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Firefighting Helicopter Down west of Edmonton
Several new sources are report the crash of a helicopter fighting the wildfires west of Edmonton near Evansburg. No reports on the crew at this time.
Forestry helicopter fighting wildfire crashes near Evansburg | Edmonton Journal |
Global News is now reporting that the lone pilot was killed in the crash. TSB on it's way to conduct an investigation.
Pilot killed in helicopter crash while fighting wildfire near Evansburg, Alta.: RCMP | Globalnews.ca |
Yellowhead 212 apparently, pilot only on board
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Sad News. Fair Skies and following winds. RIP
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Rumor: blade or blade section departed on final and was found several hundred feet away
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The US Forest Service grounded all of their Bell 205/212 fleet this evening. Supposedly because of something related to information from this crash.
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Fallen Pilot is Heath Coleman age 49. Details available here https://edmonton.ctvnews.ca/heavy-bu...ilot-1.5496351
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Originally Posted by LTP90
(Post 11073331)
The US Forest Service grounded all of their Bell 205/212 fleet this evening. Supposedly because of something related to information from this crash.
From FS Airworthiness: Bell Helicopters has discovered a serious issue with the B212 and B205 TT strap pins, inboard. Four to five days ago, a B212 operating in Canada, had a TT strap pin catastrophic failure that resulted in the blade separating in flight. That pin had only 27hrs on it. Another vendor inspected their pins because of the incident and found them deformed after only 29hrs time in service. Apparently, the part number of these pins have either FWFS or FNFS incorporated. A representative from Bell Helicopters was contacted and said that there should be a message coming out from the FAA and/or Bell very soon regarding the pin failure. According to Bell it is very likely that we will see an Emergency AD issued by the FAA tomorrow. Because of this, it is my opinion that we should stand down our Bell medium fleet until we hear from the manufacture or the FAA regarding the failure of these pins. This is emerging information and new info will be shared as it becomes available. |
If I were either a Pilot or Operator of those types of Aircraft....I would not turn a rotor blade except by hand until I knew for sure whether my aircraft had one of the affected parts or not with absolute certainty.
Never mind waiting for the Emergency AD for even a minute. Slinging a Blade is almost invariably a once in a lifetime event for the occupants. |
Terrible.
As they say, "There ain't no cure for that". |
4 Attachment(s)
Here are the actual bulletins hot off the press in brief---see the full attachments for the full ASB:
Bell has determined that some main rotor hub strap pins P/N 204-012-104-005 may have not been manufactured in accordance with the engineering design requirements and may shear as a result of the non-conformance. Although the investigation remains in progress, this ASB mandates that the suspected strap pins with serial number prefix “FNFS” be immediately removed from service. Applicability of this bulletin to any spare part shall be determined prior to its installation on an affected helicopter. APPROVAL: The engineering design aspects of this bulletin are FAA approved for FAA certified helicopters as listed in the applicable Type Certificate Data Sheet. For non FAA certified helicopters, the engineering design aspects of this bulletin are Bell Engineering approved. |
Originally Posted by SASless
(Post 11073717)
If I were either a Pilot or Operator of those types of Aircraft....I would not turn a rotor blade except by hand until I knew for sure whether my aircraft had one of the affected parts or not with absolute certainty.
Never mind waiting for the Emergency AD for even a minute. Slinging a Blade is almost invariably a once in a lifetime event for the occupants. https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur...wimn/AD_r.aspx |
TC Emergency AD
1 Attachment(s)
Issues today...
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A sad, most unfortunate accident. We like to think that vendors follow specs. meticulously and that QA catches errors but we know this is not always true. Without jumping to more conclusions it is worth noting that Bell put out their ASBs, Transport Canada got an emergency AD published and the USFS did what it could but nothing from the FAA to alert operators and ground the machines until inventories are checked and records searched to see if more of this batch of pins are in service. Well, with the 4th of July and all, I guess we shouldn't expect anyone at the desk until this morning.
