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Originally Posted by megan
(Post 10988198)
when and how to pull out has never been content of any course, other than reading others misfortunes.
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Perhaps my view is coloured by the fact that we as military were taught to fly helos on instruments from the get go, H-34 at the start and unstabilised Huey after getting wings. Flying offshore in the 1970's in the 205 we had to resort to instruments on a regular basis.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10988048)
I agree FH1100 - but it seems plenty of people still need to learn how to fly in poor (crappy) weather safely.
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If you are allowed to push the limits - ie operating special VFR because the weather isn't good enough for VFR - should you not be instrument rated and current? Seems an accident waiting to happen if you let people scud run (legally) who have no plan B.
What actual IIMC training is required in the US? Does it involve a screened cockpit or 'foggles' or, heaven forbid, actual experience of flying in cloud? If it is just a VFR 'let's pretend' exercise it is about a s useful as a chocolate fireguard. I know regulation is detested in the US but it seemst his crash was allowed to happen because part 135 regs let a non- IFR pilot fly single pilot in skoshie weather with fare-paying pax without the skills to recover in the event of IIMC. |
Crab. The chocolate fireguard is all that's required.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10989012)
because part 135 regs let a non- IFR pilot fly single pilot in skoshie weather with fare-paying pax without the skills to recover in the event of IIMC.
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As mentioned above, Part 135 does require competency in those skills to maneuver out of IIMC for all 135 rotorcraft ops to include a recurrent requirement. Having a piece of paper that says you can recover from IIMC is all very well (clearly not in this case sadly) but unless you have been tested in an environment (real or simulated) that replicates IIMC it is simply paper-safety ie no use at all. It is quite easy to replicate a DVE situation at night over unlit terrain or by day over the sea with hazy conditions, you don't actually have to go into cloud - but that is the real acid test. |
[QUOTE]
Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10989353)
But how is that policy documented and policed to ensure a level of quality assessment rather than a box-ticking process?/QUOTE]
but unless you have been tested in an environment (real or simulated) that replicates IIMC it is simply paper-safety ie no use at all. It is quite easy to replicate a DVE situation at night over unlit terrain or by day over the sea with hazy conditions, you don't actually have to go into cloud - but that is the real acid test. What I always found ironic was that even with the same identical training the percentage of offshore ops having adverse IIMC incidents was much lower than the EMS ops. Seems the ops with the higher operational control oversight have better luck at IIMC than those without like this flight. |
So Ara will have had a training document detailing the circumstances and outcome of his recurrent IIMC training then - yet for a real it went for a ball of chalk.
Is there any mandated use of 3 or 4 axis AP systems in that IIMC recovery or is it all flown manfully without having to demonstrate proficiency with the kit in your aircraft? |
I can't honestly say I read every word, but this particular flight appears to have been 100% in compliance with all regulatory requirements, and in many cases exceeded those requirements by quite a bit, including the presence of a safety management program, a pilot with IFR and IFR instructor qualifications and required Part 135 training all in order, an aircraft with an operating 4 axis autopilot, etc., etc.
Refer to: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...Report-Rel.pdf And also: https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Doc...G-abstract.pdf Leaving aside the fact that good enough is never good enough for the NTSB, it was good enough by current US regulations, indeed better than good enough. There are at least a dozen shoulda/woulda/coulda's that might have avoided this event. All of them associated with pilot judgement and not regulatory deficiencies. Don't go/slow down/turn back/air file IFR (illegally but live to tell the tale)/etc. and all already discussed in this topic, and the most egregious of which appears to be the failure to slow down. But at the end of the day, the one that sticks out like a sore thumb to me is why, in lowering visibility, with such a wonderfully equipped aircraft, was the autopilot not engaged in some reasonable mode as soon as visibility became a concern, before it became zero? As a VFR only helicopter pilot who has never flown a helicopter with an autopilot (but has used autopilots in other contexts), am I missing something? Overreliance on automation is always a favorite topic. Do we observe an under-reliance in this particular case? |
Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10989415)
...Is there any mandated use of 3 or 4 axis AP systems in that IIMC recovery or is it all flown manfully without having to demonstrate proficiency with the kit in your aircraft?
