I'm pretty sure I would ignore that bit of the RFM!

Agreed - in fact there was a second emergency landing in Brunei too, 4 months after the one you describe (vespel spline failure followed by churning). It was on its way to Bandar airport to take a senior manager offshore and landed 7 nm short in a chicken farm!

Hang on a minute. So how many S-92 incidents have there really been?

Define incidents?

Can someone list the fatal S92 crashes, where whilst airborne the the machine suffered a failure that left the crew with no options, and all onboard no chance of survival whatsoever?

We are all aware of several tragic examples of the above involving the L2/EC225.

I don't fly S92s or have any vested interest.
I do know what I would do if I suffered a loss of MRGB pressure if the ECL stated "land or ditch immediately."
I also know what I'd do if the main rotor system detached at altitude, unfortunately.

So if you are going to lump the L2 accidents with the 225 ones to try to make your case more convincing, can we lump Blackhawk accidents with the S92 ones?

But anyway I think you are missing the point. We are looking at hundreds of thousands of hours for both fleets, with a minuscule proportion of flights being problematic. Whether a major incident or accident becomes a fatal one is largely down to luck, so to get a handle on the relative safety you need to look at the big picture, and consider the basics of probability theory. If one (hypothetical) type has numerous "near misses" but no fatals (by luck) and the other has unblemished record except for one unlucky fatal accident, which is the safer?

It's akin to saying that you only want to fly a brand new type with zero hours on it, because it hasn't got a history of any fatal accidents.

An incident or occurence, where an 'occurrence means any safety-related event which endangers or which, if not corrected or addressed, could endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.'

And including places that the Press and Journal, Aftenbladet and the Grimsby Telegraph do not report from.

One thing is for sure....HC is going to talk up the Head tosser and talk down the other.

He is at least consistent in his opinion.

What really gets to him is the 92 continues flying in all the oil patches and his favorite ride has become financial drains on every operator that owns or leases the 225.

Evidently the licensing authorities, operators, AND the customers see things much differently than does HC.

HC
I'm not trying to make "my case more convincing".

I'm trying to point out there have been several unexplained* catastrophic failures# of the same component which is fitted to L2 and EC225 model helicopters (a component type not fitted to L or L1 models).

I'm unaware of similar component failures# in S92 aircraft. I'm genuinely asking if there have been any.

HC, are you saying components shared between Blackhawks and S92s have failed giving all on board no chance of survival?

Just to be clear. I'm not saying any type of helicopter is statistically less safe than any other.
I guess, like most pilots, I can accept the risk of being killed or worse, by something that couldn't be foreseen. But am mortified at the thought of getting back in an EC225 and having the rotor system detach. Which is a twice proven possibility.


*Considered unexplained, let alone rectified, by most in the aviation community, includeding several aviation authorities.
#Failures which kill all on board despite any level of pilot intervention or "luck".

The fact that we are having this 'discussion' sort of says it all. The relevant authorities have been very careful (if would seem) to not get into type specific assessments - hence this toing and froing. If they had there would at least be a solid factual basis to work from.
I know pilots who fly (or rather flew!) both. Each had their preferences, but when you come down to very big chunks flying off or losing control then the situation is pretty serious. Telling a captive workforce to put 'its' big boy pants on' or immediately pointing to the machines maintenance are tactics which add a lot of smoke and fire to the situation and the first victim are the facts.
Will the 225 return to offshore service? Without a pretty impressive effort from AH it seems unlikely, at least not in the next couple of years. In contrast the Sikorski response to the loss of control incident seemed textbook and does not seem to impacted workforce confidence.
Those things by themselves almost tip the argument, regardless of the content of the actual incident.
As to EASA clearing the type for flight? Before the incident investigation reports? Only the French would even think of doing that!

