That's fair; I had heard that one consideration might be S-92 to Scatsta followed by fixed-wing to Abz. Doubtless, minds greater than mine are at work with a solution. Thank you.

Interested to see the HUMS graph showing discrepancy's.

A A

That is a good question and one I would be asking of my company if I were an offshore safety rep. The short answer is no, we are not using it.

The system you are referring to is AAD (advanced anomaly detection) and I think it is a good system, designed to sit on top of existing HUMS systems and analyse their outputs looking for anomalies that don't necessarily breach set thresholds. I don't know why it has not been adopted, possibly commercial reasons?

I do know that Eurocopter are working on their own such system which should be out this year for the M'ARMS aircraft (225 and 155) which will be a start.

HC

Gearbox inspection frequency
 

Had a discussion offshore about the current issues with the helicopters. A question was raised about how ofted the gearboxes are opened up and the gears actually close visual inspected and NDT inspected for signs of fatigue or damage etc?
A person stated that the gearboxes had to be sent back to manufacturer for this to be carried out - I personally think all of the Aberdeen based operators surely would use their own in house mechanics & inspectors to do this, unless there was a requirement for a metallurgical inspection etc.

Any information is very much appreciated.

Thanks

It sounds like some of the research NASA has been conducting into FDM. Rather than set arbitrary limits, why not look at historical data and define what is normal. Then look at the 1 and 2 sigmas etc to set the triggers. That way you are truly looking at deviations from the norm.

I think also the speed of response of the support teams is crucial to good diagnosis of a problem.

When we used to see gradual increases in vibe levels we were never quite so alarmed as we were when we saw a step change in levels, however step changes were in a vast majority of cases due to a change of sensor or cable etc, and so by the time that question has been answered, the aircraft may have done several more flights.

The AAD system was always designed to support HUMS data integrity, but of course too many had their own agendas and commercial reasons for not integrating it. The big question was of course data ownership, and a manufacturer such as Meggitt were never going to willingly hand over data to Smiths which could be used to aid their HUMS systems development.

Sikileaks - The benefit of one global system and information sharing. Up in Aberdeen at one time the operators HUMS Managers were looking after anything up to 3 different HUMS systems. Great name by the way, I am nominating you for the Moniker of The year award!! :ok:

For the crew: Hand Salute! :ok:

For HC: thanks for your HUMS insights.

Aloha, for your HUMS points as well.

For sikileaks: thanks for that insight as well.

Once again the oil and gas industry lead the way:)
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/downloa...ndy_Dollin.pdf

And well done to the crew for compliantly following the flight manual.

TrisG
 

An operator can change the major modules of the gearbox on the "line" (i.e in a normal level maintenance facility as at Aberdeen), but you cannot disassemble the gearbox and inspect every component as you describe, for good reason however.

If you were to visit a gearbox overhaul facility you would be amazed at how sterile the environment is – it’s a temperature / humidity controlled "white coat and gloves" zone which is forensically clean. You would not wish to take a gearbox apart in anything other than that environment because in so doing, you introduce way more risk than the benefit from completing an inspection. All of the Aberdeen operators use specialist facilities to complete this work, two of them use Eurocopter.

The gearboxes and their components are managed closely, and the component “lives” (how many hours the components can operate for before inspection or retirement) are set at very conservative levels. The TBO (time between overhaul) for the EC225 main transmission is 2000 flight hours and given the average aircraft utilisation in Aberdeen , that’s an overhaul, and inspections just like the ones you describe, just about every year.

Hope that gives you some comfort.

Scots.

Oh...
 

....and Mr. Management.

From where i've been sat this last 72 hours there's been little that could be described as "leading" going on from your side...

Who rattled SM's chain?

Fair go on SM chaps. ;) The document does sayandWe all know how the industry (oil) leaps to the fore when coughing cash for safety.That'll be the day.

SM- Interesting albeit very top level ppt. Good to see that the quality of data is being addressed and I like the data mining and reasoning approach as long as it is implemented and supplemented by the judgement and expertise of the people with years of HUMS data interpretation experience.. The guys who ask questions that computers will never think of. There is a balance to be found and we are obviously still a long way from the end game, but very good to see that steps are still being made to drive technology along the road.

My original point which I didn't make clear though was taking this type of thing as a baseline, and given the advances in modern communications methods - Would it be unrealistic to envisage the guys back in Aberdeen being alerted to, and subsequently able to monitor live real time data events as they occur as is done in F1 racing? I know the distances between the vehicle and the groundstation are far greater, but then if we can have in-flight broad band available, why not??

