Amazing what conversations crop up when you supper with a troll ;-)


Utter tosh!
Having been away from the military for a while, I can't speak for the present, however we certainly practised double engine failures back in 2002 when I last flew a check ride in Lynx. In addition and more pertinent, I can certainly say that I and I'm sure a fair few other 'civvies' have practised a double engine failure ... within the last 6 months, and each 6 months for the last 12 years!

Thomas:
The company I work for practices double engine failures in the sim on all our helicopters every 6 months. 139, 225, 76, 92 ect. In pre sim days we practiced them to a power recovery at least once a year in the 212 and 76.
One must remember that a tail rotor failure can also lead to a dual engine shutdown.
In any case the rule in any type be it single or twin should be to lower / raise collective as required to maintain RPM in the green. If that is all you have time to do is that then that is the first and only priority. No RPM = a very bad outcome.
I have followed this thread since it's tragic beginning and have no idea or theory as to what happened.
In single engine times we practiced "full on" outos in 204s, 205s, 206s all models, 350s, 500s and, dare I speak of them, 47s every year. We never bent a machine in practice. Perhaps we were just lucky in having great training pilots.

Double engine failure to EOL is routinely practised in FFS for most heavy helicopter types in CAT operations in UK and in so far as I know, worldwide.

The risk of damaging the helicopter in doing this exercise in the real helicopter are just to great when considered against the chances of it ever happening for real.

As a result of reent fatal accidents the methodology and emphasis on NR monitoring after the first engine has failed has improved along with the CRM aspects of running a relight drill.

TC is probably technically correct, that no one is doing real EOLs in MEHs. However the value of completing this exercise in a good FFS cannot be understated and is the best compromise to preparing crews well and protecting live airframes.

Really ? :ugh:Which Police Aviation CRM Courses has GOULI been on ?

Coconut

I particularly like;
"While police officers are naturally an inquisitive bunch, they are trained to keep their mouths shut and their eyes and ears open when on a job. The place for questions is on the ground, not in the air when the pilot is concentrating on doing his job and the police observers are doing theirs. "

Closely followed by;
"No I don't want to give specific details for reasons of personal privacy and official secrecy."

http://files.gamebanana.com/img/ico/...spy_veiw_2.jpg
G0ULI

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SRG2138Issue05.pdf

2.6 Autorotative descent
2.6.1 Autorotative landing (SEH only) or power recovery

5.7 IMC Autorotation with power recovery

All Mandatory


TC, bearing in mind your words, have you read the False Representation Statement on the form?

How the fuel situation got to where it was is one thing, but what everyone needs to think hard, very hard about when coming up with their version of events, post flames-out, is how;

Two tonnes of helicopter,
Falling at a speed in excess of 100 kts,
Ended up in in a hole no larger than the aircraft itself,
With the transmission stopped the moment just before impact.
And the aircraft remaining in one piece.


:confused:

Mmmmmmmmm, I don't know... oh, possibly:

Autorotate...... 150', flare flare flare, check!! Level!! Cushion!! Bleed lever bleed lever, sh1t!! Lever fully up and we still have 40ft to go!!

Not a certainty by any means....... just a thought

Last time I did autos in the simulator, they were pretty realistic. I am confident that my EOL skills are sufficient to get me down safely in a normal area.

More or less my point exactly.

phil

People here are not arguing to exonerate the crew!! They just want the truth to come out. WHAT information did the pilot see versus WHAT was ACTUALLY happening. Both may or may not be the same.
The families will be angry it is taking so long, I know that I would be. However, the families will want the investigation to be thorough and accurate as well. I can only imagine what they are going through.

Here is a question for you all out there: What do YOU want from this investigation??? Someone to blame? The exact events? or possibly to make sure the likelihood of a repeat ever happening is reduced?

We all want to see all of the above, but different groups prioritise in a differing order. It takes as long as it takes.

TC
But but... I was always under the impression that when I heard the key words "Practice double engine failure...GO" I was training for, er, well, you tell me? Yes the training was simulated engine off (BZ for noticing that - rumour has it that the RAF have awarded medals for less).

Not practicing 'double engine failure in the Seaking to a landing with both engines actually off' is very far from supporting the statement that "virtually no training was undertaken for double engine failure". It is abundantly clear that lots of training was and still is undertaken. That was my point. Maybe the report will identify shortcomings there. We shall see.

Just to clarify - TC does only mean twin-engine EOLs are not practiced in the real aircraft. His previous job in a FFS for the mil gave him lots of time to see pilots carrying out EOLs there (I should know, he flamed out both engines on me enough times):)

Practice double engine failures/PFLs are a staple of twin-engine helicopter training but will terminate in either an overshoot/go around or a full flare recovery to the hover/hover taxi.

Any training is better than no training where EOLs are concerned.

Silsoe - is it your age or early onset dementia with you? Please read again and concentrate. I was specific and careful with my wording. Pay attention.
The same goes for the others who jumped down my throat - it is obvious they too are unable to read and digest at the same time.
EOL's are VERY VERY DIFFERENT from practice double engine go failures and from FFS failures. On most of the latter, you are expecting it anyway and prepared.
There is NO-ONE here on Pprune who has done a full EOL in a twin (other than their own aircraft perhaps) to a landing - in the last 20+ years. :eek:

When both engines fail FOR REAL, it costs the average pilot around 1 to 3 seconds to react to the circumstances because they simply cannot comprehend what is going on for that miniscule moment. That will have cost them a major proprotion of their 'useable' and remaining Nr. They will then have to set the cab up into wind, at the correct speed, in balance. This will cost them further Nr decay if they aren't smooth with the controls.
They will also need lots of height to prepare for the inevitable. ANY incursion below minimum Nr will mean an early exit from this life - invariably.

I purposely checked out about a dozen experienced RAF pilots, current on type (twins) in the FFS after the Strathclyde crash. I sprung the double engine failure on them (a) unexpectedly and (b) at low level (400 feet). I kept them in day mode for the exercise. Every single one of them failed to carry out the manouevre successfully. Most lost control of Nr within seconds of it decaying because they simply did not believe it was happening to them at such a low level.
ALL of them noted that the Nr decay was noticeably quicker during a double EOL than it was for a reduction to FI.
Many disclosed that it was the change of 'note' coming from the rotors together with the accompanying silence from the engines......
make of this what you will.

Now add night time, add over a city centre, add lack of experience,:uhoh::uhoh: Dare I say more.

Read carefully before you pipe up in future all of you :ugh:

TC, your specific and careful wording says;

"No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages."

TC Wrote:


I know a guy.....



[ARCHIVED CONTENT] Agusta A109E, G-DPPH

"There is NO-ONE here on PPRuNe who has done a full EOL in a twin (other than their own aircraft perhaps) to a landing - in the last 20+ years."

Lynx at Hixon, 1996?? Lynx at Leeming, early 2000's??

And finally for TC with his specific and careful words of;

"No-ONE - not the military , nor civvies teach double engine failure practice and this has been the case for ages."


Published on 28 Mar 2013
EC135 Type Rating at Bond Training Services, Gloucestershire, UK

2:30 & 3:55

I visit this forum infrequently but when I do I am invariably reminded of the old saying, "Often wrong, but never in doubt." Cant figure out why. ;)