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10989415)
So Ara will have had a training document detailing the circumstances and outcome of his recurrent IIMC training then - yet for a real it went for a ball of chalk.
Is there any mandated use of 3 or 4 axis AP systems in that IIMC recovery or is it all flown manfully without having to demonstrate proficiency with the kit in your aircraft? https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?NTSBNumber=DCA20MA059 |
Many of us flew hard day/night winter/summer IFR in old 76A models that only had a hat trim for a couple of attitude retention AP. And that was a step up from FT only 222UT that was certified single-pilot IFR, and from 212's that no stab at all and yet we did our IFR rides in them. It is all skill and scan, training, practise, experience. Annual low viz training (1/2 mile clear of cloud) required for all operators here. Avoid going IMC, but no biggie to deal with it if it happens. I've said before in this one, Ara seemed fully competent handling the reduced (but still legal VFR) weather in the LA basin that day. The fact that the police were parked is a red herring, their job wasn't to deliver a passenger. I never "got" the why of the airspeeds Ara was hauling, unless it was customer pressure to "make it to the game", same as pressing on. But it was his turf and his call. Losing visual reference was the end for him, regardless of all the outs the aircraft offered and would not have changed with any of the NTSB recommendations. One training session a year and the occasional check ride, especially done in simulated conditions, does not ensure competence 6 months or 11 months later. One more rich guy with a mickey-duck attitude to a profession.
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From the first reference I posted above, Page 9:
2.5.5 Emergency training Title 14 CFR 135.293 required pilots to undergo an evaluation for IIMC recovery and stated the following in part: (c) Each competency check given in a rotorcraft must include a demonstration of the pilot's ability to maneuver the rotorcraft solely by reference to instruments. The check must determine the pilot's ability to safely maneuver the rotorcraft into visual meteorological conditions following an inadvertent encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. Island Express’s Training Manual, Revision 15, Section F, S-76 Maneuvers, listed loss of anti-torque effectiveness, anti-torque failure, and settling with power. Revision 16 dated March 6, 2020, added brownout, whiteout, and or flatlight conditions, unusual attitude recovery, and inadvertent entry to IMC. The accident pilot was evaluated on unusual attitude recovery and/or inadvertent entry to IMC on: S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check June 21, 2019 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 8, 2019 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check August 20, 2018 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 18, 2018 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check August 18, 2017 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 12, 2017 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check January 28, 2016 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check December 9, 2014 AS-350 Part 135.293 proficiency check July 31, 2019 A review of training records revealed the accident pilot met the new hire, recurrent ground, air, and check airman, ground and air, and emergency training requirements. A records review did not reveal non-compliance or deficiencies noted by the evaluators. |
I can't copy and paste part of the Island Express documents but En Route Qualifications procedures states in para 2 that 'IEH, INC pilot will never take and aircraft into IMC weather conditions, nor into weather that in their opinion will deteriorate into IMC conditions' - well that clearly wasn't complied with.
