Or to put it another way, lets take steps to eliminate a hazard that has never manifested itself, and in the mean time increase the risk from various other hazards...

HC

Shell guy
You say that "nearly 6 years ago" Shell started 7/7=1 and that led to Eurocopter developing the EC225? The 225 was approved by EASA in 2004 and so was in development for many years before that - get over yourself!

Can anyone (HC, JimL etc) explain why PC2e wasn't introduced in the UK to the JAR-OPS 3 date but it could in the Netherlands? I get the impression there is an interesting 'backstory'.

ppng - you have not understood the complexity of aircraft contrating.

I was refering to renewal of the Shell fleet by placing contracts with operators using new aircraft like the EC225. It is not possible to confidently place a contract on an operator to operate a new aircraft until the aircraft type is certified, delivered and added to their AOC.

Often you need to plan 14-18 months in advance to get an aircraft off the production line.

When putting in place new contracts Shell Aircraft policy is also to then wait for the fleet leader to reach, IIRC, 750hrs and the fleet around 1500hrs before they start on Shell contracts so that any major airwothiness problems can be identified, to allow personnel to build experience to meets Shell's minimum experience levels on the type and to demonstrate general offshore operational suitability.

However Shell, as the leaders in offshore safety, did have to pressure the OEMs to produce the right procedures for PC2e. It is sad that the oEMs failed to progress this quickly enougth. Hopefully the EC175 will have PC2e out of the box.

Now those procedures are available, Shell operations can be conducted to PC1 (or PC2e when PC1 is not possible), addressing a remedial action from the 7/7=1 safety case!:ok:

Yet again Shell Aircraft's efforts in raising safety by eliminating the hazard of deck or water impact after and engine failiure need to be applauded. In particular such RW1D deviations from the intended safe flight path are the number one risk in offshore operations.

It is just this sort of Shell Aircraft initiative, plus the adoption of safety cases and SMS and all the other 7/7=1 actions, that are moving helicopter safety towards the levels of safety that can be achieved on regular fixed wing passenger flights.:D

You can read more here - which includes a safety case:
http://www.ogp.org.uk/events/06/11-M...s-Aviation.pdf
or here which shows how Shell lead the way:
http://info.ogp.org.uk/tpes/Programm...TermSafety.pdf

Sox6 - the UK CAA have rather lost the plot on offshore safety leadership. Its mainly down to turnover in personnel it seems.

Typical post from SM:

Yada yada yada shell, yada yada yada shell, yada yada yada shell, etc. etc.

:zzz: :zzz: :zzz:

ps: your love affair with shell is so sickening that is makes anything worthwhile you may have to say - of little interest!

I love the safety that 7/7=1 brings and really want to see that spread across the industry to save lives.

Well if you could love the safety a little more and shell at little less we would all be very f**king grateful!

Sox6 asked the question

Quote:

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Can anyone (HC, JimL etc) explain why PC2e wasn't introduced in the UK to the JAR-OPS 3 date but it could in the Netherlands? I get the impression there is an interesting 'backstory'.

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Shell Management responded with

Quote:

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the UK CAA have rather lost the plot on offshore safety leadership. Its mainly down to turnover in personnel it seems.

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What I find disturbing is that OEMs must comply with JAR-29 Certification rules in order to get Certification Approvals to field their aircraft, while it seems that operators and/or JAA member states can opt to not comply with JAR-OPS 3 Operating rules when operating those same aircraft. Why the apparent double standard?

.... Caverton Helicopters fleet before being awarded a major Shell contract - 2 Bell 412, couple of AS350B2 (oh, no, singles :eek:) couple of refurbished ancient DHC6.

Just look at the massive enhancment in the fleet since Shell's contract award with more new aircraft ordered via their JV partner:ok:

Bristow Helicopters wasn't much to speak of when Shell gave them their first proper contract in 1955.

My god man, get over yourself!
:rolleyes:

The UK CAA have issued an exemption for the NPA they created! Other EU countries are following the JAA deadlines.

So much for that old chesnut that the UK complies with everything from Europe and the continentals don't bother.

So SM, back to the PC2e debate. How many of Shell's contractors are using PC2e offshore?

Please produce a list:
Bristow:
Caverton:
CHC:
Others:

I'm sure it will make interesting reading.

