Considering the Sea King floats quite nicely upright with no flot bags inflated, that one hasn't gone so well:)

Gives a whole new meaning to the Command "Gear Up!".

helium in the tyres

That particular Sea King had ditched at top hover weight at about 1 a.m. and had been kept rotors running on the sea for some four hours awaiting daybreak so that it could be craned aboard the carrier . When the crew eventually shut the aircraft down the waves were lapping over the tops of the sponsons. Shortly after, with a lot of water in the nose electrical bay and in the forward part of the cabin, the aircraft dipped its nose and turned over. The bags did their job but it was the taking on of so much water over several hours that caused the capsize.

Funny how our recollections differ over a span of many years: I was top cover for 051 after the ditching and was also SSEO, responsible for the dinghy and bolt croppers that the ships divers 'borrowed' to go to the machine when it couldn't raise the sonar body, thus preventing an attempt at a SE take off. The cable was duly cut with the bolt croppers; the loss of the stabilising effect of the sonar allowed a roll to build up in the long swell. Eventually the SK was shut down, abandoned and left to its own devices.

Jerry G was my co-pilot, we were instructed in no uncertain terms by Flyco to remain at least 1nm clear in case we turned it over with our downwash :rolleyes:

But we're wandering OT.........

Sorry John, you've got it wrong. There was no attempted SE takeoff... black night, no horizon, too bloody dangerous to try! Yes cutting the sonar body loose made the aircraft lively, so did losing the AFCS, and all other electrical equipment gradually dropped offline but when the intercom went too I decided it was time to vacate and not risk the crew further. Not quite as you remember, but still very clear in my memory ... not the sort of personal experience one forgets!


PM sent.

And, as I am sure you know, losing the AFCS is a pretty sure sign that the nose bay is flooding and the C of G will be too far forward in that case for a safe SEWTO.

I stand corrected: recollections differ over so many years!

Back to the AW139?

Complete and utter rubbish.

:rolleyes:

I assume what he means is that the RFM tells you to ditch or land immediately if the fire warning remains after following the procedure. Had all the crews that have had such warnings followed the procedure in the RFM, there would have been a lot of ditchings, which may not all have been totally successful, and the type may have suffered some of the same loss of confidence we have seen elsewhere. Thankfully, those of us that have had these warnings have used airmanship and captaincy and not ditched! I'm referring purely to the S92 fire warnings issue and not making any comment on this ADA incident!

212 - The 139 has in its ECL for 'Engine Fire in Flight' a unique line that as far as I know does not exist in Bell, Sikorsky an AH helicopters - it says:

"Confirm Engine Fire"

Unfortunately, the simple statement is a trifle ambiguous but I know how I would read it.

G.

Apparently Leonardo just released another builtin regarding this incident.

Anyone?

Geoffers - do you know that to be a fact? Hint - I know it isn't :=

If I could cough "BS" online, I'd be doing it right now to your message :E

On affected engine
- ENG MODE switch to IDLE
- Confirm engine FIRE
- ECL to OFF
- Lift FIRE/ARM guard and press illuminated pushbutton
- Set FIRE EXTING switch to BTL1

I was referring to the assertion that "confirm fire" is unique to the 139.

See follow up bulletin below, confirms it was the oil cooler fan.

They certainly seem to be quick getting information out. I feel and AD or SB for the fan coming though.

212man wrote relative to 92 fire warnings: Then you are saying that the Cougar crew acted with proper airmanship as they relied on Sikorsky propaganda about the 92's 30 minute loss of lube lie instead of following the RFM to the letter. This from you who parked a 92 1 km short of an airfield because of a (later determined) non-event oil pump failure. There you had a safe place to land once you mis-interpreted the criticality of the situation and decided to follow the RFM instead of using airmanship to stay in the air another 60 seconds.

After the second false fire warning the 92 should have been grounded like the 235 after the oil pump drive gear failures which in the end were as serious as the 92 pump failures (which did not result in grounding). The 235 crews showed they were pros by following the RFM to ditch after an erroneous second failure indication said they had backup lube failure, which was caused by gross incompetence by Airbus wiring the sensor backwards. They could have made it to a dry landing, but thought of their passengers instead of future bar roomy war stories.

Geoffersincornwall,
Do you update the training for this? Will Leonardo lift the oil cooler noises from the CVR so you can train pilots on an alternative to ditching from That noise combined with high temps? The QRH for high MGB temp is "land as soon as possible", but the general note applied to Transmission System Failure, of which the high temp is one, adds the proviso that "multiple indications" (there were none) or "abnormal noise and/or vibration" (there was that) changes the action to Land Immediately (ditch). Quite a burden on the pilots to differentiate.

Maybe an engineering guru like noooby can fill us in on the technical consequences of this kind of failure.

BTW, the QRH Engine Fire drill says "confirm", but the Rotorsim interpretation for that has always been for the pilots to simply check for the fire lights on the power levers, none of the Puma visual check of the engines with the eyebrow mirrors, or the 92 doing the same with the tail fin camera (or doing a flyby of a convenient rig). Fortunately the Fire Warning system, like the transmission, is quite reliable. Oh, and all types I've flown have some kind of "confirm" written into the engine fire procedure, at least on the operator ECL.

The Sultan

Suggest you revisit 212man's post, as he NEVER mentioned ANYTHING about the MGB ECL procedure.

Slightly off topic, but for an engine fire, in flight, the S76D RFM states:

1. Confirm fire.
2. Attain safe single engine airspeed.
3. Throttle (affected engine) - STOP.
4. FIRE/ARM switch (affected engine) - ARM
5. Fire extinguisher switch - MAIN/RESERVE (as required).
6. Land as soon as possible..

But I digress.....