It later states the IEH flight minima for local area, controlled and uncontrolled airspace as 'Between 500' and 1000' agl but not below 300' agl and with a minimum in flight visibility of not less than 1 nm.' - another non-compliance. there is another paragraph about landing or diverting in the event of weather not permitting flight at those altitudes or in that visibility. The link is the one Wrench 1 has put in his post and the Island Helicopters documents look satisfactory on the face of it since they have weather limits, training procedures for IIMC and unusual attitudes - including a paragraph about use of automation and particularly the use of the go-around button. So if all that was followed and Ara was tested adequately and not found wanting - how did he not either make the simple decision to land or divert as specified in the ops manual or recover successfully from IIMC which he put himself into? Either he had a particularly off day or he was habitually pushing weather limits below the Ops manual and had not been properly tested on his ability to recover from UAs or IIMC in anything other than benign, VMC conditions. |
Originally Posted by aa777888
(Post 10989540)
From the first reference I posted above, Page 9:
2.5.5 Emergency training Title 14 CFR 135.293 required pilots to undergo an evaluation for IIMC recovery and stated the following in part: (c) Each competency check given in a rotorcraft must include a demonstration of the pilot's ability to maneuver the rotorcraft solely by reference to instruments. The check must determine the pilot's ability to safely maneuver the rotorcraft into visual meteorological conditions following an inadvertent encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. Island Express’s Training Manual, Revision 15, Section F, S-76 Maneuvers, listed loss of anti-torque effectiveness, anti-torque failure, and settling with power. Revision 16 dated March 6, 2020, added brownout, whiteout, and or flatlight conditions, unusual attitude recovery, and inadvertent entry to IMC. The accident pilot was evaluated on unusual attitude recovery and/or inadvertent entry to IMC on: S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check June 21, 2019 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 8, 2019 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check August 20, 2018 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 18, 2018 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check August 18, 2017 S-76 EuroSafety International check May 12, 2017 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check January 28, 2016 S-76 Part 135.293 proficiency check December 9, 2014 AS-350 Part 135.293 proficiency check July 31, 2019 A review of training records revealed the accident pilot met the new hire, recurrent ground, air, and check airman, ground and air, and emergency training requirements. A records review did not reveal non-compliance or deficiencies noted by the evaluators. |
So if all that was followed and Ara was tested adequately and not found wanting - how did he not either make the simple decision to land or divert as specified in the ops manual or recover successfully from IIMC which he put himself into? The report discussed during Tuesday’s meeting highlighted Island Express Helicopters Inc.’s inadequate review and oversight of its safety management processes. Island Express Helicopters Inc.’s lack of a documented policy and safety assurance evaluations to ensure its pilots were consistently and correctly completing the flight risk analysis forms, hindered the effectiveness of the form as a risk management tool. The NTSB concluded a fully implemented, mandatory safety management system could enhance Island Express Helicopter Inc.’s ability to manage risks. By Mike Baker, James Glanz and Sarah Mervosh
The tensions first came to the attention of federal investigators in 2008, when a fatal accident involving an Island Express helicopter revealed disagreements that had been playing out for years behind the scenes. A Federal Aviation Administration operations inspector assigned to oversee the company, then under a previous owner, had been pushing for more stringent safety practices, according to federal records. The company’s president at the time pushed back, asking the F.A.A. to assign a different inspector. The inspector, Gary Lackey, who agreed to step aside, said he was concerned that the company seemed unwilling to spend the money necessary to improve safety beyond what was minimally required. “Everything that involves safety usually involves money also,” Mr. Lackey, who is now retired, said in an interview. “I think they were trying to cut corners.”Before the tragedy involving Mr. Bryant, Island Express had four crashes since 1985 that damaged or destroyed helicopters, all under the company’s previous management, according to records. Tensions over the company’s safety culture simmered even after the 2008 crash as the company came under new management several years later, according to people