Megan, that sounds REALLY scary and a mite unsurvivable outside the sim. Look at some videos of tail fails in a hover and see how fast those things spin - and very rapidly some nose down pitch comes in, or the aircraft rolls, and the aircraft is no longer level, it is rotating tail low/tail high/tail low and very disorientating. Tail then hits the ground. In the Huey in the 70s, we used to practice slamming the right pedal forward to demo how fast it could spin - the feeling of being thrown forward against the seat belt is strange and upsetting.

In the sim, it would be interesting to see the coupling that happens after a high-powered spinning climb to 1000' and then trying to poke the nose over. Splat follows soon after.

In the 76B sim at WPB, they just taught me to grab the throttles back and make some sort of controlled LEVEL crash.

I can only keep coming back to my own experience: no way on God's earth that I would contemplate retarding overhead speed selects, nor climbing out. If you don't get that collective down in a heartbeat then you're along for the ride.

Previously unpublished images the morning after the night before:

AC, was in the 76A at WPB back in the 80's. Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved, as I said the sim would do it, but as I further said, placed absolutely no faith in the procedure. As John says,collective down, no time for procrastination.

One aspect that would be missing would be the lateral forces experienced in the cockpit from the rotation, that could make control more difficult.

I wouldn't place a lot of faith in realism in the S76 sim for these kinds of failures. For a start, it was demonstrated after the 2009 GoM S76 fatal accident that the rotor decay modelling in the simulator was miles out - I think about 7 seconds to unrecoverable Nr if the collective wasn't lowered following dual power loss, vs about 2-3 in reality.

I also used to fly in the FSI B212 sim in DFW, and was on the receiving end of all kinds of strange instructor-derived advice on handling TR failures - based on how the sim was replicating it. To illustrate how fictitious it was, in some extra time at the end of a session, where we were 'playing' on an aircraft carrier model at night, I asked for a TR drive failure soon after transitioning from the deck. I was able to catch it using sideslip, find an airspeed/power combination that allowed me to carry out a wide climbing circuit and then autorotated back down to the deck from around 1,000 ft. Lots of whooping from the back, and congratulations, but all I could think was "are you serious? Do you really think that's how the aircraft would behave in real life?"

I was also given that exercise in the D sim. From personal experience of a low level drive failure (Pulling power in the flare to land in a different type) I didn't believe the spin rate. The C++ sim was I believe more realistic in terms of spin rate.

However I got away from a control failure in another different type (355) after a teleflex failure at a similar point. The TR was providing some thrust, the spin was extremely uncomfortable, and used an aggressive nose over at somewhere near 500', I'm not sure, just took what I could see out of the window. The reason for doing it was I was into a crowded, congested area, with clear space in very short supply. The flight to safety was flown at a bank angle higher than I expected, but the run on landing was exactly as the trainers and manuals described.

Someone mentioned earlier the RFM point about controlling pitch and roll on the cyclic as you attempt to put the aircraft down after a drive failure, If the failure occurs in the cruise and you get into auto safely then from sim experience I can believe that, BUT, in the low level drive failure the spin was so violent there was no chance, the yaw/roll couple was bad and I believe that being chucked about in the cockpit I was into PIO due to the lateral G forces, but I'm not sure. Certainly it took a lot of T Cut before the aircraft was flyable again.

After those two experiences I've often considered the positioning of FCL's and engine control swithches, a pair of guarded kill switches on the P1 collective seem to be probably the best option, but in a drive failure in the S76 sim reaching up and cocking the FCL's certainly stops the spin, the aircraft then flopping onto the ground before your hand is back to the collective, the 332 and S61 did something similar, but those sims were early and there were a lot of differences between them and the aircraft.

SND

No. S76 TR drive failure in hover. Just promptly lower collective, keep it level, no need for any finesse at the bottom and accept the abrupt arrival. If you can get the engine levers OFF before touchdown even better, then you can apply an ounce of finesse with the collective at the bottom. With practice you can catch it before it's done a 180. This works in the sim. In real life you might roll off a MLG tyre. The FSI teaching as mentioned would not yield a successful outcome in a CAE3000 Level D FFS with current modelling (which is much better than the modelling of 20+ years ago).