Alloa

Great idea, real time HUMS data and even a live external camera into a helicopter operator's operations centre would be a step forward in my opinion. But there would have to be some boundaries established. The same camera feed to go to the cockpit to provide pilots with an external view.

Be careful with SM, he is not S.

Many people in other industries would be astounded if such were not being done now.

e.g. 1) Detroit diesel has for many years been monitoring prime mover engines on road trains operating all round OZ. Says one driver, 'once you get out of Queenslad where the hills are around Mt Isa and get to the flat barkly tableland in the Territory, all of a sudden the fuel pump settings would change and the 120 tonne truck would fairly leap ahead.' All done from head office via satellite.

2) A couple of years ago Caterpillar had sold a most ginormous brand new wheeled loader to an Argyle diamond mine contractor. One day it stopped. Mechanics from the agents all over OZ could not fix it no matter how hard they scratched the head. Finally someone rings caterpiller-merica.

Came the response. "Godamn, I caan't see it, where is it?"
'Well we pulled the axles out and dragged it into the big shed mate, eh!'

"Warrllll," says godamm, "you jus drag that there machine outta the shed where ah can see it and in twenty minutes it'll start."

and it did. cool eh?

One of the big issues we always faced was the level of information given to the Pilots in real time and how that was used in their decision making processes. Back then (10 years ago) the argument was that the warnings generated by HUMS were never considered reliable enough for a Pilot to decide on whether or not to ditch, however my view was always that HUMS data presented to the Pilot in real time (Such as a cockpit display) should be read in conjunction with other indications. I believe the general jist of the GE system perhaps provides better quality and granularity of data to be able to be used in such a fashion. That said there is always a scenario where something like a crack may become terminal before any other supporting indications become apparent, in which case, real time monitoring and support from base becomes crucial.

Perhaps a broad review of how HUMS is implemented is needed as much as the new technology. Maybe greater training - by which I mean train Pilots and all LAE's on the HUMS systems to a greater degree rather than have each company having a "Yoda" in the HUMS management office. Either that or expand the HUMS operation to more of a monitoring and control centre. It shouldn't need 24/7 user input staring at screens, but a method of alerting the user to events as they occur.

Incidentally.. in my scenario, we still need the "Yoda's" to oversee and manage the implementation :ok:

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/369...ml#post4865130
Would suggest a read of this thread again, seems we are on the roundabout regarding HUMS.

Who picks up the Bill for this one?

Bond, their Insurance Carrier, Eurocopter, or whoever it was that made the bad shaft (if not EC)?

What A/C are Bond using today for flights too Hummingbird and Beatrice A as thought all 225/L2 grounded:confused:

A139, might be from Dancopter?

Scots
 

Thanks for the response Scott - A lot of people are wondering why the gearbox on the heli in question wasnt investigated further?
We've been informed the pilot had reported some vibration anomalies on an earlier flight.

Some of us think a year is too long between inspections.

Thanks all the same.

Engineers arent sitting around in our place while the aircraft are flying. usually one or two on maintenance of some kind while others are working the line. not much time to be watching telemetry.

Since the oil/helicopter companies dont like paying for engineers as it is im not sure whos going to stump up for the extra people to expand the hums/telemetry dept.

shame though because its great those examples of detroit diesel and Caterpillar and also some luxury car makers do that too.

EC225 ditching May 2012
 

Yeh! there is a separate tank outside the MGB which contains Glycol, in the event of a main and emergency pump failure, the glycol or emergency lub system is selected which will lub the gearbox and hopefully get you back safely, think in this instance the oil and the glycol was coming out of the gearbox, and eventually the emergency lub system failed too, giving them no option but to ditch.

TrisG
 

Be assured, the gearbox, like the whole helicopter, is inspected at one level or another, daily. In fact, if you count the HUMS too, almost constantly.

I know there is a lot of discussion going on about how effective HUMS is, and clearly (like everything) the technology still evolves, but in truth it’s a powerful tool which helps engineers monitor the condition of critical components on an ongoing basis and helicopter flight is safer for it.

Next time you land, perhaps ask your helicopter company if they could offer you a few minutes to show you around engineering and tell you how the maintenance plans work. You’ll be comforted, whoever you are flying with.

Next time, won't you please wipe the drips of sarcasm before you hit the "submit reply" button? You got my screen all wet.

