Also, is anyone allowed to say what the aircraft was doing there ? |
10watt, what i can figure out is that a helicopter engaged on police work has crashed into a pub in Glasgow. other than the act of crashing i am unable to ascertain any other reason for the position.
regards tet |
Sisloe Sid:
The Potomac crash was not caused by any problem with the helicopter. You can PM me for details if you want. |
Thanks Shwan, just bringing it into the discussion because for now at least, the Glasgow crash also 'was not caused by any problem with the helicopter'.
To put a theory on Potomac like some are doing here with Glasgow, The Potomac ac lifted at 2304, crashed at 2311 (7 mins). The Low Fuel warning (if it illuminates) on a 680 litre tank requires you to land within 8 mins! How accurate is that 8 mins? Perhaps they are closer than at first look! |
10Watt Could someone briefly sum up the known facts please ? Also, is anyone allowed to say what the aircraft was doing there ? http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...-SPAO%20v2.pdf I'm sure if anyone knew it would have been mentioned already. (Along the river a recognised route back to base?). You'll have to wait like the rest if us and if known it will come out in further reports. |
l see.
Nothing is known apart from the obvious. Basically, all this self promotion is trivia. |
Are those US or Imperial feet, and under what conditions? NTP?
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... are there 3 French Feet in 1 Metre - in ISA conditions?
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10watt: like the power output you portray: are you dull or something?
What do you think this entire web site is about other than rumour and trivia? :ugh: |
According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact. The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact. |
Quote: According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact. The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact. That's an interesting statement from EC, can't see them saying "95 liters of fuel at impact unless they were certain! Edit: And it wasn't EC who said it. It was the AAIB. |
Actually, we could do with some clarification there.
Lemain seems to be assuming that PieChaser is wrong, and I suspect that assumption is based on Lemain having read the AAIB statement. Perhaps, just perhaps, PieChaser may be quoting from a statement issued by EC? |
BBC News - Glasgow helicopter crash: Legal action begins against Bond Aviation Group
Legal action begins against Bond Aviation Group |
What's in your cockpit?
The following article is from 2005. Nearly 1 decade ago....
Presented to International Helicopter Safety Symposium Montreal QC Sept. 2005 Roy G. Fox Bell Helicopters Textron Inc. The single most-important improvement in helicopter safety could be driven by documented information of what happened (or not) in the cockpit during an accident sequence. Accident investigators and regulators don’t know details. Pilot error is largely based on circumstantial evidence, and ends up with accident causes such as “failed to maintain RPM,” “failed to maintain clearance,” “fuel exhaustion,”— the list goes on. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS The helicopter industry, including the regulatory side, needs to work on these major roadblocks. For example, HUMS— possible maintenance credits and alerting a pilot of an impending problem—is always a good subject for a lively discussion. We need research and trial programs to build a more robust and useful HUMS, to be able to validate that the HUMS indication occurs XX hours before a catastrophic component failure. With such confidence, the pilot should be alerted that the helicopter requires an inspection before another flight. We in the industry and the regulatory agencies must work together to find ways to make improvements and also make use of technologies developed from outside of aviation. The largest single problem that prevents helicopters from rising to the safety level of the airlines is that we do not know what is happening in the cockpit. If you don’t understand what happened in a crash, you cannot fix anything and these human error accidents continue year after year. We must find a way to document what is happening in the cockpit, and that information must be retained in crash survivable media or transmitted outside of the aircraft. Many contend that we already have Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVRs) to provide this information. This comment is misleading. Reference 14 discussed the fallacy of this, as very few helicopters have FDRs. Since the FDR requirement of 14CFR135 is for multi-turbine powered helicopters with 10 or more passengers, the maximum number of helicopters meeting those requirements (including those not operating under 14CFR135) would be only 6.5% of the U.S. civil helicopter fleet. The helicopter industry needs a Cockpit Information Recorder (CIR) to provide information inside the cockpit before and during a crash. This information will allow the accident investigators to understand what actually happened (or