Originally Posted by Capvermell
(Post 9726176)
I think this lower level of magnification at Streetmap.co.uk - Map of 52.840320, -3.993511 shows rather better where the site actually is in relation to the coast and the height of the actual mountain/ridge crashed in to.
It would also be interesting to know what altitude they were travelling at during most of the rest of the journey from Luton and what effort they made to fly higher when flying over terrain chock full with mountains as high as 1085m. If determined to make the trip in such adverse weather conditions its also hard to see why they wouldn't have flown over lower terrain and north of but close to the North Wales coast, although even then there is a long and dangerous ridge of mountains up to 1064m high just south of Llanfairfechan. But as the Twin Squirrell is capable of flying at up to 3,400m was there any good reason for them to be flying this low in this area. Of course I expect weather and lack of visibility at higher altitudes no doubt came in to the equation. Or was lack of fuel to take a more circuitous route with this amount of adult passengers and luggage also potentially a factor? |
Sad that on a 'professional' forum the pilot is being blamed for flying too low in poor visibility, with little evidence. He may have been 1000 feet above the highest mountain and experienced a catastrophic mechanical fault or taken ill. It's no so long ago that the entire rotor came off of a helicopter. Had they been in poor visibility and the wreckage not found would the same presumptions have been posted?
|
Originally Posted by SandyYoung
(Post 9726303)
Sad that on a 'professional' forum the pilot is being blamed for flying too low in poor visibility, with little evidence. He may have been 1000 feet above the highest mountain and experienced a catastrophic mechanical fault or taken ill. It's no so long ago that the entire rotor came off of a helicopter. Had they been in poor visibility and the wreckage not found would the same presumptions have been posted?
|
Great post, justanotherflyer. I call it 'setting expectations' and it applies to situations outside aviation as well. Your description:
" Once airborne, the pressure to keep going just that further mile, to look for the gap in the cloud or the lifting in visibility, can then become intense, for fear of disappointing the companions on board. We've all been there." Is exactly what I meant by that 'land' decision being a difficult one, and the temptation to 'press on pressing on' is very strong. |
Originally Posted by SandyYoung
(Post 9726303)
He may have been 1000 feet above the highest mountain and experienced a catastrophic mechanical fault or taken ill.
Professional Pilots stated that they would consider this flight on this route, weather and time of the day challenging even in a much better equipped bigger Helicopter and this coming from Military / SAR Pilots gives me a clear idea what that means for a PPL in a rather small helicopter with limited equipment to deal with such an environment. Chances are 1 + 1 = 2. |
MSA is the minimum altitude to fly at when flying IFR. From a legal point of view one has to comply with the Minimum Height Rule which is 1,000 ft above the highest point within 5 nm of the aircraft. (With certain specific exceptions). Flying IFR assumes the aircraft is suitably equipped and the pilot has the appropriate instrument qualification. Also operators might specify higher criteria that the Min Ht Rule in their manuals for a variety of reasons. You also have to ask how accurately you can pinpoint position. To allow for errors you might look 10 miles either side of track (and beyond track) to find the highest point on that leg of the route.
Flying VFR you may fly below MSA. However it's a good idea to calculate a minimum VFR altitude. The idea behind this is to have a preplanned "If I can't maintain this altitude then I'm turning back or diverting". You would also use this figure before flight when studying the Met F215 etc to make a go/no go decision or electing to fly a different route clear of higher terrain. This hopefully prevents pilots from ploughing into bad weather and then carrying on until they create a problem for themselves. To arrive at the Min VFR Alt look at terrain and obstacles en route and then ask yourself "How low do I want to be to the ground?". This figure may well vary depending upon the individual pilot's experience. Ask yourself "Do I really want to be flying below 1,500 - 2,000 feet above ground level?" All the above is notwithstanding the low flying regs with respect to congested areas etc. NB As has been stated previously we don't know the cause of this accident and my comments are not intended to pre judge the results of the investigation. |
Trouble is, it's far too easy to look at the clouds on the top of the hills and then get funneled down the valleys where you can still see and maintain your 500' agl - right up to the point where the valley floor is gradually climbing and you turn a corner into a dead-end (sometimes sadly, literally) with no escape route except a turnback towards the high ground of the valley sides.
