A very sad day. My heart goes out to all of those who have lost loved ones in this tragic accident.

Before the nutters and Super Puma haters get going, does anyone know of a similarly large/heavy type that has had 200+ in service across 12 years and 400000 flight hours before a fatal accident occurred? My recollection is that the history of other types in this class is somewhat different. On that basis, I would happily get in an EC225 tomorrow.

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Jim, the various types of chinook are still going strong, just not offshore!�� Perception confidence and passenger power are everything!

very true, Cougar 91 etc and I am sure the risk of flying in either type is in reality very low. Problem in the oil industry is perception and even if this accident is completely unrelated to the previous issues (it is way too early to form opinions on that) it is undeniable that the reaction to previous incidents have given this type a bit of a reputation

That's understood, but that picture of the departed entire head is very, very sobering and quite shocking

My deepest condolences to all effected by this tragedy

What other fatal 225 accident has there been?

Sad to say but have just seen footage of the entire rotor head flying through the air having departed the aircraft in flight!
Local news footage here in Norway has eye witness footage.
So similar to the Bond puma it seems.

Only loss I am aware of is the French Air Force EC725 loss in Burkina Faso. Otherwise this is the first fatal commercial loss of a 225.

An EC725 was shot down last year. I don't think that counts.

Given that the MGB is virtually identical to that fitted to the L2, the discussions talking about only looking at EC225 accident history is perhaps short sighted. At the end of the day the H225 is simply the latest Super Puma variant.

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

Not sure being too specific on model designations helps that much - if we must talk specific model numbers the 225LP in this tragic accident contained a number of design features specifically designed to prevent a recurrence in the problems that affeceted what the press, industry and Airbus call Super Pumas.
Thus it is possibly even worse that some form of gearbox/rotor failure seems to have occurred again. Unfortunately public perception can often be more powerful than raw facts and this brand is going to struggle now - whatever the reason for this tragedy turns out to be. Those of us who spend a lot of time in aircraft know that 100% safety isn't realistic, accidents will always happen and when something dramatic happens in a helicopter's main gearbox/ rotorhead the outcome will usually be bad. We also know these are still pretty safe forms of transport and despite the recent accidents have saved many more lives than they have taken - but you won't be hearing about that from the tabloids

UK CAA have issued a Safety Directive which appears to ground the type except for SAR.

Sorry rubbish at links but I'm sure someone will provide.

SGC

The very similar Bond accident was an L2 but the gearbox shaft faults covered the EC225 as well so both types were grounded. Part of the perception issue is they all share the same fundamental Super Puma Type Certificate so no matter how much rebranding goes on they're still linked as a series. From a pax point of view they all look pretty much the same too. The 332Mk1 does have a very good safety record overall. That doesn't stop evolutions having design or manufacturing flaws (not saying that is necessarily the case here), especially when you are pushing the performance up.

Posted By UK CAA


29 April
201
6
Limitations of Operations Due to a Fatal Accident in Norway
on 29 April 2016
This Safety Directive contains mandatory
action that is required to restore an acceptable
level
of safety. It
is issued in accordance with
Article 15 of the Air Navigation Order
.
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to take
appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information
(including any ‘in
-
house’ or
contracted maintenance organisation and relevant outside contractors).
Applicability:
Aerodromes:
Not primarily affected
Air Traffic:
Not primarily affected
Airspace:
Not primarily affected
Airworthiness:
Not primarily affe
cted
Flight Operations:
All AOC Operators of
Airbus Helicopters
EC225
LP
h
elicopters
Licensed Personnel:
Not primarily affected
1
Introduction
1.1
This Safety Directive contains mandatory action that is required to establish an acceptable
level of safet
y.
It is issued in accordance with
R
egulation (EC) No
.
216/2008 A
rt
icle
14.1.
1.2
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to
take appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information, inclu
ding any “in
-
house” or contracted maintenance organi
s
ation and relevant outside contractors.
2
Compliance/Action to be Taken
2.1
The Civil Aviation Authority, in exercise of its powers under the Air Navigation Order (2009)
directs operators of any Airbus
Helicopters
EC225LP helicopter which is:
a)
registered in the United Kingdom or
b)
flying in the United kingdom or in the vicinity of an offshore installation
to comply with the requirements set out in paragraph 2.2
.
2.2
Operators must not conduc
t any public transport flight or a commercial air transport operation
with
an
Airbus Helicopters EC225LP

That doesn't come as a surprise.

also we need to bear in mind that there are many failure modes that can cause a catastrophic separation so while the result may be very similar to previous incidents the cause may turn out to be entirely unrelated to the previous shaft problem - only an investigation will tell us that

That is consistent with the available flight history showing 5 short local flights 26th and 27th.

I just scrolled the AAIB website to check for the AS 332 to EC 225 LP family accident reports after 2000.
Found 5:
G-REDL crashed with rotor hub separation,
G-REDW and G-CHCN went down under controled ditching following MGB lubrication system fault,
G-WNSB and G-REDU crashed following loss of control or references.

Did I miss something ?

DO

In 2009 a Super Puma lose the main rotor while inflight.
I do not know if this is related to this very accident but worth remembering
Report on North Sea Super Puma tragedy reveals 'catastrophic failure' of helicopter's main rotor

RIP

What strikes me is that it looks like there has been no apparent warning of a main rotor or MGB failure. Since the L2 gear boxes failures, early detection systems improvment (like position of chip detectors) seem to cover all aspects of a catastrophic MGB or main rotor failure (... sorry for beiing inacurate, but althought not qualified on type my company operates a number of them)
If there had been such a warning, I suppose the procedure would have been to reduce the power and/or descend to a "minimum safe altitude" ... In this case, the initial descend seems to be rather ATC related.