Hi John, this techniques is described in out flight manual and the FSTD with OEM Data pack is sympathetic to such handling. I am not suggesting this could work from anything but an IGE hover. The technique reduces the chances of a rollover but needs practice and patience to overcome the Startle reaction. It works when done correctly.

Where my interest lies, is I have not given much consideration to an abrupt loss of anti-torque during the later stages of a VTOL departure. I am keen to learn from others who may have some ideas on the most favourable technique. My feeling is that a rapid throttle chop and attempted AUTO from 120-200 feet and zero IAS may not be the obvious answer.

That's not true in an IGE hover! Dumping the collective will likely result in a roll-over even if the rotation is recognised immediately. And rollovers kill lots of people. Lower the lever slowly, maintain level attitude and cushion the impact.
"Throttles in hand helicopters". The theory of chopping the throttle and pulling the lever to cushion the landing is a really good idea...…..however, with the throttle frictions on and the necessary hand actions required, it adds an unnecessary degree of complexity to a simple procedure. Just don't dump the collective!

For bad TR events OGE like this accident, my ideas are somewhat limited as to the best action to take.

The problem with trying to maintain a level attitude in a rapidly rotating helicopter for more than a very brief period is (as SND wrote from personal experience) that cyclic inputs may not have the expected effect, even if the pilot was able to overcome the visual confusion caused by the rotation. Think about the trimmed position of the cyclic. The normal reference point for the fixed main rotor swashplate constantly changes once rotation begins. After 90 degrees of fuselage rotation, what was a pitch is now a roll, and vice versa. After 180 degrees of rotation, what was a pitch up is now a pitch down.

Shy, I am not suggesting there is anything like an absolute answer. However, I am convinced that exposure to TR Drive failures in the hover, in the FSTD, to overcome the initial "Startle Effect" will significantly improve the chances of success in the real helicopter. Of course all the hooded horsemen of the FSTD apocalypse rise up when we defeat the flight loop in the FSTD. Modelling is problematic as OEM data for these events are generally not available for obvious reasons. However, even if the FSTD modelling is dodgy, teaching a reaction to the event is still important.

In my experience of even the most reluctant learning students in the FSTD, plenty of practice and exposure will produce a favourable reaction from the pilot before the helicopter nose has passed through 90 degrees. And I mean not only during the recurrent training but on a repeat visit 6 months later with little prompting.

Whatever the outcome here, it provides another "hobby Horse" for me try ride in that the current EASA regulations allow us to spread the Emergency Procedures syllabus over a 3 year period. Many operators therefore, only schedule retrain and check TR malfunctions every 36 months. Clearly this sucks a bit. I would like to see regulations make a more discerning requirement to the effect that some emergency procedures should be practised and checked at every OPC. Lord knows we flog the !!!!! out of the CAT A OEIs at every OPC, which lets be honest, are probably the easiest exercises we do.

Many TREs I know, despite the syllabus they are given, are doing this already and rightly so.

Shy wrote: "The problem with trying to maintain a level attitude in a rapidly rotating helicopter for more than a very brief period is (as SND wrote from personal experience) that cyclic inputs may not have the expected effect, even if the pilot was able to overcome the visual confusion caused by the rotation. "

In my first hand experience of two tail rotor events; one was a fenestron "stall" incident on a Gazelle where we probably span in excess of 15 revolutions before I got the yaw stopped. The other was a slipping tail rotor drive belt on an Exec where the onset of yaw was quite gentle but the rate of yaw built up until the world was a blur.

Is was lucky on both occasion because the wind was calm and had no difficulty keeping either aircraft level. However, had there been much of a breeze, the outcomes of both events would almost certainly have been very different.

JJ

Let's talk about what is really Dumb.

How many times did you actually use a Pipe Wrench to undo the set throttles?

How many times did you have to pull the Tee Handles or use the fuel switches to shut down the aircraft with those Throttles held full open by the Pipe Wrench tight Throttles?