|
He may have been 1000 feet above the highest mountain and experienced a catastrophic mechanical fault or taken ill. Without a CVFDR, there will only be the radar trace and any information that can be gleaned from the electronics on board - GPS, ipads, mobile phones etc. |
Originally Posted by N-Jacko
(Post 9726145)
Which is, even by the standard of PPRUNE, potentially misleading. :)
Really what I was referring to is the concept of "safety altitude" as calculated by VFR flyers for x-country navigation. I have amended my post in view of your valuable correction. BTW I am not making assumptions about the contributing factors in this particular accident, which have yet to be determined. Typically safety altitude might be deemed as 1000 feet over the highest en-route elevation (or 2000 feet over hilly terrain). My point is that when I have queried more than one student or pilot over the years about what that idea means, the response has been in effect "don't go any lower than safety altitude if in bad visibility". More or less taking it as akin to the IFR concepts of MSA or MORA. That way of thinking is sure to lead to hazard. What I emphasise to students is that safety altitude is the minimum height above terrain that offers some sort of useful margin of choice for visual manouvering should wx deteriorate. If cloud or reducing vis. force you down to your calculated safety altitude, then for the sensible pilot there is no choice but to change course, you simply can't proceed. Occasionally I've kept mum and let a student keep going a bit further to see what happens. It's not a pretty sight as the wheel gets gripped tighter and the pilot leans forward in the seat straining to see what's coming, while the altimeter inches downwards. Accidental flight into IMC becomes a real possibility. One chap was thrilled to see blue skies in a distant gap and flew right into a wide deep valley ahead. Moments later we were boxed in visually. It took my changing to IFR and flying out on top to get us home - flying by himself a difficult precautionary landing would have been necessary. The guy was sweating bullets, and vowed "never again!" a dozen times. Anyway in summary a proper understanding of safety altitude, plus a resolute automatic decision to alter course towards clearer skies if you can't maintain VFR above it, are essential parts of a safe VFR mindset. addendum: folks, kindly note I am writing from a FW perspective. I appreciate this is a rotary forum. |
Originally Posted by Non-PC Plod
(Post 9726113)
juustanotherflyer,
I like your "pre disappointment" approach. Do you mind if I blag it and your spiel to use in TEM training? |
Are we still talking about helicopters
2000ft above hilly terrain for a VFR helicopter?
|
Originally Posted by PhilJ
(Post 9726405)
2000ft above hilly terrain for a VFR helicopter?
As noted in my original post, my background is in FW flying. If helicopter practices are typically different, then please adjust accordingly. |
Notorious for doing the unexpected?
Originally Posted by configsafenot
(Post 9724123)
The area is notorious for weather closing in on you unexpectedly
Originally Posted by snchater
(Post 9724399)
I'm a fixed wing pilot (C182) and flew into Caenarfon at the weekend. Despite the cavok conditions I almost got caught out by the rotor in the lee of the Snowdonian range (1000fpm down + very turbulent).
I note from the Valley metars that there was a brisk (20kt+) north-easterly wind on the day of the accident . Do helicopters cope well with turbulent conditions? G-XLTG
Originally Posted by alphanumeric
(Post 9724539)
a thought any ppl who wanted a twin rating needed to pass the cpl exams first?
|
Looking at the UK visual flight rules in section 4, outside controlled airspace, how long has this helicopter provision been in effect?
https://www.bfgc.co.uk/VFR_Guide.pdf For helicopters operating at a speed which, having regard to the visibility, is reasonable: Clear of cloud and in sight of the surface. |
Looking at the UK visual flight rules in section 4, outside controlled airspace, how long has this helicopter provision been in effect? This is the fundamental difference between helicopters and fixed wing. It can be, and frequently is, perfectly safe to fly in weather so marginal that ONLY entry into IMC prevents flight in accordance with VFR! Not the case in a fixed wing!! The underlying principle is that the ONLY back up is an immediate IFR climb above safety altitude, or an immediate landing. If one is unable due icing, or unqualified, to confidently conduct BOTH an IFR climb, and subsequent instrument recovery to a suitable diversion, then ONLY an immediate landing remains! However, if at the same time, the terrain over which you are flying is not suitable for a landing, then your options have disappeared. Tragically the result is then inevitable. I say again. I have no idea what the cause of this accident was. It's simply too early to say. Unless there are recorders onboard the aircraft we may never know with any certainty. Investigators may just have to collect what physical evidence there is, and make an informed guess. Very, very sad for those left behind, but a distinctly possible outcome. |
4468
The underlying principle is that the ONLY back up is an immediate IFR climb above safety altitude, or an immediate landing. If one is unable due icing, or unqualified, to confidently conduct BOTH an IFR climb, and subsequent instrument recovery to a suitable diversion, then ONLY an immediate landing remains. However, if at the same time, the terrain over which you are flying is not suitable for a landing, then your options have disappeared. Tragically the result is then inevitable. |
Flight up to MSA. I am not sure if either the pilot was qualified for IFR or if the aircraft was IFR capable, in the event of the weather, there would have been multiple opportunities to land on level playing fields or school grounds from Welshpool, Bala and beyond. Based on the impact on Rhinog Fawr, and the weather, it seems unlikely the aircraft was still under VFR.
|
Chopjock - have you tried hovertaxiing in limited visibility, in the pissing rain in the mountains? You are certainly not VFR! if your viz is less than 1000m then you are either in cloud or in fog - take your pick.
The answer is to have turned back earlier or landed when there was an option. |
Spot on Crab................
|
Originally Posted by Homsap
(Post 9726674)
Flight up to MSA. I am not sure if either the pilot was qualified for IFR or if the aircraft was IFR capable, in the event of the weather, there would have been multiple opportunities to land on level playing fields or school grounds from Welshpool, Bala and beyond. Based on the impact on Rhinog Fawr, and the weather, it seems unlikely the aircraft was still under VFR.
|
All times are GMT. The time now is 01:58. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.