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Quick question from a fixed wing type. Looking at Vertical Magazine it had a picture of what I'm guessing was one of the rotors of this aircraft. Is the pin that they are reference in the AD the large 2in pin in the middle of the blue section?
https://verticalmag.com/news/defecti...icopter-crash/ https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....6952ad9616.jpg |
Originally Posted by Bksmithca
(Post 11074495)
Quick question from a fixed wing type. Looking at Vertical Magazine it had a picture of what I'm guessing was one of the rotors of this aircraft. Is the pin that they are reference in the AD the large 2in pin in the middle of the blue section?
https://verticalmag.com/news/defecti...icopter-crash/ https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....6952ad9616.jpg |
Originally Posted by Bksmithca
(Post 11074495)
..Is the pin that they are reference in the AD the large 2in pin in the middle of the blue section?
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....71e4ec4fcd.png |
This Utube animation may be of interest to some animated assembly of head.
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Thank you to those who provided an explanation. The explanations cleared up everything and I have no desire to fly in a helicopter I'll stick to my fixed wings
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A Bell 212 just went down this afternoon in a lake in California fighting the Lava fire, pilot got out ok,
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Originally Posted by Bksmithca
(Post 11075075)
..The explanations cleared up everything and I have no desire to fly in a helicopter I'll stick to my fixed wings
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Originally Posted by roscoe1
(Post 11074363)
...nothing from the FAA to alert operators and ground the machines until inventories are checked and records searched to see if more of this batch of pins are in service....
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Heath Coleman was widely regarded amongst those who new him as an excellent person, pilot, and colleague. I have many happy memories of working with and for him and his training was superb. May he Rest In Peace, he will be well remembered by many.
FP |
Originally Posted by Fun_police
(Post 11075319)
Heath Coleman was widely regarded amongst those who new him as an excellent person, pilot, and colleague. I have many happy memories of working with and for him and his training was superb. May he Rest In Peace, he will be well remembered by many.
FP |
https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2021/A21W0045/A21W0045.html Air transportation safety investigation A21W0045 TSB has completed this investigation. The report was published on 7 September 2022. https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repor.../a21w0045.html Final Report Yellowhead Helicopters Ltd. Bell Textron Inc. 212 (helicopter), C-GYHQ Evansburg, Alberta, 4 NM WNW 28 June 2021 Exerpts: Metallurgical analysis of the 4 pins (part number 204-012-104-005) revealed that the failed pin (serial number FNFS90, bottom of Figure 7) was manufactured from 316 stainless steel, whereas the other 3 pins (serial numbers FNFS49, FNFS54, and FNFS75) were manufactured from H11 tool steel. The TSB Rockwell hardness test of the failed pin averaged 7.6 on the C scale The Bell engineering drawing used to manufacture the part number 204-012-104-003 pin specified a hardness of 50.0 to 53.5 on the Rockwell C scale as a critical characteristic of that pin. This characteristic is obtained through the double-tempering process on H11 tool steel. The investigation determined that, when the occurrence pins were manufactured in the fall of 2018, FMC stored the raw material in its stores area by material diameter, not by type or composition. This meant, for example, that all rods that were 1 inch in diameter were stored together, regardless of the material they were made of (aluminum, carbon steel, stainless steel, brass, etc.). As a result, the onus was on the individual selecting the material for the job at hand to ensure that it was of the correct composition and specification. On 02 October 2018, the stores department at FMC released the 8 rods of H11 tool steel to the production floor to begin the manufacturing process. The investigation determined that the 8 rods of H11 tool steel would have yielded only approximately 320 pins. From 12 to 14 November 2018, the rods of raw material, which varied in length from 132 to 156 inches, were cut up into 36-inch lengths and then further cut into 3.3-inch lengths. The resulting 343 pieces ... |
Quote: “The investigation determined that, when the occurrence pins were manufactured in the fall of 2018, FMC stored the raw material in its stores area by material diameter, not by type or composition. This meant, for example, that all rods that were 1 inch in diameter were stored together, regardless of the material they were made of (aluminum, carbon steel, stainless steel, brass, etc.). As a result, the onus was on the individual selecting the material for the job at hand to ensure that it was of the correct composition and specification.”
Words fail me! |
Someone is going to get sued for a lot of money for that cockup.
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Albatross.....I shall offer some words about that......"Now what could possibly go wrong with a system like that?".
