Some oil and gas companies already do enforce such a "fit through the window"policy.

Overall.....

• The operators will be pleased with this report, = more helicopters
• Could lead to an increased pilot shortage and lower experience levels?
• It will place some increased cost burden on oil and gas companies.
• The oil and gas companies do appear to get some blame for the existing state of affairs, this report will not improve the adversarial attitudes that exist
• There will be lots of no fly days due sea state >6
• It may increase the perception of safety but I am not sure how much it will improve safety in reality, it has more effect on survivability after a crash than preventing a crash.
• Perhaps less diversity will create less competition and more stable long term pricing among providers.

A lack of leadership within the helicopter industry has meant that big brother CAA will now enforce what the industry should have innovated. Perhaps this is what it needs, a regulatory approach to re level the playing field?


Luckily, it won't affect my company much, we were already ahead with many of these "initiatives"through self regulation and rigid risk reduction criteria.

How many Years have some of these issues been known of and ignored?

Finally....kicking and screaming....the CAA comes to the Table!

But.....it is an improvement no matter how reluctantly they come.


What stands out to me in the Stats, looking at the accident data and the Trend line on the Chart is despite the introduction of the latest generation of aircraft....there appears to have been an uptick in the numbers of accidents.

There was a period of time where the chart line goes flat....along the bottom....and I assume that to be the time period after the Tigers and 332 series matured.

In time I wonder if the Chart will again show such success.

Another official report where Pprune gets a mention (by name this time)!

(Annex E)

Further to the above may I ask a few pertinent questions_


Why was the sliding door opened and not jettisoned. This resulted in the exit windows being blocked.


Why did the co-pilot open his door and not jettison.


Why was the left (port) sliding door not jettisoned.


Why were none of the exit windows on the port side jettisoned


I suspect that there is one common denominator--lack of proper training of the passengers and crew.


These are my problems with the most recent accident which I suspect was the result of the pilot entering a vortex ring situation on the approach.


Regarding the Bond gearbox problem the object of collecting the debris in the gearbox is to establish the amount of damage that has occurred.
When the CAA was still a knowledgeable organisation and not a group of people with micky mouse qualifications we had a manual called airworthiness notices. In this manual was a reference to unusual or unfamiliar measurements and one of those was the amount of debris permitted in an Aerospatial 330J gearbox. This stated that the amount of bearing debris was 2 cm2. This entry was there because of an avoidable accident in Sarawak
Because of the lack of practical knowledge we now have a bunch of incompetent jobs-worth's rushing around blaming competent people in an effort to hide their own short-comings. One can only suspect that this whole sorry episode would be better served by the old school of CAA or ARB type people who knew what they are talking about.

I think reducing the max number of passengers so that everyone is next to a window is likely to reduce overall safety in the short term at least, due to the need for more flights, ie more pilots, more training and the consequential likelihood of levels of competence and experience being reduced, at a time when there is already a big expansion in pilot numbers going on.


Fortunately, the report doesn't actually say that, even though the media is promoting this line. It says that passengers have to be next to an exit / window UNLESS they have Category A emergency breathing systems (or side floats, which if they ever come about are some way off).


However I couldn't be bothered to wade through 169 pages of CAP 1034 so I don't really know what a Category A device is. Can anyone sum up?


Otherwise I find the report a little disappointing. Nothing concrete about VHM / HUMS except "we will form another committee, and its going to take until the end of the year just to do that, never mind the committee actually doing anything useful" which is surprising since 3 of the recent accidents have a direct link to sub-optimal use of VHM/HUMS.


Simulators don't get much of a mention either. Nothing about the quality of devices, the need accurately to replicate the complexities of display and autopilot systems (which are glossed over in the regulations for simulator approval).


I suppose the acid question is whether, had the actions and recommendations already been implemented, the recent spate of accidents would have been avoided. It's hard to answer "yes".

I'm in the process of "wading through" - this seems to explain Cat A and Cat B breathing devices.

(Page 32 9.9)

HC,

As the CAA does not ascribe to the Bristow Safety Goal of Zero Accidents.....the CAA judges success by the Rate of Accidents/Fatalities per 100,000 Flying Hours.

So if the current Rate is held or hopefully decreased by these changes then they shall consider that to be "success".

You should be glad all this results in more flying....more helicopters...more Pilots and Engineers....and greater revenue for the Operators and hopefully Dividends to Share Holders as a result.

As there are fewer passengers per flight then the actual exposure will be less as when an aircraft is lost there are fewer folks aboard.

Remember the Stats on that comparing the GOM to the UKCS Operations discussed in the past here?

Rough numbers....half the passenger load per fatal accident....and you can have twice as many accidents to arrive at the same number of lives lost.

It all depends upon how you want to measure success I guess.

HC, in simple terms a STASS type devices which can be used with little preparation and be deployed even under the water - i.e. not just in a ditching but also after a water impact. These devices can be quickly introduced without affecting the seating configuration. If the oil companies then wish to improve the comfort levels by reducing capacity, it is up to them.

