I think it was addressed. Firstly the (false) expectation that there would be a much longer period between engine flameouts, and secondly that when 500’ agl over a city at night without a radalt or landing light, a successful autorotative landing is highly unlikely in reality. Which is true.

If you would like to demonstrate that you have made a successful engine off landing in a built up area from 500’ at night etc, then I might be persuaded otherwise but failing that, I’m with the sheriff. Those who think they could do it have never tried it..

Was part of every ride in our outfit, throttles chopped at 1,000 for a 180° or straight in and power restored in the flare. One instructor (76) left the power at idle so you got to do one to the ground as a one off confidence builder, we all had plenty of 76 time by that stage. Not prebriefed, if it looked good he left you to it, very surprising when you pull and there's nothing there.

HeliComparator. I'm not saying that I would perform any better or worse in the circumstances as presented. I've certainly never done an EOL at night from low level over a city in an EC135 - but then I'm guessing no one else other than David Traill have either. Not having done it personally, does not preclude intellectual debate as to what might have happened.

My observations from the AAIB report are that the aircraft crashed with zero ground speed and zero rotor RPM. That's quite an achievement from 500(approx) feet agl and about 100kts groundspeed. If the pilot did nothing at all, the aircraft trajectory would still have some forward element would it not?

The report stated that the Low NR warning activated twice, was extinguished twice and then activated a third time and remained on. My hypothesis is that the first warning activated shortly after the second engine failed. The pilots instinctive reaction would be to lower the lever. If there was a restriction and the lever couldn't be lowered fully, only partially, a cyclic flare could recover the NR. This could potentially be achieved a second time but once forward airspeed and hence flare effect is depleted there's no further way to recover NR. This scenario could explain the rotor stall and the lack of ground speed.

Could something as simple as a clipboard or tasking folder have been in exactly the wrong place at the wrong time? I find this more plausible than a pilot of his experience, with heightened awareness after the first engine failure, simply mishandling the autorotation (albeit in exceptionally demanding circumstances).

JJ

With regard to Dr Thomas’ statement:

“Distressing” – understandable given her personal loss.

“Incomprehensible” – then she has not been listening.

“given months, not moments” – actually, the Captain of the aircraft had at least 8 minutes of the Low Fuel Sensors telling him to land the aircraft which he acknowledged but failed to act upon.
“history of faults with the Caution Advisory Display” – Not so - the CAD only displays what it is being told to display by the various sensors connected to it. Like any other computer, cr@p in – cr@p out.
“specifically, a history of erroneous or spurious fuel indications, amongst other technical problems such as contamination of the fuel tanks” - correct and still being reported.

Having experienced the phenomena of being told one thing by the display/qty sensors and another by the Low Fuel Sensors in similar circumstances to JT2as far back as 2007 and 2012, it also caused confusion initially but, nevertheless the aircraft was on the ground in very short order. As a result, like JT2, I also spent a day in the witness box at the FAI.

It wasn’t until I was being interviewed by Police Scotland during the evidence gathering process in 2017 that I actually did the maths on this one and it really hammered home the point. For those who haven’t done it yet:

Take off at 2044, crash at 2222 = 98 Minutes.

Fuel indicated at Startup = 400Kgs, Fuel found in wreckage 76Kgs = Fuel used 324Kgs.

EC135 Fuel planning figure 200Kgs per hour/3.33 per minute.

324Kgs used divided by 3.33 = 97.3 minutes.

Well, the Sheriff isnˋt an aviator.
So his view is legit, but we know, that we as aviators can’t follow/understand Dave’s Decision making, especially knowing, that normally every pilot should have a general idea about his endurance.
As the calculations show, a started stopwatch at t/o would have given him the same information as the warnings did, which he ignored.
And getting a fuel warning, you surely check the indications, but also their plausibility against time flown.
There sure was a human factor involved, which isn’t covered, cause we don’t know, what conversation happened in the bird

Did the Police ever provide a transcript of the police comms?

FB - I'm not sure that's the case. The calculation would have shown him that he had about 75kg left - which he did - the problem is not how much fuel he had (enough for a good twenty minutes) but where it was, ie not in the supply tanks. Or have I misunderstood something?

Well, checking where the fuel is, when you get a warning, is part of the checklist.
Evenso I landed under minimum fuel required (a couple of times), I always had a very close eye, on where my fuel was (balancing it in another ship) to avoid an early flame out.
20 min was less than required for landing by the operator.
Going below minimum fuel can happen in aviation - but I think, a very very good reason is required to accept this extra risk - i.e. a life saving mission.
And when doing so, evaluating the associated risks - and having a plan B, in case of miscalculating the fuel available.
We don´t have the police control information here - but the flight path, hovering here, hovering there, which doesn´t really implement, that they found somebody where the ground forces needed guidons to rescue them.
I know, at the moment I´m more the devils advocate - but thats my point of view.

My ac had 46kg in the tanks. It read 116kg on the gauges.
i was expecting around 120 kg so it all looked ok.

what I DIDNT know was that at the start of the day, my 400kg on the gauges was actually around 320kg in the tanks.

A stopwatch was as much use as tits on a bull

I’m not familiar with civilian operation but didn’t the refuel log (tech log?) and the engineers who did the refuel not detect the discrepancy? Or was it a known fault but an acceptable defect?

Rotorspeed, correct. We suspected that it built up over a period and I was the first to run it that low for a while.

Jay, is it not possible to use a `dipstick` ,or torch to check on the ground ( I know ,slope ,etc)...?

sycamore, neither would work on a 135 - the filler tube goes through a 90-degree bend; fuel only sits in the upper portion of the filler when the main tank is within 8-10 kg of full, which would never be the case on a UK police operation.

Fly Bull, me thinks there is a lot of "Bull***t" in your statement above.
Starting a stopwatch to calculate your endurance during Police Operations is about as much use as an ashtray on a motorbike!
Hovering, circling, balls-out to the next job. The fuel consumption is up and down like the proverbial whores draws!
Dave Trail deserves better. Like I said earlier. The hill of Hindsight is just that.

T &B, thanks.....

Fuel burn will vary but not to a large degree.