not) in those human and unknown caused accidents. Once we can document and understand the actions and sequences, we can make the appropriate corrections. This knowledge on every helicopter accident can save costs/time of accident investigations, reduce regulatory concerns, and speed up corrections to the field. Most importantly, it would allow us to correct and mitigate the human error accidents and raise helicopter safety to a new level. Reference 14 describes these benefits and issues regarding a CIR. A CIR should contain: • A still color camera (day/night) • An area microphone • A GPS • Data processing/memory capability • Crash survivable recorder. A CIR unit would likely contain the first four items and provide output to existing crash-survivable recorders. A typical still shot photo would include the instrument panel and the pilot’s controls (cyclic, collective, and pedals). A CIR could be a “poor man’s FDR/CVR.” Further in the future, we should make the CIR wireless. An onboard transmitter would be added to transmit analyzed critical data to a satellite, to a land line via Internet to the Operator’s PC and the Manufacture’s PC. The PC would be programmed to determine if a crash occurred (e.g., analysis of GPS data for anomalies). If analysis indicates a crash and no human action occurred from the operator in a few minutes, the PC would automatically notify the Search and Rescue function. The PC alert message would provide aircraft identification, time of last contact, and longitude/latitude of the wreckage. This would shorten rescue response time, which increases the probability of survival. This satellite transmission approach is already being used now for helicopter flight following with a small GPS unit. The automotive industry has this GPS tracking and crash alerting capability (when airbag deploys) in GM’s OnStar® system in many of their automobiles. SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS Helicopter safety has been improving over the years. The accident frequency appears to be flat or even increasing. The accident rates due to airworthiness issues remain very low and consistent year-to-year. Industry will continue to keep airworthiness issues corrected. The largest single potential area to make significant improvement in safety is in understanding what went on in the cockpit of each accident helicopter. Once we can document the cockpit information and sequence, we can finally understand and aggressively attack those accident causes. A Cockpit Information Recorder (CIR) tied to a crash-survivable recorder can allow quicker, more complete, less costly accident investigations. This would allow safety problems to be corrected in weeks, not years. The CIR provides the potential to reduce our helicopter accident rate by at least half if not two-thirds. The CIR can provide facts and understanding, which is required to go to the next plateau level of safety. |
I remember vividly the last hoo-hah about CVRs, many years ago. The idea was considered provocative and intrusive by many pilots. Out of interest, looking only at EC 135 pilots here on public service duty (police and ambulance), would pilots welcome the CIR or not? For the purposes of this, let's assume that the equipment and operation of it is entirely 'invisible' and requires no operator input.
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Lemain
Do you really think I would post a quote unless it was from a creditable source? It's directly from Airbus/EC website, hence it's significance!! EC135 T2i Accident (Nov. 2013) - Airbus Helicopters Thanks Airpolice. |
Piechaser -- The source is 'credible' enough but the report is wrong. Here is the Airbus text, from our link:
December 9, 2013 The AAIB today issued a Special Bulletin recounting factual details surrounding the accident in Glasgow that occurred on November 29, 2013. According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact. The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact. So Airbus have misreported the AAIB. I'm not trying to score points, people lost their lives here. But there is potentially a large difference between having drained approximately 95l and a statement that there was approximately 95l on board. Of course they could both be true....and one hopes that they are....but in this field of engineering one has to be absolutely pedantic. |
Piechaser -- The source is 'credible' enough but the report is wrong. Here is the Airbus text, from our link: Airbus know very well how much fuel was in each tank at point of impact. There is a report coming out very shortly, so let's just hope everything will become much clearer and a design change will be made. |
There is a report coming out very shortly, so let's just hope everything will become much clearer and a design change will be made. What exactly needs a design change? and why?......I must have missed something. |
A design change????.......
Two transfer pumps and fuel pipe to each supply tank from the main tank.
One pipe and one transfer pump (low fuel level) to two supply tanks, is a risky game. |
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