Cyclic, any chance you can post the front page pls? Is the EASB only relevant to EC225 or 332's or all models?
Tks

http://www.airbushelicopters.com/tec...EN&langtipi=EN

As HC says, you need a TIPI log-in to see it.

No good unless you have a TIPI login. Mine's expired.

I think you are right P clips wrong colour for MGB area.

Bizarrely is only applies to EC225 LP helicopters.

The Airbus legal and PR machine obviously doesn't want to shake up its other customers!

here is the EASB

MGB fittings
 

EASB 53A058..Interestingly reminiscent of issues with frame 5295 cracking and fitting loss of torque concerns from 10 years ago.Not,so far,a clear cut case of misplaced or incorrect suspension bar pins.

So Airbus decides to not ground EC225LPs, Shell Norway decides to stop all CHC Norway flights (with S92) indefinately, and now EASA sends out directive saying among other things to check suspension bar for "correct installation".

Starting to sound like maintenance error perhaps. Although this is only speculation at this point.

Tks cyclic, my TIPI currently dont incl 225 but got it!

Maybe this is not the only cause but the scary thing to all off us should be that all French helicopters fly using the stays and between 120, 130, 350, 365, 330, 332 and 225 how many hours were accumulated before now? Yes theres differences between pins vs bolts and nuts vs some split pin other baby pins etc but in principle they all the same for all these hours and years? Not a critisism or finger pointing, just a very sobering thought and reminder to stick to basics.

Very sad for the lives lost, 225 lost and for the engineers involved as I do not know how they are coping and hope they have support threw this regardless off the outcome!

My thoughts as well Mitchaa! The following statement was from sbs.com


"We are as certain as we can be that a technical error caused the accident. We don't think it was due to human misinterpretations," the director of the board's aviation department, Kaare Halvorsen, told reporters on Tuesday.


Thank Kaare, that really clears things up .... throw a smoke bomb out there for now.

Perhaps they read your posts on the value of HUMS:E

Why does the EASA-AD include more checks than the bulletin from Airbus?

When you encounter a HUMS alert on certain MGB condition indicators, with for example a rising trend, the workcard will often tell you to check the chip detectors and the Oil filter.

Would seem prudent to me that while you are at it just check a few other things?

Looking for and being aware that strange or unusual things can happen is what helps to keep you alive in this business.

As Orville said to Wilbur

Apologies for my previous misidentification of the suspension bar in the first photographs as being the LH bar.

Identification was based on the EC225LP IPC which I now see is wrong.

Based on the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and the EASB it is in fact the RH suspension bar.

Just goes to show even the manufacturer has problems getting it right.

Am I right in thinking that there is an engine in the way of that front mounting? And is that the explanation for the timings in EASB?

Probably because they feel that more checks are needed that those recommended by Airbus. All of which points to the consideration of a number of failure scenarios.

The EC225 and AS332L2 MGBs share a lot of commonality. The major difference is the flared housing on the 225 MGB vs the conical housing on the 332. The main module is very similar, and the epicyclic is effectivley the same on both types. Given the commonalities AS332 MGB/epicyclic failures shouldn't be discounted.

I hope you are seriously kidding. Being an advisor and making such biased and unverified statements doesn't bode well. That is profoundly unprofessional. If you were an advisor working for me your contract would be terminated here and now and I would send out a warning to any related/known other company about avoiding your service under any circumstance.

EASA vs Airbus
 

Looks to me like a quasi disagreement between EASA and Airbus. EASA check MGB health and control rod attachment. Airbus check control rod attachment only. How could Airbus not consider MGB health given the lack of the epicyclic component? HMMM!

Let's not confuse things. Not a control rod but a suspension bar.

DOH! Apologies...fingers faster than brain;) yes suspension rod.

Turkey asked a great question!
 

Auto Correct Strikes again.....Tarkay is in no ways a "Turkey"!

Interesting question!

Kinda reminds me of Transmission Mount issues on the early Jet Boxes!

Correct.

donut king If you don't know the difference perhaps you should keep your speculations to yourself.

Oil company aviation advisors accept (or sometimes recommend) the aircraft their employer has contracted and the operators who fly them, so the insecure ones feel obliged to lash out at operator or OEM after an accident as a means of self-preservation (even when the oil price is $100 plus).

But then again this thread is populated by a lot of people who have made more comment on this topic than any other, ever, so he is unlikely to be who he claims.

Yup. Horrible to think about what must go through the minds of the engineers involved especially given that maintenance error appears to be a very real possibility.

Maybe, maybe not.