Well once proven for a 225, but never mind! Anyway I am not suggesting that everyone jumps back into a 225 right now. Even though the probability of a rotor head coming off again is probably much less than the probability of another sort of accident, it is of course sensible to wait until we know exactly what the cause of the problem was and there is a satisfactory remedy. But my point is that if those two criteria are met, the only reason not to fly it again seems to be its trial and guilty verdict by social media, hysteria and general ignorance.

EASA and FAA have approved last year (october and december) the return to service of the Airbus Helicopters H225 and AS332 L2 .
.

Yes you are right about the financial drain, wrong that my view differs from the authorities, operators and customers right now. As I've just said, I think it is correct to keep the aircraft grounded until the cause and solution are implemented.

But whilst of course the weakest link in the chain dominates, in many other ways the 225 is the far better machine, from the pilot's point of view at least. But of course you wouldn't know, you haven't flown either machine.

HC,

You are correct that I have not flown either machine.

That being said....plain ol' commonsense tells me that the 225 has killed two Crews and Passenger loads of people as a result of shucking the entire Main Rotor System (both apparently from very similar causes) in a very short interval of time.

The 92 on the other hand, has not had a fatal accident that can legitimately be attributed to the Aircraft. In the Cougar crash the Crew did not follow the Checklist and the prolonged flight after that decision is what resulted in the Fatalities.

You can brag about the 225 automation all you wish....but until the things can keep their Rotorheads on.....then it is not the better machine no matter how you want to think it so.

Face it....the 92 is out there earning its living and the 225 is not.

So tell me....just why do you keep to that same old position?

Everything argues against your position.

We saw the Wessex removed from Civil Use post numerous fatal crashes did we not.....anyone that flew the Wessex loved it. But....it was removed from service.

I see the 225 thing much the same as the Wessex in how it all turned out.

Your loving how the 225 flew...versus your opinion of the 92.....that has nought to do with which aircraft is the better as Pilot Satisfaction is but one criteria of many that would determine the relative merits of various aircraft.

I personally rate the ability to retain the Rotorhead far more important than having a magic autopilot system. At the end of the Day I want to be stood at the Bar with a Pint in my hand and not plucking at a Harp.

SAS, yes of course keeping its head is quite important! I don't see anything that argues against my position - which is that the 225 shouldn't be flown until it can learn to keep its head on. But if it can, it will once again be a far better helicopter than that old rehashed dog of an S92. If not - well what a shame.

Anyway I would be careful about crowing too much, the next fatal N Sea accident is not going to be a grounded aircraft is it!

Just like the Lotto....you don't have a ticket...you cannot play....or win or lose!

AH say there is now no problem, do you share this view?

AH say there is now no problem, do you share this view?

Comparisons of the various types of helicopter, while interesting, aren't really helpful...

The problem is that MRG has failed causing two hull losses and the loss of the lives of all on board. After two incidents and major technical investigations we do not yet have a fully developed understanding of the failure mode, a package of modifications to prevent its recurrence, or a workable system to detect the failure once initiated.

After the second incident the manufacturer initially and publically concluded that MRG failure was not likely and suggested the investigation of the suspension bar assembly and a thorough review of maintenance records. Then debris was recovered which enabled the AIBN to conclude that the two incidents did indeed result from similar events in the epicyclic of the MRG. The investigators publically disagreed with the manufacturer and some of the regulators over allowing the type to return to service with increased inspections.

Many passengers lost confidence taking the view that there is a serious unresolved issue which as things stand might result in a third incident.

Some here have labelled them ill informed, hysterical even stupid; led on by a sensationalist press.

The customer may not be an expert, sometimes the packaging may sound sensational even hysterical - however he may also have a valid point!

I don't know enough about it to have an opinion, but clearly the CAA don't agree with AH or EASA. I think it is sensible to wait for the NAAIB report at the very least.

I have labelled them thus, but not for the reasons you imply. I think it is perfectly reasonable to want to wait for the steps you mention in the middle part of your post. What is foolish is to say that they will never set foot in an EC225 again regardless of anything, whilst being quite happy (relatively!) to fly in a brand new and unproven type.