Shy,
unlike the Gazelle, the 135 fenestron has an even number of blades but whilst the are they are balanced, they are not evenly spaced. This was done to disrupt the harmonic which is why the 135 fan does not whistle/whine like the Gazelle. What appears to be missing blades may simply be the larger gaps between some of the blades.

Indeed the blade at 3 o'clock and the one above ( not sure about this one, what we see could be a stator or blade ) are missing, the rest of the ten blades are still there, those around the missing ones are severely bent, so that could be the reason why they're not there, they've broken off.

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/...43_964x655.jpg

Yes, that was what I was getting at, these things can be deceiving. I was once asked how on earth I was able (and how had I obtained display clearance) to "loop" a 7 tonne helicopter during my handling display, beginning from a base height of 50 feet agl. Of course, we weren't looping at all. The manoeuvre was in fact a 90 degree banked turn through 360 degrees, after a rolling 90 degree nose up climb and a slightly less steep descent. It was meant to look like a loop, of course and it worked because the crowd saw the top of the helicopter.

Something like a MGB with no oil?

AAIB or police spokesman said all wreckage was accounted for.

Birdstrike into the engines, perhaps unlikely to be a cause - what about birdstrike into the fenestron?
If the cab had been in the hover at the time, I can only imagine that it would have a rapid and severe effect on controllability. Any violent yawing and pitching motion could easily give the impression of "tumbling" when seen from a distance at night. Any autorotation initiated from this position with no forward speed and a high yaw rate would have a limited chance of success.

If both engines were shut down, lighting the nightsun wouldn't be possible. The landing lights would be available, but the pilot has to reach up into the roof to select the Emergency Shed Bus to ON to use them.

Sasless: our nightsuns don't have an IR filter.

With regard to closing the engines down by using the manual throttles on the collective, the only time I would use those is on a normal shutdown after a FADEC problem, if they didn't shutdown in the normal way. To shut them down for a double engine off, just use the normal engine switches. The "gates" aren't a problem to move out of the way.

I woke on Saturday morning to a couple of texts from friends saying to check out the news. On doing so panic mode set in for me as I know one of the pilots very well and talk with the rest on a daily basis.

On first watching the news pictures the first thing that came to mind seeing the near complete main rotor blade was Catastrophic main gearbox failure, surely that blade would be shredded if it was rotating on impact. Today I still am thinking that but the only thing that puts a shadow of doubt in my mind is if that was the case surely the 135 fleet would have been grounded for inspection of suspect parts? I just feel now that the AAIB know more than they are saying for now.

One thing for sure both myself and colleagues will miss Dave's dulcet tones on our frequency and my own heart felt condolences go out to his family, friends and anyone else affected by this tragedy :{

...but AO did. And a non filtered spare. So it could have been either.

A couple of comments
 

I've read most of this thread, but didn't see anyone addressing the below, apologies if this is redundant.

Night time Autos (especially when you're not expecting it) are very difficult, even when you practice regularly. Very hard to push the collective down, to make yourself go down faster at night into an unknown abyss.

I am aware of a couple of accidents with EC135's involving inadvertent movement of one or more throttles out of the fly position and into manual. This event manifested itself with subsequent loss of control and ground impact, two of which were at night. One of the accidents had video which showed one of the engines spitting sparks out as it oversped and relit, subsequently taking out the hydraulics.

I'm curious if Eurocopter ever moved the Fadec auto buttons from the overhead position to the panel?

Fuel contamination with water could be a possible scenario, other types of contamination would illuminate the airframe fuel filter light, assuming it had one.

Any sort of gearbox problem, main or tail usually involves temperature first, followed by metal chips all of which should show up on the annunciator panel.

You may want to review that procedure.

Reasons for double engine off?

Removing your hand from the collective?

Landing light on the nose is always available on Battery Bus.

Search and Landing light is on Shed Bus - Not available OEI or AEI unless Shed Bus Manual.

Night Sun - (HPC) High Power Consumers Bus? - Not available OEI or less regardless of Shed Bus Selection? Different Bus? Available with 2 GEN or on ground with GPU only?

Just my personal opinion, what if the aircraft suffered some sort of dual engine failure, and rotor RPM was not maintained in a flyable range? we had two separate aircraft experience this exact scenario. the first aircraft had a FADEC failure to low side during autorotational rpm check, pilot tried to recover from the autorotation with collective at 500 feet and bled off almost every ounce of rotor rpm. aircraft tumbled from altitude after control was lost. I personally witnessed the second accident when during another Auto RPM check, pilot forgot to reclaim throttle, and tried to recover from the maneuver at 500 feet. aircraft fell vertically with very little RPM and impacted runway very hard in a level attitude causing the same type of damage to the aircraft as seen here. it was unfortunate that something as simple as a loss of NR led to 2 fatal accidents, but it happened, and could happen again.

http://www.armyaircrews.com/images/f...52709_oh58.jpg

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b2...aii27May09.jpg

just my thoughts from a computer chair, condolences to all involved and hope to see a well written report as to the cause.

