MF26, Us Brits have this stuffy elitism
Don't agree with this sentiment we all need to have an amount of confidence it's the nature of the job but we have all had "there but for the grace of god go I" moments and talked about later, quite often on this forum, if we were elite these mistakes would not be made or aired in public.
WDU

Whodictus,

I respectfully disagree. I refer you to the Shetland helicopter discussion. I could argue all day long with regard to CAA versus FAA etc but this is not the thread for that. Also being ex military I can attest to this pompous view of superiority over foreign militaries which frankly is just nonsense. In all cases we are better than some but worse than others. For the purpose of clarity I was not a military pilot just a lowly infanteer. Have a good day.
Regards
MF26

Elitism
 

As a retired fixed-wing driver, I have followed this thread with great interest and learned a lot, admittedly starting with almost zero knowledge of helicopter flight.

However, some of the majoir differences of opinion between you guys have provoked me either to offer a tentative opinion, or ask (tactfully, I think) for an explanation on what I assumed would be a fundamental point.

The only responses I've had have been from an interested resident of Glasgow, and an American pilot who I've previously traded ideas with on fixed-wing topics.

If you British rotary-wing pilots were capable of consensus on the mechanics of basic emergency manoeuvres, it would be perfectly understandable that you might not want to waste time answering stupid questions from outsiders. But that is evidently not the case, so maybe it's time you started looking outside your elite box?

basTon -congratulations on a completely pointless posting that served no other purpose than prove the attitude problem we all seem to suffer from.

Do enlighten me on the underlying purpose of your comment about simulators so I can stop wanting to boil my I-Pad.

DB

In case you haven't noticed, there is a separate thread for entering auto. Leave this to the Glasgow crash can you :ugh::ugh::ugh:

Fuel Probes - Vertical Positioning
 

An earlier poster mentioned that the fuel probes (presumably capacitance type), for crashworthiness reasons, do not go all the way to the bottom of the tank.

If it is possible that one or more of the probes could had been fitted lower than intended, this would have given a greater fuel reading than is actually present, and a false sense of security. Can anyone shed any light on the type of fuel probes and their mountings to say if this could be possible?

There has also been mention of a red light giving incorrect fuel level indications. From where does this get its information, the fuel probes or an independent sensor?

Note: My own limited experience with capacitance probes was characterizing those for Typhoon & Nimrod MRA. 4. Characterizing means recording the capacitance value for a given depth of immersion in fuel. I have no helicopter gauging experience.

They are mounted from the bottom up. The low fuel sensor switch is on the same probe, but is electrically separate. Discussed previously.

The 135 has equipment plates with various fuel system components on them, they become an integral part of the tank when fitted.

RotaryWingB2, Thanks for the info.

I haven't been following most of this thread, so please take this as you like. If I'm rehashing someone's ideas, I apologise. My history; several decades earning my living as a pilot, mostly helicopter, military and civilian, small and large helicopters, North Sea for much of my career.

My hypothesis is excessive noise. There are times, even when chugging to the platforms/rigs and back, that my inadequate brain gets swamped by too much chatter happening simultaneously on the radios while my colleague and I are discussing operational matters. At times we might be forced to turn down one or both radios briefly. In other words "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate".

Yet I'm given to understand by other colleagues who have done those jobs, that police and EMS helicopter crews can be listening to four or more radios simultaneously, trying to prioritise which of the strident transmissions most deserves an immediate response.

So you can see where I'm going with this. In the extremely unlikely event that both engines should fail, a few valuable seconds could be lost before the pilot realises the seriousness of the situation and lowers the lever, after the rotor has decayed to below a recoverable rotational speed.

Colibri,
Your other colleagues are correct. There are a total of 6 radios - 2 ATC and 4 Tac - plus the intercom. The pilot's priority is the in use ATC and secondly, the Tac that the task is being run on. Everything else is turned down or off. Further, everything other than the in use ATC is off for take off and landing.

Police helicopters all have their individual discreet squawks.