Is it true that the person who started the online petition is a UK Independence Party candidate in Rochdale, Lancashire standing for election this week?

Or indeed this problem of how the lift is transmitted to the fuselage on another type and cracks resulting in an AD: http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/394...box-crack.html

Possibly.

Rochdale Online - Local Election 2015

He says he works within the oil and gas industry.

Is HUMS a optional fit same as it is on a AW139? By optional I do not mean optional for the NS but optional from the factory.

The FWD suspension bar and its airframe fitting are located in the No1 engine bay. It has a protective fire proof metal shield over it. The lower end of the bar and fitting are not visible in normal operation.

Checks of the fitting will probably require removal of the No1 engine.

The suspension bar pin is extracted through the firewall between the two engines once a panel has been removed.

I’m fairly sure HUMS is an option.

What annoys me is that HUMS support is also a very expensive option. An AH tax on safety.

In this day and age such support should be provided by the manufacturer as a matter of course without someone making money out of it.

My first hand experience is that HUMS installations and collected data is well within area of industrial secret, all against general safety of operations. That is the one and only reason why some OEM real time HUMS HW & SW is not already running now days in front of pilots at last on advisory level....

They have the bottom end of the forward suspension bar, I think they don't have the front suspension bar fitting yet.
If they find this fitting, and this fitting is un-damaged then 2 solutions:
Maintenance...
Pin shear under fatigue or corrosion or.... highly un-probable but...has to be checked

Ahh, dipperm0 is obviously the Airbus PR rep sent here to calm the waters :E

According to the eyewithnessesand to the damage on the aircraft, i think it is not possible that the accident is caused by a broken suspensionbar/bolt/fitting, especially not the forward one.
The eyewithness told that the aircraft was sideway wobbling , then there came 3-4 cracksound(epicyclic/ringgear+3 suspension bars?), then the rotor an AC separated. The Rotor then flew/fell to one side(guess it has to do with the direction of rotorspinning) and the AC to the other side.

Her is a translation , and a link to one of the eyewithness:

« I was outside with my daughter, i heard the helicopter comming, so i picked her up and pointed at the helicopter.
I told my daughter «there is daddys northsea-helicopter»
After 3-4 seconds it started to wobble very much back and forth, and then there came 2-3-4 quite large «bangs», and i can see that parts are separating from the helicopter, most likeley the gear.
Then i see the rotor goes off the helicopter, and the helicopter fell to the ground»

He then says:
«The helicopter flew normal, then i saw it wobble and heard a «bang», after about two seconds i heard one more «bang» and then the helicopter goes straight to the ground»

Øyenvitne: ? Jeg så at rotoren falt av ? deretter gikk helikopteret i bakken - NRK Hordaland - Lokale nyheter, TV og radio

If one of the supensionbar failed, i would think that the rotor would behave another way, it looks like it is ripped right of. The MGB module was also remaining on the AC

Pretty strange that the slidingcowling seems to have no big damage.

Maybe it would be helpful to rename the "suspension bar pin" to "Jesus pin". Not as technically descriptive but maybe more appropriate to it's importance.

Also, the pins should be clearly marked so one can easily identify them. There seems to be at least one instance of an incorrect pin being installed which was caught on ground run up. Or redesign so all three are the same.

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/578...ml#post9364808

And, maybe an inspection procedure should be developed using a camera/bore scope so the engine does not have to be removed to inspect.

Inspection of the Rod end hardware should be covered on installation by a duplicate inspection.

Post installation hardware can be checked for installation with a boroscope from the gearbox end going in through the Suspension bar hole in the rear firewall.

Torque checking of the suspension bar airframe fittings hardware will require MRH fairing /Engine/interior trim removal.

dipperm0 Nothing is improbable at this stage of the investigation. Improper material, heat-treat. process finish, anti-corrosion coating, or any number of other causes. But also failure originating from corrosion pitting or wear originating from either the pin, bar or airframe fitting. There are numerous potential root-causes and it is way too early in the investigative process to try and guess the cause. Guessing never resolved a single accident investigation.

I have great faith in the ability of the investigation to determine the probable cause based upon the resources of all the entities involved. My thoughts are with all the families, colleagues and employees affected by this awful occurrence.

While the press briefing yesterday has ruled out human error by the pilots, does anyone know if CHC are looking after their engineers in Norway?

I imagine that having fitted a new gearbox only the day before that there may be some fairly distressed people working in engineering and I would like to think that there is support in place for them.

Question for those that actually know, is there any way to visually distinguish the different sized pins when they are installed? Different heads or pin orientation perhaps.