Haven't seen any comment yet on the limitation of operations to the Ditching Approval. How many of the North Sea fleet are not certificated to SS 6?

There is also a subtle little clause in the report about the introduction of fire-fighting equipment to normally unmanned platforms. When the CAA takes over the licencing of the offshore landing sites, it can address this and also ensure that the additional visual cues (leg lighting) that are necessary on well-head platforms (as recommended in CAP 647) are fitted.

Jim

Farsouth - thanks. So I wonder if there are any category A devices out there, and what form they might take. Of course, if you make the passengers wear their re breathers throughout the flight, so just needing to pop the valve, that would probably make them Cat A!

SAS, I have no interest in increased revenues since I had to sell all my shares when I retired. I only have an altruistic interest.

You're right about the stats, but in this neck of the woods the emphasis seems to be on how often they fall into the water, rather than the body count (in other words, the Sumburgh L2 carried the same "weight" as the gearbox failure L2, at least as far as public opinion goes)

Jim, yes I presumed the use of Cat A a devices was a feasible short term goal, since the report goes on to require their use later anyway.

I'm sure pilots and passengers alike will be glad of the SS6 limit. Of course further reducing the limit for helicopters with a lower float SS certification is a little further down the line. Personally I don't see a need to limit SS at the destination to that of the float certification but plenty of my ex colleagues do. In any case, what about SS en route?

On the NUI thing, I see this as a minor tidy-up. On the one hand, the logic of so doing is obvious, but on the other hand when was the last time firefighting kit was required on a helideck?

Page 37 9.18.d

So, from 1st June 2014, until Cat "A" EBS is developed - maybe one to two years - it seems we will be down to max of 13 passengers in the S92. At least we'll be able to carry lots of fuel...........:)

Had a quick look at the CAA document. One glaring anomaly, to me anyway, is the statement that sea state 6 is a sig. wave height of between 4 and 6 metres. Where we operate there is a huge difference between the occurrence of 4m and 6m waves.

Langball,

Standard designation used in Part 29.

Jim

So are there any helicopters currently in North Sea service where seating will be adversely affected by the new rules ,for instance the S-92 with internal long range tanks, early Super Pumas with smaller windows?

Yes, pretty much all of them. The S92 has similar or smaller windows to the old Super Pumas, so it's not about window size, it's about being next to a window. Only helicopters with 2 seats total in a row would be unaffected, and there aren't many (any?) of them. Hardest hit would be those with 4 seats in a row. AW139?

But anyway, if the pax have the Cat A emergency breathers there is no impact.

The aircraft of choice becomes the one with the worst windows.

12 in an EC225?

8 in an AW189, or do the rear windows count?

6 in an EC175?

This getting silly.


Just get the £#<&ing doors off!

JimL;

There will be all sorts of hormonal fits at the Belgrano if you keep posting on here! What I really struggle to understand these days is that when you and I flew together we were in a S61 with basic sas, Decca roll maps and crap radar and we seemed to manage a higher level of safety than today.

My copy of the ops manual from back then covered so many situations and procedures better than the modern manuals. Has JAR opened up more holes in the Swiss cheese? Is training not as thorough? Are the procedures JAR compliant, but in fact not fit for purpose?

How many of us on here remember the rule of no deck landings in 50 + kt winds after the Cormorant crash in 1992? That lasted until the oil companies couldn't get urgent supplies offshore. Oddly the first oil company to whine owned the Cormorant.

I'm glad I no longer work offshore, but I believe that this safety review should have started at Gatwick, then Brussels, and then the oil companies who have slashed costs and compromised safety by their cheap attitude for so long.

I expect Shell Management will be along shortly to justify the behaviour of the oil companies, but I personally will take a lot of persuading that current practise as defined in legislation is best practise.

SND

TOMBSTONE IMPERATIVE AGAIN?
 

Congratulations to the UK Regulator and the principal Union for reacting to the issue of North Sea Helo Ops so long after the events!!!

Now we await the next fixed-wing disaster to stir a similar reaction, too late.

Eurocopter fuel guaging, turbofan engine cowlings, fatigued aircrew to name but a few of the much-flagged issues which are waiting to produce the next fixed-wing airline disaster, but so far the warnings from the coalface are ignored.

SASless, I totally agree with your postings and others in the same vein, but until we see the suits at the top of the aviation food chain carted off in 'cuffs etc......you know the rest? :ugh:

Jim

I said it at the top of the page

SND

I am not SM but I do work on the customer side. As I have said before, I think that much of the responsibility lies with the helicopter companies who have had to be dragged kicking and screaming into buying new aircraft. Thank goodness that industry has demanded newer aircraft, otherwise 30+ year old 332Ls would still be on offer........oh, wait a minute......

JimL, forgive me ignorance (non-pilot here), but what is 'Part 29'