Give us a break ( gee it a rest )
 

At the time of the 1990 incident with Bell 2006 in Glasgow, I was a senior member of the engineering support of that helicopter and know only too well the stress , doubt and immense pressure that will be on those people for some considerable time ( maybe years ) , thank god there was no PPRUNE then, there are many people out there who have been supporting these aircraft diligently for years , these same guys are now doubting every signature they ever made in the log and probably have nightmares and sleepless nights , all this rhetoric is just trumpet blowing!!!!

Leave it to the experts, remember the dead , the injured and all those who are suffering and under trauma , not just now but for a long time to come.

Those same people read these threads in hope of quick answers which we all seek , to give us peace. There are no short cuts , this will take time , so please respect those who are suffering !!!!

I have been there , this doesn't help!!!!

Ooh la! la! Steady on!

Actually, we believe it was transiting to base so probably something like 120Kts at the "occurrence" I expect. It clearly arrived with a considerable vertical velocity too - maybe half of that, plus a fair bit of horizontal before a all that smashed timber stopped it. To achieve damage like that? How about 6000fpm (60Kts ) down and 30 - 60 forward? That's my guess.

A herring gull in the face at 120Kt would easily incapacitate the pilot totally, perhaps doubled over the cyclic pushing it forward and the lever down, or perhaps blinded. The rest I leave to your imagination, but it seems to fit everything we know so far which is more than can be said of most of the theories here.

Highly unlikely the result of an auto or an auto gone wrong, (simply cos its a twin) I can't believe there was any control available at all from that arrival so the sort of event described by the AAC chap above describes the behaviour of the airframe but how would an operational Ec130 ever get there?

A fenestron failure in the cruise is surely no more than a nasty surprise at the time as the fin is designed to unload the fan at that speed (Speaking from Gaz experience only) but correct me if I'm wrong.

Unless anyone thinks they were in a hover or at very slow speed at the time (and I haven't seen any suggestion to this effect at all) fenestron and autorotation just don't add up.

They wouldn't risk lifting it via a damaged MGB.

Fuel starvation falls into the auto argument, and in any case is too far fetched for tech/piloting reasons to be credible.

Suspicion of uncontained engine failure would result in fleet grounding and is reasonably easy to check for in situ.

All else I can see is some big and unexpected hydraulics/control failure (but then lifting via m/r head and grounding order arguments apply)

This leaves sabotage/interference or anything else that is so unlikely that no one's yet seriously considered it.

We'll know soon enough.

Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
 

On the bird strike theory I accept that the air intakes are design to prevent ingestion. A Starling murmuration is more than a flock and can number several thousand smallish lightweight birds. I accept that this is an unlikely cause. However, I would draw the attention to AAIB bulletin 9/2008 relating to a similar type. The cause if the accident was not determined but the pilot observed a bird strike sound prior to power loss and Autopilot disengagement. Assessing a twin turbine failure he elected to autorotate ending up short of North Weald I a field. In that case the A/c was at 125kts in the cruise and transiting the Stansted Zone. It make interesting reading even if the cause/ circumstances are not similar.

http://www.pprune.org/members/89803-the_flying_cop
 

Really!! A rough understanding as per your page 27 comments , I think you seriously exaggerate your own knowledge !!!!

As for your last paragraph!!!

"It has been the most terrible tragedy, and I feel tremendous sympathy for all the families, friends and colleagues who have been affected both directly and indirectly. Perhaps we can take some comfort in that they passed on to the next life doing something that they loved, both in the skies and in the bar."


"Both in the skies and in the bar"... You can't be serious !!!!

AAIB
 

When can we expect a preliminary report from AAIB

Kennethr
I fully understand where you are coming from and, in that, you have my sympathy.
However, in amongst the Trolls, Walts and Journalists on this thread are many 135 pilots, some of them police pilots and colleagues of the deceased crew and some who have been on duty everyday since this incident in the same type of aircraft who are keen to know what happened here. We want to know what failed, what the syptoms were and what we need to look out for to avoid ourselves, our crews and our engineers having to suffer the same.
We know the AAIB will come up with the goods, we know they will be thorough in their work but until they do, sad as it is, wherever there is no fact there will be speculation.

Both in the skies and in the bar
 

I read 'in the bar' as the casualties on the ground, i.e ....in the bar as opposed to in the skies, not that the crew liked a drink.

Forty odd 2
 

I respect and recognise that, things have moved on a lot in 24 years , but you must agree some of this is just absolute nonsense and insensitive to those that were suffering

I will post no more comments , I just wanted to point out that social networks are not always sympathetic to the real story and people should remember the real victims

I have been in aviation a long time and learned many lessons, but very few if any from this site

Better to read published and verified documents , just my opinion but I thank you for your tolerance at my rant