involved in the discussions. The F.A.A. recorded an additional “incident” in the summer of 2018, when two Island Express helicopters were started up too close to one another, causing significant damage to the blades on both aircraft. As recently as 2017, Kurt Deetz, a pilot and former safety manager at Island Express, resigned from his safety responsibilities, he said, over “differences of opinion” about how the company’s safety management system should be run. It is not known what caused last month’s crash. Officials with the National Transportation Safety Board said they are looking at a range of potential issues, ranging from weather to mechanical problems. A key question is whether the Island Express pilot attempted to fly into thickening clouds and fog; N.T.S.B. investigators have asked for the public’s help in gathering photographs of weather conditions near the scene of the crash. Island Express’s general counsel, Teri Elizabeth Neville, declined to comment in detail until after investigators release their findings on the crash. In a telephone interview this week, Ms. Neville said she was not aware of disputes with safety officials and noted that the company’s four crashes happened before the current management took over. She declined to say when that was, but state records and the company’s website suggest it was in 2012 or 2013. Mr. Lackey, who was the F.A.A.’s point person for Island Express off and on during his 17 years at the agency, said the tensions between him and the company’s management began sometime around 2005, and N.T.S.B. records show that he issued warning letters to the company. The records also show that the company’s former owner, John Moore, pushed back against Mr. Lackey’s efforts — in particular, his recommendations to tighten safety procedures on refueling, operating rotors when passengers were boarding, and operations at a helipad in San Pedro, Calif., that Mr. Lackey felt were unsafe. The company also protested when Mr. Lackey failed a pilot on a proficiency check. Discussions over flying in bad weather came up with all helicopter companies, Mr. Lackey said. Though federal regulations allow helicopter flights in relatively low visibility, given their ability to fly very slowly when necessary, Mr. Lackey said he urged charter operators to consider the risks of doing so and advised them in such cases to land the aircraft and wait for the weather to clear. He was aware that companies had to balance safety with the need to complete the jobs they were hired to do, he said, and those that did not deliver their customers on time might find their clients going to another operator. Island Express was one of the few companies to go to Mr. Lackey’s managers to challenge his oversight, he said. After a series of clashes, the F.A.A. in 2008 assigned a new principal operations inspector for the company, records show. “When John came in and said he wanted a new P.O.I., I said, ‘Fine, you can have somebody else,’” Mr. Lackey said, referring to Mr. Moore. Mr. Lackey said he felt the new person would also be vigilant about safety and that it was an opportunity to reset what had become a contentious relationship.In a statement, the F.A.A. said it could not comment on an individual case, but that it was not uncommon to periodically rotate inspectors to new assignments. “All aviation safety inspectors are qualified to perform the oversight work they are assigned,” the statement said. Mr. Lackey said he was assigned once again to oversee Island Express in subsequent years and found that Mr. Moore seemed more willing to accept F.A.A. safety requests. The relationship improved, Mr. Lackey said, until new owners and managers took over at Island Express. After that, Mr. Lackey said, some of the old conflicts began to re-emerge. Once again, the company argued for a different inspector, but this time, Mr. Lackey said, he did not recall a change taking place in response to the request. Accident and aviation experts said that tensions between aircraft companies and local F.A.A. inspectors are not uncommon. But short of gross incompetence on the part of the inspector, they said, it is highly unusual for an inspector to be replaced at the suggestion of a regulated company. In his interview with N.T.S.B. investigators after the 2008 crash, Mr. Moore did not raise any issues about Mr. Lackey’s competence, acknowledging that the inspector “knows his stuff.” Jeff Guzzetti, a former N.T.S.B. and F.A.A. accident investigator, said that “a personality clash between an operator and an inspector” is not uncommon. “It’s less frequent that an operator would hold sway over the F.A.A.,” he said. “It would have to be something that rises to the level of getting the attention of upper F.A.A. management to say, ‘Let’s get this inspector off and get another inspector.’” Mr. Moore did not respond to a message seeking comment.Mr. Deetz, the former safety manager who also flew Mr. Bryant as a pilot for Island Express, said that proactively managing safety within the company had been