I may well know you as an individual, but I certainly don't know who 'efish' (joined 2007 - 3 posts) is :ugh:

User names and who the person is, means very little to me. Here as in real life, I take people as they are to me, some people may well have one opinion in a face to face discussion, and a different one when posting here. I'm sure that if we were all in a crewroom somewhere, we'd all be very civil to each other discussing the flaws in our theories, and most would even take their turn at the bar :suspect:

I have only spoken to one person about this incident on the phone, and that was right at the very beginning. If anyone suggested that scenario to me, they would have been told how ridiculous it was!

Besides, perhaps a pm might have been in order if you wanted to use me as a reference :rolleyes:

Atb

SASless

I too have some relevant experience, and I can agree that 99% of the time, the system of 'assisting the pilot' can and does work well. But IMVHO it's the 1% of situations were there is real pressure and a genuine threat to life when such a system is exposed for what it really is!

If, (and it's a very big if at the moment) a fuel issue of any description caused this accident, it would be appallingly indefensible to drag in the two police officers on board.

My feelings on this are very well known here, and I'm also aware I am a lone voice, so I don't need to labour these views

Wise words Sasless :ok:

How would a Mayday call have saved any lives in this incident?
I think the scenario presented isn't one as simple as lowering the collective and getting a call out. All well and good at 1500ft above an airfield, but over a city, both engines unexpectedly stop, at night, in forward flight, picking a landing point, chasing the rpm etc.

If you're so hung up about the distress call not being made in this incident, remember, neither did the Malaysian 777, despite apparently being able to change heading!

Dapt,

Aviate, Navigate, Communicate....in descending order of priority and usefulness in an emergency. Telling the entire World of your woes and tribulations does not change the absolute need for the first two. One can never get to item three and do just fine in most cases.

TR - as you are persisting with the above assertion please clearly show some recent evidence of a police officer who has become a QUALIFIED (by virtue of the fact that they MUST PASS AIRCREW Line Checks) police air observer without any knowledge or training.

I have read a copy of a police air observers training manual and course syllabus in work which clearly states the course aims and standards required to be proficient as an observer. It is essentially a condensed version of a PPL(H) and EC135 Type Rating course covering subjects such as Helicopter Principles of Flight, Meteorology, Navigation, Aviation Law, Human Performance, Operational Responsibilities, EC135 Airframe, Engines, Systems, use of checklists, CRM etc.

I will happily PM you the full syllabus content if you wish, but I doubt even that would change your opinion.

The reason you are a "lone voice" as you put it is because you are wrong.

Bladecrack
I am happy to accept your offer. Thank you.

Danger danger! Whilst I disagree with TR about how observers are crew, that last post is bollocks. You do a couple of hours POF and Other subjects. Please do not compare it to a PPL standard. It just isn't. Sorry.

Jayteeto is a massive supporter of police observers, but also is a realist.

SS , Re #2739 - yes, sort of, although it was about the #2712 post where I felt you & others were possibly posting red herrings? I wasn't meaning to criticise, just felt that the splitting of hairs over (possibly critical in this case) 20kgs MLA/ between different operators did not reflect the critically important points a) to d) that I then offered in my post #2727
I usually value your posts and am happy to apologise if you felt niggled.

Re those who are taking me to task over my "Optional" comment re CRM, & TFOs as "quasi-crew". To that end, I refer all to my honourable colleague SASless in #2743, as his ethos is as near identical to mine as makes no difference. I would also echo his comments in #2736 - I really don't see any benefit in expanding further, with the exception of commenting on - For those of us who regularly fly to low fuel states, we do occasionally need to turn off transfer pumps, i.a.w. RFM. I am not advocating that the RFM should not be followed, just that UK, Night, Police Ops can follow the procedures to the letter without turning off BOTH pumps - it's systems knowledge that helps to determine which one & when, and CRM helps with the "why". :ok:

T-R #2740 - If you get the messages above, good. I have never implied that TFO system understanding/appreciation/knowledge is anything other than optional, but it could make the difference between a good & poor pilot decision. To dismiss a TFO comment in flight almost mirrors the actions of the pilots involved in the Kegworth/M1 737 accident - around which so much CRM is based. I am not, at any stage, implying that any blame should be placed on the "passengers", since the final decision/responsibility rests with the Captain/Crew - I'm just saying that including two brains with a bit of spare capacity (certainly in transit) can often improve processing power & decisions making for the benefit, and ultimately survival, of all.

The thread has been chasing its tail for some time.

I wonder if the fairly recent decision to no longer add FSII to JetA1 has had any cumulative effect on the possibility of a major fuel gauging error.

Bladecrack:
.....therefore I am an expert on the subject:ugh:
Don't talk claptrap bladecrack!
TFO's are cops first and foremost. Most of them take a close interest in aviation others put up with it. The vast majority are very good at what they do.
Exceptionally, one may find (statistically) that one of them is a PPL.
Because the majority are interested in what the pilot is doing, they leave all the big decisions to him/her. They MOST CERTAINLY leave all the serious airmanship decisions to the professional aviator who is paid to take those decisions. NO-one would ever openly dispute an airborne decision during a critical period unless that pilot was 'incapacitated' mentally.
They TRUST their pilot, he is there because they want him to be there.
You're talking bollocks.

Once again I can say, "much of the above with which I can agree."

Firstly jayteeto, thank you. I didn't accept bladecrack's offer in order to be educated. I accepted it because I know it to be wrong! The comment I can most strongly agree with is that I too am a massive supporter of police observers but am also a realist. If anyone thinks differently, then they have my argument dead wrong!

zorab

Yes I did understand the subtlety in your post and as I said in #2740, I agree. But some people extend what is expected of the police, to the point that they may somehow share some responsibility if things go wrong. That would be grossly unfair, and I'm prepared to say it.