Who could possibly thought there was no risk of harm with such a concept? How many QA inspections and reviews took place with that not be discovered and fixed that would have prevented that death of a good and decent innocent Man? I would love to be sitting on the Jury for that Civil Suit....as there would be some bankruptcies as a result. Were I Criminal Prosecutor I might be looking into a case that would result in criminal charges. This kind of thing is not just another "Golly Gee Whiz...we sure messed up on that one!" event and that be it over and done with. |
The initial error was shocking enough. But the the defective pins were identified at the heat treater and came back in a separate box with a red tag, individually marked with yellow lines, and bearing distinctly different oxide colors. They were somehow mixed back in, and later recorded as passing(!) hardness tests. (I'd also be surprised if the huge difference in hardness wasn't obvious when the parts were stamped with serial numbers, though the report doesn't say exactly how that was done.) Maybe they got confused over whether they were manufacturing helicopter parts or paperweights?
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I'd also be surprised if the huge difference in hardness wasn't obvious when the parts were stamped with serial numbers |
Originally Posted by megan
(Post 11293402)
Don't know the system they used, but these are often etched by lasar beam in industry, if such was the case would hardness be evident?
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Links from the public domain w/ excerpts:
.
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"the debtors’ overall financial health has suffered as a result of complications with debtor Fore Machine that led to the loss of its primary customer, liquidity constraints and the ultimate decision by the debtors board to cease Machine’s operations in November 2021."
"“Despite Machine’s corrective actions,” in November Bell canceled all outstanding purchase orders with Machine" Complications. |
Yes.
Following that passage, appearing under Background . "Machine’s primary customer, Bell Helicopter, ended its relationship with the debtors in November 2021, threatening Machine’s near-term going concern capacity and leading to the debtors’ board’s ultimate decision to cease all operations to preserve cash. The board and its advisors concluded that, given the proprietary nature of the Machine’s equipment, assemblies and processes, a sale to Bell would maximize the value of Machine’s assets for its stakeholders. With the exception of a relatively small amount of inventory and work-in -progress inventory, Machine’s offer to sell substantially all of its assets was rejected by Bell." .I do not know the circumstances of this case, but one scenario that springs to mind is of a long established, family-owned company that has been passed down to a second generation which then, out of necessity or ambition, invites outside money and influence into the board room to secure survival or spur growth - with predictable consequences. And in this instance, what I am sure were unintended outcomes. The restructuring document features comments about demand-vs-capacity issues in 2020. The crash investigation report features remarks about issues in 2017. Reviewers on Indeed.com claiming to be employees post remarks mentioning demand-vs-cap issues going back some time from 2021. . |
What boggles my mind is that the company must have been extremely aware of the stringent requirements for the manufacture of these critical parts. After all, even from reading the report we can tell that a significant emphasis was placed on quality control and certification - on paper. But with all these hoops they had to jump through, in the end they still didn't seem to take quality control seriously. In any decent aviation company I've ever worked at, obvious problems, like storing different materials together that are easily confused, would've been noted by someone and reported in a safety management system to be investigated and rectified.
It sounds like this company and its employees didn't understand why all the certification was being required to begin with, as if they were making door latches for garbage cans or something. |
EddyCurr, in passing on link to the TSB report, included a few excerpts. But I think these are also noteworthy:but earlier in the report: |
What boggles my mind is that the company must have been extremely aware of the stringent requirements for the manufacture of these critical parts A partial seizure of the right engine-driven fuel pump’s (EDFP) spindle shaft and sleeve bearing, resulted in high torsional loads. As a result of those high loads, the drive coupling to the EDFP sheared. Consequently, the EDFP was unable to provide sufficient fuel flow to sustain engine operation at take-off power. Metallurgical examination of the sleeve bearing and spindle shaft from the EDFP revealed localised galling damage - an abnormal wear mechanism that can lead to high friction and seizure. The sleeve bearing had been remanufactured under the specifications of an engineering order during the last component overhaul. Although the manufacture of the replacement component correctly complied with the requirements of the engineering order, the specified material did not possess the galling resistance properties required for use with a high-speed fuel pump. |
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Poor compensation for a Life and all of the harm it caused to the family in its loss of a family member.
Sometimes I do like Lawyers when I see a fair and legitimate demand for compensation is obtained. I wonder if Punitive Damages were bargained away during the settlement process. |
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