part of his job. He said he established safety protocols for the company and convened a quarterly meeting with pilots and maintenance employees to discuss safety issues. But he said it was the company’s owners who usually dealt directly with the F.A.A., and he was unaware of any disputes with federal regulators during his time at the company. Mr. Deetz declined to elaborate on the specific dispute with company management that prompted him to resign from his position as safety manager sometime in 2017. “It all goes back to culture,” he said. “There is window-dressing safety, and there is real, actual, get-your-hands-dirty safety culture.” He later left the company altogether to take a pilot position with a competitor and now flies air ambulances in Arizona. Most of the company’s previous crashes — a total of four since it was founded in 1982 — involved mechanical failures, federal records show. In the 2008 accident, a turbine engine blade failed during an approach to Catalina Island near Los Angeles, leading to a rapid plunge and a crash into the ground that killed three people and injured three others. In 1999, in the same area, a helicopter with seven people on board crashed and slid down a hill, striking some trees and rolling over after an engine failure caused by a loose pneumatic fitting. The crash resulted in mostly minor injuries. In 1989, another incident with minor injuries occurred when an engine failed over the ocean because of a worn fuel pump assembly. The pilot was able to set the craft down with the help of emergency floats.In 1985, an Island Express helicopter collided with another helicopter, an accident that investigators found was probably a result of “the inadequate visual lookout of both pilots.” One person was killed and 11 others were injured. In the most recent incident, in 2018, two of the company’s Sikorsky S-76 helicopters were parked next to each other at Long Beach Airport for a photo shoot. When pilots started the engines, the drooping rotors straightened, and their blades began colliding. All six blades were damaged, an F.A.A. report says, “and Island Express Helicopters altered their parking plan to no longer park two S-76 aircraft next to each other.” Mr. Guzzetti, the former federal accident investigator, said the 2018 incident was of more concern than it might initially appear. “This one is recent and it’s operational,” he said. “It’s an indicator of inadequate safety culture.” But John Cox, an accident investigator and the head of Safety Operating Systems, an aviation consulting firm, said it was hard to determine any pattern in the company’s overall record. The previous crashes, he said, occurred over a long time period and many of them involved equipment failures, not operational ones. “It could be construed as a red flag to have this many accidents for the same operator,” Mr. Cox said. “But you have to look more deeply as to when those accidents happened, over what period of time.” |
Originally Posted by megan
(Post 10989640)
Mr. Deetz declined to elaborate on the specific dispute
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I think the IEH accident history is a red herring, a series of unconnected failures that don't imply a safety culture issue.
But, the incident where 2 S 76s ended up damaged smacks of complacency, poor awareness and poor piloting - if you can get something as simple as a photo shoot so wrong that is concerning. Whatever Mr Deetz's issues with the company, they seem largely irrelevant to the Bryant crash and are probably a personality issue of the '6 of one and half a dozen of the other' variety. What cannot be ignored is that Ara did not comply with the IEH Ops manual which is quite clear on both the weather limits for flight and the actions to be taken in the event of weather deterioration. If his attitude to the Ops manual was like this habitually, one must question his attitude to other professional aspects of flight such as the UA and IIMC training - was there a cosy relationship in IEH where boxes were ticked to meet the regulations but no actual testing was conducted - a 'handshake currency check' if you will. Are there sufficient numbers of helicopter guys in the NTSB who understand the difference between the inherent stability of a FW and the inherent instability of RW, especially where IIMC is concerned? |
I wonder why.... Actually I know....seek the truth |
Originally Posted by JimEli
(Post 10989612)
Since March 6, 2020 is after the accident, what exactly was he trained and tested on? And the FARs initiated mandatory checking on the maneuvers and procedures in paragraph (c) when taking a competency check after April 22, 2015.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 10989577)
The link is the one Wrench 1 has put in his post and the Island Helicopters documents look satisfactory on the face of it since they have weather limits, training procedures for IIMC and unusual attitudes - including a paragraph about use of automation and particularly the use of the go-around button.
