Why in the world does he need a TFR established wherever he decides to go? If anyone's going to take pot shot I don't think it would involve an aircraft.

The article is typical Obama bashing and it's sad to see these deaths being used as such!

It even starts with this statement:
So, nothing unique to the present incumbent and not the first time the TFR was in force! A more measured approach to the questions would be; "did standard security service protocols influence the causes of the accident?", not "was it Obama's holiday that did it?"

A couple of weeks of restrictions does not create these kinds of proficiency numbers:

BTW, the official report is here: http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/LinkClic...d=61&mid=88592

It is not Obama bashing....it is simply suggesting the Temporary Flight Restriction threw a huge wrench in the Flying Program for the unit and perhaps that played a role in the management pressures to play catch up after Obama departed.

Oddly....it ain't all about Obama and his annual vacation for some golfing.

Sadly it looks like a familiar tale of poor serviceability of the fleet (for a number of reasons including manpower), a continued push to keep the readiness levels (keeping someone's command/promotion tick boxes filled) poor morale and just not enough training - ie achieving bare currency as opposed to proper competency.

Sad waste of good guys.

Strange use by the military of the description "mishap" - which in my book is a small mistake / unlucky accident / misfortune. However ....

I note some crew members had total flight time equal to their flight time on CH53 - is that erroneous reporting, or possible? And the low total hours makes one realize their vulnerability without sufficient and regular competency training.

I spent more time offshore so easily forget the pressures within the military, but it makes me wonder if Safety Culture has been developed enough when the Aviation Safety Officer is noted as having a heated discussion on the previous day about the execution of that particular flight - and no-one took enough notice - does he not have direct access to the unit commander?

Pretty standard US terminology in their reports - MP = Mishap Pilot. I guess similar to my company's non-use of the word 'accident' as one of the definition's implies something that couldn't be controlled or predicted.

I've always been amused by the use of the term "substantial" when describing damage to an aircraft in an accident, even though the largest piece you could fit in your pocket.

As anyone who has done helicopter formation will tell you - line astern is the worst position because judging the rate of closing is so much harder - and that's in the daytime. At night it is almost impossible - hence the advice in their training documents to minimise time spent within 15 degrees of that position.

It is a sad and tragic event that could have been avoided with proper funding. I knew the Major slightly that died in that accident. We had mutual friends and were both stationed on the same Air Station several years ago. I've known too many fine men and women who have died in accidents like these over the years.

I also have been in the same situation as those Marines were in with not enough money for flight time, poor leadership, and being pressured to do a flight when you shouldn't. One year I got a little over 100 hours (the minimum according to OPNAV 3710) because of funding and this was back around 2006.

Hopefully this situation with funding, equipment, and training will change but I'm not that optimistic.

Then add in the use of NVG's and NVG compatible lighting rather than the standard Nav Lights and you add another dimension to the difficulty.

Well the CO and the Brigadier General were stood down which probably means the hierarchy can sleep at night anyway:mad:

Meanwhile press on itis has its way again........:{

Poor souls.

Sasless, sorry, by night I meant, but didn't specify, being on NVG with NVG formation lights.:ok:

The US Navy uses an officially defined doctrinal term, Mishap, which has severity codes A, B, and C. That term covers both ground and air events.
I've investigated a few of each.
Reference: OPNAVINST 3750.7 series ; Chapter 3:

Quote:

---

The following mishap severity classes, based on personnel injury and property damage, apply to all three categories of mishaps listed above. To determine mishap costs see paragraph 314.

a. Class A Severity. A Class A mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or aircraft or UAVs exceeds $1,000,000, or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing, or any
fatality or permanent total disability results from the direct
involvement of naval aircraft or UAV. Loss of a UAV is not a
Class A unless the cost is $1,000,000 or greater.
b. Class B Severity. A Class B mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or aircraft or UAVs is more than $200,000 but less than $1,000,000, or a permanent partial disability or the hospitalization of three or more personnel
results.
c. Class C Severity. A Class C mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to property or aircraft or UAVs is $20,000 or more, but less than $200,000, or an injury requiring five or
more lost workdays results.
d. Any occurrence in which the total cost of property or aircraft or UAV damage is less than $20,000 and there are no
reportable injuries is not an aviation mishap. Report these
events as hazards. (See Chapter 4.)

---

Your opinion on the semantics of the term is noted, but irrelevant. You are invited to read chapter three of the OPNAV instruction, which governs Navy and Marine Corps aviation safety and mishaps, for further edification.

Tis common practice for the POTUS and the VP. Some of the fun ones were when Dick Cheney would go fishing in his drift boat on the Snake River. His property in Jackson Hole lies on the border of two National Forests. The TFR would be a "Rolling TFR"--speed determined by the water flow and where he took lunch. I was on fire contract on those forestswith a helicopter for his last 3 years in office.

In reality the Secret Service is easy to work with. We had a discrete transponder code and direct phone and radio communication with them in the event we needed to get in and effect an initial attack on a wild fire.

Crab,

There are more than a few that frequent here that did not have the privilege of doing military flying or experience NVG formation or precision flying using NVG's that others got to enjoy.

Just pointing that out in case that might have been overlooked when they are considering what it must have been like that night....offshore....operating in close proximity to another aircraft with not just limited visual acuity but also a very limited field of view as well all in a different hue of lighting than normal vision.

Lonewolf 50

Thanks for allowing me the opportunity to further my military edification but the resume was sufficient. I now see Class "A" Mishap mentioned once in the preliminaries.

Your involvement in the investigations is noted, but irrelevant!

Lonewolf, forget the classifications that applied at the time, may have been as you quote above, but the fond quote at Ellyson ('67) was it was impossible to have an accident in the TH13, providing you had the data plate.

Yes, and so do the Ops(O) and the Training(O). Who does the CO, in the end, listen to? Given the details in the article, and the relief of the CO, the chain of command seems to have found fault with his choices.


Not sure if you spent time in the military or not, but operating safely is the issue ... and if you aren't operating you are not doing your job. So it's a balancing act.
It's not either or, it's both. That would compare to your offshore experience: if you aren't operating safely, to include operating where the revenue is derived from, then you don't have a company, much less a safety culture (of whatever quality).

Not that there is any pressure Offshore to fly is there?

Or are there shortcuts taken that impinge upon safety either.

My, we are being defensive. Of course there are far fewer pressures offshore in comparison where the role is nowhere near as demanding as night formation NVG - everything is in the Ops Manual agreed by oil company which means PIC can simply refuse to do flight using manual as defence which should include qualification, currency and pairing. Ok, so depends on the maturity of the oil company's local management and aviation advice - and the intervention from CO and ASO equivalent to back you up if necessary.

My point about ASO was that he had a new CO to convince on 13/14 Jan about the execution of the flight. Of course CO was possibly under pressure from Brig Gen to continue operating as normal - though CO did brief his new unit not to push it. Just cruel, tragic and ironic that Sanborn relieved CO in order to, in his words, prevent a mishap.

Last thing both operator and oil company want to hear after an offshore incident, accident is "but I thought I was helping the customer" (with the short cut, failure to follow SOP etc). I was just trying to get a feel if that had permeated through to the military. I mention it 'cus an old Vietnam pilot I knew had a simple rule from moons ago - 3 things wrong prior to pulling power, cancel the mission, think again. A simplified version of how to avoid lining up the holes in the Swiss cheese.