Read David Hill's excellent books about the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash to see how easy it is for the senior ranks to avoid censure for making face-saving airworthiness decisions.

No General, Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel or Major will be held to account. What disgusting culture inside AAAvn. Led and continue to be lead by the dullest of wet paper spoons.

To think that they have been able to unnecessarily bury billions of tax payer dollars, kill 4 people, leave a huge capability gap, waste more millions on leased civil aircraft, then spend billions more on newer aircraft and not be held to account - is sadly, expected, but an absolute disgraceful travesty.

Wrong engine shut down. More here. https://asiapacificdefencereporter.c...poor-training/

“Investigations into flying accidents usually reveal a complex set of circumstances, and this is no exception. The root cause of the accident was the rupture of a high-pressure turbine blade in the left-hand side Number 1 engine, which caused a catastrophic but contained failure. This particular problem has never occurred previously and in fact the engines – and the entire family of NH90 helicopters, of which Taipans are a part – are exceptionally safe.

“However, in the aftermath of the incident, Army implied that everything was due to this single technical issue. Consequently, this has been fed to the media – and through them a false narrative has been conveyed to the Australian public that Taipans are unsafe and had to go. The truth is far more complicated than that – and has profound implications for the ongoing inquiry in the fatal Lindeman Island crash, which claimed the lives of four service personnel.

In an emergency, Taipans are designed to fly on a single engine – the Safran RTM-322 – which is one of the most safe and reliable in its class. However, as bad luck would have it the helicopter was at very low altitude and was heavily loaded at the time with Special Forces divers. Because it takes a fraction of a second for the computerised engine control system to respond to a failure, the helicopter dropped while moving slightly forward and briefly touched the sea surface before rising to a low hover.

So far, so good – the helicopter responded as it should – but an already scary situation was made worse because four Special Forces divers were hanging onto the outside of Bushman 82 as part of the exercise. From here on, the situation gets even messier, with the report stating that aircrew in the back of the helicopter were able to release the two SF divers on the left-hand side – who dropped safely into Jervis Bay – but the two on the right-hand side were dragged unexpectedly through the water, being stripped of their equipment in the process.

The crucial part of the report then explains:

“Bushman 82’s aircrew did not recognise the aircraft briefly impacted with water while executing initial bold-face emergency procedures. With the Automatic Flight Control System ‘Hover Mode’ still engaged and the right-hand engine at maximum power, the aircraft then rose into a low hover of approximately 23 feet albeit with rotor speed decaying.

“The Non-Flying Pilot in the left-hand cockpit seat, believing the aircraft had settled on the water, removed their helmet in preparation for commencing emergency egress procedures. The Flying Pilot in the right-hand cockpit seat, now aware the aircraft was in fact in a low hover, shut down the right-hand engine at a height of approximately 19 feet. This resulted in a high rate of descent, an impact force of 80, extensive structural damage to the airframe and automatic activation of the EFS (Emergency Floatation System.”

An earlier part of the report states and is worth repeating:

“As a result of the Flying Pilot’s actions to shut down the Number 2 (right-hand) engine at a height of approximately 20 feet, the aircraft descended rapidly and impacted the water a second time at a force of 8G. The crew egressed successfully with minor injuries and were retrieved by prepositioned emergency rescue vessels.”

This has been the consistent reporting of APDR – the helicopter performed as designed, but the situation could have involved serious loss of life because of human operator error. Hitting the water at 8Gs is no joke and one shudders to think what would have happened to all on board if they had been on another type of aircraft.

The report also says that the Army had decided for reasons of cost not to implement a fix for the RTM-322 engine turbine blades that had been recommended years before by the manufacturer.

In dry language, the report details the confusion in the cockpit about the altitude of the Taipan – and because of this misperception first one pilot and then the second, removed all connections to their Top Owl day/night helmet so they could get out as quickly as possible. This was motivated by an unjustified fear that the helicopter – which is fitted with safety flotation devices – would quickly roll over and sink.

This misperception might have been caused because that is what would have happened if a helicopter without floatation devices – such as a Black Hawk or a Sea Hawk – had been forced to ditch in similar circumstances.”