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Crab
As ever, very good take on all of this. But did Ara really not have a current IR? And I guess even if he did, an issue would be his IMC currency. Pretty extraordinary to be flying an S76 without surely? And does anyone know what the weather was like at the intended destination? And how would Ara have known that - was there a nearby airfield with met reporting? How much further did he have to run? One of the biggest risk areas of ops to private sites in poor weather is uncertainty of weather there. Reports from particularly non pilots are to be given little weight in my experience. But fundamentally I do groan at yet another stupid accident that should never have happened. All the form filling out and box ticking issues are just peripheral - there was just grossly incompetent pilot judgement here I’m afraid. If it was the usual low time PPL in an R44 scenario it wouldn’t have surprised too much, but a charter operator with a celeb in a S76.... |
Originally Posted by rotorspeed
(Post 10990037)
As ever, very good take on all of this. But did Ara really not have a current IR? And I guess even if he did, an issue would be his IMC currency. Pretty extraordinary to be flying an S76 without surely?
Originally Posted by rotorspeed
(Post 10990037)
And does anyone know what the weather was like at the intended destination? And how would Ara have known that - was there a nearby airfield with met reporting? How much further did he have to run? One of the biggest risk areas of ops to private sites in poor weather is uncertainty of weather there. Reports from particularly non pilots are to be given little weight in my experience.
. At 0851 PST, (prior to departure) VNY reported a calm wind, visibility of two and a half statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,100 feet agl, At 0905 PST (just prior to departure), CMA reported a wind from 080° at 7 knots, visibility of 4 statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,600 feet agl, At 0951 PST, (about 5 minutes after the crash) VNY reported a calm wind, visibility of two and a half statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,300 feet agl, At 0955 PST (about 10 minutes after the crash), CMA reported a wind from 030° at 3 knots, visibility of 4 statute miles, haze, ceiling overcast at 1,700 feet agl, During the NTSB Board meeting the investigators said that at the time of departure the forecast flight conditions were within company specified limits, but that the visibility less than 3 miles at VNY should have resulted in the pilot consulting with the Director of operations and the SVFR should have required an alternative plan. I'll add that in looking at the NTSB provided ADS-B data, which includes GEO altitude, I can see that the pilot was squeezed to ~300' AGL going over the U.S. 101 pass near Mureau Rd (this pass is the highest point on his planned route). After the pass, the helicopter maintains ~300' AGL for a few seconds as the road (and the helicopter) descend ~150', then the pilot climbs to "get above the layers". I hypothesize that the pilot's plan was to get over the pass and descend underneath the cloud base to complete the flight scud running, but that conditions on the other side of the pass were not what he expected. A witness told the NTSB: "The cloud that the aircraft entered and disappeared into was a thick wall that extended as low as about ten feet above ground and upward beyond visibility. This low cloud started at about the Juan Bautista de Anza East Trailhead, heading west. This trailhead starts at the end of Calabasas Rd. When I first spotted the aircraft, the clouds were relatively higher than the cloud I watched it disappear into. I couldn't guess the altitude of the higher cloud line but it was lower than a police helicopter would fly when closely circling a person on foot over a residential neighborhood in West Hills, CA. It appeared that the aircraft was flying at a level which had visibility until it entered the cloud wall." |
Originally Posted by airplanecrazy
(Post 10990139)
None of the pilot's proficiency check records published by the NTSB (since 2014) show FAR 135.297 Pilot in command: Instrument proficiency check.
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Originally Posted by Gordy
(Post 10990166)
This check is only completed if the aircraft/pilot are flying on a 135 IFR program which they were not. The company was Part 135 VFR only. The inadvertent IMC portion of the 135.293 and .299 was completed each year.
