Online Training voice: “Is it ok to take ‘trippy diet pills’ and watch tic tok videos while flying?”

YES.

OLTV: “You have not scored successfully. Try again.”

NO

OLTV: ”You have passed. Your certificate has been uploaded.”



Manager: “We have a safety program”.

I'm not sure if it was the one that rolled itself over between the hangars at Shawbury late 80s/early 90s?

Every Wessex pilot knew the risks of ground resonance in the old girl but more scary was doing full power pulls with the aircraft chained to the ground - you knew if any one of the chains let go, it was going to be brown underpants time.

Full power runs in a helicopter chained to the ground?
Not sure that's a statement about the helicopter, or the pilots...
:)

For reference purposes......

Not to excuse any behavioural issues that have already been highlighted, but a few additional things that came to mind:

(1) The B3 has a larger tail rotor than the B2 - this means even small pedal movements generate noticeably more powerful forces. Additionally, the starting position for the B3 is defined by Airbus as having the left tail rotor pedal 2cm forward; the B2 does not have this stipulation and the POH simply refers to 'neutral' (which I suspect most pilots would take to mean having the pedals level with one another). Interestingly, outwith the start list, the B3 POH also refers to the tail rotor pedal positions in varying different ways ("mid position", "re-centralize", "pedals centred") and all seem to be referring to a 'neutral' position.

(2) Pilot had limited experience on the type variant (6.5hr on AS350B3) - as the B3 is FADEC controlled, it equates to the 'throttle' (collective twist grip) effectively being a binary switch from ground idle to flight idle with a computer controlling the rate of acceleration between these two points. In contrast, the B2 has a manual 'throttle' (fuel flow lever) - although it is entirely possible to move this rapidly, it takes the conscious action of the pilot and a swift movement would feel unnatural / unusual (POH: "Gradually increase the fuel flow, maintaining a constant rate of rotor acceleration"). Although the acceleration of the B3 is not what could be considered as overly 'harsh', it could catch out a pilot who is lacking focus and / or is new to a FADEC system.

(3) The pilot had spotted an abnormal position of one of the skid gear springs on the pre-flight - the report doesn't seem to offer any additional information, but if the spring was not adequately making contact with the ground then it could reduce friction between the skids and the tarmac. Alternatively, if it was pushing the skid up at the rear, there could be a similar loss of friction. The single photo of the aircraft in the accident report doesn't offer any appreciable indication of which spring was at fault, but the circular score marks appear concentrated around the left-hand skid.

From experience, I've had the B3 rotate unintentionally during spool up from ground to flight idle due to one of the skids being on a loose rock / gravel surface - admittedly the rotation was of a limited degree but still occurred even though the pedal position was as per the POH and my feet were on the pedals.

It used to be SOP for new ac just off the production line.

Stories from a tent camp:
I was told years ago of a brass blade weight slug violently departing a Bell 47 Blade at full RPM ..outside a hangar near Toronto.
The blade weight penetrated the hangar, a couple of walls therein and came to rest in the wall of the startled maintenance dept secretary’s office mere feet from her head.
Meanwhile the newly overhauled G4-A thrashed itself to pieces out on the ramp. No one was hurt but there was considerable excitement for a while. Fortunately both pilot and engineer were strapped in and shaken but not stirred.

Another tail was of a 205 test that consisted of attaching a choker firmly secured to the ground to the cargo hook and pulling full power for some kind of check…topping perhaps.
Power was then to be reduced the ac landed, shutdown and adjustments made.
Well after 5 or 6 runups the last run is satisfactory and the pilot decides to, at full power to punch off the choker, The instantaneous rate of climb was spectacular the G forces startling.
When order was restored and the aircraft landed it was found that the airframe was severely bent. The pilot also had a sore neck because the forces had snapped his head and helmet violently forward
Don’t know if this is true but it was a good story.

The song was in SH songbook some years before that.

That's exactly what happened to a mate at Culdrose in the late 1960s. A chain let go and the Wessex ended up thrashing itself around on its side and the pilot was rendered unconscious with severe head injuries even though he was of course strapped in and wearing a helmet. He never flew again due to his injuries.

Apologies for continuing the thread drift (I am one of those who cannot understand the mentality of anyone who thinks it acceptable to take phones, videos or music into a live helicopter cockpit...); I think the SH songbook occurrence refers to the one which future Air Marshal TJ endured at Odiham. On extracting himself from the wreckage, he walked in the line office and entered a fault in the F700 along the lines of "when AFCS engaged on ground, aircraft rolls over onto its' back".

Sometimes there are legit maintenance requirements to apply collective or tail rotor pitch during a ground run. And sometimes no matter how much you prepare, sheet happens. Unfortunately, balancing an AS350 #1 TR driveshaft is not one of those times, and no matter how you look at it, there was just too much wrong up front to any make sense of this incident.

Logic and commonsense would dictate that greater care and safety rather than less should have been applied because:

1. A noted discrepancy with the skids

2. Performing a nonstandard procedure

3. Presumed lack of experience/training for procedure

4. Loose or removed covers and panels

5. Use of external electrical power

6. Use and connection of balancing equipment

7. Potential for improper, incorrect or faulty maintenance consequences

8. Personal outside the aircraft

9. No communication with personal outside the aircraft

Remember one of those trying to get one of the fuel computers to reproduce an intermittent fault. Scheduled for 2 hours, by an hour and a half I was losing the will to live, starting to need a wee and seriously considering sacking it off when it finally failed.

Got programmed for the same thing the next evening, I respectfully requested someone else might be considered for the task.