The rules are being tightened up, under "part NCC", the new regulations come into force next year.

However, as I keep saying, irrespective of the rules, some owners care little about what is legal or safe. They simply want the flight to go ahead (been there, seen it, got the T shirt, resigned from the job).

For some, it's a case of if one captain refuses to fly, he will eventually move on, or be moved on. There is always a keen or unsuspecting pilot who will go. The problem is, as time passes and reputations become known, it's sometimes relatively inexperienced young "thrusters" who end up in the job.

Part NCC was mentioned in the AAIN report and in the link I posted, and it clearly addresses the need for an SMS and Ops Manual. So what else will the CAA study come out with?

The CAA review will have to address their own lack of manpower to oversee and enforce any future increase in their breadth of regulation.

There are still loopholes in Part NCC, or any other regulations. As far as minimum weather conditions are concerned, at private landing sites, some of which may be used on a "one off" basis, who is to say what the visibility actually was, apart from the pilot on the day? The pilot will still have to take the flak when he tells the aircraft owner that the flight cannot go ahead in conditions that were acceptable in the past. Therein lies the problem.

Under NCC would the owner, irrespective of what flag of convenience they are using, not be treated as an Accountable Manager or have to employ someone acceptable to their home EU Authority and therefore someone who can stand-up to the most demanding owner?

Surely the basic rule that was broken is starting a flight in IMC below 1000 feet AMSL without the protection of a surveyed site or indeed Instrument Runway.

Climbing IMC from effectively the surface out of an ad hoc field landing site carries risks beyond acceptable for normal pax ops.

We used to do this exercise on the runway at ABZ behind IF screens but only to demonstrate/simulate a departure from a rig in DVE. 'twas never intended to be a land based LVTO.

I have heard this practice is routinely carried out onshore in the private/corporate world but call me a Jessy, its not a practice I would want to be involved in. Imagine OEI prior to VTOSS.

DB, I don't think "below 1,000 feet amsl" comes into the practical equation. The 1,000 foot rule is a legality to ensure en route terrain and obstacle clearance under IFR.

The problem here was that a transition from hovering using external visual cues (whatever they were, most probably very limited), to an instrument climb, wasn't successfully completed.

As I often repeat: Hovering isn't too difficult. Instrument flying isn't too difficult. It's the bit in between that catches people out, time and time again. Both departing from and arriving at terra firma, as recent tragic accidents and recorded incidents have proven.

Strangely enough (or perhaps not), it's also the bit helicopter pilots aren't well trained for, at least, not in the civilian environment, once away from the "luxuries" of an airfield.

This often gets confused amongst the argument for and against Class 1 takeoff performance. Some seem to miss the obvious, i.e. if Class 1 is required, it's obvious that sufficient visual cues must be available in order to allow a Class 1 departure to be made. This requires sufficient visibility to assess an adequate clear departure path and a sufficiently high cloudbase. At TDP the pilot must be able to see the ground and the reject area ahead, in case an engine quits at the most difficult moment (i.e. just before TDP).

In marginal weather conditions, Class 1 performance for departure (and landing!) may have to be sacrificed altogether. But in truth, full Class 1 is seldom available at remote landing sites, at least, at ad hoc ones. And that, unfortunately, is the core business of the onshore corporate helicopter market.

How many Engine Failures have occurred on AW139's during Takeoff before Vtoss ever in the History of the Fleet?

How many AW139's have crashed into the ground during IMC Takeoffs at Night with absolutely no mechanical or avionics failure?

Which risk are we more concerned about?

Obviously, it's the Captain's responsibility to decide on the day which he ought to be most concerned about, ideally all risks should be totally ameliorated....

(Of course, the risk/fear of losing your job because the aircraft owner is breathing fire at you to depart whatever should make no difference).

Odd....that Boss can be very persuasive in his arguments.

Not any more.


You might say that his outfit was two accidents waiting to happen.

He became the Late....rather than just late.

Surely it is not legal (clearly not safe) to just punch into IMC from anywhere on the face of EASA Land!

The basic IFR rule must apply, absolute minimum height in IMC is 1000' unless flying a published approach/departure procedure. This is why in offshore we have published en-route descent, ARA and rig departures. This is the rules of the air.

This debate should not be about the take off technique causing the accident. It should be about the sensibility of taking off at all when the initial flight trajectory is un surveyed and in IMC. Did he not fly into a tree?

Double Bogey
 

DB, the European regulations are prescribed in SERA, notably 5015. To quote:

The important bit is the first few words, 'take-off or landing'. These guys may have done something illogical but there is no evidence that they broke the Rules of the Air.

DB, no he did not fly into a tree. That is made clear in the report from the AAIB.

With regard to your understanding of the legality of departures to IFR from a private site, or departing from an airfield whilst not on a SID. If it wasn't legal, no aircraft intent on transiting under IFR could do so if the the cloud base was below 1,000 ft. That certainly is not the case. It's perfectly legal for an IFR helicopter with an IR'd crew to change between VFR and IFR and back again as required on one flight.

Double-Bogey
How do you think a 'Rig Departure' is an 'approved' IFR departure?
The fact that you require a certain 'estimated' vis prior to departure?
The assumption that you can safely resort to OEI profile whilst maintaining good visual references on a dark and stormy night?
SNS atleast, there is no useful radar at rig height to determine clear climb out and RT separation is dubious at best.
The trivia that went into the approach mechanism compared to the simple departure procedure - where it could be argued that the profile changes required upon Engine failure just after TDP are far more hazardous........
I always thought that was taking the urine.

I dont think flying VFR in IMC is allowed just because the aircraft and pilots can do it. Of course one can fly legally and perfectly safe IFR in VMC but flying VFR in IMC will hurt one day, especially close to ground.

DB

What specific criteria do you think an IR pilot in an IFR twin should use for private ops departures into IMC?

ROTORSPEED I don know the answer to your question but surely the criteria necessary to ensure a safe departure would be prudent allied to appropriate training, checking and recency!

Are you saying on this particular occasion what they did was safe but just poorly executed or were the conditions inherently unsafe?

Maintain VMC until in Contact with ATC and able to clear obstacles until on an approved IFR Clearance.

UK Rules might be different but good piloting practices should mandate that as minimum standard practice.

That sounds great, but often not applicable to departures from private/remote HLSs in UK. ATC coverage doesn't even exist in many areas of UK.

Q1. What can ATC physically do to help a pilot successfully transfer from visual references to flight on instruments (as the crew failed to do in this tragic accident)?
A1. Nothing.

Q2. Where are these "approved IFR clearances" in UK?
A2. They don't exist.

There seem to be some "knee jerk" reactions here!

It appears from what has been posted that some expect helicopter pilots wanting to fly in IMC to transit from a remote/private HLS to an airfield under VMC (below 1,000 feet above the surface, in marginal weather) then carry out a SID from there! That is, quite frankly, ridiculous.

What is needed is sufficient forward visibility and sufficiently high cloudbase for a safe transition to a climb clear of obstacles to be made, followed by a safe transfer onto instruments whilst climbing to MSA for the IFR/IMC transit. Provided the takeoff area is clear, with sufficient visual cues for a safe initial departure, it matters not that the aircraft isn't actually at an airport.

It goes without saying that the crew need to be capable of making a safe transition to an instrument climb; that is the most critical part of the manoeuvre.