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Originally Posted by aa777888
(Post 10989944)
His training records can be reviewed at this link: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...dacted-Rel.pdf
However, the point is, IEH added the tasks for unusual attitude recovery, and inadvertent entry to IMC to their training manual AFTER the accident, an egregious oversight by both IEH and the FAA POI, a violation of FAA policy and possibly FAR. So, how did they train/evaluate these tasks in the S-76? Did the procedure address airspeed management, autopilot, diversion, abort, landing or emergency IFR? Because of the oversight, we don’t know. At best, they used a generic procedure, and at worst the instructors/evaluators did whatever they pleased. Or, did they even didn’t do it, absent published tasks? Without a specific delineated procedure, maybe the accident pilot was attempting to perform exactly what his GOM (at the time) instructed him to do, “pilots will never take an aircraft into IMC…” As best he could. All we know is the forms have a checked box on them. |
Originally Posted by JimEli
(Post 10990196)
...Without a specific delineated procedure, maybe the accident pilot was attempting to perform exactly what his GOM (at the time) instructed him to do, “pilots will never take an aircraft into IMC…” As best he could.
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All of this speculation is pretty moot. There are things we cannot know about this accident, and things that we will *never* know. We do know that Ara was Instrument-rated and took annual 135 checkrides which most likely included some hood work. *EVERY* VFR 135 ride I've ever taken (and I've taken a bunch) included a UA recovery. So he was - at very least - qualified to fly under IFR even if he was not current and legal (approved) to do so. How many people on internet boards like this one claim that a pilot is not a pilot with an Instrument Rating, as if that imbues one with some magical skill set that just might come in handy in a situation like this? (Obviously, that's bogus.)
But keying on that... We can surmise that Ara had a somewhat "casual" relationship with weather. If it is true that he flew over the Pacific, over a cloud deck to get offshore and then descended (probably IMC) to get under the marine layer and come back into the beach VFR, then we can also surmise that he was able to maintain some semblance of control over a helicopter by reference to the instruments only. But that's just a guess. So what happened here? What went wrong so quickly? Was there a distraction or two just as the view outside went completely white? We're pretty sure that right after he punched-in, he called up ATC to report that he was climbing to 4,000', figuring that the guy he was talking to was familiar with who and where he was. Not so! They'd had a controller change and now the guy he was talking to didn't know Ara from Adam. This new controller had to go through the whole process of getting him radar identified, something the other controller presumably wouldn't have had to do. So now Ara has got to look down and put in a squawk. And while he was down there, he probably re-centered the GPS to Camarillo. I would *guess* that right then, Kobe keyed the intercom and said something like, "Hey, uhhh, Ara? Are we okay here, buddy? All I see outside is...nothing." And while those things were happening, the helicopter was banking over to the left, undetected because "someone" took his eyes off the attitude indicator and the helicopter did what helicopters do when you're not paying attention. Unusual Attitude recovery practice is great. We all should get some. Trouble is, when it happens for real, when you're already down to just a couple of hundred feet above the rising terrain when you punch-in, your chances of getting the wings level, stopping the descent and getting a climb going before smashing into something are pretty...how shall we say...zero. So Ara maybe didn't have any "real world" UA practice lately. Big deal, what would it have helped in that case? Once he got into the UA, it was game-over. Some of us seem to think that flying a helicopter and not crashing is SOOOO EASY! Any idiot can do it. The truth is that sometimes circumstances conspire and combine against us and a bunch of crap happens at exactly the wrong time, and maybe we're not operating at 100% that day for whatever reason.. Maybe on any other day, Ara would've initiated the straight-ahead climb to get above the layer and he would've popped out on top, perhaps as he'd done once or twice before. No harm, no foul, no one would have to know...and he'd continue on with the flight like nothing happened. |
Originally Posted by FH1100 Pilot
(Post 10990220)
..So Ara maybe didn't have any "real world" UA practice lately. Big deal, what would it have helped in that case?