How small must one's hands be in order not to get hold of both Throttles?

How many hovering autorotations have you actually done without rolling both Throttles off simultaneously?

How do you execute a Hovering Autorotation in a Bell 212/412?

As to the S-76....explain how you can be quicker in moving the Engine Levers over your head and getting back to the Collective Lever than simply rolling the Collective Throttles on the 212/412 to the Ground Idle position with your hand on the Collective mounted throttles to begin with?

Right now....my opinion is you are talking Dumb...... I am willing to listen to your responses and change my mind.

Megan, really? pulling straight up with no anti TQ control? Have you ever stopped to think about that?
Next argument, Chopjock, your statements demonstrates that you have absolutely no idea of what you are talking about when it comes to CatA.
Height Velocity diagram is for basic certification requirements.

Folks....please do not try this at Home!

Care to tell us where you were taught that?

Had they ever tried to replicate that in an actual aircraft?

My experience in teaching at two different Sim Training facilities located at different manufacturers delivery locations would challenge both the technique being taught and the basis upon which it would even be discussed as the training is supposed to be based upon the RFM, the applicable Operators SOP's etc, and National Aviation Regulations (FAA, CAA, EASA, etc).

Show me anywhere that suggested technique fits under any of the above?

DB,
I didn't mean to imply anything else - I don't think there is an absolute answer to this type of failure because of differences in aircraft design and how, when and where the failure occurs.

In the case of an IGE hover, in a helicopter where there is no immediate way of "rolling off" the "throttles", I think I'd lower the lever asap, as you say, and accept the yaw rate at touchdown. If I had a second crew member who could either retard the ECLs or switch the engines from flight to "Off" it would be a bonus, but he'd have to be very quick!

Edit: Just checked my S-76 RFM (more than a bit dusty now - I've not flown the type for well over ten years). The advice therein is to lower the collective then select both engine levers to OFF at about ten feet and use the collective to cushion the touchdown. You need two left arms to do that, or be lightning fast if you're at a ten foot hover!

Obviously, as an ex-sim instructor I totally agree with the rest of your post. Any sim training is of benefit but it was sadly neglected in the past by the UK military and elsewhere.
As I've posted on the forum before, I know of at least one RAF helicopter crew who said that without the sim training they had received, they probably wouldn't have survived 'their' tail rotor malfunction (albeit in this instance a loss of tail rotor control, rather than a total loss of drive). They ended up in the North Sea and the aircraft was recovered almost intact despite it not having floats fitted - although I'm led to understand that it suffered fire damage after recovery and never re-entered service!.

The beauty of teaching in the sim is that one meets all walks of life. [And the experiences they recall].
I have briefed (or should I say been briefed by) several crews over my years who have experienced TRF in the hover and/or in the cruise.
The hover left the 2 crews I dealt with - with a very easy dilemma: dump the lever and accept ones fate and trash the cab (which in their cases was that the crews survived) or pull for height - prolong the agony and die a violent death.
The cruise is more easily survivable because of the torque setting at which it happens - giving time to discuss matters.
ANY TRF at a high torque setting will lead to rotational disorientation either immediately or when the power is reduced. This causes complete loss of SA leading to loss of control of the aircraft invariably. Not to mention gravitational effects preventing the pilot [not handling] from reaching the throttles in one case!

Delaying landing the aircraft without removing engine power during a tail rotor failure at a hover is exactly the wrong thing to do....in my sometimes less than humble opinion.

I fall back on adage of "Ass, Tin, Ticket!".

The helicopter is a reusable shipping container designed to protect its contents....and can be used for that purpose when needed.

The Boss Fellah can buy another Helicopter.

The Authority can only take your License.

Do what serves your best interest in minimizing injury or death for you, your crew, and your passengers and don't worry about the rest.


An example....had the crew landed immediately upon realizing they had lost tail rotor control and got the Throttles moved back to ground idle or shutoff....they might have avoided going swimming.


If you get hit with a commercial....my apologies but this is the run-up to our Midterm Elections!