Quote from Fortyodd2:

"Chris Scott,
Fair point. However, the "basics" in this instance are to get the lever down, control Nr and attitude. What happens next depends on a large number of type, altitude, speed, etc factors.
Apart from a fairly large application of rudder, I cannot image that the drills you would have used on the A320 suffering an engine failure at FL 300 & 500Kts would be the same as those in a Dakota on a half mile final."

I see this thread has become moribund, and your kind reply has been shunted off to the autorotation thread. Not sure I'd be welcome over there!

Re your analogy with fixed-wing, perhaps you should have posed a complete loss of power from both engines in quick succession. If caused by a problem in the fuel system, for example, the A320 crew would have about 10 minutes to sort it out and relight one or both. In your Dak scenario, the frangible approach lights (if it's that sort of airfield) would be the most likely end-point, unless there's flat ground to the side. From one or two miles' final over a built-up area (I can think of many), however, there's nowhere to go, and stalling IAS is about 55 kt.

To return to topic, no one responded to my observation that the AAIB has merely said so far that Nr was zero at impact; prior to that we do not know.

Having assessed the VS at first impact, they could calculate a notional height from which the a/c might have fallen with a stationary main-rotor. That at least would be interesting.

LW 50,

I neglected to acknowledge your interesting and helpful post. Thanks!

Sooo.....
 

So it seems like it is more like a fuel problem resulting in a dual engine flame out...the burning question is still why? were his fuel guages indicating more than he actually had? if so one engine would have quit first due to less fuel in the supply tank....was he on one engine when he called to enter the zone? and trying to make it to the pad...from what I have read about this pilot he does not seem like a risk taker. I can understand to some extent no rpm at the end but why a dual engine flame out????.....

What makes you think that this is the reason?

I've seen no mention of the FADEC in this thread. I'm aware that it will be different from the Chinook but there are documented incidents of one engine running down and the torque matching system causing the other engine to run down in sympathy.
Just to clear up the autorotation experience/reaction by this particular pilot. He had had some training and practice in the gazelle as well as Chinook (landing in the sim only). Perhaps of more relevance was his ability. He was a truly outstanding stick and rudder man in any situation. He also had the kind of relaxed manner most pilots can only dream of; I'd have put my life in his hands (and on many ocassions did!) anytime.

Chinnok Transition to EC135
 

Hi

Transition to Heavy Lift to Medium is not easy, and autos are different.

Speaking of the commander's experience. The AAIB report shows he had accumulated 5,592 hours total, with 646 on type. A type he appears to have started flying in 2010.

In the previous 28 days he had flown 19 hours on type, and 38 in the previous 90.

In the previous 3-4 years was he flying some other type? Perhaps also in the previous 90 days or so? Or do police helicopters now only fly 600 hours or less per year?

I'm not for one moment suggesting anything significant in this, but it's not exactly how I would expect it to have read.

He was clearly very experienced overall, talented and hugely respected. I'm just curious.

Bull ****!

A Helicopter is a Helicopter is a Helicopter.

They are different in different ways....but they are all Helicopters.

Moving from a Chinook to a Single Rotor Helicopter is far easier than going the other direction....as we all learn to fly Helicopters in small Single Rotor Helicopters so we are just going back to what we first learned.

Learning to fully maximize the performance possibilities of the Tandem Rotor takes some effort as it does require some slightly different techniques than the single Rotor.....and sadly some Pilots never learn how to do that.....just as some are at best only mediocre single rotor helicopter pilots.

I didn't read SAS's post as 'ad hominem' at all.

He was simply pointing out that single rotor helicopters seem mediocre, once one has been to the 'Dark Side'!:)

I'm sure he would agree that all RW pilots are equally superb!

Air ambo pilots generally fly short (0:15) sectors, followed by a wait for a patient. I am getting approx 230 hrs a year at a busy base. Rozzers get a bit more, at merseyside I got approx 300 hrs a year. He started approx 2009