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-   -   Esso load drop Longford, Victoria (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/604169-esso-load-drop-longford-victoria.html)

gulliBell 10th Jan 2018 02:02

Esso load drop Longford, Victoria
 

Originally Posted by rrekn (Post 9930009)
Esso do now...

Speaking of whom, I hear the Longford aerial bombing range has been active again :=

John Eacott 10th Jan 2018 09:43


Originally Posted by gulliBell (Post 10015677)
Speaking of whom, I hear the Longford aerial bombing range has been active again :=


Facebook link won’t show, but a ladder on a short line vs the tail rotor looked ripe for an early release!

megan 10th Jan 2018 23:22


I hear the Longford aerial bombing range has been active again
A result of management dictating how sling loads are to be done, as in the previous example? Pilots were not permitted to exercise "command", you had to do what you were told. Spelled out in plain language to a number of pilots.

gulliBell 11th Jan 2018 03:30

It would have been an easy job for a 206L swinging a 50' line. Step-back 5x5, 3 crew and an AW139 just complicates it too much.
Just saying.

gulliBell 12th Jan 2018 03:16

I know we are drifting OT, but seriously :ugh:

WIN NEWS reporter "1/2 tonne of steel with a mind of its own...46 km/h winds forcing the pilot to make an emergency drop..will review exactly what caused the instability."

Well, that will be an easy investigation. What on earth were they thinking belly hooking that load with a 10' line. Guys, if you wish to stay off the 6pm nightly news can I suggest using a 50' next time. That load was always going to go aerodynamic the way it was rigged.

megan 12th Jan 2018 03:49

Your 206 wouldn't be picking up a half tonne of steel and carrying it any distance gulliBell. 139 would be a good carriage for the task.

Got a link, or story on what occurred?

The previous incident was because the budget couldn't afford a bigger net for the company dictated method of packaging. Perhaps this time not a long enough strop.

gulliBell 12th Jan 2018 05:33

The news report was half a tonne, but I'm told it was really only 400 kg. I've slung enough 400kg loads up mountains in a 206L to know that a 206L can do it easy. And it didn't have to go far, only down to the monopods.
And as for the budget couldn't afford a bigger net on the previous aerial bombing practice, that is just dead wrong. Sure, the net was too small for the load, but there was a bigger net available. The guys that rigged the load didn't think to use it. That incident was an eye opener for all concerned because the empty net whipped up when the drums fell out and the pallet put a dent in the tail boom.

http://www.gippslandtimes.com.au/sto...ddock/?cs=1198

Look how it was rigged, I'm just stunned nobody thought it would go aerodynamic rigged like that.

fadecdegraded 12th Jan 2018 07:05

Ok the guys that rigged it got it wrong but didn’t at least one of the pilots have a look at before the job or at the very least eyeball it when hooking it up.
Wouldn’t take to much of a look to see it wasn’t right surely.

gulliBell 12th Jan 2018 08:19


Originally Posted by fadecdegraded (Post 10017537)
Ok the guys that rigged it got it wrong but didn’t at least one of the pilots have a look at before the job or at the very least eyeball it when hooking it up.
Wouldn’t take to much of a look to see it wasn’t right surely.

Yes. The pilot would have had to sign the load manifest and completed the step-back 5x5 paperwork. I can just hear the chain saws warming up to cut down the forest to feed the paper mills to supply the paper for the paperwork that's going to be generated from this one. And I hear the Chief Pilot has been re-assigned to Siberia, or somewhere in Russia. Obviously he'd be appreciative leaving town before the avalanche of paperwork hits.

John Eacott 12th Jan 2018 09:21

Not very good quality, a screen grab of a FB image, but the load seemed to have a nasty swing prior to release!

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/8...sso+139+01.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/8...sso+139+02.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/8...sso+139+03.jpg

finalchecksplease 12th Jan 2018 09:52

Looks like its a flatpack ladder now ... :E:E:E

heliduck 12th Jan 2018 09:56

On a positive note, it was a good decision to punch the load!!

John Eacott 12th Jan 2018 10:25


Originally Posted by finalchecksplease (Post 10017648)
Looks like its a flatpack ladder now ... :E:E:E

Rigging 101: or how not to?

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/8...sso+139+04.jpg

gulliBell 12th Jan 2018 12:42


Originally Posted by heliduck (Post 10017651)
On a positive note, it was a good decision to punch the load!!

