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-   -   Helicopter Accident Isle of Wight (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/667888-helicopter-accident-isle-wight.html)

nicolai 4th September 2025 16:59


Originally Posted by Pittsextra (Post 11945864)
As we may know the AAIB may comment upon the flight and its authority but I’ve never (not that I read endless reports but enough to take a view) seen the operation cited by the AAIB as causal.

The report on the accident to AW139 G-LBAL in Norfolk (likely pilot disorientation while taking off at night in fog from a small field in the middle of nowhere, killing two crew and two passengers) had quite a lot to say about the nature of the operation of a complex helicopter in such difficult IFR conditions and about the operator's failure to learn from a previous fatal accident. That's not quite saying "the operation caused it" but I read the report as the investigators thinking the way the aircraft was operated was strongly related to the crash: if they hadn't been flying like that, regularly and deliberately, they'd not have had these accidents.

212man 4th September 2025 17:51


Originally Posted by nicolai (Post 11948835)
The report on the accident to AW139 G-LBAL in Norfolk (likely pilot disorientation while taking off at night in fog from a small field in the middle of nowhere, killing two crew and two passengers) had quite a lot to say about the nature of the operation of a complex helicopter in such difficult IFR conditions and about the operator's failure to learn from a previous fatal accident. That's not quite saying "the operation caused it" but I read the report as the investigators thinking the way the aircraft was operated was strongly related to the crash: if they hadn't been flying like that, regularly and deliberately, they'd not have had these accidents.

Yes, a bit of reading between the lines, when required, identifies the investigators’ real feelings.

Pittsextra 5th September 2025 08:20


Originally Posted by nicolai (Post 11948835)
The report on the accident to AW139 G-LBAL in Norfolk (likely pilot disorientation while taking off at night in fog from a small field in the middle of nowhere, killing two crew and two passengers) had quite a lot to say about the nature of the operation of a complex helicopter in such difficult IFR conditions and about the operator's failure to learn from a previous fatal accident. That's not quite saying "the operation caused it" but I read the report as the investigators thinking the way the aircraft was operated was strongly related to the crash: if they hadn't been flying like that, regularly and deliberately, they'd not have had these accidents.

As you highlight the operation of the helicopter is mentioned, indeed there is an entire section titled: Previous accident, Safety Recommendations, regulation, and oversight in the G-LBAL report.

The failure lies in regulation; In that investigators can keep writing detailed reports and making recommendations but if authority fails to act they find they just write a similar report sometime later. As the AAIB write:-


These matters were addressed by the AAIU’s recommendation (SR7 of 1998) that:

● The UK CAA should consider the establishment of a special category for the operation of corporate aviation.’

Although the UK CAA accepted this recommendation, no special category was established. CAP686 was issued after the G-HAUG accident, but provided guidance rather than regulation. Private operations of complex aircraft continue as before.

The same intent was also expressed in another recommendation (SR8 of 1998), which took account of the transition to regulation by the JAA: ‘The JAA Joint Working Group for JAR OPS 2, which reviews operation standards for aircraft operation in the JAA States, including the UK and Ireland, should consider the establishment of a special category for the operation of corporate aviation, to encompass the operation of aircraft such as G-HAUG EW/C2014/03/02

The JAA (whose functions have largely been subsumed by the EASA) did not respond to this recommendation and no special category was established.
So the point is there is previous as far as G-LBAL was concerned - I don't know of an equivalent for this R44 crash and therefore find the sudden realisation of its operation puzzling; although since much of the reaction it is suggested that the company has an AOC and is an ATO so likely it ain't the paperwork?

ShyTorque 5th September 2025 08:49


The failure lies in regulation; In that investigators can keep writing detailed reports and making recommendations but if authority fails to act they find they just write a similar report sometime later. As the AAIB write:-
Regulation is one thing - but when the man who pays your salary and has the authority to fire you there and then is sitting right behind you it can be more than a little difficult to say no to him.

​​​​​​​Thread drift, but it’s always worth a reminder.

Pittsextra 5th September 2025 11:22

But less difficult if regulation makes his insistance illegal. Being illegal not only makes them think of their own liability but its difficult to fire someone insistant upon you breaking the law. One of the big issues with those not really familiar with aircraft is their mentality defaults to a machine that they are - the car. They then extrapolate that thinking to the sophistication of the machine, the fact pilots are paid and that what is being asked is not "illegal". If you have to explain at the point its being asked its the relationship is broken.

76fan 5th September 2025 11:28

Re the above accident reports, this makes me so angry ...

"The AAIB has referred previously to the pressures – real or perceived – on pilots of aircraft operated in the corporate environment. These pressures remain when an aircraft is operated privately, but the private operation is also less comprehensively regulated."

I used to think that the CAA did not know what went on in the helicopter "corporate environment", then thirty-five years ago I realised that actually they didn't want to know or if they did then they didn't care. Little seems to have changed in all those years.

FloaterNorthWest 5th September 2025 19:30


Originally Posted by 76fan (Post 11949248)
Re the above accident reports, this makes me so angry ...

"The AAIB has referred previously to the pressures – real or perceived – on pilots of aircraft operated in the corporate environment. These pressures remain when an aircraft is operated privately, but the private operation is also less comprehensively regulated."

I used to think that the CAA did not know what went on in the helicopter "corporate environment", then thirty-five years ago I realised that actually they didn't want to know or if they did then they didn't care. Little seems to have changed in all those years.

Things are starting to change. Now that the CAA is getting back to the required numbers there is now capacity to audit Part-NCC operators. I know of two corporate operators who have been audited.



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