Tris:

Curious to know who "we", are? And by whom were you all informed (RE: the pilot reporting vibration anomalies)?
Sounds like a juicy bit of gossip there.

wire less

The Eurocopter 225 Glycol system is a loss system. It is only designed to work for 30 minutes at Vy (approximately 70-80 knots) which equates to the minimum horsepower going through the MGB. It did not fail, it did its job and allowed G-REDW go get closer to land. It undoubtedly contributed to the successful ditching.

This is not correct.

From the AAIB SB S2/2012:

I presume the "S" refers to "smart". It's something I think most, if not all, here would agree upon.It's a book of suggestions, not to be slavishly followed in all cases, which is where an aviators experience comes to the fore. Slavishly following manuals, SOPs etc have been the cause of past accidents. Being management with your head stuck where the sun don't shine you wouldn't be aware of that.

Heli

One only needs to read the GE AAD summary reports to know that it is only a minor improvement and others need to realize it is not capable of real time results.

As to pilot alerts the reg agencies forbid it for very good reasons.

TC

B73....read the statement very carefully....it said "indications of a failure" which does not mean the system actually failed.

My impression upon reading the AAIB report was the Glycol system worked...but Cockpit indications were it had failed. HC and others discussed the fallibility of the sensors associated with the glycol system and noted their TBO was halved after routine Engineering protocols determined the problems with them indicating properly.

I am sure HC shall set me straight if I am off in this.

I think the emergency lube becomes slightly irrevelant when you have an unsupported shaft loose in the gearbox. Metal was being made hence the chip caption. The only option here is to do what the Captain did. Emergency lube is for loss of oil, not for a catastrophic failure of a gearbox component. EC obviously thought that this would never happen otherwise you wouldn't put both pumps on the same shaft.

Nicely said Cyclic, that's the most sensible post I've read for a while...

teej5536
 

I work offshore. The "we" you refer to are the people who were present at the OIM's brief.
He was relaying information given to him directly from Bond via the operating company.
The chopper in question landed offshore (at our installation) on an earlier flight and reported some high vibration levels which were subsuquently relayed to the beach and the crew were informed they were within operating limits and it was safe to continue.

Thats all I know.

It amazes me how the shaft managed to break. Gearbox oil pressure, main and standbye, is not very high and I would not have thought that it would put any undue torque on the driveshaft. The early Pumas did not even bother with a pressure guage; they just had a light on the CWP. I presume they were standard gear pumps like 100,000s of car oil pumps which seem to go on for ever. I can see why EH thought it might never cause a problem.

HUMS in real time would not be a reality, near real time maybe and segmented data maybe but not true real time. You could have the system do some alerting to notify someone at the beach/ops center of a potential issue and may be able to do some spot or threshold monitoring but currently that would be about it.

A few other issues you would have to deal with and have been raised in other discussions is how much do you want someone from outside the aircraft making choices for those in it. Not only would you have to deal with a lot of decisions on what extent you want to go per your company guidelines you may also have to deal with government/operational area rule sets as well which may limit or prohibit this activity.

Then you have to deal with equipment. On a truck or piece of shore based equipment you have an unlimited amount of flexibility as to where you can place your antenna and the gear for the system and how it's wired up. With an aircraft you just can't do that. Not only do you have to get approval to add the gear, you may not have the proper real estate on the airframe to place it.

On top of that you have to judge satellite communication reliability. I would guess that most company's don't know what that is currently but I can tell you that at times it can be spotty and most days you will have at least 2 short periods of drop out of coverage (Iridium) . They are short but they will effect any and all data. In addition you can count on it that systems will loose connectivity and need to have power recycled and you will need a way to identify that the system is not sending data or good data and have the pilot intervention to try and correct the issue.

So a but off the main focus of the thread but some things to consider when talking about real time HUMS data.

just a small point for etouffee.

The coastguard utilise sat comms as well as some of the O&G fleet in aberdeen, so they are used.

All the talk of real time HUMS totally depends on the system recognising that there is a problem. If the failure is a first ever, how do you know what the symptoms will be?

If this a/c had "High Vibration" on an installation how could the beach possibly relay that it is within limits and to continue without seeing the a/c or checking the hums data ?

Exactly, and that shows both the power and the danger of "a little knowledge" and Chinese whispers!

Or maybe they checked the pilots' teeth fillings, and finding them still intact, with headsets having not fallen off, declared the aircraft to be serviceable.

I do have some sympathy with the offshore guys - we scare them witless with the Safety videos (aka disaster movies) before each flight, and we feed them just enough information for them to be frightened. Sometimes I think it would be better if we behaved like British Airways etc and just stonewalled any requests for information following minor events such as the one cited.

HC