...and a questionable decision to pick it up in the first place. They had a crewman, there should have been no issue at all putting it on Dolphin on a 50' line. I bet they went short-line to make it easier at the delivery end...just my wild guess. Send it out on a work boat next time.

For those of us with a bit of experience in O&G know how this investigation will go...the standard 3 step process.
1. Blame it on an act of God; failing that
2. Blame it on a contractor; and failing that
3. Blame it on the blue-collar worker at the lowest point of the food chain who should have known better.

They're already tried 1 with the attributed 46 km/h wind theory. That 'aint gonna pass the aero club sniff test. etc etc.

megan 12th Jan 2018 13:39


Sure, the net was too small for the load, but there was a bigger net available
No there wasn't.

Following the previous incident the rigging of loads was put into the hands of .......... riggers, who else do you expect. Of course, what they know about helos you could write on the point of a pin. Management decision, and written into their "how to do manual". The only person who could approve a sling load was delegated to non aviation management. What could go wrong?

Post the FB link please John?

gulliBell 12th Jan 2018 15:04


Originally Posted by megan (Post 10017812)
No there wasn't.

Oh yes there was...the crew that day was BA, BR and DD. I was one of those 3. I don't think you were. Just saying.

Blackhawk9 13th Jan 2018 00:37

Been down the road before of load prep with oil companies "only a rigger can do it" , despite going to AMTDU had to do a riggers course to tick the box, then promptly ignored all I did on the riggers course and prepared the sling loads properly.

John Eacott 13th Jan 2018 01:35


Originally Posted by megan (Post 10017812)

Post the FB link please John?

I've tried before but it seems to be blocked here.

Add letters oo instead of numbers 00 in the appropriate places: https://www.faceb00k.com/concernedma...7277648832407/

Re the net size discussion, I would have looked at a 30-50ft line with a choker to the top of the ladder rather than a net?

megan 13th Jan 2018 01:37


Oh yes there was
Oh no there wasn't. I have far, far more information than you, in fact there had been a concerted effort to get the organisation to get a bigger net, had been costed, but no authorisation was forthcoming. Was involved in the investigation.

Have a copy of the old 76 procedures they used, one of which states "slings are to be kept as short as possible".

Thanks for the steer John.

gulliBell 13th Jan 2018 03:50

Welll....all I can say is 4 people inspected that load - and I was present - before it was carried and not one person expressed any concern the net was too small. If the pilot had any concern about the size of the net he didn't say so, and in any event if he thought the net was too small that load wouldn't have flown. The load flew well at 90 kts and the three of us on-board were all surprised when the drums fell out of the net. It wasn't until later we learned the pallet in the empty net had actually hit the aircraft. The net wasn't jettisoned, it stayed attached to the hook. There may not have been a bigger net at the heliport that day, but there were bigger nets available offshore, BBMT and elsewhere within the organization that might have been used. And plan B might have been to break it up into 2 loads of 2 drums but, as I say, nobody expressed any concern about the size of the net so a larger net wasn't requested and it was done as a single load. Anyway, moving on....

megan 13th Jan 2018 04:47


nobody expressed any concern about the size of the net
Aaahhhh, but yes they did.

Scardy 13th Jan 2018 11:08

A bigger net would have done very little to help avoid this occurrence.
Belly hooking a load like that?🙈

gulliBell 14th Jan 2018 01:35

Basically the same mistake that was made on the previous bombing run...the load wasn't rigged properly, and if any concerns were expressed about it they still went ahead and did it. Should be an easy investigation, just cut and paste from the previous investigation report.

Karma bit on that day...EXQ was a brand new aircraft, as I recall this was its first job offshore after delivery. I remember when we did the hook check the hook was wired arse-about. Arm the hook, "hook open" advisory light came on. Release the hook and "hook armed" advisory light came on. Not that this had anything to do with the load falling out of the net, of course. But still, as I say, karma....

My guess is they'll outsource jobs like this (i.e. sling load jobs that can't be belly hooked). But there is a political angle at play, if you start outsourcing parts of the operation - day SAR has already been outsourced (CHC), some pilots have been outsourced (HNZ), sling load jobs might be next - it might not stop at that. If outsourcing reaches critical mass they might end up outsourcing the whole shooting match. And that would be a case of shooting the proverbial golden goose in the foot.

gulliBell 14th Jan 2018 01:47


Originally Posted by megan (Post 10018290)
Aaahhhh, but yes they did.