It should be all, with the exception of certain aircraft like the Mil 8 and contracts that pre-date 2005, provided that appropriate procedures are in the RFM.

Shell OUs have invested massively in new machines partly, with more to come, for this heightened performance for PC1/PC2e and of course the improved certification standards.:ok:

I will verify and report back.

Any news on your research SM beyond the Netherlands?

:E

I can add Brunei and Malaysia (S92 only - not EC225)

After that I suspect the sheet will be blank. :mad:

6/7=0.8571248 just doesn't have the same ring to it :E

The most interesting statement to come from this debate is JimLs explanation of the lack of visual cues avaiable to the pilot during landing - and as he explains, that spawned the necessity of the HAPs model.

In effect this statement (if true, and with a bit of offshore experience myself I think it is) pretty much kills any attempt to adopt a predictive performance environment for offshore.

Therefore, is it right to even attempt to define and control the many variables in play and of course the answer will always be YES, otherwise progress would never happen.

Having said this I am with Geoffers on this one. The environment we operate in offshore is dynamic, often unstable and always demanding. To even imagione how crews would fare when faced with the potential of complex computations, that due to the variables at any one minute changing, are probably inappropriate and flawed is one thing. To consider the chaos caused to the transport system (which is what we are part off) is unimaginable.

Some things in life get invented early on and they are pretty darn perfect. The wheel being one of them that springs to mind.

In my opinion, the work done all those years ago to define the HAPs modelling, and the slight adjustment by JAR to give a bit of thrust margin (AEO HOGE), is the "wheel" of the offshore environment.

I am somewhat dissapointed that so much effort has been expended into this issue and so little effort expended to tidy up and improve on what we have now. In my experience, majority of Offshore CPs occur way to low. Typically about 20 to 25 feet, and some significantly lower than that.

And yet the HAPs wants us at 40 feet ADH (I figure I noticed entirely lacking in JimLs disitations above (sorry JimL - sure this was just an oversight).

I challenge every Offshore pilot to look closely at their own personal CP profile. For the avoidance of doubt, and in concurrence with JimLs early posts, HAPs says we should have:

10 Knots G/S, rotor tips coincident with the deck edge, 40 feet ADH at the CP.

That is the equivelent of the 5 story block of flats above the deck.

For those of you who are too low, try the HAPs profile properly and you will be amazed at how much better the profile feels.

Geoffers is absolutley right in my opinion. The proposal is not only too complex, it is probably ill conceived from the outset.

Finnaly. in all of this little discussion has been made as to the mitigation of exposure (when it exists). Remember that JAR 3.517 carried a significant burden for the Operator and the Aircraft to reduce the possibilities of OEI by mandated use of HUMS, Reliability, training and of course profiles utilised to reduce the risks of Exposure in so far as is possible in the environment (the HAPs model).

The apparent lack of in service OEI events in the landing and take-off phase bears testiment not only to the helicopters inherent reliability, but the value of these mitiogation tools.

It is never a good thing to resist change solely due to the inertia of current practice. But In this instance that is where I am at unless someone can greatly simplfy the mindboggling data splurged throughout this thread.

DB

Please be more patient sox.:=

It has taken some time to review all Shell operations, the company does fly over 80,000 hours a year.:cool:

It does appear that local regulataory restrictions, mainly in the UK (:ugh:) and other third world countries are delaying the adoption of PC2e.:{

However that is still 7/6.33 = 1.11, which is far better than any other oil company can manage. :)

As an aside, a maths lesson for VL;):
Industry accident rate / Shell initiatives = Shell accident rate.

One day we will hopefully get to 0.85!:D

Boys, just ignore SM, Ive been checking out the plank forum on pprune, because of interest in the QF incidents of late (cos me mother and sisters use on a monthly basis), your man is even offering his advice there ......:rolleyes: Wind up merchant = Loser......:ugh:

Wow, there is a big admission SM!

I wonder how far along Shell is actually along with implementing 7/7, 5 years after launching it.

Certainly at 80,000 hours pa the 2009 GOM accident has screwed the target of 1 fatal(?) accident per million hours (the 5 year and 10 year Shell avarages are at least 2.5 by my calculations). I also suspect a plataeu has been hit by Shell, just like SM keeps point out the airline industry has hit.