Rotorspeed,
What accuracy should they have maintained? What were the dimensions of the primary and secondary protected areas for this initial approach segment? What Flight Technical errors, pilot reaction times and wind speeds were used when determining the turn radius and ground track? What descent gradient was assumed etc etc:ugh:

The simple fact that they hit the ground 1.36nm offset from the intended track - in this phase of the approach - shows that this procedure did not meet any normal design standard. If that does not constitute I don't know what does!

To put a perspective on it, there is a VOR procedure at a neighbouring airport here that has a 14nm outbound leg with a descent from 3500' to 2000', prior to a procedure turn. If you hit terrain 1.36nm at the end of that leg you would have tracked in error by 5.5° . Given that the normal tolerance for IR testing - not the procedure design - is 5°, do you think CFIT would be a reasonable outcome for a 0.5° error?

As an aside, it's easy to concentrate on the approach phase in isolation - what about the missed approach? Imagine climbing out from this missed approach point on one engine :\

And more importantly, who calculated the DH/MDH and based on what pressure setting?

The most dangerous thing about such approaches in my mind is the same mindset that prompts a pilot to carry one out in the first place will be the same mindset that keeps him going that bit further down the approach to get visual rather than throw it away.

I believe (stand to be corrected) that it was Radalt based as over the Lough. Calculated how? - anyone's guess!

212man

Given the local terrain in the S76 accident I fully agree that the GPS approach here did not meet any normal design standard, which meant high standards of accuracy were necessary. The pilots should have maintained an accuracy to keep themselves well away from the hills. With GPS a lateral tolerance of 250m could have been achieved. Had the approach been overlayed as a route on a moving map their error would have been obvious and probably avoided. This was not an example where the pilots were trying hard and did a good job endeavouring to fly the approach well - it was very casually undertaken, which was the problem. A published approach flown with similar attitude could have had similar consequences.

Your example of the 5 deg tolerance highlights the inaccuracy of a VOR approach compared with GPS. With a VOR or NDB approach a tolerance measured in degrees is all that can be used, and this results in a large tolerance at distance. A GPS approach will obviously have a spatial tolerance regardless of distance from the landing site and be far more accurate over most of the approach.

To be clear, I am not actually defending this S76 approach - just saying the reason this accident occurred was fundamentally poor piloting and CRM.

rotorspeed , ok then, we just need to super-pilots never doing little errors... :ugh:

The problem was flying that app in the first place, not a bad pilot performance.

There is a NEED for a margin, always. No matter how precise the aids are.

I've been in similar apps and I will not be there again. For me IMC over terrain = published IFR flight and app (or offshore ifr), if not, I don't want the job.

You will not get to the retirement doing that for ever...

Best regards
Aser

EASA ROA vs. private helicopter approach/takeoff in IMC under VFR
 

I'm augmenting this thread of to me (Austrian) very peculiar
"UK approaches" in IMC under VFR (IFR would need ATC guidance, publiced procedures, not?)

The Ballyedmond incident was an ac operating under private pilots rules, albeit conducted by CPLs, clearly in IMC, flying their own GPS guided approach to a private helipad.

A) Is any of that legal under EASA regulations?
If yes, what are the limitations, license- wearther-limits- or type-of-operation- wise.

B) Is it still legal under CAA ruling (G- reg, grandfathered, etc) ?

Thx, interesting read.

So, whats the EASA's current (2015) stance on IFR flights outsde controlled airspace, especially in IMC?

SERA.5015 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) - Rules Applicable to All IFR Flights

(a) Aircraft Equipment(b) Minimum Levels

it seems that is the phrase that is so abused since it is often argued that your descent below SAlt is part of the landing phase - hence self-positioning GPS letdowns, IMC with no idea what traffic or obstacles are in the way.

It would be a mistake to over-generalise; I'm not sure that many pilots would do that. Pre-recce/planning, ATC assistance and TCAS can all be used to minimise the risks.

The UK CAA will not allow you to write a PART-OPS operations manual that gives you as much operational freedom as the legislation. They insist you write something like:

Non-commercial ops, are currently outside this, but with PART-NCO/NCC on the way in, that may be tightening up too.