Punching George's Buttons are not as much fun as punching the Coey's Buttons I reckon....but if you got them...use them!

Even the now ancient Sperry Helipilot system would fly an ILS down to 60 Knots and 50 feet AGL holding Localizer and Glide Slope pegged in the middle of the donut....why not just pat George on the back and say "Thank you very much old friend!"?

That's true. And you just had to be alert enough to ensure the RADALT captured the 50' otherwise you'd be alerted from your slumber when the wheels touched down.

Banging on about 50 years of safe single operation and an accident in a year of twin operation is presumtious. Highly experienced pilots, total time and in type, and qualifications, have come to grief in exactly the same manner as is assumed here, CFIT on a night approach to a ship. I refer to the Bristow Puma in Oz. The story will without in time.

In the sixties I knew of fully automatic ILS and landings in a 4 jets followed by;--

"I thought you were flying it".

we seemed to manage for very many years in RAF and RN doing it - the only problems encountered were usually when the rad hold was left engaged as you coasted in - that resulted in a large upward movement of the collective on the Mk3 and lots of shouting:)

The radalt might lock onto the seabed in very shallow waters in very calm conditions (on old installations) but that probably accounts for a minute percentage of the user spectrum.

I believe it was the RAF Tristar fleet that had autoland fitted but not enabled due to issues with the manufacturer but some crews pressed the buttons anyway since the box was there and then complained about the accuracy of the system.

APs are great but you have to use them properly.

Never, ever heard of this phenomena before despite hundreds of hours overwater in flat calm (non doppler) conditions with radalt hold.

We often had it in Cyprus on the Wessex John - it was only in crystal clear and shallow waters when it was properly glassy. Fortunately we didn't have a rad hold facility so it just manifested itself as a very obvious overreading on the gauge.

Rad alts can give inaccurate readings when operating over fresh water, the purer the worse it could be. In the Antarctic we had to be careful that the rad alt was not giving a reading above ground level as the pure snow sometimes did not read. I imagine in the fresh Norwegan fiords much the same could happen.-

If I was down to 50 feet and George was still driving....trust me I was not sleeping! I was sweating bullets more like!

Besides....skids make for a terrific alarm clock in your scenario!:E

Preliminary report from the ATSB. Makes for interesting but sad reading:

Investigation: AO-2018-022 - Collision with water involving twin-engine EC135 helicopter, VH-ZGA, 35 km north-west of Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 14 March 2018

I think there is quite a bit more to come out.

Especially about his HUET currency.

I'm sorry, but reading that report...does anyone else think 'he' was single pilot after the ditching? Sad reading.

Fascinating reading - bringing lots of memories back to my deck landings and also my EC135 flying.
Looking back at my time then, I clearly recall having to readjust my instrument scan from the centre of the 'hub' of instruments being the Main AI - to the centre being the RCDI. Anything greater than 300'/min caused alarm bells to ring, but I was so fixated on it - it rarely if ever happened as I became more experienced.

Also looking back over my career - I realise now, why I was so tired - mentally after night low level sorties, especially to decks - simply because of the sheer amount of concentration exerted.
Maybe (easy after the event) just maybe, the PiC dropped his guard and assumed the other pilot was experienced enough NOT to take his eye off the ball.
One of my most frequent mantras to all my students/co-pilots was always: NEVER EVER assume the pilot next to you knows what they are doing - especially the experienced ones!

Two seasoned vets unable to monitor and maintain a simple gentle RoD - how tragic is that eh?
Add HUET lack of currency and you have all the holes lined up.
I sincerely hope that someone out there will learn from this (and other accident reports) and live to see retirement.
RiP.

Yep. HUET lack of currency is a big one. Pilot found inside the aircraft with seatbelt undone and door not jettisoned. So he survived the initial impact but didn't follow escape procedure.

Should we also be concerned that both pilots had to remove their helmets, presumably because the standard helmet connection to the aircraft was difficult/impossible to disconnect under the pressure of the situation? Any sensible aircraft/avionics designer should know (in the 21st Century) that a straight pull plug is essential for rapid egress in an emergency.

That sort of error was expected to be sorted in the 1930s, and could well have heavily contributed to the death of the pilot who had tried to escape unsuccessfully.

Furthermore, why on earth did such an operation not provide UEBS as a mandatory standard for the crew?

With his seat belt undone and no emergency exit formed, probably no amount of UEBS would have been of any assistance. Regrettably.

Maybe, but maybe not.

Was he going for the other exit to follow the surviving pilot? Could the air have given him the ability to slow down and act in a more survivable manner? We'll never know, but both UEBS and a straight pull helmet plug could have made a big difference to both pilots escape chances; notwithstanding the HUET currency issue.

Remember, both pilots had removed their helmets: what extra time did that take both in the decision making and in the execution?

What is the take up of UEBS in the offshore industry in Oz John, both crew and pax. Can remember in my day the operator, offshore oil, was loathe to the idea of wearing immersion suits and/or helmets.