Post #66 SAS. To repeat I said, "was in the 76A at WPB back in the 80's. Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved, as I said the sim would do it, but as I further said, placed absolutely no faith in the procedure. As John says,collective down, no time for procrastination"tottigol, If you read my post #66, repeated in the para above, you will see that, yes I gave it very serious thought, and came to a conclusion. I've highlighted the relevant part so that it doesn't escape your notice.

As I said SAS, "Can only assume it was something dreamt up by the instructor involved". Instructor was not you BTW, though can't recall who it was, had a number over the years. :ok:

Another thing to consider is your subsequent NR relative to the cab versus terra firma.

Having a TR lets you "wind your way into the sky" - lack of a TR unwinds it relative to terra firma but not the cab.

A rotation of 1.5 turns per second = 90 RPM which in the recent AW169 incident would equal 26-27% of your NR!

Your face mashed into the panel or the windscreen may be the least of your problems by then!

It is most important to not let the rotation develop. This enhances self-preservation!

I have experienced TR drive failure simulation (level D manufacturer owned with manufacturers data but appreciating the caveats.)

OGE Hover 2000'.

Aircraft with collective mounted throttles and a very large fin (EC135) - no briefing or forewarning and average ability on my part - recovered it but saw ~ 200' on the RAD ALT.

Most of todays machinery with skinny little pylons to enhance TR performance - good luck getting it straightened out with forward speed. You will need a lot of room on your side.

IGE - chop the throttles (if you can) and hold it off as long as possible. If you cant chop the throttles just plant it. To quote Sasless - ATT!

SASless - I take issue with your comments associated with the Canadian frigate crash.
Taking into account the "WTF" factor for pilots, this could add up to 3 seconds ish of delay. For a TR failure this could equate to 2 x complete revolutions of the aiframe before the crew accepted the cause.
1. The G forces are enormous - the NH pilot may not be able to get to the throttles.
2. Taking this particular incident into account. Even assuming the the throttles were chopped almost immediately - this would result in the CH124 sinking and colliding head first with the back of the ships superstructure, probably causing even more of a mess and definitely missing the deck!

Sometimes (naturally or otherwise) it works out best if the pilot(s) don't have time to react properly....

TC,

This is what I posted:

When you are that close to landing on a Deck (elevated helipad, roof top helipad....or anywhere for that matter) and you are unable to stop a yaw to the right (American design)....how long does it take to know you have a problem....45 degrees of yaw....90 degrees....180 degrees....360 degrees 720 degrees?

Yes there is a delay before you realize you have a problem.....yes....there is a delay while you process that recently learned knowledge.....then you have to formulate your plan....execute your plan....and then see if your plan is working.

My point in presenting the video was to demonstrate how quickly the situation gets out of hand.....if retarding the Engine Levers is delayed.....FOR WHATEVER REASON!

Boy Scout Motto is "Always Prepared!".....that works for Helicopter flying too.

From personal experience....when my left foot touched the chin bubble and the aircraft was still turning right.....even my slow thinking Red Neck Brain grasped there was a problem....instantly!

That same slow thinking brain worked better if it was like the old fashioned water well pump....the kind that had to be "primed".

That is where training and SOP's (Cockpit Procedures) come into play.

I do firmly believe....had the Handling Pilot firmly bottomed the Collective before the aircraft or as the aircraft rotated past the starboard side of the ship....they might possibly have stayed on the deck and had a better outcome.

(As we do not know for real at what point the ECL's were retarded....we can only guess they were still powered when the aircraft rolled over onto its side and spinning like a Top.)

As it was....they had one heck of story to tell in the Bar later....all survived and only one crew member was injured with a broken arm.

The teaching point is simple....at or near a hover and you lose Tail Rotor Drive/Thrust....holdiing the Collective up is not going to end well.....but landing the helicopter and getting the power off as quickly as possible is the far better course of action.

In the specific case of Helicopters with Collective mounted throttles....I would reverse that order.....meaning roll off the Throttle(s) then carry out an EOL.

