just a strong guess. No further evidence.
Regards
Last edited by Captain104; 24th Jan 2004 at 21:43.
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Add the below facts to the above mix and you get a sinking feeling in your gut.
Design specifications initiated by Airbus required all subcontractors to complete a Failure Mode Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on every supplied component, sub system and system. The FMECA was to be constructed in such a way that the failure mode and it’s effect was to be shown down to the smallest piece part of an equipment.
Marconi who built the Flap Slat Computer (FSC) refused to comply stating that it was too time consuming and too costly. What they did was to add up the failure rates for each type of component in the FSC and then total up all of the different sums. This gave a predicted failure rate for the components but it did not account for the effects of those failures on the computer and its’ function in the Flap Slat System.
To top that off Marconi refused to supply Lucas (the constructor of the Flap drive system) with a full up FSC. What they did was to provide one control lane of the full up computer which allowed Lucas to operate their “iron bird” extending and retracting the Flaps but the single lane not having redundancy and the ability to isolate failures meant that the flaps were inadequately tested. However even without adequate testing, the Flap system was certified.
On the first revenue flight by Lufthansa to Cairo the flaps could not be retracted after landing. The aircraft had to return to Frankfurt in a non-revenue status with the flaps almost fully extended. The computer could not detect nor could it isolate the fault.
Although the German contractor that designed the Slat drive system had a full up computer their FSC was unable to detect a run-away when hydraulic pressure was applied to their “iron bird”.
I can only assume that this non-compliance by Marconi on the FSC was carried over to the Flight Control Computer.
Adding to the above the Flaps and Slats were not grounded to the wing structure.
All of the above was provided to the FAA, DGCA, CAA and the LBA and nothing was done to either chastise Marconi or recertify the Flap system.
Marconi who built the Flap Slat Computer (FSC) refused to comply stating that it was too time consuming and too costly. What they did was to add up the failure rates for each type of component in the FSC and then total up all of the different sums. This gave a predicted failure rate for the components but it did not account for the effects of those failures on the computer and its’ function in the Flap Slat System.
To top that off Marconi refused to supply Lucas (the constructor of the Flap drive system) with a full up FSC. What they did was to provide one control lane of the full up computer which allowed Lucas to operate their “iron bird” extending and retracting the Flaps but the single lane not having redundancy and the ability to isolate failures meant that the flaps were inadequately tested. However even without adequate testing, the Flap system was certified.
On the first revenue flight by Lufthansa to Cairo the flaps could not be retracted after landing. The aircraft had to return to Frankfurt in a non-revenue status with the flaps almost fully extended. The computer could not detect nor could it isolate the fault.
Although the German contractor that designed the Slat drive system had a full up computer their FSC was unable to detect a run-away when hydraulic pressure was applied to their “iron bird”.
I can only assume that this non-compliance by Marconi on the FSC was carried over to the Flight Control Computer.
Adding to the above the Flaps and Slats were not grounded to the wing structure.
All of the above was provided to the FAA, DGCA, CAA and the LBA and nothing was done to either chastise Marconi or recertify the Flap system.
Last edited by Lu Zuckerman; 25th Jan 2004 at 02:40.