Delta-Ng. - your last 2 posts - Spot on.

Pittsextra - option B - know what you have to start with and updated / re-assessed as you go.

Pittsextra,

the trouble is fuel flow is not at a constant rate. Demands in S&L flight at 110 kts say could be a chunk less than sitting in the hover. Taking off with an hours worth of fuel, is that at best endurance or highest likely fuel flow required?

FRF / MLA is a limit not a target.

It’s so simple you say. Start the clock and you should know what your endurance is?

WRONG

I have got airborne in a helicopter with faulty fuel gauges. They SHOWED 1:30 fuel but were over-reading by 15 minutes worth. In other words the fuel was not there at the start. It got very tense when the other warnings came on.

The only time you can be confident of your contents is when the tank is brimmed full or empty.

If this aircraft had faulty gauges, it could have lifted with god only knows what in the tanks. The stopwatch call would be irrelevant

As I said above, it happened to me

Delta NG, that last line says it all

ANFI we all know what your bee in your bonnet is and it has f***k all to do with this accident.
One day you will grow up and realise you live in the real world where problems are real. Not imagined. Not hypothesised. Just real.
DeltaNg summarises this event very well in his last line. I would add, given the nature and background of the pilot that night..........there is most probably more to this story than what the current evidence implies. The subject pilot deserves at least that consideration.
BTW he was 2 minutes from landing at his home base. His calculated FRF would have been intact. If the events had not unfolded as they did it would have been just another professional pilot exploiting his available endurance efficiently to serve the public.
That is what this is about. Complexity and no of engines play no significant part.

Pitts. UPLIFTED FUEL. In professional aviation we make a big effort to ratify/verify the amount uplifted against the difference on the fuel gauges before and after refuel. But it is meaningless if the gross amount displayed before refuel is already erroneous AND we did not fill and witness to the brim.

Read/listen to what is being written. Anecdotal evidence of fuel indicating in the supply tanks that wasn’t there.

FUEL ENDURANCE - unless you are Stephen Hawkins, mentally calculating the predicted fuel consumption on a Police Ops flight is practically impossible. Hovering, balls-out, loiter type circling and everything in between was taking place on this flight. Other than a vague notion of what could have been used the pilot could easily be 10-20% out. Thus a very heavy reliance on gauge indications is necessary. And that is assuming the value indicated at all stages of flight is correct.

Double Bogey- spot on

For the record, it may not have happened in this case. BUT, if the aircraft had the same fault that happened to the Barton aircraft a few days later and was discovered in a few aircraft in the fleet check, then that’s a game changer. What if the fuel wasn’t ever in the tanks at take off? All the stopwatches in the world wouldn’t have helped.

However, even if the fault had been present, there was enough belt and braces systems to give the pilot the information he needed.

IF HE HAD BEEN TAUGHT AND UNDERSTOOD THE FUEL SYSTEM PROPERLY

Not looking for an excuse, just looking for a reasonable understanding of why Dave might have been confused

Well, the police NRW went for twins after a series singles having problems (crashing)
And even nowadays I d rather have a spare engine operating over congested areas, hovering prolonged times, day and night.
If a donk fails on you it’s just more relaxing having another one keeping you in the air instead of the need to react instantaneously to recover the Nr, getting speed, deciding where to autorotate to (especially at night with NVG).

How many engine failures had I?
One sputtering engine allowing limited power only, on a Bell206 where parts of the compressor housing went through the engine , several times when I tried to increase power - with passengers on board,
One engine to shut down on a Bo105
One engine to shut down on a BK117

The occurrences on the twins were much less stressful, nearly „non events“, except for the paperwork involved...

So ne question for me, what I prefer....

I haven’t seen these posted before but this is the list of issues the FAI will address

SHERIFFDOM OF GLASGOW AND STRATHKELVIN
Court Ref: GLW-B1473-18
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ISSUES

1. When and where each of the deaths occurred.

2. When and where the aircraft crash occurred.

3. The cause or causes of each of the deaths.

4. The cause or causes of the helicopter crash, including:-

4.1. how fuel was managed on the aircraft and in particular why both
transfer pumps were switched OFF, rendering unusable the
otherwise usable fuel in the main tank;

4.2. whether the Pilot’s Checklist was available to the pilot;

4.3. whether it was within the competence of a helicopter pilot
qualified to fly G-SPAO on police duties to comply with the
requirements of the Pilot’s Checklist;

4.4. at what stage in flight did the LOW FUEL warnings likely occur;

4.5. why, having acknowledged the LOW FUEL warnings, did the pilot
not complete the actions detailed in the Pilot’s Checklist;

4.6. whether the timing and/or the initially intermittent character of the LOW FUEL warnings contributed to the Pilot’s Checklist procedure not being completed;