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My take is that this is simpler than people are making out. " Circumstances conspire and combine" is not reality. Conditions only exist. They have no consicousness or means of combining against you. We allow them to " conspire" by ignoring them individually and forgetting what the one job of a pilot is. That is to fly the aircraft to the point of a safe landing. Ignore Kobe if he calls on the ics when you're busy. In fact isolate the passengers if you like, if they are chatty when you are sweating. No need to dial in that squawk code if you are busy actually flying. It can all wait, it isn't going to save your butt. If you've ever lapsed from your task of driving a car due to a phone call, text or something that just draws your eye off the road then you must know this is no different. He obviously had the training and ability to revert to basic instrument flight ( had the rating and had UA recovery training) but chose not to focus on that. What he apparently did not have was the judgement to see that in a little while all would be forgiven if he landed short, in a vacant parking lot and called cabs for the passengers. I suspect that his thoughts during the flight, until g forces were not computing, was " I can get through this" , not " I need to be on the ground right now, if not a few minutes ago".
The words I rember most clearly from my ( airplane) instrument instructor were " Quit fu*king with the radio and just fly". |
Indeed, Roscoe and gulliBell, all of those things are what Ara *should* have done. Sadly, apparently he did not do any of them. We are left to forever wonder why.
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Airplane Crazy
Out of curiosity, on the SPZ-7000 DAFCS, what does the pilot have to do to activate the go-around button? Does the AP1 or AP2 button need to be pushed first? Does the FD2 button and/or CPL button need to be pressed before the go-around button? |
But did Ara really not have a current IR? And I guess even if he did, an issue would be his IMC currency. Pretty extraordinary to be flying an S76 without surely? We are left to forever wonder why |
If he'd done 6.8 hours IF training in a 76 he should have worked out that you should not be hands flying it in IMC, and certainly not hands flying it in SAS mode with the force trim off. For the life of me I can't see how you can get in a UA in a 76 unless you were flying in SAS and totally not paying attention. Teaching UA's in the 76 on annual recurrent training was never done in SAS, always in ATT with the force trim on. I'd like to know what mode he was flying in to have lost control.
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Originally Posted by industry insider
(Post 10990261)
...I am a bit rusty on the SPZ 7000 but if my memory works...
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Originally Posted by industry insider
(Post 10990261)
...the GA function would essentially manage speed.
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Whilst Ara certainly does seem to have been 'current' in terms of his 135 checkrides and UA/IIMC training - I am left wondering how demanding those UA/IIMC manoeuvres were that he had to pass.
The IEH Ops manual defines a UA as +/- 10 kts of intended IAS or +/- 10% of normal cruise power (unless I am reading it all wrong) so very little adjustment required to correct either of those. By comparison, the 2 standard UAs for Brit Mil IRTs are 'Low speed autorotative turn at not more than 30 deg AoB and High speed descending turn at not more than 30 deg AoB' - both of these should be recovered with minimum height loss and with a specified minimum base height and recovery height to simulate being below safety alt. My point is that if you don't train properly for a hazardous situation, you are far less likely to recover from it if it does present itself. Do the part 135 UAs and IIMC checks come even close to replicating real disorientation? If not, is it because the checkers don't have any more actual IMC time than the check airmen and have no idea what it is really like? Real disorientation is f***ing scary - as Robbiee has discovered - and only good, realistic training or a very big handful of luck will save you. |
Originally Posted by gulliBell
(Post 10990313)
An S76B has a SPZ 7000?
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Ara got his A model 135 rating on 12th September 2014 and B rating 12th August 2017. What IF time he had in either model i don't know, but with no IF time since completion of training in October 2007 that means he had between seven and ten years between drinks, whatever you had learnt about IF in training would be long forgotten, assuming the 6.8 hours were in the B over the period of 31 months is not going to get you one tenth of the way up to speed.
If he'd done 6.8 hours IF training in a 76 he should have worked out that you should not be hands flying it in IMC, and certainly not hands flying it in SAS mode with the force trim off. For the life of me I can't see how you can get in a UA in a 76 unless you were flying in SAS and totally not paying attention. An insight to the company ethos may be gained in the docket with interview with one of the pilots. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?NTSBNumber=DCA20MA059 Down load "3 OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP INTERVIEW OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS" and open the "Deetz" PDF file. |
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