Better still - if this "north American" approach had been replaced by the european one (where we bring the cab to the hover alongside the ship FIRST and then transition sideways, the whole episode would have been better resolved for all concerned, as the TR failure in the approach or hover would have resulted in contact with the ocean - relatively safely and as importantly, the subsequent crash would NOT have impacted the damn ship causing untold damage to its superstructure.
What "eejit" designed an approach to land on a ship - directly from behind, with thousands of tonnes of steel blocking any possible escape route?????
IF someone had died either from the impact with the deck or falling off it, the chances of this being avoided would have been greatly enhanced by hovering alongside first before deciding all was well and then transitioning sideways.
Concur with teaching point - a TR failure in the hover is best dealt with by selecting down motion on the collective, taking power off and forcing a positive landing.

TC,

Perhaps your allergy to Spam is causing you some indigestion.

Even using your method....the aircraft has to approach the ship in order to land aboard.

When the Tail Rotor decides to go is not up to any procedure used and if it goes as you are crossing onto the deck or over the deck....as small as most Frigate Decks are....you are in a very bad position to land aboard or not roll off the deck into the Sea.

Ship Decks are just unstable pinnacles in reality....aren't they?

Do your Navy Pilots hover alongside the mountain top then transition sideways to land?

TC, the audio in that film clip indicates USS Cushing, which was a LAMPS MK III capable ship in 2002 when that accident happened.
(I am pretty sure my log book indicates a few landings on that ship when it was in the PAC fleet ... but it's been a while).

The up the backside approach was designed in the early 1980's for the RAST/BEARTRAP crapola that the USN decided was needed for recovery on rough seas.
I preferred the 30 degree offset approach from LAMPS MK I, but that's no matter.
Good friend of mine was in a hover, about to put a LAMPS MK III (SH-60B) onto a ship via that silly RAST thing when his TR let go. At night.
He just got away from the ship, then chopped throttles (CP did that) and spalshed it in wet. All over very quickly. All swam out. HEEDS was helpful to all.

The approach wasn't the problem in this case. it appears to me that the approach had stopped/paused over the NATO SeaSparrow/SeaChicken launcher aft of the flight deck. The usual method was to keep the relative motion > 0 until over the spot, however, carrier folks weren't as used to those approaches as LAMPS folks.

The H-3 in that video is in dirty air coming into the spot, and IMO not being a LAMPS guy was coming in at too low of an angle, technique wise, in terms of angle measured from the vertical. (My perception of that might be due to the video angle of the camera, so I may not be right about that).
Typical Carrier based habit for an on board ship landing.

Beyond that, SASless is right, even if he is an Army guy.
If the tail lets go there, it's a worst case scenario; you ain't flying that one away, dump the collective and stay dry.
Uncle will get a new bird.

Back in the day, our 30 degree offset kept you clear of the ship until over the deck, but that's an ax to grind that does nobody any good, since RAST was this magical fkucing thing ... never mind me, just a curmudgeon here, grumbling into his beer.

As to your "European Approach" crap, bollocks to it being "better." Did it a few times in a NATO ex due to STANAGS and HOSTAC rules.
Going into a HOGE hover next to the ship and sliding actually increases some risks, although if the tail lets go before the slide, cut gun into the water and Robert's your mother's brother. Yeah.

If it lets go as you slide over the deck you get into the same pickle that Sea King guy did. Momentum is a thing.

SAS - I am/was a navy pilot for decades. Lonewolf I operated off Canadian frigates for 3 years during my exchange tour and used the beartrap hundreds of timesd. What a fantastic piece of kit (by the way the Brits invented it but never used it).
Bringing a cab alongside first kills several birds with one stone:
1. NO dirty air to worry about.
2. A permanent escape route dead ahead and to the offside.
3. At night, the PH has continuous visiuals with deck lighting throughout the landing procedure. Approaching from over the stern can and does (because I did many cross deck ops with the yanks) cause visuals to "disappear" as the ship pitches out of limits.
For example: Pitch limits for a frigate at night, for a FREE landing: +/- 1-3 degrees. Roll limits: 5-10 degrees. Haul down: Pitch: up to 10 degrees. Roll: 25 degrees. These limits are impossible to sustain if one approaches over the stern. Alongside - you can simply wait forever until the ship enters 'quiessence' and then you can land. This is impossible coming in over the back.
4.. Pilot can trim, relax and get ready for the final landing assessing everything in relative calm before relying on 100% looking out.
5.. Any T's and P's issues can be identified and resolved before "committing".