4.7. whether there have been other instances of LOW FUEL warnings
not being followed;

4.8. whether the pilot believed the fuel transfer pumps were
operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, because he believed he had switched the fuel transfer pumps back ON, and if so whether the design or layout of the switches contributed to such errors occurring;

4.9. whether the pilot believed the transfer pumps were operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, as a result of erroneous fuel indications being displayed on the CAD;

4.10.what the root cause or causes were of any such erroneous fuel indications and whether they were adequately investigated and acted upon prior to the accident;

4.11.whether there was a failure of any part of the CAD prior to the accident;

4.12.what steps were open to a helicopter pilot qualified to fly this helicopter after both engines flamed out;

4.13.whether the designed time-interval between engine flame-outs was compromised by the design of the fuel tank system and, in particular, the undivided volume above the supply tanks, which, depending on the attitude of the helicopter, might have allowed fuel to migrate from one supply tank to another;

4.14.why autorotation, flare recovery and landing were not completed successfully;

4.15.whether the ability to carry out autorotation, flare recovery and landing was compromised by the design of the cockpit layout.

5. The precautions, if any, which could reasonably have been taken, and which, had they been taken, might realistically have resulted in the helicopter crash being avoided, including whether the crash might realistically have been avoided:-

5.1. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that both transfer pumps were switched OFF;

5.2. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that a fuel pump, having been switched OFF, has since been submerged in fuel;

5.3. by designing the fuel tank system and fuel contents indication system in such a way that the fuel transfer pumps did not require to be switched ON or OFF during flight;

5.4. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning, in the case of anomalous or implausible combinations of outputs from the sensors;

5.5. by designing the fuel tank system, and in particular the differential capacities of the supply tanks, in such a way as to ensure that the design objective of creating an interval of 3-4 minutes between engine flame-outs, or such other interval of time as would be represented by 4.5kg of fuel, or any other safe interval of time, was achieved;

5.6. by ensuring that power to the RADALT and steerable landing light was automatically maintained in the event of a double engine flame- out.

6. The defects, if any, in any system of working which contributed to the deaths or the accident, including:-

6.1. whether any aspect of the system of maintenance of G-SPAO, including its washing regime, contributed to the contamination of the fuel and/or the fuel tank system with water;

6.2. whether any aspect of the pre-flight check procedures contributed to the accident occurring;

6.3. whether any aspect of the training of pilots, in particular, with regard to fueling, pre-flight checks, the pilot handover procedure, the operation of the fuel contents indication system, erroneous fuel indications, the appropriate response to fuel cautions and warnings, and the execution of an autorotation at night, contributed to the accident occurring;

6.4. whether the practice of the “day-shift” pilot handing the aircraft over already fueled to the “night-shift” pilot contributed to the accident occurring.

7. any other facts which are relevant to the circumstances of the deaths, including:-

7.1. whether, and the extent to which, the Safety Recommendations of the AAIB in their Report 3/2015 have been adopted and implemented;

7.2. whether, and the extent to which, the operator, helicopter manufacturer and engine manufacturer have taken necessary and appropriate safety actions following the accident, including those considered by the AAIB in their Report 3/2015;

7.3. whether, and the extent to which, any recommendations should be made by this Court.



http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/de...9.pdf?sfvrsn=2

Looks like the investigating officers have been asking the right questions. Hopefully the armchair investigators who had all the answers on Pprune will now realise there are many more issues that need to be addressed before we character assassinate Dave. The conclusion may or may not agree with the original board, however he will be able to rest in peace, knowing that he has been given a more thorough hearing. Everyone involved deserves that.

No need to practice them for real.
But it would enhance the chance to get things right- i.e. switching the EmerShedBus early with the first problems arising, (low fuel warning i.e.), if pilots had a go in a simulator once or twice a year....

toptobottom, RVDT,

While personal relationships and personal issues may be relevant, they are unlikely to be considered outside of professional CRM issues aboard the aircraft. If there were known issues prior to the flight, management will be heavily censured and criticised for not doing anything about it. Close or familial relationships are generally forbidden between officers serving together, although it is not unknown for husband and wife to serve at the same station and/or work together in the same vehicle. The problem is that allegations of collusion will be levelled if an account of events by such officers is disputed.

If such matters are considered, it is likely that that part of the FAI will be heard behind closed doors and the conclusions omitted from the final report unless they point directly to being a primary cause of this incident.

Evil Twin. Luckily for us your narrow minded view is not shared by all

Evil Twin and RVDT - while I get this is a rumour forum and bearing in mind I did not know the Pilot I am struggling to understand how you can possibly come up with that hypothesis.

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