In that case OIMS should have put a stop to it. If concerns were expressed, I bet the investigation report didn't mention it, right?

megan 14th Jan 2018 03:56


In that case OIMS should have put a stop to it
You think?

You'll remember it was a VFR operation, so some questions may be in order.

1. What planning did crews undertake to ensure VMC was possible?

2. How often were you required to shutdown offshore due weather?

3. What plan of action did you have in the event of finding yourself single engine and everything onshore socked?

4. How much time did you build flying IMC in those so called VMC conditions?

5. What was the lowest height at which you flew enroute and were IMC?

6. How low did you get in IMC to find a platform?

gulliBell 14th Jan 2018 04:36

Well yes, all of that is true. Not-withstanding. Esso Captains usually displayed excellent skill and judgement in everything they did...if an Esso Captain thought a net was too small for a sling load job I'd be surprised he proceeded with the mission using that net. No different today, if an Esso Captain thought that ladder was rigged properly - and let's face it, it obviously wasn't - I'm surprised they proceeded with a "let's see how it flies" experiment. Particularly since nobody wants to be the first to put a scratch on the shiny new toy. From the video of the incident, the load flew exactly as expected for the way it was rigged. Lucky they didn't put a scratch on the shiny new toy, or worse.

Mistakes made in the past are likely to happen again if the lessons learned are ignored. The recommendations made in the incident report following from the EXQ bombing run, if followed, should have seen them not do what was done this time.

megan 14th Jan 2018 05:24


if an Esso Captain thought a net was too small for a sling load job I'd be surprised he proceeded with the mission using that net
You may not be aware of the relationship between management and pilots. Used to be outstanding, but it changed.

The CEO's at one time used to be Australians, Jim Kirk and John Schubert immediately spring to mind, both would drop into the crewroom for a chat and coffee if they were in the vicinity. Then the Americans moved in, and as one non aviation manager told the assembled pilots in a conference room, "We (management) don't give a **** about you people. You people have it too good". Exact words, reason behind statement, they were a stable workforce.

Pilots used to be under their own award, administered by the AFAP, but the AFAP were just a rubber stamp, all negotiations were carried out by the pilots themselves. They were all suckered into becoming staff, and relations within the group changed. No more Fridays at the pub or socialising, it was every dog for himself. Reason? The yearly appraisal, which determined your pay rise. Such an appraisal system does not encourage stand up arguments with management. As I said previously, management attitude was you do what you're told, a PIC was PIC in name only, you had to do what management ordered, and bugger what the regs or ops manual said.

Jim Ward is a exemplar of the companies attitude towards its employees.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esso_L..._gas_explosion


Esso blamed the accident on worker negligence, in particular Jim Ward, one of the panel workers on duty on the day of the explosion.

The findings of the Royal Commission, however, cleared Ward of any negligence or wrongdoing. Instead, the Commission found Esso fully responsible for the accident.

Other findings of the Royal Commission included:

1. the Longford plant was poorly designed, and made isolation of dangerous vapours and materials very difficult;

2. inadequate training of personnel in normal operating procedures of a hazardous process;

3. excessive alarm and warning systems had caused workers to become desensitised to possible hazardous occurrences;

4. the relocation of plant engineers to Melbourne had reduced the quality of supervision at the plant;

5. poor communication between shifts meant that the pump shutdown was not communicated to the following shift.

Certain managerial shortcomings were also identified:

1. the company had neglected to commission a HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) analysis of the heat exchange system, which would almost certainly have highlighted the risk of tank rupture caused by sudden temperature change;

2. Esso's two-tiered reporting system (from operators to supervisors to management) meant that certain warning signs such as a previous similar incident (on 28 August) were not reported to the appropriate parties;

3. the company's "safety culture" was more oriented towards preventing lost time due to accidents or injuries, rather than protection of workers and their health.
Low level managers are just as much under the pump as those pilots on staff with regard to appraisals. Don't rock the boat is the message, do what you're told and you'll be rewarded come appraisal. The fact that pilots may be provided by HNZ, or some other entity, under contract, makes no difference to their standing. Rock the boat and we'll get someone who doesn't.

OIMS? Yes, good stuff, for lighting your campfire.


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