In this particular incident described here - the TR let loose just as he cleared the edge of the aft portion of the deck. Failure occuring 1 second earlier would have driven the cab right into the back of the frigate making matters MUCH worse for all concerned including the ship. Hovering alongside at a high power setting might actually trigger the TR failure resulting in a downward trajectory into the ogging WITHOUT hitting the ship. Once committed to moving sideways over the deck however - of course the scenario would be the same as the one described here but the amount of time spent over the ship during this manouevre would have been reduced to a minimum, so too - harm to the crew.
It's a no brainer - hovering alongside is by a long chalk the safest option. [Which is why the vast majority of other country's naval ops deploy it.]

Another reason why an approach from the astern or "30 degrees" is ridiculous:
This would never have happened if one approached to the hover alongside |FIRST!

TC, I always wondered why you did it that way.

TC,

The 46 crash was not a standard ship landing.....it was a Counter Terrorist Assault Landing gone awfully wrong.

Seven people died in the crash.

It was clearly a pilot error accident.

The Pilot under shot the deck, stuck one rear landing gear through the wire netting and experienced dynamic roll over.

We all know the story behind this vintage piece SAS. The cause of the crash was power settling by the way.
Dynamic rollover eh? WTF will you think of next?
The rigging and wheel tangling was a by product.
i say again: This could NOT have happened if he'd shot an approach to the hover alongside.
7 people would be alive today if this jerk hadnt shot a zero/zero.

TC.....let's take it very slowly so you might grasp what is being said.

It was not a standard deck landing.

The aircraft landed short of the deck.

The landing gear got hung up in the deck edge skirting preventing the aircraft from maintaining controlled flight.

With the landing gear tangled as it was.....the aircraft rolled over on its side as it departed the deck.

Alongside per UK method or a Standard USN approach would not have allowed this to happen.

Crapsakes....you have a video to watch to see what happened AND you are the one that posted it.

Watch it again......carefully......perhaps you can accept that it was not a standard approach in any regard.

You do see the two SEAL Assault Craft following the Helicopter to the Ship...right?

That give you a clue as to what was going on in that evolution?

It was a fast aggressive approach and attempted landing that went all wrong.

It has nothing to do with "Standard" in the manner you wish to apply that concept.

When you do a Direct Action Assault....pull up alongside the Target and wait for the ship to enter whatever the hell you called it.....when assaulting a vessel with armed terrorists aboard and see how long you last.

Why can you not just accept the RN does it one way and the USN. uses a different method.

I submit they each have reasons for doing what they do that are valid to each.

Of course you will not want to argue who does more of these things.....considering the size of the two fleets and its associated helicopter force.

SAS the pilot was a grunt, probably never seen a ship before.
His "brain" thought: I'll do a zero/zero approach offering minimum exposure time on finals, except, ships MOVE and they move when least expected, so an attempt to land on a hard surface, when that hard surface has just moved down or up 6 feet in a matter of seconds before landing, suggests this is NOT, repeat NOT the way to land on a ship. But when grunts drive, others dive.
Secondly: AFTER, repeat AFTER the helo hit the deck (not before) having made a (shall we say) positive landing, only then did the helo find itself short and the rear gear tangled in the rigging. The pilots then action was to lift away from the short landing by applying collective and voila - the helo pivoted about the gear tipping the cab over.
Make no mistake SAS, this was an approach which led to him approaching too qiuckly for the circumstances and finding at the end of the approach that he didn't have the power to cancel the fwd momentum of the helo (Ergo: Power settling). This is the ONLY reason he collided with the superstructure. Post collision - he tried to reverse away and got snared up.
PS: i love the dynamic rollover idea though - that's a cracker! Were you a grunt too, I guess?

Hmm..TC. I thought that CH46s were flown by Marines. Probably seen a few ships, I would think.