As far as SASless is concerned, last night I exchanged pm's with him, and said that in every respect I have operated in an identical manner to him also. No argument other than the precise division of responsibilities.

Thomas coupling I agree.

Look my attitude is well known. Because of the higher than average risks inherent in, and exemptions 'enjoyed' by this type of operation, I think there MAY be a case for two pilots. That's my opinion and others have theirs. I'm happy to park that issue.

But what is difficult for me to swallow, is when people imply, or state that the police officers on board could share any responsibility for this accident. Perhaps they DID notice fuel states/lights/cautions etc. perhaps they DID bring those concerns to the attention of the pilot as I would expect the experienced and good ones (certainly in the front!) to. But in the absence of CVR, save recorded radio calls, we will never know.

But even if they neither noticed or verbalised these things they are STILL guilty of absolutely nothing. They cannot, and should not be criticised. This is VERY different to a situation in which their is a fully trained co-pilot on board with shared responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight.

Hopefully my position may be a little better understood? I'm happy to leave it there.

I have said nothing for some time after being jumped on by SAS. But just to answer a couple of Questions.
Yes Police radio is always recorded at the relevent control centre.
I find it very odd that no comment has been released of any conversation between those highly experienced Police "passengers" and their control room.

My own, not inconsiderable experience of such matters is that Police radio tapes will reveal a great deal of what was going on. Having served for some time in the Police Internal investigations dept, almost my first actions in any mobile enquiry would be to seize such tapes and go through them with a fine tooth combe. Only then do you usually find the answer to why was it there, what was it doing, and what its intentions were. In this case and given that the machine was so very close to landing in any event, I would have expected that the rate of conversation between "passengers" and their control room to have already conveyed pre landing notification. But then what do I know?
TF

T-R - I'd concur, we seem to be of the same mind.

Whilst I can't agree with the two pilot argument, I do hold completely that the buck stops with the single, in this case, crew member and that no blame, if any were being apportioned, should be attached to any passengers in this, or similar, cases.
As has been intimated elsewhere, and by me, I find some TFO systems-knowledge has numerous advantages, to whit:

1. A Police officer wishing to get on with his/her job, albeit trained, but in an otherwise completely unfamiliar environment, benefits from understanding that the "office" they're working in is unlikely to fail suddenly. It improves their confidence in machine & pilot (and therefore mental ability to do their job) especially when the latter demonstrates his/her understanding of the former.
2. A pilot encountering a problem will benefit if the TFO (maybe reading out the emergency procedure) understands what he's reading, and doesn't read it like an automaton - especially given the "English" style the manufacturers employ. Yes, the pilot should know, or have a good idea of, what he's going to be doing, but reinforcement from an external source often helps towards a safe result.
3. A TFO with some understanding of the system under investigation might only need to say "hang on" before the pilot takes an incorrect action, and maybe avert a greater problem.
4. The only counter to the above in my mind is when a pilot gets flustered & tells them to "pipe down, I'm dealing with this" - it's happened in the recent past and will happen again, sadly, multi-CRM training/refreshers or not.

Whatever the result, we find that practising an emergency at shift brief, with as much systems discussion as Pilots or TFOs wish (unless a job comes in), helps all to achieve a greater understanding of what we might face when the chips are down. We're all in the same boat, after all! :ok:

Culture affects the whole crew. Not just the pilot.

We cannot have it both ways.....the TFO are part of the "Crew" or they are not.....which is it?

If they are not part of the "Crew" with duties and responsibilities that inclusion affords....then CRM does not apply to them beyond the Pilot informing them of on-going situations and directing their actions re pending Emergency Landings, etc.

If they are "Crew"....then CRM, duties and responsibilities along with liability follows that inclusion.

The fact the ANO and FAA rules say one thing.....and the reality of the situation is another has no direct bearing on how things work in the aircraft. The Reality is the "Crew" works as a team....and in essence works as a "Crew"....one Pilot and two TFO's, or a Pilot and two Medical Personnel....but it is a "Crew" Operation in practical terms.

SASless:
I currently fly with "crew". They are cabin crew. They have duties and responsibilities too. They do courses in CRM. Some of them are also qualified pilots.

The fact that they are "crew" could not ever make them even remotely liable for any accident in which the pilot(s) may be at fault. Because the driver(s) are specifically and extensively trained to bear that exclusive responsibility. The word 'crew' simply means the individual has a role to play on board. In no way does it imply any responsibility for that 'flying sh1t'!

The fact that 'the reality' may be subtly different is frankly neither here nor there I'm afraid. You correctly mention the ANO and FAA rules say 'one thing'. You needn't look any further.

That is precisely to prevent the blurring of lines (which some around here seem to wish) that could result in totally innocent people being burdened with utterly undeserved opprobrium.

As I said in my PM to you last night, that would be cowardly.

I'm just sticking up for the observers here. Any suggestion of their 'liability' is from the Walter Mitty world in which the likes of 'chopjock' live I'm afraid.

I regret, in my previous post (2759) I did wrongly allow sarcasm to creep in. Police Air Observers (TFO's) are wrongly in my humble opinion classed as passengers, but they are in all real aspects of the matter crew. Their assistance is generally relied upon by the pilot although I fully accept that he/she is at all times "In command" of the aircraft and flight.

I remain deeply concerned at the apparent lack of attention to detail of Police radio traffic, although fully accept that this may well feature in the final report.

TF

TF, the age old problem, crew/passengers, round and round we go. I'd have thought the creation of NPAS would include a logical step of taking 'crewing' to the next level. Perhaps once the police TFOs have all retired and have been replaced by themselves as civvy TFOs it'll be easier to change things.;)